

Great Patriotic War: Unknown Won

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Moscow
massacre

Victory or defeat?

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"The Defeat of the Nazi Invaders near Moscow" — following this Oscar-winning propaganda film made in 1941, Soviet historians assessed the Battle of Moscow as an unconditional victory for the Red Army and a military disaster for the Wehrmacht. However, in recent years there has been more and more information that casts doubt on the old myths. Is it possible to consider "the defeat of the Wehrmacht" its organized planned retreat from the capital for 200 km? Was Stalin's victory "Pyrrhic", given the ratio of losses of at least 10 to 1 in favor of the Nazis? If the Red Army near Moscow "broke the back of the fascist beast" - how to explain the failures of the next year, 1942: the Kharkov disaster, the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Rzhev meat grinder and the Leningrad

blockade that claimed many millions of lives? And shouldn't the Battle for Moscow be renamed into the Battle of Moscow?

Answering the most "uncomfortable" and painful questions, this book restores the true history of one of the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War - without regard to propaganda clichés and ideological censorship. UDC 355/350

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INTRODUCTION

The battle for Moscow was a great test for the armed forces of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. The best troops and commanders were thrown into its crucible by both sides. As you know, the Soviet troops withstood the blow, and then drove the enemy away from the capital, the German troops suffered the first major defeat since the beginning of the Second World War.

The battle for Moscow is rightfully considered one of the most complex and multifaceted events of the Great Patriotic War, during which major political, military, economic, and psychological problems were simultaneously resolved by both sides. The Hitlerite leadership sought in practice to prove the viability of their blitzkrieg plan in the war against the USSR and once again to show the whole world the unbending power of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet leadership was practically brought to the brink of survival and was forced to mobilize all the material, human and ideological resources it had for defense. In order to achieve these global goals, the military leaders of both sides were given voluminous and complex tasks, the solution of which often went beyond the limits of Human capabilities. This led to cruel And bloody battles, huge human sacrifices to you. According to the number of those killed in battle, the battle for Moscow was

ONE of the bloodiest of all the years of the Second World War

Historians around the world have repeatedly considered the battle for Moscow in their writings. German - from the point of view of the failures of the Wehrmacht. Other Western ones - from the position of A. Hitler's miscalculations. Soviet - as proof of the superiority of the Soviet system and the courage of the Soviet people. Many

the Russians are like a poorly prepared and not entirely successful strategic battle of the Red Army.

All of them are right to a certain extent and flawed to a certain extent. In an effort to illuminate one side of such a large historical canvas, many unwittingly, and some deliberately, forgot about the second, no less bright and significant. As a result, the reader often received what can only be called fragments and does not give a complete picture of what happened.

For a more complete coverage of the battle for Moscow, it is necessary to consider from different positions and from different angles of view. Only then will it be possible to see all aspects of this historical phenomenon and identify the interrelations that played the role of decisive factors. Among these factors are troops, weapons, people, terrain, seasons, road conditions and much more, which in one way or another affects the course and outcome of any operation and battle.

At the same time, one must understand that the events that took place in the autumn of 1941 in the Moscow region cannot be considered in isolation from other events at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The blow to Moscow was not a fix-idea for A. Hitler and his inner circle, but a consequence of the defeats that the Red Army suffered before a new plan for a strategic operation called "Typhoon" appeared in the bowels of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. This plan was connected with the intention of the German leadership to end the war with the Soviet Union before the end of 1941 and Germany's unpreparedness for a longer war.

And this is not at all because, as some historians argue, Hitler was afraid of repeating the fate of Napoleon and was afraid of the vicissitudes of the Russian winter. Moreover, he knew that the cover of the Moscow direction, the Soviet

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the leadership has always paid special attention, and an offensive in this direction will hardly be able to solve the main economic problems of the war. But in pursuit of solving political and military problems, he decided to take such a risky step, throwing his main forces at Moscow. But the combination of completely objective factors did not allow the German troops to solve the tasks assigned to them and, for the first time since the beginning of the war, forced them to retreat a considerable distance and suffer tangible losses.

At the same time, the losses of the Soviet troops in the battle near Moscow significantly exceeded the losses of the enemy, and the strategic operation planned by the General Staff of the Red Army did not achieve its goals. During the defense and counteroffensive, the Soviet troops destroyed thousands of settlements in which

our compatriots lived, destroyed hundreds of enterprises, dozens of large railway and automobile bridges, many kilometers of hard-surfaced railways and automobile roads. As a result, the Smolensk, Bryansk, Oryol, Kalinin, Tula and Moscow regions suffered such losses that it took decades to replenish. There were also huge casualties among the civilian population. All this together gives a somewhat different color to the victory of the Soviet troops near Moscow in late 1941 and early 1942. |

However, one should not forget that victory over a strong opponent, as a rule, is not given immediately, but is forged gradually and starts small. As a result of the battle near Moscow, the Red Army won the first major victory over the enemy, under whose blows Warsaw, Oslo, Brussels, Paris, and Belgrade had already fallen. The capital of the Soviet Union turned out to be too tough for the Nazi generals, despite all their desperate attempts to take over this city.

Politicians determine the goals of the war, operations plan
Ruyut and are carried out by generals, officers die in battles and

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soldiers. A. Hitler wanted to take over Moscow in 1941, JV Stalin did not allow him to do this. But in order to solve the set political tasks, the major military leaders of both sides prepared and carried out a number of military operations, each of which became a separate page in the history of military art. The battles of formations, units, subunits and each individual soldier were not only an integral part of these operations, but something much larger, which often gives meaning to all human life.

The fate of Moscow on both sides was decided by specific people. Politically, Hitler failed at Moscow. In operational terms, the German generals turned out to be better prepared than the Soviet ones. In moral terms, in the battle near Moscow, the Soviet soldier defeated the German soldier, not allowing the impudent foreigner to triumph in Red Square.

And again the question arises - how to evaluate what happened near Moscow at the end of 1941? Some of the researchers, referring to the number of losses and the incompleteness of the offensive operation, write about the unsuccessful outcome of the battle near Moscow for the Soviet troops. Others, speaking of the failure of the German plan for a blitzkrieg against the USSR, argue that the Soviet command achieved a huge victory near Moscow. Still others are more restrained in their assessments of what happened, considering the battle of Moscow in the context of other events.

194] and 1942.

I also do not undertake to make categorical assessments. Having broken down a large problem into a number of component parts, I propose to consider it sequentially and draw a reasonable conclusion at each stage. Only the sum of pluses and minuses can give the result that characterizes the given phenomenon as a whole. But even at the same time, each reader reserves the right, on the basis of facts known only to him, to draw his own private conclusion, which may not coincide with the generally accepted one. This is quite understandable as

from the point of view of history, and from the position of a particular person.

Any war consists of battles. And battles consist of battles in which each person plays his own unique role and dies only once. Therefore, before the feat of an individual, everything else pales, and any victory in a great battle becomes only a consequence of this feat.

Learn *

In 1982, I entered the command faculty of the MV Frunze Military Academy, but in a group with a military history bias. We had to, having acquired a thorough knowledge in the field of operational art and tactics, acquire the skills of research and analysis of operations already carried out, including in the battle of Moscow. The scientific curator of our group was Colonel Boris Ilyich Nevzorov, Ph. separate ski battalion.

At that time, we first studied battles and operations in detail on the maps in the classroom, and then went directly to the location of the most important historical events in order to better link theory with practice. B. I. Nevzorov demanded careful preparation for each lesson, and already on the ground he supplemented our reports with numerous NM, facts known only to him. As a result, we did not just make excursions to the battlefields, BUT. to some extent, they themselves experienced many of their moments, assessed the quality of the decisions made, argued, Brought their own arguments...

| We traveled all those places near Moscow where fierce battles took place at the end of 1941 and the beginning of

1942. At the same time, B. I. Nevzorov was not content only with his and our work. For each lesson, he attracted retired officers who were direct participants in these events, organized visits to local museums, meetings with old people who survived the battles for their native village or city.

At the end of the whole cycle of studies related to the Battle of Moscow, a scientific conference was held at the department. General B.V. Panov always invited prominent Soviet military leaders to it, who participated in the defense and counteroffensive near Moscow and could significantly expand and supplement the overall picture of the events of that difficult time.

It is known that at that time all publications had to be built strictly in accordance with the "party line". But in the course of oral presentations by researchers and participants, such facts often "surfaced", which later we discussed with each other only in a whisper. True, this did not in the least diminish the significance of historical events, but on the contrary, it increased interest in them. And as it turned out, there were plenty of such "blank spots" during the Battle of Moscow.

In the spring of 1991, on the eve of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory, already being a teacher of the history of military art at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, I was sent to Naro-Fominsk, where there is a mass grave of soldiers 222- th Rifle Division of the 33rd Army of the Western Front, who fell during the liberation of this city. We were faced with the task of putting this burial in order and, if possible, clarifying the names of the soldiers and commanders buried there. There were about forty of them on the tombstone. But when we opened a meter layer of the earth, we saw many hundreds of unrecorded and nameless

human remains.

Employees of the Naro-Fominsk district committee of the party urgently arrived at the excavated mass grave. After its comprehensive review, it was decided to organize

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to conduct a thorough examination of the remains of soldiers in order to determine their identity. Already on the first day of the inspection, we found more than ten posthumous medallions, most of which contained notes with information about the owner. There was no doubt that in the future this work would yield positive results. Unfortunately, it had to be temporarily closed until the end of the Victory Day celebrations. Then came the summer holidays, followed by August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. More about the unexplored mass grave of Soviet soldiers

no one remembered in Naro-Fominsk ...

And only ordinary human indifference turned out to be able to do what the official authorities did not find the strength and means to do. On May 9, 2005, at the initiative of Colonel V. D. Leiman and with the financial support of V. M. Polyakov, Yu. E. Vasyutin, I. Sh. Ganbarov, V. D. Gorny, O. V. Dorofeev, V. M. Egudkina, V. V. Kovaleva, A. N. Kozhukhova, O. V. Koroleva, V. V. Logvinenko, S. M. Mashevsky, V. I. Myasoedov, O. D. Puzikova, A. G. Skoromny, Y. S. Khokhlov and I. V. Shchukina, by the work of architect Andrei Anisimov, next to the mass grave, a chapel in the name of the Holy Great Martyr George the Victorious was opened and consecrated. At present, it has become one of the centers of spiritual education for many residents of Naro-Fominsk.

There are hundreds of such mass graves in the vicinity of Moscow. And far from all the soldiers buried there have been identified to this day, indicated on tombstones and mourned by their relatives and friends. The year 1941 is moving further and further away every day, and living memory and human gratitude are being replaced by completely different concerns and feelings. The Borodino field dacha, generously watered with the blood of the defenders of Moscow in 1812 and 1941, is being irresistibly built up. Shamelessly, the land on which there are burials of Soviet soldiers of the period of the Great Patriotic War is being sold into private ownership. New owners, families, whose real estate and capital have long been far from Russia

eleven

these, these burials only interfere, and there is neither respect nor memory for them. New times bring forward new values. Gradually, the last participants in the Moscow battle are dying out.

History can be rewritten, new names and new facts can be written into it. But time will pass, and meticulous researchers will put everything in its place. Therefore, I believe that the Great Patriotic War, the Battle of Moscow and the names of its worthy participants will never disappear from the pages of the history of our Fatherland and the paths to the graves of those who gave their lives in the defense of the CAPITAL will never be overgrown.

MOSCOW DIRECTION
IN PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

Historians have several opinions regarding the exact date of the birth of the plan of attack on the Soviet Union by the top leadership of Germany. Some believe that [Germany began preparing for a war against the USSR almost immediately after A. Hitler came to power

ra in 1933. Others say that this happened much later, after A. Hitler and his inner circle saw that Western Europe, in particular England, was ready to put up with the aggressive aspirations of Berlin in order to achieve its political and economic goals. Still others, and there are also quite a few of them, claim that the Soviet Union itself caused Germany's aggression against itself, which was preparing to attack the Wehrmacht's army in the summer of 1941 of the year. The final point on this issue has not yet been set. But, based on historical facts, we can say that since the mid-30s, relations between the two countries, despite various political and economic overtures, were hostile, and the outbreak of World War II put an end to this issue.

Historians know that on June 25, 1940, already after Belgium, Holland, Poland, Denmark, Norway, France fell under the blows of German troops and the troops of England were thrown out of the mainland, at Hitler's headquarters forces of Germany, who received

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code name "Strike Force to the East". It is not difficult to guess which East was discussed. To the east of already occupied Poland was the Soviet Union.

The same idea was also reflected in the discussion of Germany's immediate military-political tasks at a conference that took place at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 31, 1940. On that day, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces F. Halder in his diary for- wrote: "Russia should be finished in the spring of 1941. The sooner Russia is defeated, the better. The operation makes sense only if we crush this state with one blow. Merely capturing operational space is not enough. Stopping in winter is fraught with danger. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to deal with Russia. ... So, May 1941, 5 months to carry out the operation... |

Purpose: the destruction of the life force of Russia. The subsection is divided into:

Attack on Kyiv with the adjoining flank to the Dnieper. Backlash waffe destroys crossings near Odessa.

A strike on the outlying states in the direction of Mo SKVA.

In conclusion - massive strikes from the north and south. Later - a private operation to seize the oil region of Baku "(Halder F. Military diary. Daily records of the chief of the General Staff of the ground forces 1939-1942. Vol. 2. -M ..., 1969. - S. 73-75).

True, the chief of the personal headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal V. Keitel, writes something completely different in his dying memoirs. He states: "When I returned from vacation on August 10, 1940, I was completely unaware of Hitler's new plans. All that I knew for sure was that hopes of a speedy end to the war with Britain should be finally abandoned. America with its unlimited resources loomed behind the Ostrovityans. The abandonment of the planned invasion in the fall of 1940 and its subsequent postponement to the spring of 1941 forced

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we should look for other ways to force England to conclude a peace agreement "(Keitel V. 12 steps to the scaffold ... - Rostov n / D: Phoenix publishing house, 2000. - P. 256).

Of course, in relation to the historical truth, the statements of V. Keitel are very doubtful, and, above all, when compared with other facts. And they say that at the end of June - the first half of July 1940, the general plan for the war of Germany against the USSR at the political and economic levels was finalized, and on July 21, the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, received a verbal order from A. Hitler on the development of the military part of this plan, that is, the concept of a strategic offensive operation using the armed forces (Philippi A. Pripyatskaya problem. - M., 1959. - P. 29).

The execution of this extremely secret task was entrusted to a small group of the best military staff specialists of the Wehrmacht. Their task was to, having made all the necessary calculations, reflect the Fuhrer's intention on maps graphically with a specific indication of groupings, the directions of the main attacks, the boundaries of the final and intermediate tasks, and the timing of their implementation. As a result of this work, it is necessary to clearly link the actions of the branches of the armed forces in terms of frontiers, time and methods of solving operational tasks. Every more or less educated military person is well aware of this work and knows that without it it is practically impossible to talk about any subsequent actions.

At the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces and the General Staff of the Ground Forces, this work was carried out for almost five months, from the end of JULY to the middle of December 1940. It is quite understandable that the discussion of individual issues of the concept of a strategic operation at Hitler's headquarters since then has been ongoing and it has become more and more clear-cut.

It is known that when developing the concept of a strategic operation, F. Halder proposed to inflict the main blow on

Moscow in the shortest direction from Belo

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Russia, having previously defeated the howl located there
ska.

The well-known German General G. Goth writes about this in his memoirs Tank Operations. At the same time, he notes that on July 31, 1940, when A. Hitler first presented his plan of war against the USSR to the highest generals, he stated that "operations should develop in two directions: the first - to Kiev (the flank adjoins the Dnieper) and the second - through the Baltic to Moscow. After that, the troops advancing from the north and south unite.

Thus, we can conclude that in the original plan of the war against the USSR, the strike on Moscow was considered in parallel with the strike on Ukraine as the main one. But the axis of this strike was to pass not through Belarus, but through the Baltic states, which at that time could become a good springboard for the concentration of non-German troops.

In writing, the concept of the operation was first presented to the Führer on August 5, 1940 in the form of the "Project of Operations in the East." Then this "project" as a result of the emergence of new considerations, changes in the political situation and the intervention of A. Hitler, underwent significant changes. However, his main idea - the attack by the main forces from Northern Poland and East Prussia on Moscow in order to destroy the opposing northern group of Russian troops - remained unchanged "(Got G. Tank operations. - M.: Voenizdat, 1961. - P. 34-36).

So, by the end of the summer of 1940, A. Hitler's decision to attack the USSR in the first half of 1941 took on its fairly clear outlines in the form of a plan for a strategic offensive operation with two main blows in the general direction of Moscow. But the events of the late summer and autumn of 1940 forced A. Hitler to seriously change his original plans.

On December 5, 1940, at a regular meeting devoted to the plan of attack on the USSR, the Fuhrer declared:

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The north should strive to encircle the enemy forces in the Baltic, so the central grouping should be strengthened so that it can be thrown to the north. Later we will decide whether to strike at Moscow or to the east of it ...
"This statement means

It began that, without changing his attitude towards the attack on Ukraine, the direction of the second main attack A. Hitler decided "instead of Moscow to aim to the north, in particular, to the Leningrad region, where he expected to link up with the Finnish troops. Consequently, the strike directly on Moscow became secondary (Military Historical Journal. 1991. No. 2. - P. 8-9; Top secret! Only for command! The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR. - M.: Science Publishing House ", 1967. - S. 148-149).

The Fuhrer's retreat from the original plan for the strategic offensive operation of the Wehrmacht was clearly manifested on December 17, 1940, when the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the armed forces reported to A. Hitler a draft directive on the Barbarossa plan. At that time, this project was not approved, since it was based on the operational plan of the OKH, which provided for the main attack through Smolensk on Moscow. Seeing this, the Fuhrer did not sign the document, stating:

"The Russian front must be broken through by the main forces on both sides of the Pripyat. After that, a large force of motorized formations should advance to the east, and then turn to the south and north. Motorized formations must turn to the north, if only to repel possible enemy counterattacks from the east. It is also necessary to quickly seize the coast of the Baltic Sea so that the Russian fleet cannot interfere with the delivery of iron ore to Germany from Sweden by

the Thai sea. If the Russian army quickly disintegrates, then the central grouping, simultaneously with the turn of Tom to the north, can launch an offensive against Moscow "(Got E. Tank operations. - P. 39).

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It was a plan according to which the economic and political aspects of the war against the USSR were placed above the military ones. But among the top generals of the Wehrmacht there were practically no economists and politicians. Therefore, among the military there were many supporters of inflicting the main blow on Moscow, as a result of which, as they believed, the internal disintegration of the Soviet state would occur. In particular, General G. Goth, linking this strike with the solution of the main task of the war, reasoned as follows:

"Did Hitler realize how he would end the war? Clausewitz, who participated in the war of 1812 on the side of Russia, takes Bonaparte under his protection when he is reproached for having penetrated too far into Russia. Russia is not a country that can really be fought for; occupy... Such a country can only be defeated by its own weakness and the action of internal strife. To get to these weak points of the poly-

The only way to achieve a real existence is through a shock that would penetrate to the very heart of the country. Only by reaching Moscow itself with a mighty impulse could Bonaparte hope to undermine the courage of the government, the steadfastness and loyalty of the people. In Moscow, he hoped to find peace, and this was the only reasonable goal he could set for himself in this war "(G. Got. Tank Operations. - P. 43).

But all this is nothing more than reasoning, and many of them were born after the end of the war. And then, in December 1949, the plan of the operation was developed and signed by Hitler, the implementation of which began on June 22, 1941 and in accordance with which the Soviet Union had to take on enemy strikes in all strategically important operational areas, including the Moscow .

Of course, A. Hitler, the High Command of the Armed Forces, the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the Main Staff of the German Air Force knew well that the Moscow direction in the military-strategic plans of the Soviet leadership had always played a leading role.

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Back in the 1920s and 1930s, when Poland was considered one of the main probable adversaries of the USSR in the West, the Polotsk, Minsk and Slutsk fortified regions were built in this sector to cover the western border. After 1939, when as a result of the "liberation" campaign the border of the USSR was pushed to the west, the construction of the Grodno, Osovets, Zambrowsky and Brest fortified regions began to cover this direction. And although Soviet researchers preferred not to recall these fortified areas after the end of the Great Patriotic War, for the sake of historical justice, it must be remembered that about 50 defense units were prepared within their boundaries, and the construction of more than 2,600 long-term structures (firing points) began. Of the total number of these defensive structures, on June 22, 1941, about 600 units were already completely ready, and the remaining 2,000, although they were under construction, could, if necessary, be successfully used as defensive lines when they were occupied by troops.

And there were a lot of troops in Belarus. On its territory were the troops of the Western Special Military District, commanded by General of the Army D. G. Pavlov (Chief of Staff, Major General V. E. Klimovskikh). The troops of this district included four combined arms armies (3rd, 10th, 4th, 13th), as well as a number of formations and units of district subordination. In total, they numbered 672,000 personnel, 2,556 tanks, over a thousand guns and mortars, more than 2,000 anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns,

almost 2 thousand aircraft (TsAMO, F. 208, op. 2589, d. 93, l. 5; f. 16A, op. 2951, d. 243, l. 228-231).

| Of course, while approving the plan for a strategic offensive operation against the USSR in mid-December 1940, A. Hitler could not have complete information about the

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the standing of defensive structures and the exact number of forces and assets in the Western Special and other military districts as of June 21, 1941. But he was well aware that inflicting the main blow on Moscow would not ensure the solution of the tasks that he put in the first place. That is why the plan of the military operation conceived by the Fuhrer differed significantly from that proposed by his generals.

At the same time, while preparing for a war against the USSR, A. Hitler knew that there was opposition to him in the ranks of the top generals and, perhaps, therefore, he did not immediately insist on his decision. Therefore, at the first stage of the strategic operation according to the Barbarossa plan, on the direction of Minsk - Moscow, the Army Group Center was concentrated, which, after the inclusion of the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth, became the most powerful of the army groups, operating on the Eastern Front. The most decisive tasks were set before it - the destruction of the troops of the Western Front on the territory of Belarus by encircling and then defeating its main forces on the outskirts of Minsk.

THE TRAGEDY OF GENERAL PAVLOV

The first strike of the German troops in the Moscow direction was to be received by the troops of the Western Special Military District, which on June 22, 1941 consisted of four combined arms armies (3rd, 10th, 4th, 13th), a number of formations and units of district subordination. These associations and units included 672 thousand personnel, about 2556 tanks (116 heavy, 126 medium and 2314 light), 10087 guns and mortars (3586 guns and howitzers, 1260 120-mm and 82-mm mortars, more than 2 thousand anti-tank guns and 190 76-mm anti-aircraft guns), 1909 aircraft (of which 424 are new) (TsAMO, f. 208, op. 2589, d. 93, l. 5; f. 16A, op. 2951, d. 243, l. 228-231).

This amounted to a quarter of all the troops concentrated in the western military districts. True, after the completion of the liberation campaign, the recruitment of personnel for the troops of the district was partially carried out at the expense of the population of Western Belarus (former Poland), which was more than cool towards the Soviet power.

The border troops stood guard over the western borders, which on the territory of Belarus were consolidated into the Central Border Detachments and numbered 19.5 thousand people. At the same time, the protection of the old border of Nica continued, where 5 border detachments served. This was due to the activation of Nosti's spy and bandit activities in the western regions of Belarus, disorderly

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population migration and the desire of the Soviet leadership to control the border area.

In front of the troops of the Western Special Military District, by June 1941, the enemy deployed a grouping consisting of 27 infantry, 5 tank, 3 mechanized, 1 cavalry divisions and 1 mechanized brigade. This grouping consisted of 595 thousand personnel, 823 tanks, 3185 guns, 4473 mortars, 2691 anti-tank guns, 678 anti-aircraft guns.

Thus, the German side outnumbered the troops of the Western Special Military District 1.8 times in artillery, mortars and anti-tank guns, and 4.2 times in the number of anti-aircraft guns. However, the German troops were inferior in terms of the number of tanks to the Soviet troops by 2.8 times and had approximate equality with them in aviation (Compiled on the basis of TsAMO, F. 16, op. 2951, d. 235, l. 86-109; d. 243, sheet 228-230; file 253, sheet 47-50; file 262, sheet 81-95).

This task was brilliantly solved by the command of Army Group Center. The troops of the Belarusian Special Military District (from June 22 - the Western Front), despite the fairly good preparation of the theater of operations and the availability of forces, at the beginning of the war were unable to build the first defensive operation. Formations of Army Group Center, acting on the flanks of tank groups, were able, within the first four days after the start of the war, not only to break through the defenses along the border line, but also to deeply envelop the Bialystok grouping of Soviet troops from the flanks.

On June 26 and 27, the forward detachments of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups, striking in converging directions, broke through to the outskirts of Minsk and captured the city. A large grouping of Soviet troops west of this city, consisting of six divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies, three divisions of the 13th army, two divisions of front subordination, as well as the remnants of other units and formations of the Western Front

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she was completely surrounded and by the beginning of July they were defeated. The first major breach in the Moscow direction was broken by the Wehrmacht surprisingly easily and quickly.

The losses of the Soviet troops in Belarus in the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War were enormous. Thus, in the book "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century", it is indicated that in the defensive operation in Belarus for the period from June 22 to July 9, 1941, the troops of the Western Front lost 341 thousand people without return (killed, captured and missing), 4799 tanks and 1777 combat aircraft (Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Statistical study. - M.: Olma-press, 2001. - P. 268).

According to a report to Hitler by Field Marshal F. von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, dated July 8, 1941, Soviet troops lost 287,700 people in the Bialystok and Minsk region alone as prisoners. In addition, German troops captured or destroyed 2585 tanks, [449 guns, 246 aircraft. At the same time, according to German data, the loss of personnel of Army Group Center in the period from June 22 to July 9, 1941 amounted to 6923 people killed, 1126 missing and 20.883 wounded.

At the same time, it should be noted that, in accordance with the records of F. Halder, the total number of losses of the German ground forces on the Eastern Front, as of June 30, 1941, was a little more than 41 thousand people killed and wounded (Halder F. Military diary. T. 3, book I. - S. 81). And since the general staff was counting the losses in all three directions of the main attacks, then, accordingly, in Belarus they could not differ significantly from those in the Ukraine and the Baltic states. And this means that in the zone of the Western Front in the first week of the war, the Germans could lose about 13-15 thousand people killed and wounded, that is, 16-17 times less than the defending Soviet troops. And this is with the existing balance of forces and means and the preparation of the theater of military operations.

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In the historical literature of the Soviet period, the entire burden of blame for the defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus is assigned to the command of the Western Front, which showed confusion and could not organize the command and control of subordinate troops in the framework of the first defensive operation.

At the same time, few people remember that on the very first day of the war, two (out of five available) marshals of the Soviet Union were sent to the headquarters of this front at once - the former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G. I. Kulik. But, as G.K. Zhukov writes, already on June 26, the Headquarters of the Civil Code became aware that

that the first fell ill, and the second "it is not known where." Therefore, in despair, I. V. Stalin decides to immediately call to Moscow the current Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, who at that time also unsuccessfully "saved" the position of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In order to understand such an unclear situation, Comrade Zhukov, who had just arrived in Moscow, asked for forty minutes (!!!).

To solve such a difficult task in accordance with the latest conditions of the situation to a major "strategist". G.K. Zhukov did not need to get in touch with the representative of the Stavka on the Western Front, nor with the headquarters of the Western Front, nor with the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It was enough to go into the next room with the clearly bewildered People's Commissar of Defense Mar

shalom of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko and replace

by the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, in order to understand that the situation on the Western Front was "really exceptionally difficult." And on this basis, G.K. Zhukov immediately decides on the transition of the troops of the Western Front to the defense at the turn of the Western Dvina River and the cities of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Mozyr using not only the second echelon of the front (13th Army) , but also four new armies (19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd). In addition, it was decided to "urgently begin preparing defense

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on the rear line along the line Selizharovo - Smolensk - Roslavl - Gomel by the forces of the 24th and 28th armies of the Headquarters reserve. In addition, we proposed to form another 2-3 armies at the expense of divisions of the Moscow militia. (Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. - M.: Voen izdat, 1970. - P. 256).

. Marvelous. The strategic decision to create two lines of defense and deploy seven armies on them is made by three military leaders, one of whom has just arrived from the airfield. Nevertheless, "all these proposals were approved by I. V. Stalin," although at that time, according to G. K. Zhukov, "where the enemy would be stopped ... we did not yet know."

Despite this, at 10:05 a.m. on June 27, Georgy Konstantinovich summoned the chief of staff of the Western Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Klimovskikh, to the Bodo apparatus and ordered him to "urgently search for all units" and cover the Minsk fortified area. But, as you know, it was not possible to accomplish this, and "on the evening of June 28, our troops retreated from Minsk ... The Headquarters and the General Staff took the news that our troops had left the capital of Belarus ..." (Zhukov G.K. Remember knowledge and reflection, p. 58).

- June 29, 1941 furious with the surrender of Minsk

JV Stalin twice visited the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Headquarters of the High Command and demanded explanations from the military. But, apparently, they could not answer anything intelligible. G.K. Zhukov himself also prefers not to remember the period from June 27 to 30. Only at 06:45 on June 30, at the direction of S. K. Timoshenko, did he contact the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D. G. "to take no decision on the Western Front, not knowing what is going on in the areas of Minsk, Bobruisk, Slutsk." G.K. Zhukov Once again demanded "as soon as possible to gather all the forces of the front and bring them into proper condition" in order to "in no case prevent a breakthrough of units

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enemy in the area of Bobruisk and in the area of Borisov. But by that time, the command of the Western Front no longer had the strength or means to solve this problem.

On June 30, 1941, due to miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, Generals D. G. Pavlov and V. E. Klimovskikh were removed from command of the front troops. Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko was appointed the new commander of the Western Front, and General G. K. Malandin was appointed chief of staff. L. Z. Mekhlis, head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, People's Commissar of State Control, member of the Central Committee and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, is appointed a member of the Military Council of the Western Front.

On July 6, D. G. Pavlov was arrested. Details of this arrest can be found in Ivan Stadnyuk's book "Confessions of a Stalinist" with a reference to its direct participant, the former head of the Special Department of the 10th Army's mechanized corps, at that time Captain I. G. Goiko.

In particular, this officer, whom I. Stadnyuk met in Odessa after the war, said that on or about July 5 or 6 he was temporarily in the reserve of the Special Department of the Western Front in the dacha district of Gnezdovo near Smolensk. At that time, he was summoned to the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NPO, Mikheev, who had arrived from Moscow. Mikheev ordered to take weapons and follow him in two cars to the Dovsk area. In the cars were also the secretary of Mekhlis with the rank of brigade commissar, Mikheev's assistant. Before leaving, Mikheev announced that the purpose of the trip was the arrest of the former commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov. According to some reports, on that day he was supposed to be in the Dovsk region, and Mikheev was very afraid that he would not be in the hands of the Germans.

The group arrived in Dovsk around eight o'clock in the morning. We stopped at a crossroads. Mikheev and others entered the building of the communications department, and Goiko was instructed to observe

give for the crossroads. There was practically no traffic on these roads, and only after 30 minutes away from

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From the side of Orsha a single passenger car appeared. In the car, next to the driver, sat General Pavlov, and behind him was his assistant.

Pavlov rather rudely asked why they stopped the car.

"You are invited to go to the checkpoint," Goiko replied.

"There is no command post here," the general retorted.

At that moment, Mikheev, the secretary of Mekhlis, quickly left the post office building and approached the car. They invited Pavlov to enter the building, where they announced his arrest.

Then Pavlov was taken to Smolensk, where they arrived at approximately 4 pm. The arrested man was taken to the office of the head of the NKGB, where a few minutes later L. Z. Mekhlis entered. With his characteristic harshness and intemperance, he attacked the former commander, allowing such words as "scoundrel", "scoundrel", "traitor", "you opened the front to Moscow for the Germans."

Pavlov, sitting in an armchair, tried to object. But Mekhlis did not listen to him. He spoke to himself and heard only himself. By order of Mekhlis Pavlov, they searched.

Further, I. G. Goiko writes: "After the departure of Mekhlis and other Pavlov, remaining with me, he began to express his indignation at the fact that Mekhlis called him a "traitor" and "traitor". At the same time, he admitted his guilt for the unpreparedness of the district troops to repel the attack of the Nazi troops, despite the warning of the people's commissar of defense the day before, for the loss of almost all aviation at border airfields at the start of the war, for the failure and loss of communication between the district headquarters and the armies. and formations of troops on the first day of the war, which led to the loss of control of the troops and ignorance of the situation on the Border.

In a conversation with me, he often repeated: "I am guilty and must bear responsibility for my guilt, but I am not a traitor and not a traitor" (I.F.

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So, the main culprit of the military failures of the Red Army on the territory of Belarus at the beginning of the Great Patriotic

stvennoy war found. It was General D. G. Pavlov, who then suffered a "deserved" punishment. At the same time, it must be understood that the personality of this person never met the requirements that were presented to him at the beginning of the war.

Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov was born on October 23 (November 4), 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kologrivsky district, Kostroma province, into a peasant family. He graduated from a rural school and a city school, and in the fall of 1914, at the beginning of the First World War, he was called up for military service. During the two years of the war, he rose to the rank of senior non-commissioned officer, and was awarded three awards for military distinctions. But in the battle near the Smokhode River in 1916 he was seriously wounded and captured. He returned to his homeland in January 1919.

By that time, the Civil War was already raging in the country. 21-year-old Dmitry had no time, and no need to understand the difficult political situation. It was necessary to quickly adapt to the conditions of the new time. And in the spring of 1919, he joined the ranks of the Red Army, in December of the same year, hastily graduating from the Kostroma infantry courses, he held the positions of platoon commander, commander of a cavalry squadron, assistant commander of a cavalry regiment on the Southern, Southwestern and Turkestan fronts.

In 1922, after graduating from the Omsk Higher Cavalry School, D. G. Pavlov was left in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1928 he graduated from the MV Frunze Military Academy and was appointed commander of a cavalry regiment. For his courage and skillful leadership of his subordinates during military operations in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, he receives the Order of the Red Banner.

me.

But in the early 1930s, the emphasis in the development of the Red Army was placed on the mechanization and motorization of troops. Therefore, in 1931, D. G. Pavlov graduated from academic courses

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at the Military Technical Academy (in the future - the Military Academy of Armored Forces) and was appointed commander of a mechanized regiment, and in 1934 - a mechanized brigade.

In 1936-1937, D. G. Pavlov was the commander of a tank brigade, then a tank group in Spain. For the skillful leadership of the troops and personal courage on June 21, 1937, he was awarded the title [Hero of the Soviet Union. In the future, the Spanish experience will make him one of the most promising military leaders of the Red Army.

Upon returning to his homeland, D. G. Pavlov was appointed deputy, and from December 1937 head of the Avtobro-

non-tank management of the Red Army with the assignment of the military rank of commander. He supervised the formation of mechanized formations: mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions, individual tank regiments. He dealt with the issues of training tank commanders, the development of manuals, manuals and instructions for the combat use of armored forces in operations and battles. For the purpose of inspections, G.D. Pavlov traveled several times to the area of the Soviet-Finnish war, but, of course, he did not take a direct part in the hostilities.

In June 1940, Colonel General of the Tank Forces D. G. Pavlov was appointed commander of the Belorussian (Western Special) Military District, which significantly expanded its borders to the west in connection with the annexation of Western Belarus in 1939. It is believed that under his leadership, plans were developed to cover the state border with formations of the Western Special Military District and their actions in the event of an invasion by fascist Germany, the operational equipment of the theater of military operations and the training of troops was carried out. But in early January 1941, playing for the "Reds", he lost the operational game to G.K. Zhukov, exposing his troops under the flank attacks of the "enemy". Despite this, he was awarded the rank of General of the Army.

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G. K. Zhukov, becoming Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in mid-January 1941, did everything possible to ensure that the strategic plan for covering the new border of the USSR, developed by his predecessor, General K. A. Meretskov, was not approved by I. V. Stalin. This led to the fact that such an important document was received by the district troops only at the beginning of May 1941. After that, on its basis, in a very short time, it was necessary to develop plans for armies, corps, divisions, that is, all those who were to directly cover the border. D. G. Pavlov and his staff could not complete this work by June 22 in full.

On the evening of June 21, 1941, the premiere of the Moscow Art Theater, which first came on tour to this city, was to take place in the Minsk district House of Officers. The tour opened with the play "Anna Karenina" with Alla Tarasova in the title role. Almost all the republican, city and military leadership gathered for the premiere...

After the end of the first act of the play, Corps Commissar A. Ya. Fominykh, a member of the District Military Council, decided to go to the headquarters to find out the news. On the second floor, he met the district chief of staff, who happened to be at his desk that Saturday evening.

— Vladimir Efimovich! Why aren't you on Anna? —

Fomin asked.

- You know, Alexander Yakovlevich, something is disturbing in my soul,
- answered V. E. Klimovskikh. - I called the 3rd and 10th armies. It is reported that the border guards and some advanced units hear noise in different places ...

The chief of staff was silent for a moment and shrugged his shoulders in bewilderment.
chami.

- Yes, something has been happening lately... noise began to be noted on the western banks of the Biebrzh, Nareva, Bug... Fresh trenches... He gave instructions: to continue surveillance and be ready... I called the General Staff... reports to the operational duty officer... He asked for permission to raise troops. The attendant, after talking with someone, replied:

thirty

"It is not allowed to raise troops. Don't be provocative...

A few minutes later, the commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, arrived at the headquarters and, turning to V. E. Klimovskikh, asked about the news. The chief of staff began to report on the ongoing noises and minor sabotage on the border, but a call on the HF telephone interrupted his report. The commander jumped up to the apparatus, picked up the receiver. On the other side of the wire was the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko.

Pavlov briefed him on the situation at the border. The people's commissar gave instructions, to which the commander only replied "I obey!", "Understood!", and at the same time made some notes in a notebook. Finally, D. G. Pavlov said, apparently in response to Timoshenko's question: "I consider it necessary to raise troops, to move formations to the frontier according to plan." But, apparently, on the other end of the wire they had a different opinion, and Pavlov again switched to "Yes!" and "I'm listening."

After talking with Moscow, Pavlov slowly put the receiver on the phone and, turning to V. E. Klimovskikh, said quietly:

— Vladimir Efimovich! Tell the commanders to be at headquarters. Do not raise troops. I give permission to raise only duty units... I repeat, only duty units, but no more. Explain it. Tell all the chiefs of staff, intelligence officers, operators that all reports be rechecked, otherwise we will provoke them. Let them report all the time and keep us informed of all events. Fire, fire so that they do not open without permission

NIA.

- What comes out, Dmitry Grigorievich, is this a war? —

asked the member of the Military Council.

"War, war!.. They cackled..." the commander answered nervously. We have been talking about this for years, but there is no war! And if there is a war, then what? Scared?

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This tone of the commander's answers puzzled many. It was clear that Pavlov was upset. But, knowing his character, it was useless to talk to him, who was "out of sorts". He nervously threw someone a phone call: "Yes ... act according to the situation" (Stadnyuk I.F. Confession of a hundred lineist. - M.: Patriot, 1993. - P. 353-355).

Based on these instructions from the commander, at 23.50 on June 21, 1941, by order of the chief of staff of the district, commanders, chiefs of staff and some chiefs of services were summoned to the headquarters of the armies covering the state border. At the same time, no specific orders were issued by the district headquarters, except for "everyone to be in place", was not given.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the enemy attack for the troops of the Western Special Military District turned out to be sudden. The belated exit to meet the advancing enemy forced the Soviet troops to engage in battle on the move, in parts. On the directions of the aggressor's strikes, they failed to reach the prepared lines, which means that they did not succeed in a continuous front of defense. Encountering resistance, the enemy quickly bypassed the Soviet units, attacked them from the flanks and rear, and tried to push his tank divisions as far as possible into the depths. The situation was aggravated by sabotage groups dropped by parachute numbering from several dozen to two hundred people, as well as submachine gunners on motorcycles rushing to the rear, which disabled communication lines, seized bridges, airfields, and other military installations. Small groups of motorcyclists fired indiscriminately from machine guns in order to give the defenders the appearance of being surrounded. With ignorance of the general situation and loss of control, their actions violated the stability of the defense of the Soviet troops, causing panic. Many rifle divisions of the first echelon of the armies were dismembered from the very first hours, some were surrounded. Communication with them was interrupted. On the first day of the war, the headquarters of the Western Front did not have a wired connection even with the armies, let alone with formations, it was intended

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for the direct defense of the state border.

D. G. Pavlov and his staff in the first days of the war were feverishly

but tried to restore command and control of the troops with the aim

creation of a united front of defense on one of the most advantageous

frontiers. But the formations and units of the covering armies retreated so quickly that German tanks appeared on the planned lines earlier than the retreating Soviet units. The front commander even tried to carry out a counterattack, but the hastily assembled counterattack group also turned out to be incapable of combat.

The position of the troops of the Western Front inexorably continued to deteriorate. A map captured from the enemy on June 25 with the location of his troops testified to the intention of the German command to surround the troops of this front with an exit to Minsk from the north- and south-west. Marshal Shaposhnikov, who was with the front headquarters in Mogilev, turned to the General Headquarters with a request to immediately withdraw the troops. Moscow gave its go-ahead. However, as it turned out pretty soon, this decision was too late.

Thus, the first frontline defensive operation in the Moscow direction by the Soviet troops was not only lost, but lost with a truly devastating score. As a result of the failures of the troops of the Western Front and the capture of Minsk by the enemy in the first week of the war, Generals D. G. Pavlov, V. E. Klimovskikh and some other senior officials of the Western Front were arrested, tried by a military tribunal and were shot.

Thus, one of the first strategic defensive operations of the Red Army, which later received the name Belorussian, ended. For 18 days, the troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were completely lost, the remaining 20 lost from 30 to 90% of their composition. The total losses were calculated in huge numbers - 417,790 people, of which without

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return - 341,073 people, 4,799 tanks, over 4,000 guns and mortars, and 1,777 combat aircraft. The rear of the front lost 1,766 wagons of ammunition, more than 17,500 tons of fuel, 2,038 tons of lubricants, 60% of food and fodder supplies, and all stocks of clothing items designed for 370,000 people. Leaving almost all of Belorussia, the troops of the front withdrew to a depth of 600 km.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 25th RIFLE CORPORATION
IN THE VITEBSK REGION

The sixth issue of the journal "Military Historical Archive" published a report of the Chief Military Prosecutor to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR L. Z. Mekhlis dated September 27, 1941, compiled on the basis of materials from an investigation into the hostilities of the 25th Rifle Corps in the Vitebsk region in the period from 10 to 20 July 1941. Undoubtedly, the current reader has already formed his own negative opinion both about Comrade L. Z. Mekhlis and about the investigations of the military prosecutor's office of that period. In part they are fair, and I do not intend to convince them otherwise in this book. But the facts presented in this memorandum speak volumes. I offer separate fragments of this document and small comments on it.

On July 1, 1941, the 25th Rifle Corps, consisting of three (127th, 134th and 162nd) rifle divisions, was transferred near Vitebsk from the Donbass (it was formed in the city of Stalino, today's Donetsk). Consequently, in its composition it could have about 45 thousand people of personal

composition, about 400 guns and mortars of 76-mm and higher caliber, about 150 45-mm anti-tank and about 50 37- and 76-mm anti-aircraft guns, up to 1500 vehicles, about 300 tractors. This is not counting machine guns, rifles, carbines, means of communication, horses ... Major General S. M. Chestokhvalov, chief of staff of the corps, was entrusted with managing all this complex combat economy

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Colonel Vinogradov and Brigadier Commissar Kofanov.

Of course, someone will object to me, stating that it is unlikely that the formations of this corps were staffed and equipped according to the wartime states (state 04/400 of 04/05/1941). But it must be borne in mind that the 25th Rifle Corps began to be transferred from its places of permanent deployment after it was replenished with people called up from the reserve. It could be replenished with weapons both during the formation period and along the way and directly on the spot. There were plenty of military depots along the Dnieper line. I also admit that the regular set of heavy weapons and ammunition was not complete, but we'll see further.

Upon arrival in Kyiv, the corps commander received a combat mission to take up defense along the Western Dvina River from Vitebsk to the city of Sourzh-Vitebsky on a front of about 70 kilometers. Undoubtedly, the standards were somewhat higher than the pre-war ones. The rifle division accounted for up to 23 kilometers of the front of defense. But at the same time, one must understand that the divisions had to defend across the river and for each kilometer of the defense front there were up to 15 machine guns, about 6 guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and above, several anti-tank guns, as well as several hundred infantrymen armed with rifles. And

carbines. Theoretically, it is quite possible to maintain the defense with such forces, especially since not all approaches to the river are equally accessible to enemy tanks and infantry. It only remained to organize it correctly, and then promptly control the subordinate formations of the mission units in battle. But the materials of the investigation tell a completely different story.

"The loading and dispatch of parts by rail from Kyiv took place on July 2-4. There was no management of the loading and advancement of the units, as a result of which the arrival of the echelons was not coordinated with the upcoming performance of combat missions. Nevertheless, by July 11, in the area of \u200b\u200bconcentration of the corps (north of the city of Vitebsk

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near the village of Mishutki) arrived the headquarters of the corps, the 442nd cavalry, 515th, 162nd and 738th rifle regiments, as well as the 410th light artillery regiment, the division of the howitzer artillery regiment and the 263rd separate communications battalion. Somewhat to the right of the corps headquarters in the area of the village of Prudniki is the headquarters of the 134th rifle division, as well as two rifle battalions from the 629th and 738th rifle regiments, a communications battalion, one division of a howitzer artillery regiment, and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion.

As is known, the flank movement of large masses of troops is always fraught with great dangers and must be clearly coordinated with the advancement of other formations carried out from the rear to the front and from the front to the rear (evacuation). First of all, the occupation of the most remote lines is organized, and then the near ones. In addition, each line is primarily occupied by the forward detachment, reinforced by sappers and artillery, and then the main forces of the formations move there as they arrive. From the beginning of deployment, enemy reconnaissance is organized in the defense zone, the command posts of all formations are advanced there, and communications are established with all the defense zones and sectors. And again we see that the set of forces that carried out the advancement in the first echelon of the 134th Infantry Division was sufficient to fulfill the tasks of the first stage in the absence of direct contact with the enemy.

On July 1] the forward battalions of the divisions took up defense along the western bank of the Western Dvina, the rest of the units along its eastern bank. But on this day, the defense sector occupied by two battalions of the 501st Infantry Regiment was attacked by "enemy motorized mechanized units of unknown number (reconnaissance was absent) and broke through the Western Dvina to the Vitebsk-Smolensk and Vitebsk-Surazh highways. The indicated two battalions, having no overlying leadership, fled in a panic. Overwhelmed by the panic of the "encirclement", on the night of July 12, the headquarters of the corps began to change its location. By 16.00 July 12

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corps commander Major General Chestokhvalov with a group of staff commanders and a communications battalion, leaving part of the vehicles, arrived at the command post of the 134th rifle division in the village of Prudniki. Their arrival immediately caused panic in parts of the division, since those who arrived, including Chestokhvalov himself, spoke in panic about the losses allegedly inflicted by the Germans on units of the 162nd Rifle Division, their bombardment from the air, etc. By 17:00 on the same day, Major General Chestokhvalov reported that enemy mechanized units had broken through in the Vitebsk region and were moving along the Vitebsk-Surazh highway, and that "the headquarters was surrounded", and ordered the corps units to retreat to the east, abandoning western bank of the Western Dvina of the 134th Rifle Division.

Comments: Having correctly organized combat support along the western bank of the Zapadnaya Dvina River and deploying the main forces on its eastern bank, the corps commander did not take care of the interaction of these forces. The bridge was not reliably covered by infantry and artillery and was not preparing for an explosion. Enemy reconnaissance was not carried out. An enemy breakthrough in one direction led to panic among the leadership of the corps, which began to spread to the troops.

"After the orders of the corps commander Chestokhvalov to retreat, a stampede to the east began. The first to run was the corps headquarters and the 2nd echelon of headquarters 134-1 sd, led by the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Svetlichny, who had been absent from the command post since July 9 - "lag behind" and only by the time of withdrawal on July 12 arrived in the village of Prudniki. Motor vehicles without leadership in a panic rushed east to the town of Jankovich ... [On July 3, the corps headquarters stopped at the town of Yankovich, but on July 14 it moved into the forest near the village of Ponizovye, abandoning all control of the corps. Following the example of the headquarters of the corps, military units scattered without offering any resistance to the enemy, abandoning their materiel and equipment.

Comments: The corps began to withdraw from its positions without an order from above, not only without entering into contact

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confrontation with the enemy, but without understanding the real situation. The elementary rules of withdrawal were violated: withdrawal routes, intermediate lines and forces for their occupation, the final line of withdrawal of troops were not determined, the withdrawal of heavy equipment, artillery and the removal of other military property was not organized, there was no organization of communications at the stage of withdrawal. All this, of course, led to the fact that the departure is practically

immediately took on the appearance of a stampede.

And yet, in the area where the headquarters of the corps was located, "by the end of the day on July 14, the following were concentrated in the forest: the 515th joint venture, the 410th paws, the battalion of the 738th joint venture of the 134th SD, two divisions of the 567th paws of the 127th SD, one battalion of the 395th joint venture of the 162nd rifle division and small units of other units, about 4,000 people in total, armed with rifles, machine guns, grenades, artillery, mortars with ammunition reserves. The commander of the corps, Major General Chestokhvalov, the commissar of the corps Kofanov, the head of the political department of the corps, regimental commissar Lavrentiev, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Vinogradov, and other senior commanders, about 30 people in all, were also there. "The chief of staff of the 134th Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel Svetlichny, came running here in the evening on July 14 disguised in civilian clothes, without personal weapons. The corps commander Chestokhvalov made a decision: without waiting for the rest of the corps to approach, continue to retreat to the east, advancing only in forests and only at night, without entering into resistance with the enemy, categorically forbidding to shoot at the Germans. The cowardice of the corps command reached the extreme. On the orders of the corps commander, Colonel Vinogradov tried to shoot the driver of one of the motor vehicles of the convoy, who accidentally had a short circuit horn. He immediately personally smashed the signal horns in all the vehicles so that an accidental horn would not be repeated and the location of the headquarters column would not be given out to the enemy. This is how they moved on July 14, 15 and 16."

Comments: Even after fleeing the battlefield, the corps commander, despite a certain presence of forces and

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funds, did not make any efforts to consolidate at the achieved line in order to collect the rest of the units on it and organize defense. The subsequent withdrawal of the corps headquarters was carried out solely with the aim of saving their own lives at any cost.

The final part of the report is devoted to the actions of individual commanders of the 25th Rifle Corps during their stampede to the east. When a staff column of 10-12 passenger cars, accompanied by an armored car, ahead of other columns, late in the evening, at the entrance to the village of Rypshevo, ran into a small detachment of German intelligence officers ("according to eyewitnesses, there were about 10 intelligence officers ...), who led the motorcade in the first car, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Vinogradov, without stopping the car, drove through and jumped out of the village. The commander of the corps, Major General Chestokhvalov, who followed him in the second car, stopped the car, threw down his personal weapon, raised his hands and went to the Germans.

After that, the rest of the commanders and political workers

headquarters of the corps, the drivers of the cars "abandoned their cars, documents and everything that was, and without a single shot they scattered through the bushes." Subsequently, they continued to make their way to the east in small groups and one by one. Some of them, if possible, took off their military uniforms and disguised themselves as "collective farmers", some destroyed personal and party documents. As a result of such a "withdrawal", many groups and individual servicemen died or were captured by the enemy, others simply fled.

Thus, the troops of the 25th Rifle Corps, which were supposed to defend along the Western Dvina River in the Vitebsk region, "shamefully fled, opening the way for the enemy to advance to the east, and subsequently, being surrounded, lost most of their personnel and materiel. ". The corps, which consisted of three divisions, practically did not accept the battle, ceased to exist. At the request of the chief military prosecutor, the court

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The corps chief of staff Colonel Vinogradov, his assistant lieutenant colonel Stulov, corps commissar Kofanov, chief of corps political affairs regimental commissar Lavrentiev, corps artillery chief lieutenant colonel Glushkov, and chief of staff of the 134th rifle division Svetlichny were handed over to the military tribunal. The commander of the corps, Major General Chestokhvalov, who surrendered, was convicted in absentia.

It must be understood that, in offering the reader this memorandum, I am not at all "spitting saliva" in an effort to show the extremely low moral and combat qualities of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. There were examples of staunch defense of formations and units, examples of the personal courage of soldiers and officers. But there was something else. Only when small groups of motorcycle reconnaissance of the enemy appeared did they leave their positions and whole units scattered. Army corps and divisions sometimes defended individual settlements for quite a long time, but practically did not conduct field defense at intermediate lines of withdrawal. Without a fight, often even before the approach of large enemy forces, bridges over water barriers remained unexploded. The Central Military Archive of the Ministry of Defense does not contain a single plan of a defensive operation developed not only by the headquarters of the Western Front, but also by the headquarters of its armies. One gets the impression that the higher headquarters lived their own lives, while the troops subordinate to them acted independently. And, as a result, the encirclement and defeat in the first half of September 1941 of the main forces of the Southwestern Front in the Kyiv region !!! Think about it - THE FRONT: hundreds of thousands of people, a huge amount of artillery, tanks, aircraft ... Why were our commanders at the same time? Ge was that notorious Soviet military art, the advanced nature of which was customary to talk about for many years?

Returning to the defeat of the 25th Rifle Corps in the Moscow direction in July 1941, I also cannot help but note that a number of commanders and fighters of this unit, despite the cowardice of command, survived

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Neil fidelity to military duty. Quite a lot of groups with light weapons came to the location of the Red Army. And the head of the 5th department of the headquarters of the 134th rifle division, captain Baranov, having gathered under his command up to a thousand people, being tied up by a large number of wounded and the property of the division, did not give up command of his group. He took up all-round defense in the forest, organized reconnaissance and, having waited for the arrival of a detachment of Lieutenant General I.V. .

AT THE BORDER OF THE DNEPER

At the beginning of July 1941 1999, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko took command of the troops of the Western Front. The reserves of the Headquarters of the Civil Code were sent to this front, from which new formations and formations were hastily formed. The influx of fresh forces was so powerful that by July 10, 1941, the Western Front of the new composition had 65 divisions, 580 thousand people, 6900 guns and mortars, 1300 tanks, 380 aircraft. In the presence of such a quantity of forces and means, relying on the Dnieper, the Soviet command expected to stop the enemy's offensive in the Moscow direction.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership took steps to cover up the Moscow strategic direction. Already on June 25, 1941, that is, on the 4th day of the war, the Headquarters of the Civil Code ordered the deployment of the second strategic echelon consisting of the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies along the line of the Western Dvina-Dnepr rivers. The control of these troops was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M.

On June 27 and 28, that is, on the 6th and 7th days of the war, the Headquarters of the Civil Code ordered the deployment of three more reserve armies (16, 24 and 28th). These formations received the task of "preventing the enemy's penetration of Va in the direction of Moscow, destroying it

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powerful counterattacks by ground troops and air strikes" (TsAMO, f. 9ba, op. 1710, d. 1, l. 1-2).

However, the defeat of the troops on the territory of Belarus forced the Stavka | On July, transfer the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies to the Western Front, first entrusting the command of its troops to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, appointing S. M. Budyonny as his deputy. The reserves of the Headquarters of the Civil Code were sent to the western front. But they could not stop the enemy advance in the Smolensk region.

But the strategy of war, as a rule, is not limited to one operational direction, but requires the development and implementation of a larger plan of military operations. At the General Staff of the Red Army, which at that time was headed by [I. K. Zhukov, there was no such plan. Therefore, not only the actions of the fronts, but also the actions of armies, corps, and divisions were not coordinated with each other. And this led to the fact that the enemy, having achieved success in one direction, could relatively easily transfer his efforts to another and strike where he was least expected.

After the defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, the German command in July-early August 1941 carried out an operation brilliant in conception and execution to encircle and defeat the troops of the 6th, 26th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In this massacre, about 25 rifle, 8 tank and 4 motorized divisions were crushed. At the final phase of the operation in the Uman region, 103,000 Red Army men and commanders were taken prisoner, including two army commanders, 317 tanks and 858 guns, and many other military property were captured. The defeat of the Soviet troops near Uman in late July and early August 1941 became an important stage in the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. On August 28, A. Hitler and B. Mussolini even flew in to look at the consequences of the Uman battle, who received a special parade of German and Italian troops.

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By that time, the troops of Army Group Center were conducting an offensive in the Moscow direction. On July 29, formations of the 2nd tank group of General G. Guderian captured Smolensk and moved further to the east. And in the south, the tank and motorized divisions of the 1st Panzer Group of General H. von Kleist, freed after the Uman encirclement, were able to reach the Dnieper and seize a bridgehead in the Kremenchug area. As a result of this, favorable conditions were created by the forces of the mobile formations of Army Group Center and Army Group South to encircle the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Kiev area. This operation was successfully carried out in the first half of September 1941. It was

one of the largest "cauldrons" of the Great Patriotic War, in which the Soviet troops not only lost another 621,324 people, 411 tanks, 18,368 guns and mortars, 343 aircraft, but also once again showed their inability to resist strategic offensive enemy plans.

In general, by the end of September 1941, German troops on the Soviet-German front were able to achieve very great success. The forces of the Western and Southwestern Fronts of the first formation were practically annihilated, and the troops of the Northwestern and Southern Fronts were substantially defeated. The troops of the army groups "North", "Center" and "South" advanced more than 600 kilometers to the east. The Luftwaffe won air supremacy. All the mechanized corps available in the Red Army were destroyed, despite the fact that the vast majority of Wehrmacht tank divisions retained their combat capability.

Such a course of the strategic operation allowed the German command to draw positive conclusions regarding previously adopted plans and did not require a significant change in these plans. But A. Hitler behaved

much more.

, _ In the memoirs of F. Halder, shortly after the defeat Soviet troops in Belarus, July 2 [1941, command

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The commanders of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were invited to the headquarters of the 2nd tank group, located at that time south of Minsk, where the commander of the 2nd field army, who had recently arrived from Germany, also arrived. He informed that Hitler's headquarters had decided that both of these tank groups should be combined into the 4th Panzer Army for delivering a powerful blow through Smolensk to Moscow. Consequently, from that day on, the Moscow direction, on which two of the four tank groups on the Soviet-German front are concentrated, becomes the main one, and the generals unanimously welcome this decision.

But very little time passes, and the Fuhrer changes his plan radically. Attacks on Leningrad and the Ukraine are again becoming the main ones, while the offensive in the Moscow direction is given only an auxiliary value. On July 20, 1941, F. Halder makes the following entry in his diary: "Arguments about the significance of Moscow were rejected by the Führer without any serious arguments" (Halder F. Military diary. Vol. 3, book 1. - P. 198).

In this regard, Hitler deliberately goes to weaken the Army Group Center advancing in the Moscow direction and demands that after the end of the fighting in the area

Smolensk, the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups dispersed left and right to support Army Groups South and North. Thus weakened, the Army Group Center was forced to continue the offensive against Moscow with the forces of only infantry divisions, as a result of which the pace of the offensive fell sharply.

Many generals did not like this, and on the same day Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Land Forces, expressed his disagreement with the Fuhrer's decision. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F. Halder, the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. von Bock, and the commanders of the tank groups, Generals G. [at

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'derian and G. Goth. But the arguments of V. von Brauchitsch and the opinions of other generals were not taken into account by A. Hitler.

_ V. von Brauchitsch was invited to the Fuhrer, who tried to explain the situation to him and practically convinced the teneral field marshal of the correctness of his decision. But the front-line generals, of course, did not know the whole "kitchen" of making strategic decisions in Berlin and blamed V. Brauchitsch for not being able to defend his point of view before Hitler. So, already after the war, the commander of the 3rd tank group, General G. Goth, wrote in his memoirs: "It was only after the war that the commander of the 3rd tank group learned about the operational plan of the commander of the ground forces, who intended to py armies "Center" to the north to support the army group "North". This was because he received neither OKW Directive No. 21 (Barbarossa) nor OKH Directive of 31 January 1941, only orders from Army Group Center. At the beginning of January 1940, Hitler gave the order: from the directive "Barbarossa" everyone should know only the most necessary. However, in addition to this, Army Group Center also worried that the 3rd Panzer Group would not turn its eyes too early to the left neighbor. In fact, everyone in the 3rd Panzer Group tried to get on the way to Moscow as soon as possible "(from G. Tank Operations. - P. 58).

, At the same time, A. Hitler did not refuse to continue the offensive against Moscow and already on the evening of July 20, 1941, sent a telegram to the General Headquarters of the German Ground Forces with the following content: "To fulfill the task assigned to the infantry armies of Army Group Center, to attack to Moscow - available. A total of 20-22 divisions are available with reserves in the rear, including the forces advancing from Ro Slavl to support the 2nd Panzer Group, as well as the forces needed to ensure the advance of the 3rd Panzer Group. With these forces, the army group must lead the offensive

on a front about 250 kilometers wide against

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an enemy who already today has supposedly eight infantry divisions, parts of six other infantry divisions, three tank divisions, two motorized divisions and which, in all likelihood, will receive significant reinforcements from new formations, of which there are many located in the Moscow region.

But below, apparently being well aware of the difficulties of the upcoming operation, A. Hitler warns the commander of Army Group Center that "the army group will first have to break through the defensive line, behind which, presumably west of Moscow, there are additional defensive positions, although of field type. And that "this monstrously difficult task can be accomplished by an army group only if its forces are concentrated in the main directions ... [The High Command of the Ground Forces is aware that under these conditions one cannot expect quick success in the Moscow direction. On the contrary, it will be a slow gnaw through the defenses of the troops thrown up by the enemy again and again, which will cost heavy losses, and it is very possible that the offensive will bog down altogether.

At the end of the document, it was said that "in accordance with the considerations expressed by the Führer and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, this seems possible within the framework of the general operation. Therefore, the main command of the ground forces did not. has no objections to the described operation against Moscow, if he is not required to make a quick decisive advance in the direction of Moscow "(Top secret! Only for command! - M., 1967. - P. 294-295).

Of course, neither the commander-in-chief of the Army Group "Center" F. von Bock, nor the commanders of the armies subordinate to him were delighted with such plans of the Führer. Von Bock immediately turned to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces for clarification, but he replied that in a private conversation, Hitler had stated that only the need to destroy the enemy, finding

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Standing in front of the front of Army Group "South" forces him to abandon large-scale operations in the "band of Army Group "Center" and that this measure is only temporary and does not at all mean a final rejection of the attack on Moscow by the main forces.

y. At the same time, based on the decision

The reorganization of the troops of Army Group Center has been carried out. "The 4th Panzer Army was being disbanded. The 3rd Panzer Group, subordinate to Army Group Sever, received the task of covering the right flank of Army Group Sever with its advance across the Valdai Upland and finally cutting off communication between Moscow and Leningrad. The 2nd Panzer Group, reinforced by several army corps, received the name "Guderian's Army Group" and was left under the command of Army Group Center directly. in the western direction to Gomel, destroy the enemy stationed there and stabilize the situation on the right flank of Army Group Center.

On July 30, A. Hitler issued Directive No. 34. In accordance with this directive, Army Group Center received a ten-day period to rest and resupply its motorized formations. To do this, she was instructed to "go on the defensive, "using the most convenient for this" areas of the terrain. In order to carry out subsequent offensive operations against the Soviet 21st Army, Army Group Center was to "take advantageous initial positions, for which offensive operations with limited objectives could be carried out."

| This directive and the subsequent instructions of the Fuhrer, received by the troops at the beginning of August, created the opinion among the command of the German ground forces and some other high military leaders that from now on it was decided to inflict the Wehrmacht's flanking strikes in Ukraine and in the Moscow direction. Thus, 4 August, General F. Halder, after a conversation with the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, W. von Brauchitsch, notes that the main goal

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The subsequent actions of the German troops may be their strike on Moscow or a strike through the Ukraine with the aim of mastering the Caucasus and seizing the oil regions. At the same time, he writes with confidence: "This year our troops will be near Moscow, and the seizure of territory in the south will happen by itself in the course of the development of the situation" (/ Alder F. Military diary. Vol. 3, book 1. - S. 240).

Indirect evidence that the Moscow direction was again becoming the main strategic plan of the Wehrmacht was Hitler's call to the headquarters of Army Group Center of the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups on August 4, 1941. Both commanders, having arrived in Borisov, reported to the Fuhrer on the state of technology of tank formations. After that, by decision of the commander of Army Group Center, both tank groups were ordered to begin withdrawing individual tank divisions from the front for rest and resupply, so that the groups would be ready for the offensive between 15 and 20 August.

At the same time, Hitler expressed himself vaguely about his future plans. He declared that the rapid advance far forward of Army Groups Center and North had created a completely new situation and that the transfer of the 3rd Panzer Group to the north was no longer necessary. At the same time, in one of the conversations, the Führer stated that the main targets for the offensive of the Wehrmacht were the industrial regions of Leningrad and Kharkov. Moscow was given only third place, but the right to make a specific decision Hitler reserved.

The content of this conversation becomes known to F. Halder, and the illusions of the chief of the general staff of the German ground forces regarding the main attack on Moscow are again crumbling. On August 6, F. Halder notes in his diary that at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South in the presence of the Führer, at his request, "the commander of Army Group South" raised a number of issues related to the strategic goals of the war. In particular, the question of the significance of Moscow was raised. The Führer again unequivocally rejected this

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offer. He again continued his song: "First, Leningrad must be captured ... Secondly, the eastern part of Ukraine is captured ... And only in the last turn will an offensive be undertaken to capture Moscow" (Halder F. Military diary. ty 1.—S. 247).

, 15 August Hitler, influenced by the failure of the army group "North", decided to stop the further offensive of Army Group Center "on Moscow. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group was ordered to immediately transfer one tank corps (one tank and two motorized divisions) to Army Group North, "since the offensive there threatens to bog down."

On September 6, a new OKW directive No. 35 was issued. According to it, the German high command planned to conduct two major operations in succession in the near future. The first was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops near Kiev by the forces of the Army Groups Center and South, the second ordered "after the threat to the southern flank of the Center group was eliminated, to launch a decisive offensive by von Bock's troops on Moscow. It was from the day this directive was issued that the immediate preparation of the German operation to capture the Soviet capital, which later received the code name "Typhoon", began.

In the preamble to this directive, A. Hitler explained the mochi

you of your new decision to attack Moscow. According to him, "initial successes against enemy forces located between the inner flanks of army groups

"Nentr" and "North", from the point of view of the encirclement of Leningrad, create the prerequisites for carrying out decisive operations against the Timoshenko army group leading the offensive. It must be destroyed before the onset of WINTER. To do this, it is necessary to pull up and concentrate All the forces of aviation and the army, without which we can do But on the flanks ...>

`In the following days, the general plan for the attack on Moscow was finalized, and then formalized in the form

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orders of Army Group Center, which set out in detail the tasks of each formation.

The operation was to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, the main idea of defeating the formations of the Red Army on the outskirts of Moscow was as follows. Having created "strong tank units" on the flanks of Army Group Center, the German troops "as a result of double envelopment in the direction of the city of Vyazma" were to destroy the Soviet troops of the enemy, located east of Smolensk.

Two directions were planned for the strike of motorized forces: "the first - on the southern flank, presumably, in the area southeast of Roslavl (4th Army) with a strike to the northeast" - fresh 5th and 2nd tank divisions; and "the second - in the area of the 9th Army with a strike through Belyi" - significant forces from Army Group North were to be brought up to this area. It was stated that "only after the bulk of the forces of the Timoshenko group were destroyed as a result of this operation, the Army Group Center, adjacent to the right to the river. Oka and to the left to the upper reaches of the Volga, start pursuing the enemy in the direction of Moscow.

The German Air Force was tasked with supporting the offensive "especially in the northeast direction." The main forces of the 2nd Air Fleet were also to operate on the flanks.

The second stage of the offensive (pursuing the enemy to the gates of Moscow) was planned to be ensured: from the southern flank - by the advance of "releasing motorized units" from the front of the Army Group "South" in a northeast direction, and from the north - by the offensive of the Army Group "North" on both sides lake Ilmen and to the meeting of the Finnish "Karelian Army". In a separate paragraph, Hitler emphasized the need to reduce the time for preparing and conducting operations.

It is necessary to immediately emphasize one essential detail in terms of the German command. "Release-

given motorized units" from the front of Army Group "South", i.e. formations of the 2nd tank group, so far it was not planned to launch an offensive on the main axis. They were only supposed to cover his southern flank. Obviously, the OKW was worried about the fate of the operation in the Kyiv region and did not want to get ahead of events. A more specific task for the Guderian group could only be set in the event of a successful development of hostilities to defeat the Soviet Southwestern Front.

_ Naturally, this turn of events did not suit the command of Army Group Center. The headquarters of F. von Bock did not leave hope that later he would be able to use the power of the 2nd Panzer Group and, at the expense of its formations, expand the front of the offensive in the Moscow direction. However, so far it was necessary to plan the operation in a rather narrow area, which was fraught with serious complications on the flanks of Army Group Center.

The army group command also had to come to terms with the fact that even with a quick success near Kiev, the 2nd Panzer Group had to move first to the south, then, as expected, again to the north. At the same time, it had to overcome several hundred kilometers in a relatively short time. This inevitably entailed great wear and tear of materiel and physical exhaustion of the servicemen, not to mention losses in personnel and armored vehicles. In addition, the move to the south, in the end, threatened to disrupt the close flank cooperation of the 2nd Panzer Group with the 4th Army, advancing on Moscow from the Ro-

, slavl'ya.

- ' After the issuance of Directive No. 35, the painstaking preparation of the German troops for the operation began. The time limit forced the German generals to act quickly and vigorously. In the development of this directive, the main command of the ground forces indicated that the decisive

`Nenya now has the transfer of six infantry divisions

`From the 2nd and 6th armies, two tank divisions from [germany,

liberated formations of the Army Group "North", the 2nd Panzer Group in the Army Group "Center" before the beginning of October 1941] of the year. It was noted that the offensive of the army group could be carried out before the beginning of October under the following conditions: a) the combat operations of the Army Group "South" in the interfluvium of the Dnieper-Desna rivers would basically end before September 25; 6) the infantry formations of Army Group Center will not be weakened by defensive battles by the beginning of October; c) weather conditions will be favorable

to facilitate the movement; d) the troops of the Army Group "Center" will hold the front and retain the supply base of Smolensk.

So, the main plan of the first stage of the German offensive against Moscow in the autumn of 1941 was an enveloping attack on Vyazma by the forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups. At the same time, for the sake of this operation, the 4th Panzer Group of General Goepner was transferred to the band of Army Group Center from the Leningrad direction. This, of course, weakened the German forces intended to capture the city on the Neva, called into question the successful connection with the Finns back in 1941, but gave the German command a chance to concentrate all available forces in the main Moscow direction.

After the issuance of Directive No. 35, Vyazma began to appear in almost all documents of the German command devoted to the forthcoming offensive. Moreover, the name of this city was often mentioned in telegraph conversations between the Commander of Army Group Center and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. After September 6, some disagreements arose between these two commanders regarding the depth of the advance of the German troops in the first stage of the operation. It now appears that these disagreements were a reflection of the situation on the fronts at that time and the nature of hostilities that had changed since the beginning of the campaign.

It was clear to both F. von Bock and W. von Brauchitsch that the offensive could no longer be postponed, but both of them could not come to an agreement on the next

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'blowing question: where should the tank units of the encirclement unite - where it was indicated in the directive (near | Vyazma), or is it still further east? Von Bock proposed not to confine ourselves to the Vyazma region, but to move further towards Gkatsk. Von Brauchitsch was cautious and believed that the option of completing the encirclement at Vyazma was the most optimal.

> W. von Brauchitsch had a different opinion. On September 12, he informed the commander of the group: "... The main 'goal of the operation carried out by the Army Group "Center" 'should be to disable the main core of the concentration of enemy troops located in the center of the Timoshenko group of troops on limited territory and close coverage to destroy it..." Brauchitsch noted that an immediate strike on Moscow "due to lack of forces is impossible and only the destruction of the encircled enemy will make it possible to achieve further goals. "... For the planned bilateral coverage of the core of the Timoshenko grouping, it is necessary to take the direction of the general attack on Vyazma ..."

On the same day, the commander of Army Group Center, in a report to the General Staff of the OKH, again indicated that it was necessary "instead of enveloping the enemy's positions near Vyazma, wedged into them with a concentrated blow from the flanks. According to available information, the enemy has a sufficient number of forces in the rear defensive sectors. Thus, the internal flanks of the shock groups "will be able to connect only east of Vyazma, about halfway to Gzhatsk."

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It should be noted that both near Minsk and Smolensk, the German tank units tried to advance as far as possible and cover as many enemy forces as possible. In fact, von Bock in September 1941 continued to adhere to this former line. Brauchitsch, on the contrary, 'now preferred a more cautious point of view, considering the forces of Army Group Center insufficient for a deeper coverage of the Timoshenko grouping than was planned in Directive No. 35. He proposed,

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first of all, to destroy the Soviet troops stationed in the immediate vicinity of the front.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that W. von Brauhitsch, in contrast to F. von Bock, supported the opinion of those generals who believed that too deep coverage of the enemy was now becoming more and more dangerous, it was fraught with the fact that the offensive might not reach its goals. Thus, representatives of the General Staff of the OKH, who were at the 3rd Panzer Group, warned that "when reaching distant targets, the enemy's front of coverage will, as before, not be dense enough and in this case large enemy forces will be able to break through and leave , avoiding an environment that can only be completed after a long time. The time we have at our disposal is limited."

In the end, the OKH decided to use, first of all, the tactics of "small sacks", and thereby indirectly admitted that the "blitzkrieg tactics" in Russia did not justify itself; it became necessary to adapt on the move to the actions of the Soviet units.

The preparations of the German troops for the operation fully took into account the terrain for the upcoming offensive, the issues of timely delivery of troops, and camouflage. The General Staff of the OKH determined the number of corps and divisions needed for each sector and specified operational plans. The deployment of troops and their concentration were entrusted to the command of the army group, which was charged with the responsibility of directing the operation. Graduates of the German Academy of the General Staff (general staff officers), who were directly in the troops and held various command positions, were responsible for specifying the tasks of each

unity.

It is significant that at the initial stage of the preparation of the operation, much attention was paid to ensuring that the area of concentration was at a considerable distance from the area of attack. The enemy was not supposed to draw the correct conclusion about the direction of the main attack.

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Of great importance for the success of the offensive were: camouflage, disinformation of the enemy (including radio deception), the spread of false rumors behind enemy lines, as well as taking into account the terrain, uninterrupted supply of ammunition, etc.

The scale of Army Group Center's preparations for the offensive in September 1941 far exceeded all the activities of the offensive action support group in July-August 1941. Practically for the first time since the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the OKH and the headquarters of the Army Group "Center" so scrupulously and thoroughly resolved the issues of command and interaction of troops. Tasks were assigned to formations that were not on the offensive, as was the case in previous weeks and months, but on the defensive or on their way to the front line. On the one hand, this simplified the transportation of equipment and ammunition, the replenishment of units with reserves, and on the other hand (as it was before the start of the war), it became possible to study in detail the area of upcoming military operations, to study the opposing enemy forces.

The plan to destroy the opposing Soviet forces (as was the case before the start of the offensive of Army Group Center in Belarus in June 1941 and later near Smolensk) was based on the two-sided envelopment of the enemy. The shock groupings of the Army Group Center were separated at the front and were preparing to encircle the Soviet troops covering the Moscow direction. The northern grouping was concentrated in the area of Dukhovshchina, and the southern - near Roslavl. The distance between the groupings (the tip of which was supposed to be tank formations) was approximately 150 km, that is, almost two times less than between the 2nd and 3rd tank groups before the start of Barbarossa. Such a formation of troops was caused, firstly, by the need to encircle the most numerous Soviet grouping located along the Minsk-Mo SKva highway, and secondly, by the fact that German intelligence knew exactly in which places the front line of the echeloned

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Soviet defense has the highest, and in which the lowest density. Some blows fell on

weak sectors of the Soviet front and made it possible to avoid major losses already at the initial stage of battles. On September 19, the upcoming operation received the code name "Typhoon".

On September 16, 1941, F. von Bock issued Directive No. 1300 ("Directives for a New Operation"), which fully took into account the situation that had developed at that time on the front of the German forces. According to the operational concept developed by the headquarters of the group and set out in this directive, the 4th Army (with the subordinate 4th Panzer Group) and the 9th Army (with the subordinate 3rd Panzer Group) were to break through the enemy defenses along on both sides of the Roslavl-Moscow highway and to the north of the Smolensk-Moscow highway and pincer the enemy at Vyazma. Parts of the 9th Army also had to advance their troops in the direction of Rzhev. Behind the dacha of the 2nd Army there was an offensive between Pochep and Sino pol in the direction of Sukhinichi, Meshchovsk and on the southern flank to Bryansk. The 2nd Panzer Group, whose concentration was the area in the region of Rylsk, Pochepa and Novgorod-Seversky, was to strike through the Orel-Bryansk line. It was indicated that the tank group was advancing "from the south in the direction of the enemy's positions on the Desna River and displacing him in cooperation with the 2nd Army in the arc of the Sudost and Desna rivers." The High Command of the Ground Forces instructed that the right (southern) flank of the 2nd Panzer Group be covered by the Svapa and Oka rivers.

The directive also stated that the situation on the flanks of Army Group Center during the offensive would be as follows: on the northern flank, the 16th Army (Army Group North) would "defend the line of lakes in the Ostashkov sector, Lake Ilmen, Volkhov", and on the southern flank - formations of Army Group "South", presumably, will "advance in the general direction towards Kharkov."

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The forces of twenty-two German corps were intended for the operation. The offensive was to take part (now in full) formations of the 2nd Panzer Group. Moreover, formations of the 4th Panzer Group were transferred from the Leningrad region to Roslavl. From the Army Group South, von Bock also received two tank, two infantry and two motorized divisions. From the reserve of the main command, the fully equipped 2nd and 5th tank divisions, which arrived from Germany, were transferred to the army group, which were supposed to be part of the 40th corps of the 4th tank group. On September 19, the transfer to the area of operations of Army Group Center of the 27th Army Corps began from the area of Army Group D, which was in France.

Thus, the general front of the upcoming offensive

Army Group Center against the Soviet forces in the Western direction expanded to 600 km: from the headwaters of the West. Dvina - in the north to Glukhov and Shostka (Ukraine) - in the south. This made it possible to carry out the operation more decisively, to use a wide maneuver and not to be afraid of a strike on the southern flank of the formations intended to encircle the enemy near Vyazma. <. The offensive of the ground forces was to be actively supported by aviation. On the eve of the offensive, the command of the 2nd Air Fleet carefully planned the interaction of aviation with the ground forces. To facilitate communication, Kesselring's headquarters was located next to the headquarters tents of Army Group Center in a forest camp near Smolensk. It was assumed that the 8th air corps and its air defense units would be assisted by the penetrations of the VU of the 3rd tank group of General Hoth, the "air connection of Interaction with ground forces" from the 2nd air corps and the 2nd air defense corps of General O. Desseloh would cover the columns 4th Panzer Group of General Töpner, and a special unit of Lieutenant Colonel Count K. von Shenborn, part of the 2nd Air Corps, together with the General's 1st Air Defense Corps transferred from the south

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V. von Axtelm - to contribute to the breakthrough of the 2nd Panzer Group of General G. Guderian.

We must not forget that the leadership of the Wehrmacht, after the defeat of the Soviet Southwestern Front near Kiev, practically put an end to the ability of the USSR to continue active hostilities and believed that the Red Army would hardly be able to create a continuous front between Lake Ladoga and the Black Sea and that more to hold it. Already after the war, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, F. Halder, admitted to the famous English historian B. Liddell Hart that after the battle of Kiev, Hitler bluntly declared: "Militarily, Russia is finished." F. von Bock, building his plans for the capture of Moscow, also did not allow the thought that the resistance of the Red Army in this direction would grow daily.

However, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had a different opinion about their forces and even, on the contrary, expected to launch offensive operations against F. von Bock's group in the future. Unfortunately, the Soviet high command, despite numerous warnings about the active preparation of the German attack on the capital, was unable to determine the exact time of its start. In addition, the command of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts made unforgivable miscalculations in analyzing the situation at the front. This may include the conduct of private offensive operations, encouraged by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to the detriment of strengthening defensive positions, as well as the incorrect determination of the direction of possible main attacks by the German troops.

BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

, From the very beginning of the war, the Soviet leadership took few measures to cover up the Moscow strategic direction. Already on June 25, 1941, that is, on the 4th day of the war, the Headquarters of the Civil Code ordered the deployment of the second strategic echelon consisting of the 19th, 20th, 21st] and 22nd armies along the line of the Western Dvina-Dnepr rivers. The management of these troops was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M.

_ On June 27 and 28, that is, on the 6th and 7th days of the war, the Headquarters of the Civil Code ordered to deploy in the Smolensk region at a distance of 180-250 kilometers from the front edge of the Western Front three more reserve armies (16th, 24th and 28th) . These formations received the task of "preventing the enemy's breakthrough in the direction of Moscow, destroying him with powerful counterattacks by ground forces and air strikes" (TsAMO, f. 9ba, op. 1710, d. 1, l. 1— 2).

| However, the defeat of the troops on the territory of Belarus forced the Stavka | On July, transfer the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies to the Western Front, entrusting the command of its troops at first to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, appointing S.M. Budyonny as his deputy. The reserves of the Headquarters of the Civil Code were sent to the Western Front. As of July 10, 1941, the Front included 65 divisions, in which there were 580 thousand people, 6900 guns and mortars

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Comrade, [300 tanks, 380 aircraft. But they were unable to stop the enemy advance in the Smolensk region.

Meanwhile, the General Headquarters, strengthening the defense of the Moscow direction, began deploying four more newly formed armies (29th, 30th, 31st and 32nd) in the rear of the Western Front. To manage them, on July 14, the Front of Reserve Armies was created under the command of Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov. Its headquarters is located in Mozhaisk. The front was given the task of "stubbornly defending the line of Staraya Russa, Bely, Yelnya, Bryansk." In the same order, the Stavka demanded that a rear line of defense be prepared at a distance of 70-80 kilometers from the indicated line. This marked the beginning of the construction of the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line on the distant approaches to Moscow (TsAMO, F. 219, op. 37549, d. 1, L. 23-25).

On July 16, the State Defense Committee ordered the formation of the front of the Mozhaisk defense line within five days, including in its composition the newly created

given to the 32nd, 33rd and 34th armies. Lieutenant General P. A. Ar was appointed commander of the troops of this front.

Temyev.

Thus, in order to cover the Moscow strategic direction by the Soviet leadership in the period from June 22 to July 16, 1941, in addition to the four available, the deployment of 13 more combined arms armies and the preparation of several rear defensive lines were started. Some of these lines were based on water barriers, others were planned on tactically advantageous terrain for defense. All frontiers were prepared to a certain extent in engineering terms. But, despite the presence of troops and defensive lines, the enemy offensive in the Moscow direction developed successfully.

The change in command of the Western Front was not enough to stop the enemy advance. Having successfully completed the operation to encircle Soviet troops in Belarus, on July 16, advanced units

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The 2nd tank group of G. Guderian, developing an offensive in an easterly direction, broke into the southern part of Smolensk, which was traditionally considered the "gate of Moscow". By that time, the formations of the 3rd tank group of G. Goth had reached the northeast of Smolensk, to the Minsk-Moscow highway. Stubborn battles began for the city, the capture of which, in addition, meant a new large encirclement of the troops of the Western Front.

Three armies of the Western Front were defending in the Smolensk region: the 20th (General P. A. Kurochkin), the 19th (General I. S. Konev) and the 16th (General M. F. Lukin). To reinforce the troops of the 20th Army, the 5th mechanized corps of I.P. Alekseenko was sent into battle separately.

Operations in the Smolensk area can be conventionally divided into four stages.

At the first stage (from July 10 to 20), there was a breakthrough in the defense of the Western Front and the encirclement of the 19th, 16th and 20th Soviet armies, as well as the offensive of the 21st Soviet army in the Bobruisk direction.

Describing this time, General K.K. Rokossovsky, who was appointed commander of the mobile group of the Western Front, writes in the book "Soldier's Duty":

"Konev with his formations, as they were unloaded, tried to take control of Vitebsk, where the enemy had already broken into, but to no avail. Massed German air strikes against the attacking units frustrated all these attempts, forced them to withdraw,

M. F. Lukin still held Smolensk, and, apparently, S. K. Timoshenko was confident in his steadfastness, although the commander of the 16th Army by this time had only two rifle divisions left. But these were excellent formations - personnel divisions from Transbaikalia, whose hardening and traditions can hardly be overestimated. I remember the words I heard at the front headquarters: "Lukin is sitting in a sack and is not going to leave."

The mouth of the bag in the area of Solovyovskaya and Ratchino VOY crossings across the Dnieper, the Germans tried in every possible way to recapture. There was a combined detachment of the colonel

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A. I. Lizyukov, to whom, in view of the importance of the matter, the commander of the front personally set the task of providing routes for the supply of everything necessary for the troops fighting near Smolensk, and, if necessary, their ways of withdrawal "...

At the headquarters of the front, I got acquainted with the data for July 17. Staff members were not very sure that their materials corresponded exactly to reality, since there was no communication with some armies, in particular with the 19th and 22nd. Information was received about the appearance of some large enemy tank units in the Yolna area. Data on the landing of an airborne assault in Yartsevo were available, but they have not yet been verified "(Rokossovsky K.K. Soldatsky DUTY - P. 58).

The mobile group included divisions of the 7th mechanized corps (commander General V. I. Vinogradov), as well as other units, including battalions of the people's militia. These forces carried out a counterattack, as a result of which the troops of the mobile group captured Yartsevo. Despite this, during this stage the enemy was able to advance eastward by about 200 kilometers at a rate of up to 20 kilometers per day.

The second stage (July 21-August 7) was characterized by an attempt to organize a counteroffensive by the troops of the Reserve Army Front.

It was during this stage of the fighting that some Soviet commanders became aware of the imperfection of the defense, based on individual infantry cells, not connected by trenches. All the same K. K. Rokossovsky writes:

"Our charters, which existed before the war, taught us to build defense according to the so-called cell system. It was argued that infantry in cells would suffer fewer losses from enemy fire. Perhaps, according to theory, this is how it turned out, and most importantly, the line looked very beautiful, everyone was delighted. But alas! The war showed another ... "

Deciding to check everything for himself, Konstantin Konstantin-

the newcomer headed to the front line of defense. "Having reached one of the cells, I changed the soldier who was sitting there

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2 was left alone. The consciousness that somewhere on the right and on the left, too, were Red Army soldiers, I retained, but I did not see or hear them. The squad leader did not see me, as th: "All my subordinates. And the fight continued. Air blasts and mines exploded, bullets and shrapnel whistled. Sometimes planes dropped bombs. and I, an old soldier who participated in many battles, and then,]

frankly, I felt very bad in this nest. All the time I was not left with the desire to run out and look to see if my comrades were sitting in their nests or had already Mokinuli them, and I was left alone. If the feeling of anxiety did not leave me, then how it was with a man who, perhaps, was in battle for the first time! ..

The cell defense system turned out to be unsuitable for war. We discussed in our team both my observations and the thoughts of the officers who were instructed to take a closer look at the infantry on the front line. Everyone came to the conclusion that it was necessary to immediately liquidate the system of cells and go over to the trenches. On the same day, all parts of the troupe were given appropriate instructions ... "(Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. - P. 71).

/ ^ . In early August, Smolensk was occupied by the enemy. The front commander S.K. Timoshenko gave the order for the 06th withdrawal. The troops of the 16th and 20th armies retreated beyond the Dnieper, the enemy was able to move even further east at 50 kilometers at a rate of about 3 kilometers per

"After that, A.P. Kurochkin was recalled to Moscow, M.F. Lukin was appointed commander of the 20th Army, and K.K. Rokossovsky took over the 6th Army. When the position was transferred, the wounded General M.F. Lukin sighed bitterly to Nul: "The Sixteenth Army was not defeated, it was pulled apart ..." ', After the remnants of the 16th Army and the Rokossovsky group were united, the new association was a rather impressive force. It consisted of five infantry, one tank division, a tank brigade

-T, Remizova, heavy artillery battalion and other units. The army took up defense on a 50-kilometer

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front, intercepting the main highway Smolensk - Vyazma. For the first time in the zone of the 16th Army, the Katyusha battery was used.

In the third stage (August 8-21), the center of combat operations shifted to the south. On July 30, the Reserve

front. The troops of the Western and the 24th and 43rd armies of the Reserve Front launched an offensive on August 16 with the aim of defeating the Dukhovshchinskaya and Yelnya enemy groups. At the fourth stage (August 22-September 10), the Soviet command tried to thwart the offensive of Army Group Center by active actions. On September 10, the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts went on the defensive.

The third and fourth stages of the Battle of Smolensk were associated with another event, which at that time was perceived by many as quite a common occurrence. It was indicated by the publication of Order No. 270 by the Headquarters in connection with the capture of the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov.

The Kachalov group (145th, 149th rifle and 104th tank divisions) on July 23 from the Roslavl region, on the orders of the Headquarters, launched a counterattack on Smolensk, striking in a northwestern direction. This counteroffensive was to be supported by other armies.

The situation was not favorable for this counteroffensive: the offensive capabilities of Army Group Center were not exhausted, German aviation dominated the air, the Soviet troops were engaged in battles with the enemy, did not have prepared initial lines for the offensive and did not have reserves. Such a counteroffensive was doomed to failure from the very beginning. Despite this, the formations of the group of General V. Ya. Kachalov managed to break the stubborn resistance of the enemy in two days and throw him back across the Stomet River.

The offensive of the group of General V. Ya. Kachalov along the Roslavl-Smolensk highway caused concern among the German command. By order of the commander

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Army Group "Center" two army and one motorized corps went on the offensive against Roslavl and cut off the group of General V. Ya. Kachalov. When leaving, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and Kachalov himself died. The offensive actions of the NN groups of generals V. A. Khomenko and Kalinin were not developed either. on the troops of General K.K. Rokossovsky (38th rifle, 101st and 107th tank divisions) at the set time, she could not go on the offensive at all, as she was forced to repel the attacks of German troops rushing to Vyazma. The historian V. A. Abaturon in his book "On the Western Direction" writes that the reasons for the failure of the offensive of the operational groups on Smolensk are correctly reflected in the report of

the energy department of the headquarters of the Western Front for the period from #} July to August 15, 1941 of the year. In it, in particular, it was noted: "The offensive ... was carried out by splayed

fingers on a wide front, with a linear construction of Zoya orders. There were no manpower and means of building up strikes in the depths of the enemy defenses.

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The story of General V. Ya. Kachalov turned out to be very A. Later, the fact of his death on July 23, 1941 was confirmed by the former commander of the 149th Infantry Division © Neral-Major F. D. Zakharov and described by Marshal of the Soviet Yu. Union A. I. Eremenko in the book "At the Beginning of the War". In Nov Rguste in 1941, everything was different.

#7 On August 16, order No. 270 was issued (without the right of public E in the media), signed by I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. M. Budyonny, K: . Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnev, and G.K. Zhukov. In 1997, this order was published in Volume 13 of the Russian Archive collection. By this zrikaz a number of generals (P. G. Ponedelin, N. K. Kiril tov, V. Ya. Kachalov) were accused of surrendering. With regard to Shenja V. Ya. Kachalov, in particular, it was noted: `` "The commander of the 28

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ruzheniya, showed cowardice and surrendered to the German fascists. The headquarters of the Kachalov group came out of the encirclement, part of the Kachalov group made their way out of the encirclement, and Lieutenant General Kachalov preferred to surrender. preferred to desert to the enemy..." Thus, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov was ranked among the enemies of the people with one stroke of the pen. On September 29, he was sentenced to death in absentia. Only in 1953 V. Ya. Kachalov was rehabilitated posthumously.

But Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941 was also notable for its command part. In accordance with this order, it was ordered:

"Commanders and political workers who, during the battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters. whose families are subject to arrest as the families of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland.

To oblige all higher commanders and commissars to shoot on the spot such deserters from the Nachso stave.

The units and subunits that are surrounded by the enemy selflessly fight to the last opportunity, take care of the material part as the apple of their eye, break through to their rears by enemy troops, inflicting defeat on the enemy.

shist dogs.

To oblige every serviceman, regardless of his official position, to demand from his superior commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own. and if such a commander or part of the Red Army, instead of organizing a rebuff to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him as a prisoner, destroy them by all means, both ground and air, and deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who have surrendered of state benefits and assistance.

To oblige the commanders and commissars of divisions to immediately remove from their posts the commanders of battalions and regiments. hiding in the gap during the battle and afraid to lead the battle on the battlefield, to lower them from their positions.

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"how to transfer impostors to the rank and file, and if necessary, shoot them on the spot, putting forward in their place brave and courageous people from the junior command staff or from the rank and file distinguished Red Army soldiers."

— This order had several consequences. Firstly, surrender, even as a result of being wounded, was regarded 'as treason. Each commander or Red Army soldier became hostage to his family. Secondly, lynching or a speedy trial with execution on the spot was preached in a legal manner. It became possible to settle scores not only with people who showed instability in battle, but also with other objectionable personalities. Thirdly, random people who did not have the knowledge and skills of organizing and directing a battle were often appointed to the positions of commanders thus vacated. All this taken together was supposed to increase the stability of the Soviet defense, but did very little to improve its combat quality.

In September, General I. S. Konev was appointed commander of the Western Front. General M.F. Lukin took over the 19th Army, and General F.A. Ershakov took command of the 20th Army. K.K. Rokossovsky continued to command the 16th Army. The armies of the Western Front, snarling and even counterattacking, continued to retreat to the east, breaking out of the encirclement. Therefore, the enemy could not carry out the complete defeat of the Soviet armies in the Smolensk region. Later, in his memoirs, the chief of staff of the 4th field army, General G. Blumentritt, wrote: "Two field armies ... held three sides of the pocket, while our tanks blocked the exit from it near Yartsevo. Again, this operation was unsuccessful. At night, Russian troops broke out of the encirclement and went to

East..."

And yet, the operation in the Smolensk region ended unsuccessfully for the Soviet troops, who during the fighting suffered

LI huge losses. According to the report of the Military Council of the Western Strategic Direction, the divisions of the 16th and 20th armies literally melted away in long, continuous

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battles. Most of them have 1-2 thousand people left. In total, over the last decade of July 1941, the troops of the Western Front lost 105.7 thousand people, including 46.8 thousand missing, that is, about 45% of the total losses.

As a result of the encirclement and the rapid advance to the east of the Wehrmacht in the Smolensk region, the total losses of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts reached almost 760 thousand people, including 486.2 thousand irretrievable. At the same time, German sources say that in the Smolensk region, Wehrmacht troops captured 310 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers. Also, the Soviet troops lost 1348 tanks, 9290 guns and mortars, 903 combat aircraft.

The losses of the Wehrmacht troops (the 2nd and 9th field armies, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups, the reserves of the Army Group Center, additional formations brought into battle) amounted to 96.5 thousand people. At the same time, the Germans lost 241 thousand people killed and missing.

The Soviet command, preoccupied with covering Moscow and constantly observing the inability of the commanders of large fronts to organize and conduct operations with large masses of troops, decides to create rear lines of defense and split up the front, creating a large number of smaller formations. In the rear of the armies of the Western Front, for the defense of the line Bely, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya, the Desna River, the concentration of the 24th and 28th armies begins. Behind them, at the line of Ruza, Mozhaysk, Maloyaroslavets, Naro-Fominsk, the 32nd Army advances. The 16th Army is being transferred from the Southwestern Front to the Moscow direction. On July 14, all these, as well as the 30th Army, were united into the Front of Reserve Armies, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny.

On July 18, the command and headquarters of the Moscow Military District were entrusted with the functions of command and headquarters of the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense with the inclusion of the 32nd, 33rd and 34th armies in this front. command

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General P. A. Artemiev was appointed as the head of this front. This front lasted until July 30, 1941, and then its armies were included in the Reserve Front, commanded by the General of the Army

GK. Zhukov. On July 24, the left-flank 13th and 21st armies of the Western Front were separated into an independent Central Front under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov. A new stage of the battle for Moscow began.

ON THE FAR APPROACHES TO MOSCOW

After the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kiev and their defeat near Smolensk, the German command faced the acute question of how to continue the offensive. Hitler was well aware that a frontal attack on Moscow was fraught with great loss of life and time. He didn't want either of those. But until that time, such forms of conducting offensive operations as "Klin" and "Pincers" perfectly justified themselves, which crushed the Soviet defense into parts and smashed it piece by piece, including by carrying out large operational encirclements. In the attack on Moscow, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht was not going to abandon well-tested and repeatedly justified methods.

True, by that time the conditions of the situation had changed somewhat. Despite a number of major defeats, the Soviet command managed to constantly restore the front line at the expense of reserves, deploying new fronts and bringing more and more armies, corps and DIVISIONS into battle.

And this is not surprising. At that time, the human resources of the Soviet Union were still huge, and military production was only gaining momentum. Despite the fact that a significant part of the European territory of the USSR had already been lost, many industrial enterprises were destroyed or captured, in September alone Soviet industry produced more than 700 tanks, of which

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About 500 KV and T-34s, more than 2,000 combat aircraft, over 7,000 guns and mortars of 76-mm and higher caliber, about 10,000 machine guns, over 300,000 VOK propellers and machine guns. This was enough to

to deploy new military formations, taking into account the existing military reserves.

Therefore, despite a number of major military failures in the summer and early autumn of 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had a rather high opinion of its forces and even expected to launch offensive operations against the German troops and, first of all, against the troops of the army group in the near future. "Center". Unfortunately, the Soviet high command, despite numerous

warnings about the active preparation of the German attack on the capital, failed to determine the exact time of its start. In addition, the command of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts made unforgivable miscalculations in the analysis of the situation at the front. This may include the conduct of private offensive operations, encouraged by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to the detriment of strengthening defensive positions, as well as the incorrect determination of the direction of possible main attacks by German troops as part of the enemy's general offensive against Moscow.

As of 1 October 1941, the Moscow direction was covered by the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. Further to the east and directly in the region of Moscow, reserves were hastily concentrated, which, having barely gathered their strength, were brought into battle.

The troops of the Western Front, consisting of the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies (commander Colonel General I. S. Konev, chief of staff Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky), covering the directions to Torzhok, Rzhev and Vyaz MU, occupied a front with a total width of up to 300 kilometers. On the right wing of the front, in a strip of 65 kilometers, the 22nd Army was defending under the command of Major General V.A. Yushkevich. South of it in the strip up to 80 kilometers

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defended by the 29th Army. Even further south, in a strip up to 50 kilometers wide, based on the city of Bely, the 30th Army defended itself. Further, covering Vyazma, the 19th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin defended in a 25-kilometer-wide strip, and the 16th Army of Major-General K.K. Rokossovsky defended in a 35-kilometer strip. South of Yartsevo, in the Dorogobuzh direction, in a strip 45 kilometers wide, the 20th Army under the command of Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov defended. Two rifle, two motorized rifle and three cavalry divisions, as well as three tank brigades and two motorcycle regiments, remained under frontline subordination.

The operational density of troops in the zone of the Western Front was relatively high. On average, there was one rifle division for every 10 kilometers. Density of tanks on 1 km of the front, on average, was 1.6, artillery guns and mortars of caliber 76 mm and above - 7.5, anti-tank guns - 1.5.

Behind this front, the Reserve Front was deployed, consisting of the 31st (Major General V.N. Dolmatov), 49th (Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin), 32nd (Major General S.V. Vishnevsky), 24th, 43rd (Major General P.P. Sobennikov) and 33rd (brigade commander D.P. Onuprienko) armies. The troops of this front included 28 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 4 separate tank divisions.

brigades and 3 separate tank battalions. With an average staffing of rifle divisions from 8 to 12 thousand people, they also had 285 tanks, more than 2100 guns and mortars of 76-mm and higher caliber, 385 45-mm anti-tank guns. Until October 8, the Reserve Front was commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny.

On October 8, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts were merged into one Western Front, commanded by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov. Major General A.F. Anisov was appointed chief of staff.

Taking into account the arrival of new forces and means, and moreover, that the defense zone of the new Western Front is practically

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Poster. October 1941

Cesky remained unchanged, the operational density of troops on the Western Front increased significantly. According to calculations made on the basis of the capital work "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", they averaged 2.4 tanks, 14.2 guns and mortars of a caliber over 76 mm per each kilometer of the Front. and 3.4 anti-tank weapons Diya. Directly on the Rzhevsky and Vyazemsky directions

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In areas where the main forces of the front were concentrated, these densities were much higher.

To the south of the Western Front, in a strip up to 320 kilometers wide from Snopot to Putivl, the troops of the Bryansk Front (front commander, Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko) defended themselves as part of the 50th, 3rd (Major General Ya. G. Kreizer) and the 13th (Major General A. M. Gorodnyansky) armies. In addition, an operational group under the command of Major General A. N. Ermakov, consisting of two rifle, two cavalry divisions and two tank brigades, operated on the left wing of the front. In the reserve of the Bryansk Front in the area of Bryansk were two rifle divisions, one tank division and one tank brigade, which had practically no materiel. In total, the front had about 60 tanks, over | thousands of guns and mortars of caliber 76 mm and above, 270 anti-tank guns.

The air forces of the Western and Bryansk fronts at the beginning of October 1941 had 364 serviceable combat aircraft, of which 188 were fighters, 154 bombers and 22 attack aircraft.

The attack on Moscow was entrusted to the troops of Army Group Center, which by that time, as a result of continuous fighting, had lost a significant part of its personnel, tanks and combat aircraft. So, only the formations of the 9th Army Corps in the period from August to October lost about 11 thousand people.

For the attack on Moscow, the 4th Panzer Group (four tank and two motorized divisions) was transferred to the Army Group Center from the Army Group North (four tank and two motorized divisions), from the Army Group South - six infantry, two tank and two motorized divisions. In this regard, by September 30, against the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts, the enemy concentrated the 2nd tank army (5 tank, 3 motorized, 5 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division), the 2nd field army (9 infantry divisions), 4th field army (10 infantry divisions), 4th tank army (6 tank, 1 motorized

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'bathroom, 1 infantry and SS divisions, 9th Army (12 infantry divisions), 3rd Panzer Army (3 tank, 9 motorized, 2 infantry divisions). A total of 60 divisions, including fourteen armored and six motorized. Tank and motorized divisions were: The 2nd, 3rd and 4th tank groups. The attack on the ground forces was to be supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which by that time had up to 950 aircraft.

Consequently, the troops of the Western, Reserve, and Bryansk fronts slightly outnumbered the enemy in the number of infantry (cavalry) divisions, but they were about twice inferior to him in the number of tanks and aircraft. With regard to artillery, including anti-tank artillery, there are different opinions. Soviet sources claim that according to this indicator, the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were significantly inferior to the enemy. But German sources give completely different information. In addition, they recall that in the conduct of defense, artillery always has superiority over that which supports the advancing troops.

The German command intended, as before, to shatter the Soviet defenses with several powerful blows, tank "wedges" in order to then, developing the offensive in depth, begin to build up the next operational "pincers". This time, the main blows were delivered by the forces of the 2nd Panzer Group on Orel from the Shostka region, the 4th Panzer Group in the general direction to Moscow from the southwest, from the Roslavl region, the 3rd Panzer Group in the general direction to Moscow from the west, from heaven she is Spiritual. As a result of these strikes, supported in the rest of the sectors by the offensive of the field armies, small pockets were outlined on the approaches to Moscow in the regions of the south.

Nee Bryansk and on the outskirts of Vyazma, and then a large Tel in the Kaluga region. The German command believed that after completing this task, the resistance of the Red Army in the Moscow direction would drop, and the question of the surrender of the Soviet Union would already become obvious.

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Rzhev

Under pressure from the enemy, the troops of the 29th Army retreated from Sychevka to Rzhev. The Soviet command, taking into account the operational importance of this city, decided to organize its defense. But the troops allocated for this purpose were not on the spot. They began to collect everything that was at hand: courses for junior political officers (40 people), a carpentry battalion (about 70 people), a reserve regiment (144 people), a railway battalion (about 80 people), a consolidated detachment of headquarters commanders, a headquarters security battalion 31 th Army, three squadrons of cavalry without horses of the L. M. Dovator group and others. In total, about two thousand people gathered with difficulty. They are armed with about 50 guns of various calibers, up to a hundred machine guns. The local district committee of the party organized a detachment of the militia, which took up defense along the banks of the Volga. But then it turned out that these people were preparing to act as a partisan detachment behind enemy lines and, by order from above, they left their positions and left the city.

The enemy launched an attack on Rzhev with infantry supported by tanks. On November 11, at 2 pm, enemy tanks broke into Zubtsov and launched an offensive simultaneously in three directions: Zubtsov - Rzhev, Zubtsov - Voloko Lamsk and Zubtsov - Staritsa. Aviation bombed Rzhev. The city was on fire. Through Rzhev and the highway bridge across the Volga, military units and refugees went to the east. In the evening, a railway bridge across the Volga was blown up in Rzhev.

On October 12, another 909th rifle (up to 500 people) and artillery regiments approached for the defense of Rzhev. The 31st Army was preparing to defend the city. But it was at this time that the reorganization of the troops began. The commander of the 31st Army (Major General V.N. Dolmatov) was ordered to transfer the Rzhev combat sector under the control of the 174th Infantry Division, and the troops - to the 29th Army. The 31st Army was abolished, and its command was to leave for Medovukhovo, located beyond the Volga.

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Reorganization at such a crucial moment gave the most negative results. So, on October 12 at 10.30 the headquarters of the 22nd army, apparently not knowing that the 174th rifle division had already been withdrawn from this formation and sent

Lena to Rzhev, ordered its commander to follow a forced march to the Staritsa area and firmly occupy the crossings across the Volga there. The division commander, Colonel Ilyinykh, asked the army headquarters about how he should act. But instead I learned that at 5 pm the Military Council of the Western Front had already reported to Headquarters that the 174th Rifle Division had been transferred from Rzhev to the Staritsa area. Of course, the division could not simultaneously carry out these two mutually exclusive commands. She continued to move towards Rzhev.

At 10 p.m., the division commander received a new order from the headquarters of the 22nd Army. He was ordered, defending himself with the main forces in the Rzhev region, to send one regiment with a forced march to the Staritsa region with the task of "taking up a stubborn defense along the banks of the Staritsa River, firmly holding the crossings, covering the Kalinin direction."

But all these orders and orders are already too late. On October 12, at 5 p.m., the enemy occupied Staritsa, and Olenino from the west. A situation developed when formations and units of the 29th and former 31st armies were squeezed from both sides by German troops. There was a threat to their environment. The command of the Western Front decided to withdraw the 29th Army to the northern bank of the Volga.

But the headquarters of the 22nd Army did not let up. On the morning of October 13, Ilyinykh again received a radiogram demanding to report on the location of parts of his division and the combat missions they were performing. To this request, he was forced to answer that he did not have the necessary forces for the defense of Rzhev or Staritsa.

By the morning of October 13, enemy tanks were already 7 km from Kalinin, that is, more than 100 km north-northeast of Rzhev. On this day, the commander of the 174th

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rifle division received an order from the commander of the 29th Army, keeping the bridges in the Rzhev area, to ensure that the army marches beyond the Volga. This task was accomplished, and the formations of the 29th Army safely withdrew beyond the Volga, leaving Rzhev without a fight.

On October 14, Kalinin was captured by German troops. And only the reserves hastily transferred there could stop the further advance of the enemy to Torzhok.

In connection with the abandonment of Rzhev without a fight, the Headquarters decided to bring V. N. Dolmatov to trial by a military tribunal. Fuel was added to the fire by I. S. Konev, who accused the general of dishonesty and loss of control of subordinate troops. But the investigation did not reveal Dolmatov's personal guilt, making

the conclusion that "in the actual situation, the 31st Army did everything possible to hold the line indicated to it." Shortly thereafter, V.N. Dolmatov was appointed deputy commander of the troops for the defense of Moscow.

Vyazma

For an attack directly on Vyazma from the west, formations of the right flank of the 9th on the left army and the 3rd tank group were concentrated. From the south-west, in the same direction, the left-flank divisions of the 4th Field Army and the 4th Panzer Group were to advance.

The command of the Western Front, taking into account the greatest likelihood of an enemy strike in the area of the Smolensk-Vyazma highway, covered Vyazma from an attack from the west by the forces of the 19th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin and the 16th Army of Major General K.K. Rokossovsky. At the same time, the 19th Army defended a strip of 25 kilometers, and the 16th Army - 35 kilometers. The bulk of the tanks available in the front were also in the Vyazma direction - in the 19th, 16th armies and in the front reserve. So, in the 19th Army there was one tank brigade (24 tanks), in

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V. Y - two tank brigades (61 tanks). As part of the front reserve, there were a total of 385 tanks.

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The bottom of the Ira was concentrated on the probable direction of the enemy's main attack; in the defense zone of the 19th Army, their density was respectively 19 and about 6, and in the defense zone of the 16th Army, 9.4 and 2.

NI Behind these armies, between Yartsevo and Vyazma, was the 27th Army Corps, the reserve of the Western Front. South of Yartsevo, in the Dorogobuzh direction, in a strip 45 kilometers wide, the 20th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General F. A. Ershakov) and the 24th Army of the Reserve Front were defending. Directly to Vyazma, Li covered the troops of the 32nd Army of the same front.

"Thus, in the Vyazma region and to the west of it, by early October 1941, a significant number of troops were concentrated, which were organizationally part of three fronts. This meant the presence of gaps and open flanks between the fronts, as well as the lack of proper interaction between them. This was what the enemy was going to take advantage of.

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On the night of October 2, 1941, the Fuhrer's appeal was read to the soldiers of the Eastern Front. It said: "Today, at last, the prerequisites for the last cruel blow have been created, which, even before the start of winter, should crush the enemy and deal him a mortal blow." One of these strikes was planned in the Vyazma region.

At dawn on October 2, the 3rd Panzer Group and formations of the 9th Army delivered the main blow at the junction between the 30th and 19th armies, broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and advanced 10-15 kilometers by the end of the day. Under these conditions, the commander of the Western Front decided to push back the enemy that had broken through and restore the situation with a counterattack by the troops of the 30th and 19th armies, as well as part of his reserves, united in an operational group under the general command of General Boldin.

In the capital work of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War", it is very "modestly" noted that these "counterattacks undertaken by Zee on October 4 were not successful. General Boldin himself, in his memoirs about these counterattacks, also "modestly"

reads.

The enemy, having repelled counterattacks, began to develop an offensive at the junction of the 49th and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front. At the same time, the troops of the 4th German field army and the 4th tank group began to develop an offensive in the zone of the 43rd and 33rd armies, pushing them to the north and east.

On the basis of the first day of the offensive, the command of the German ground forces noted that the offensive of the troops of Army Group Center along the entire width of the front took the enemy by surprise and therefore initially met with only insignificant resistance. It was concluded that "in general, the enemy's defense turned out to be weaker than expected."

The Soviet high command was unable to quickly respond to the changing situation and prevent further breakthrough of the German motorized formations. The General Staff of the Red Army received up to

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'reports of successful actions in the defense of the 16th, 20th and 24th armies of the Western and Reserve fronts, and few could 'believe that German tanks had already entered the Sias-Demyansk-Yukhnov highway, bypassing the main grouping of Soviet troops.

s to K. Rokossovsky recalls:

>, "Messages from the 19th Army by the evening of October 3 became more fey. The commander spoke on the phone:

'- Forced to bend his right flank and turn < front to the north ... I have no connection with my neighbor - the 30th Army.

2 Lukin asked for help, and we sent him two rifle divisions, a tank brigade and an artillery regiment.

° Our neighbor on the left, General Ershakov, was calm.

2 No alarm signals were received from the front headquarters.

: And meanwhile the storm was approaching. Soon it broke out under absolutely unexpected circumstances "(Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's debt. - P. 81).

.,. On October 4, the armored wedges of the 3rd and 4th tank troupes continued to develop the offensive in the direction of Vyazma, covering the 19th, 16th and 20th armies of the Western and the 32nd, 24th and 43rd armies of the Reserve fronts. By the end of that day, the tip of the tank wedge of General G. Goth (3rd Panzer Group) was already 60, and E. Göpner (4th Panzer Group) was 70 kilometers from Vyazma.

On the evening of October 5, K.K. Rokossovsky unexpectedly received a telegram from the headquarters of the Western Front, in which he was instructed to immediately transfer the sector with the troops of the 16th Army to the commander of the 20th Army, General F.A. organizing a counterattack in the direction of Yukhnov. Ro Kossovsky at first did not even believe this telegram and asked for confirmation. But, having received it, he proceeded to carry out the order, which in that situation seemed meaningless. Later, Konstantin Konstantinovich Nisal: "Our headquarters moved to a new destination,

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and we all felt that some terrible events had taken place, and at this alarming moment we had no troops. there is no certainty that we will find troops where they send us. Attempts to contact the front headquarters by radio were unsuccessful. We found ourselves in some kind of emptiness and in a very stupid position "(Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty, - p. 82).

As K. K. Rokossovsky foresaw, the promised divisions did not turn up in Vyazma. Contact with the headquarters of the front still failed. While Konstantin Konstantinovich and the officers who arrived with him were trying to sort out the situation, enemy tanks broke into Vyazma. The headquarters group of the 16th Army barely succeeded

break out of this city in an easterly direction.

Soviet troops, holding positions between the flanks of the breakthrough areas, were 100-110 kilometers away from the city. There was a real threat of a new large encirclement. But at the request of the commander of the Western Front, I. S. Konev, to allow a retreat to the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line, the Supreme Commander did not respond. And only on October 6, when the encirclement ring near Vyazma was narrowed to 20 kilometers, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command finally allowed the commander of the Western Front, I. S. Konev, to begin a withdrawal.

In the work "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War", only a few paragraphs are devoted to this withdrawal: "Due to the fact that on October 6 the headquarters of the Western Front moved to a new command post, he led the withdrawal of troops weakly. The administration of the 16th Army managed to retreat, transferring its troops to the 20th and 19th armies.

At 19.30 on October 6, a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was sent to the headquarters of the Western and Reserve Fronts on the direction of the army general to the area of operations of these fronts [I. K. Zhukov as a representative of the Headquarters.

On October 7, the enemy broke through with his motorized corps to Vyazma, from the north with the 56th corps of the 3rd tank group, from the south and east with the 46th and 40th corps

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Fragment of an anti-tank ditch on the outskirts of Moscow

4th Panzer Group, and surrounded parts of twelve rifle divisions and four tank brigades of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies and General Boldin's group. The encirclement of Soviet troops west of Vyazma was a major setback in the early days of the Battle of Moscow. On October 8, the commander of the Western Front ordered the encircled troops to break through from the encirclement in the direction of Gzhatsk. The actions of the troops on the breakthrough were not clearly planned. Each of the armies tried to break through independently in order, which could not give the necessary results "(Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 1. - P. 280-281). Thus, the defense of Vyazma, in the area of which the troops of the second echelon of the Western and the 32nd Army of the Reserve Fronts were supposed to be, for some reason failed miserably. Those formations that by that time still remained unbroken and held the defense between the flanks of the German ° breakthroughs in the Vyazma region, on the orders of the Headquarters, began to withdraw from their positions to the east, hoping to make a gap in the German stake on the move. But

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the rapid retreat of the formations of the Western and Reserve fronts (after the completion of the encirclement) was in the hands of the command of Army Group Center, since now the Soviet troops had no room for maneuver. Pursued from the west by the German infantry divisions, the units of the Red Army ran up against the steel curtain of the German panzer divisions in the east. These are not just words. It must be understood that on a front only 80 kilometers wide, south and north of Vyazma, the Germans concentrated six tank divisions. The 10th Panzer Division was advancing directly from the direction of Vyazma.

The front of the Soviet defense was rapidly narrowing, and all attempts by the command of the 19th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin) and the 20th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov) to break through in the area of the village of Bogoroditskoye (north -west of Vyazma) and in the Panfilovo-Yushkovo region (south of Vyazma), undertaken on October 8-12, 1941, ended in failure.

According to the report map of the OKH on October 13, 1941, the number of formations of the Western and Reserve fronts that fell into the ring was 24 rifle divisions, 3 tank divisions and units of 15 rifle and 7 tank divisions.

According to operational data plotted on the OKH report card on October 8, 1941, units of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 43rd Soviet armies, consisting of 23 rifle divisions and 3 tank divisions, as well as individual units of eight rifle and two armored divisions. About six more infantry, one tank division and one tank brigade were forced to operate in scattered combat formations in the area of the villages of Medvedki-Preobrazhenskoye, north of Spas-Demyansk.

The encircled list does not include the 16th Army. This is due to the fact that its commander and staff were recalled to the east in advance by order of the front. But the formations of this army, transferred to the 20th Army, were surrounded and almost all were captured or died. K.K. Rokossovsky writes that, having learned about the state of the former

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quiet subordinates, he even wanted to return to the troops. But I am the enemy, by sealing the ring, I have already deprived us of this opportunity. and most importantly, the headquarters of the 16th army was supposed to be used 'to carry out some task, the duty was to appear and receive it.'

— Thus, due to a combination of circumstances

, K. Rokossovsky has once again escaped the encirclement

death, or captivity in order to subsequently PERFORM "some" important task. It is difficult to call it otherwise than fate.

On that day, the headquarters of Army Group Center issued Order No. 1870 on the continuation of operations in the Moscow direction. It said: "The enemy armies, surrounded to the west of Vyazma, are facing their annihilation. The entire encirclement front continues to advance against them. All units that can be released must immediately start pursuing enemy units that have escaped encirclement in order to prevent him from creating a new front of defense ...

, Along with the task of destroying the enemy in the "cauldron" near Vyazma, which was assigned to the divisions of the 4th and 9th German armies, F. von Bock set his troops for dachas to continue the attack on Moscow. At the same time, the 4th Army was to advance with its 13th and 12th Army Corps from the line of Kaluga, Medyn in a northeast direction, and the 57th Motorized Corps was to capture the crossings across the Protva River. The divisions of the 4th Panzer Group, which were not engaged in blocking the "cauldron", received the task of advancing along the road from Vyaz-we to Mozhaisk. The released forces of the 3rd tank troupe had to prepare for a further strike in the direction of Kalinin, Rzhev.

_ The German historian K. Reinhardt, in his book "Povo Rot near Moscow", writes the following regarding the fighting in the Vyazma region in early October 1941:

, "October 2, in the "last painful and decisive battle of this year," all the other troops of the Center group entered, from which Hitler demanded that they "according to

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with the next powerful blow ... they defeated the enemy before the onset of winter. Good weather favored the massive use of aviation,

which gave especially active support to the 4th and 9th armies, which acted in the direction of the main attack. 1387 aircraft participated in the fighting.

The breakthrough of the 3rd Panzer Group in the defense zone of the 24th and 43rd Russian armies was successful. The erroneous idea of the Soviet command about the inexpediency of carrying out defensive measures in this area, which was located between the Western and Bryansk fronts and was under the jurisdiction of the Reserve Front, led to catastrophic consequences for the Soviet troops. When both armies began to withdraw as a result of a German attack, the southern flank of the Western Front and the northern flank of the Bryansk Front were exposed. On October 5, Budyonny reported on this matter: "The situation on the left flank of the Reserve Front was created extremely

serious. There is nothing to close the resulting gap along the Moscow Highway."

Besides, the command of the Red Army initially thought that there was an offensive with limited objectives and that everything was not so tragic. The divisions of the first echelon, which fought defensive battles with the advancing enemy, did not know what to do, since the Russian command was paralyzed for some time. Already on the second day of the offensive ... the mobile units of the Germans bypassed the left flank of the Western Front and went to its rear. On October 5, the tank wedge of the 4th Panzer Group turned north and reached Vyazma two days later.

As a result of the breakdown in communication, both the formation commanders and the Soviet high command had no clear idea of the situation at the front until that day. K. F. Telegin, who was then a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, paints a figurative picture of the situation that developed in connection with the offensive of the German troops:

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"Until October 5, all the attention of the Central Committee of the Party, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front and the Military Council of the District is focused on "the complicated situation near Tula. On October 4, workers of the Political Directorate brought a translation of G. G. Zhukov's speech on the radio. The Fuhrer announced that the last decisive offensive was being launched on the Eastern Front and that "The Red Army has been defeated and has not been able to restore its strength" OA. ". It was not clear what kind of "decisive offensive" and "defeat" of the Red Army was in question. The General Staff received no such data from the Western and Reserve Fronts... But still, the night of October 5 passed in anxious worries. Communication by telephone with the Western Front was interrupted, and our communications officer did not report anything ... But at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, the pilots of the 120 Yakovlevs are moving a column of tanks and motorized infantry up to 25 km long, and they did not find our troops in front of it.

Telegin ordered that this report be rechecked by means of aerial reconnaissance. This time the Russian fighters were even fired upon, but again Telegin did not believe it. The High Command simply could not imagine that the Germans could break through to a depth of 100-120 km. The best pilots were sent to reconnaissance for the third time. They reported that the Germans had already occupied Yelnya during this time. Only after this did the Russian High Command recognize the situation as serious, and Stalin ordered that the Moscow defensive region be brought to full combat readiness. The Military Council received an order to take positions near Mozhaisk with all the troops at its disposal and "at all costs to delay the enemy who had broken through in front of the Mozhaisk border for five -

seven days until the Stavka's reserves arrive...

At first, the Russian troops stubbornly defended themselves, but then they began to retreat to the east, trying to avoid the encirclement of NIA. On October 3, the war diary of Army Group Center recorded: "The general impression of these

yah, based on air reconnaissance data, it was

that the enemy is determined to defend himself, and there are no other orders from the Russian high command."

On October 4, General Konev reported to Stalin about the threat of encirclement. On October 5, he received an order from the Stavka to withdraw to the Vyazma-Rzhev line of defense prepared in advance. At the same time, the 31st and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front were transferred to him in order to ensure unified command and control of troops in the Vyazma region. However, on 7 October the 10th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group linked up with the 7th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group. The encirclement ring east of Vyazma was closed.

At the same time, as German air reconnaissance reported, "significant enemy forces have escaped encirclement, and large columns of Russian troops are moving in the direction of Moscow." The Russians again, despite heavy losses, managed to timely withdraw large forces from the threat of encirclement.

It should also be noted that, leaving the encirclement, the Russians inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans. According to the report of the commander of the 7th Panzer Division, on October 11 and 12, the formation lost more than 1000 people killed and wounded, and one battalion was practically completely destroyed "(K. 83-86).

Now I propose to look at how the events of that time were seen through the eyes of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, General F. Halder. In particular, he writes:

"2 October. [Army Group Center. Today at 5.30 the troops, using clear autumn weather, launched a major operation "Typhoon".

The situation at the front in the evening: the 4th Panzer Group dispersed the resisting enemy groups and advanced 5 km in depth. The troops of the 4th Army are successfully advancing on the entire front and have advanced an average of 6-12 km. Panzer Group Gotha and the 9th Army are advancing quite successfully, advancing up to 20 km in depth.

Installation of anti-tank barriers on the streets of Moscow

October 3rd. Operation Typhoon develops almost classically. Guderian's tank group, advancing through Orel, reached Mtsensk without encountering any resistance. Göpner's tank group rapidly broke through the enemy's defenses and reached Mozhaisk. Hoth's tank group reached Kholm, thus approaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper, and in the north advanced as far as the Bely. The enemy continues to hold unattacked sections of the front everywhere, as a result of which a deep encirclement of these enemy groups is outlined in the future.

. October 5th. The battle on the front of Army Group Center is becoming more and more classic. Guderian's tank group entered the Orel-Bryansk highway. The enemy units that counterattacked the left flank of Guderian's tank troupe were driven back and would later be occupied by Ruzhena. The 2nd Army advances rapidly with its northern flank, encountering almost no enemy resistance.

Göpner's tank group, bypassing a large swampy area from the east and west, advances in the direction

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Vyazma. In front of the troops of the right flank of the Hoepner Panzer Group, followed by the (57th) motorized corps from the reserve, which has not yet taken part in the battles, there is no more enemy.

October 6th. Army Group Center. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army, advancing from Orel to Tula, experienced a powerful enemy counterattack from the northeast (in the offensive zone of the 4th Panzer Division). On its right flank, contrary to expectations, it was completely calm, so it turned out to be possible to bring up the lagging mobile divisions of the right flank and replace them with infantry divisions transferred in the direction of Rylsk.

The 17th Panzer Division succeeded in capturing Bryansk from the east.

The right flank tank group of Göpner and the silt flank of the 2nd Army advance on Yukhnov and beyond without encountering significant enemy forces.

The 3rd Panzer Group, subordinate to the 9th Army, finally broke through the enemy's second line of defense to its entire depth and entered the 7th Panzer Division onto the motorway in the area north of Vyazma. The 9th Army broke the resistance of the enemy in the area of Bely. On the whole, it can be said that the operation being conducted by Army Group Center is approaching its apogee—the complete encirclement of the enemy.

Today Göpner's Panzer Group linked up with Gotha's Panzer Group in the Vyazma region. This is a major success. achieved during the five-day battles.

The 9th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Rzhevsky direction (in the Bely region) and put up infantry for elephants to cover its flank, which was entering Vyazma, from the northeast and east.

October 8th. Army Group Center. On the eastern flank of the 2nd Panzer Army, as before, no enemy pressure was felt. The western flank of the army, which is subject to enemy counterattacks, is securely covered. As a result of unfavorable weather, the offensive through the Orel-Bryansk highway was suspended. Goto troops

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'willing to continue the offensive. In the area north of this tsiosse, the enemy forces are withdrawing in east and northeast directions. So there is still a gap in our 'big environment' system here. The encirclement of the enemy grouping in the Vyazma region is protected and protected from possible enemy attacks from the outside in order to release the encircled formations.

“ The right flank of the 4th Army had already advanced far in the direction of Kaluga.

‘ The 9th Army, having secured a strong barrier from the Rzhev direction and from the east, apparently completely eliminated the threat to its flank and rear.

_ October 9th. Enemy pressure on the western flank of Guderian's tank group is increasing all the time ... The battles against the encircled enemy grouping in the Vyazma region are downright classic. Outside the pocket, the 4th Army advances with its right flank on Kaluga, while the 9th Army concentrates forces on the northern flank for an attack on the Rzhev area.

‘ Teneral Rich. Air reconnaissance data. The transfer of reserves was not found. Very intensive movement of echelons on the railways (delivery of supplies 'or evacuation) from the south to Moscow "(Halder F. Military diary. Vol. 3).

_ Of particular interest is what he writes in his memoirs regarding the situation, plans for an attack on Vyazma and during the operation, Commander General G. Goth, Duchy of the 3rd Panzer Group, writes in his memoirs. I offer the reader a section of his book "Tank Operations" with the slightest reductions. In particular, he writes:

“North of the Smolensk-Vyazma highway, the enemy's defense passed through Yartsevo, along the western

river Vop, crossed the Novoselki-Bely highway, then turned sharply to the west and skirted from the southwest and west a vast swampy area located south of the railway line st. Western Dvina -

In ... In general, the Russian defense was a well-developed system of trenches and fortifications. Here eng

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The skies hoped to hold out through the winter. The rear line of defense was also built. It was supposed to pass along the eastern bank of the Dnieper (in its upper reaches), under Sychevka, west of Rzhev.

Actually, the Moscow defensive line went from Kaluga through the field of the Battle of Borodino in the direction of Kalinin. Hundreds of thousands of workers of Moscow enterprises built a defense system in depth here, using all the means of modern fortification. The core of this defense was created earlier and was located on both sides of the Smolensk-Moscow highway. It consisted of concrete fortifications covered with barbed wire, minefields, anti-tank ditches...

The German troops were located as follows: between Yartsevo and Novoselki - the 8th and 5th army corps (eight infantry divisions), further to Baevo - the 6th army corps (three infantry divisions). The 23rd Army Corps (also consisting of three infantry divisions) was deployed along the Western Dvina River to the area north of Andreapol.

At the beginning of September, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group received an order to develop and report to the commander of the Army Group "Center" an operation plan based on the following idea: the 9th Army cuts through the enemy's front and advances in the direction of Vyazma, with a goal in cooperation with the 4th Army, attacking Vyazma from the southwest, destroy the encircled enemy units. It was also ordered to report on what could be the actions of the 3rd Panzer Group in the general offensive of the 9th Army.

At that time, the 3rd Panzer Group included: the 7th Panzer and 14th Motorized Divisions, the 900th Training Brigade. In addition, it was supposed to transfer to its disposal |, bi 8th tank, 36th motorized divisions with the headquarters of the 41st tank corps, as well as the headquarters of the 56th tank corps.

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The plan of operation "provided for a breakthrough from the No-

village across the hill to Vyazma. With the concentration of large tank forces and with more or less good weather, it was possible to reach the Dnieper on the second day of the offensive. in the Kholm area, and then strike in the direction of Na Vyazma before the enemy is able to bring up the forces necessary to repel the offensive. The outlined encirclement front from Vyazma to Kholm (60 kilometers) could be provided with sufficient forces provided that infantry divisions were quickly brought up. The disadvantage of this option was that large enemy forces southwest of the city of Bely would only be subjected to a frontal attack, but would not be surrounded. Therefore, sooner or later, these enemy troops could appear on the left flank of the 9th Army. Another disadvantage was that, due to the narrowness of the offensive zone, the horse-drawn wagons of infantry formations would slow down the rapid advance of the second echelon of the tank corps. Therefore, it was necessary to reassign the neighboring infantry divisions to the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group.

_ The command of the 9th Army also submitted to the headquarters of the army group its offensive plan, which provided for the main attack by the forces of the 5th Army Corps across the Vop River in an easterly direction. To ensure the rapid advance of infantry units, it was proposed to use tank corps on the right and left of the 5th Army Corps. But this would exclude an operational breakthrough of the tank group behind the enemy's rear. Therefore, the commander of the army group ordered a breakthrough by the concentrated forces of the 3rd Panzer Group in the direction of Kholm - Vyazma. The neighboring 5th and 6th Army Corps were reassigned to the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group.

_ Those boilers, in the creation of which until that time the 3rd Panzer Group had to participate, were obtained in the course of the operations themselves. The encirclement plan arose on the spot, without special preliminary development. Now

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it was about breaking through the enemy front in order to provide tank formations with sufficient space to strike at the enemy from the rear. Therefore, it was necessary to carry out systematic preparations for a breakthrough in advance, which would be a prerequisite for the success of the encirclement operation.

The conditions of the terrain and roads in the region east of Novoselki allowed the use of only one tank corps in the direction of the main attack, which could provide a narrow gap in the enemy's defenses. As for the second tank corps, due to the bending of the front line, it had to be used first to strike in the direction of Belyi. Thus, both corps were forced to act in divergent directions.

The headquarters of the 56th Panzer Corps, which arrived earlier than the others, was instructed to develop a plan for a breakthrough in the direction of Kholm. The 7th and 8th tank and 129th infantry divisions were transferred to his submission. At the last moment, it was decided to hold up the 8th Panzer Division as part of Army Group North, so it was replaced by the 6th Panzer Division. Unfortunately, the forces of the 4th Panzer Corps had to be split up, which had been operating in the same composition from the very beginning of the campaign. The tank regiments of both tank divisions were not completed to full combat strength, while the success of the breakthrough depended on the penetrating power of the tank strike; that is why the tank regiment of the 7th Panzer Division was temporarily reassigned to the commander of the 6th Panzer Division. After reaching the Dnieper, it was supposed to restore the former order of subordination. The expediency of such a measure, as a result of which the 7th Panzer Division was deprived of its main means of attack, is doubtful... |

The 129th Infantry Division was ordered to follow the panzer divisions in such a way as to be included in the encirclement operation only on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The task assigned to the 5th Army Corps, using the blow of tanks, was to provide a permanent cover

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I oh, the body. In addition to the 1st Panzer and 36th motorized divisions, the 6th Infantry Division, which was in combat contact with the enemy, was subordinate to the corps.

:{-th tank corps was to capture the highway junction - the city of Bely, then turn tank Wu and the motorized division to the front to the east, force the Dnieper above Kholm and secure the left flank

3rd tank group from enemy attacks from the bychevka area. It was possible to successfully carry out the turn of units to the east and maintain operational cooperation within the entire Zankovo group only with very skillful management of the corps ...

The breakthrough was made with unexpected ease on October 2, in dry weather. The 8th Aviation Corps once again provided effective support to the ground troops. Enemy resistance in the tank penetration sector was less stubborn than we had expected. =. The tank units of the 56th Panzer Corps quickly broke through the wooded area along the Volp River, half way between Novoselki and Kholm. Stubborn battles once again Returned southwest of the Hill. A tank brigade of Russians approached here from the south, fighting not for life, but for death. These battles delayed the crossing of the Dnieper. On October 4, the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions broke through the surviving bridges to the eastern bank, crushed enemy resistance and turned towards Vyazma. October 6 7th

the tank division entered the motorway and found itself in the rear of the Enemy, who began the withdrawal to the eastern bank of the Dnieper too late. 7 October 10th Panzer Division 4th

The Nkovoy group joined in the Vyazma region with the left-wing regiment of the 7th Panzer Division. By this time, the 56th Panzer Corps had already created a continuous gunning front in the sector from Vyazma to the Dnieper (east of

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Holm). The fierce night attacks of the enemy, who tried to break through in this sector to the east, did not succeed.
had...

41] Panzer Corps had to overcome strong enemy resistance in the area southwest of Bely. On October 4, having reached the area south of the city, the corps turned its front to the east. The task of capturing the city was to be solved by the 6th Army Corps. In an effort to link up with the 56th Tank Corps, the 41st Tank Corps broke through to the Dnieper and crossed it on October 7 in order to cover the rear of the units holding the inner front of the encirclement.

The 5th Army Corps, quickly passing through Kholm and the area to the south of it, pulled itself up to the tank units, which made it possible to quickly and in accordance with the plan change the tank divisions located on the inner front of the encirclement. Only insignificant enemy forces managed to escape to the east ...

But on October 7, the day when the encirclement of enemy troops near Vyazma was completed, the first snow fell on the entire front - a warning that it was time to suspend operations. Despite this, the German command decided to continue the development of operations with the aim of capturing Moscow or encircling it before the end of the year ...

The 3rd Panzer Group captured Kalinin on October 14th. But after that, the enemy had an ally who managed to do what, despite all the sacrifices, the Russian command could not achieve. Not the Russian winter, but the autumn rains put an end to the German offensive. It rained day and night, the rain fell continuously, interspersed with snow. The roads got wet and traffic stopped. The lack of ammunition, fuel and lubricants and food determined the tactical and operational situation for the next three weeks "(Got G. Tank operations. - P. 153-159).

On October 10, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Western and Reserve Fronts were united, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the united front. I. S. Konev

hall by his deputy. The composition of the Military Council of the front included N. A. Bulganin, I. S. Khokhlov and S. N. Kruglov.

„ At this time, the command of Army Group Center, using a previously tested method, tried to split the front of the encirclement west of Vyazma into two parts, which was theirs: it was easier to suppress the resistance and will to fight of the Vbvet troops. For this purpose, on October 12, 1941, the 87th Ivhot division, on combat patrol of which the Command Post of the 8th Army Corps was located, made its way from the west, along the highway, to Vyazma. COMMUNICATION was established with the units of the 10th Panzer Division VIZIA located in the city.

“On October 12, Soviet units made an attempt to break through the highway from north to south west of Vyazma. But. General Lukin, who commanded these troops, did not know that in the Selivanovo area, where General Vrshakov was located, the resistance of the encircled was already practically suppressed. Nevertheless, the Germans could not hold back the last desperate onslaught of the Soviet soldiers on the night of October 12-13, and a significant part of them, as a result of heavy and bloody battles, were able to break through to the south. However, there they fell into a new environment.

=,* . On October 13, Soviet troops in the Vyazma region ceased organized resistance, although their scattered groups continued to fight behind German lines for at least another ten days. Some of them even managed to escape from the encirclement.

The picture of the completed battle was truly tragic. An officer from the headquarters of the 8th Army Corps wrote in his report: “... It was frosty and the first snow fell. Endless streams of Russian prisoners walked along the auto Strada to the west. The corpse fields near the centers of the last battles were full of horror. Everywhere there were masses of saddled horses, property, guns, tanks were lying around.

The losses of the German troops were also significant. Only one 8th Army Corps in the period of October 2-14, 1941 lost more than 4 thousand people killed, missing and wounded. At the same time, you need

take into account that during this time its units captured 51.5 thousand Soviet military personnel and took 157 tanks, 444 guns and other military equipment as trophies.

In the battle near Vyazma, German military art once again proved its superiority over the Soviet one. The blows were delivered by tank wedges in narrow sections of the front, thanks to which it was possible to achieve

significant superiority in forces and means in the chosen directions. On the rest of the front, the Soviet troops were pinned down by the enemy's infantry divisions, which, after the encirclement was completed, created his internal front.

During operations, the Germans made the most of their advantage in firepower and mobility and struck most often where they were not expected.

In the German motorized and infantry formations, interaction with aviation was well established. Under the command of each formation, an Air Force communications headquarters was created, which received applications from ground units for the bombing of enemy troops and transferred them to squadrons providing air support for the offensive. Moreover, at the command of each corps and division operating in the main direction, there were Luftwaffe officers who kept in touch directly with the combat groups of aircraft in the air.

Another reason for the futility of the attempts of the Soviet command to block the path of the tank wedges of the Wehrmacht was the fact that the Germans often knew about the intentions of the enemy. The German field commanders promptly took advantage of radio intercepts of communications between Soviet headquarters and used radio deception. So, on October 6, 1941, at 13 o'clock, the radio interception control post of the Army Group Center transmitted information to the operational department of the group's headquarters about the order of the Western Front to the commander of the 32nd Army with the following content: "At dawn on October 7, with all your might, hit the wall of the enemy tank forces to

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others are moving along the Yukhnov-Znamenka road. All measures must be taken." This information was immediately brought to the headquarters of the 4th German Army, General Marshal von Kluge, who took the necessary countermeasures. -. At the same time, the attempt of the German command after the Vyazma War to organize an effective pursuit of the Soviet troops failed. Despite the fact that Medyn was taken on October 11, and Kaluga on October 12, "Dead gaps in the Mozhaisk defense line" were created, the offensive of the German troops developed with difficulty. The continuing stubborn battles of the Soviet troops in the encirclement indicated that the withdrawal of the Foisk from the Vyazma region would require the German command to take longer than expected. Attempts by units of the Red Army to break out of the encirclement in the Vyazma region on October 30-12 pinned down the 40th and 46th tank corps intended for pursuit and delayed their replacement.

Only on October 14 was it possible to regroup the main

forces of the formations of the 4th and 9th armies operating near Vyazma and direct them to the pursuit, which began on October 45. But even then the forward detachments of the Germans turned out to be too weak to break the growing resistance of the enemy in the first onslaught. They could only move forward with very heavy losses.

On October 15, the commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal G. von Kluge, assessing the situation, stated that a critical investment had developed on the Eastern Front. On the one hand, the German troops found themselves in freezing weather without winter uniforms and warm apartments. On the other hand, "the impassable terrain and the stubbornness with which the enemy defends himself, covering his communications and quartering areas, make it extremely difficult for our forward detachments, which are still weak, to advance."

In the report of the headquarters of the 57th tank corps, which was advancing in the area of Medyn and Mozhaisk, Los reported that "the last battles for mastering Russian positions

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The actions were the most fierce during the entire period of the campaign in Russia. Losses in tanks increased greatly from the beginning of the operation until mid-October. Thus, the 6th Panzer Division, which on October 10 had over 200 tanks at its disposal, on October 16 had at its disposal only 60 tanks ready for use in battle. The 20th Panzer Division, which was one of the first to start pursuing Soviet troops in the direction of Moscow, out of 283 tanks it had on September 28, by October 16 irretrievably lost 43 tanks. The 4th Panzer Division, battered in the battles in the Mtsensk region, had by this time only 38 tanks.

According to available German data, on 16 October the 2nd Panzer Army had 271 tanks, the 3rd Panzer Group 259 tanks, and the 4th Panzer Group 710 tanks. In total, the commander of Army Group Center had 1240 tanks at his disposal. At the same time, you need to understand that, of course, we were talking about the tanks available. But there were far fewer of them ready for use in battle. The infantry units were also forced to pay a heavy price for their successes in the offensive. The losses of Army Group Center for the period from October 1 to October 17 amounted to 50 thousand people.

In the combat log of the headquarters of Army Group Center on October 19, it was recorded:

"On the night of October 18-19, it rained on the entire front of the army group. The condition of the roads deteriorated so much that a severe crisis ensued in supplying the troops with food, ammunition, and especially fuel. Road conditions, weather conditions and terrain in the

significantly delayed the course of military operations. The main concern of all connections is the supply of material and technical means and food.

F. von Bock was forced to admit in his diary. that the pursuit of Soviet troops after the capture of Vyazma did not have the success he had hoped for. He wrote: "In total, all this (private successes achieved) can only be assessed as nothing. dismemberment

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The battle formations of the army group and the terrible weather have meant that we are sitting still. And the Russians are gaining "time to replenish their defeated divisions and strengthen the defense, especially since near Moscow they have a lot of railways and highways in their hands. This is very bad."

The difficulties caused by heavy losses in men and equipment and the lack of replenishment were further complicated by mudslides and disruption of supplies. The mudslide did not immediately make itself felt during the hostilities. Only from mid-October did its disastrous consequences begin to be felt on the entire front of Army Group Center. This happened precisely at the very moment when the fighting began on the defensive line near Mozhaik and when the advancing German divisions needed a large amount of ammunition and fuel.

The German command, of course, was aware of the difficulties that could arise during the autumn thaw. But it believed that this should not be taken into account, since it was planned to win the battle for Moscow before the onset of the thaw, that is, until mid-October. The German leadership did not consider it necessary to consult on this issue with specialists. The opinion of the meteorologists at the disposal of the OKH was not requested. .

As a result, the advancing German troops did not properly prepare for the thaw. In the autumn of 1941, the OKH asserted that the Germans had suffered an "incredible natural disaster" and that "thaw was unprecedentedly strong and dragged on for an unusually long time." Thus, the German command was ready to shift its guilt to some higher power, which did not depend on it. Later, even Hitler had to recognize this. In particular, he once stated: "With the onset of the rains, we were once again convinced that it was 'Happiness that the German armies did not advance 'Far into the depths of Russia' in October."

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Troops of the 4th Field Army under the command of General Field Marshal G. von Kluge and two tank groups advanced on Moscow in the Central direction. The 3rd Panzer Group was commanded by Colonel General G. Goth, the 4th by Colonel General E. Goepner.

Kluge Hans Pontor, background, German commander of the Second World War, in the battle of Moscow commanded the 4th Army and Army Group Center, Field Marshal.

The 4th German field army, which until the end of December 1941 was commanded by Field Marshal Hans Gonthar von Kluge, led the attack on Moscow from Smolensk and Vyazma.

G. Kluge was born in Poznan (Prussia) on October 30, 1882. After completing his studies at a military school, he enters the service in the imperial army and in 1901 receives the rank of second lieutenant. In 1912 he graduated from the military academy, where he received training through the service of the General Staff.

Member of the First World War. He commanded a battalion, was a representative of the General Staff at the headquarters of the infantry division and the Alpine Corps. He took part in the battles on the Western Front, was wounded. Captain. He proved to be a good staff officer.

After the war, he was left in the service of the Reichswehr. He worked in the Ministry of Defense, was a battalion commander, chief of staff of a cavalry division, commander of an artillery regiment. Since 1933 - inspector of the signal troops, major general. Since 1934 - commander of the military district in Munster, lieutenant general. Since 1936 - General of Artillery.

At the same time, Kluge was a supporter of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, W. von Fritsch, who was removed from his post in February 1938 on the basis of accusations of homosexuality. In mid-1938, he was also dismissed. But in connection with the approach of the war [Hitler ordered the return of G. Kluge to the army, and

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A. Hitler and V. Keitel among the commanders of the Wehrmacht on the eve of the attack on Moscow

he was appointed commander of the newly created 6th Army Group.

_ During the Second World War, during the attack on Poland, he commanded the 4th Army. This army cut the Polish Corridor in three days, and then paved the way for Warsaw with

northwest. This campaign raised Kluge's profile in Hitler's eyes. [Colonel General.

During the defeat of the French army on the Western Front, his army operated in the main direction, where the French were surrounded and captured. Promoted to General Field Marshal.

On the Soviet-German front, General Klyuche commanded the 4th field army. His army participated in the encirclement and capture of the 10th Soviet army near Minsk. Participated in the battle near Smolensk.

From the beginning of August - the commander of the infantry corps. In September 1965, he spoke out as an opponent of the decisive offensive of the NIA against Moscow. But F. von Bock ordered him to take over

And.

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leadership of the 4th Army, on the flanks of which the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups operated. Both tank commanders were dissatisfied with the too slow action of the infantry, but Kluge could not do anything to increase the pace of the offensive.

On December 25, he replaced F. von Bock as commander-in-chief of the Army Group Center. In this capacity, he began to take revenge on those generals who had previously criticized his actions. General G. Guderian was the first to achieve the removal of General G. Guderian, then the commander of the 4th Army, General L. Kübler, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Hoepner, and the commander of the 9th Army, General A. Strauss, were removed.

In 1942, the troops of Army Group Center fought local battles. As victories on their account were the defeat of the formations of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General P. A. Belov near Kirov, Kaluga Region, the defeat of the troops of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps near the city of Bely, and the disruption of the Soviet offensive near Rzhev.

In 1944, Hitler appointed Field Marshal H. von Kluge as commander-in-chief of the troops on the Western Front, where the Anglo-American army inflicted a number of defeats on the Germans. Assuming command of the German troops in the West, Kluge developed and successfully carried out the Ardennes Offensive, which resulted in a serious defeat for the Allies.

Field Marshal H. Kluge was connected with the participants in the conspiracy against Hitler, but the decisive moment did not support them. Later one of the biographers of the Wehrmacht commanders

wrote that Kluge was a Prussian officer - an adherent of the traditions of the military caste, who had significant abilities in his chosen field of activity. But he was also distinguished by an indecisive character and an opportunism that bordered on weakness of will. With his penetrating mind, Kluge understood the enormity of the Nazi regime, but at the same time he saw significant personal and professional benefits from working with him. On

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'Throughout the Second World War he knew that he 'should join the anti-Hitler conspiracy, 'BUT hesitated between a sense of duty and personal gain. Until the end, he never made a final decision. For this double game, he received the nickname "cunning fox." ®' After the failed plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944, he helped some of the conspirators escape, after which he sent a letter to the Führer, in which he called the conspirators "ruthless killers" and assured Hitler of his "unwavering loyalty." But the arrested conspirators named Kluge among their accomplices. A. Hitler did not immediately take any repressive measures against Kluge, but made it clear that he no longer trusted him, as before. , `` In July 1944, H. Kluge could not prevent the allied landing in Normandy. He removed 'a number of German military leaders from their posts, but the situation did not 'become better. Hitler ordered him to counterattack against Nika and throw him into the sea. But it is not possible to complete this task.

On August 15, H. von Kluge left his headquarters for the troops and disappeared for 12 hours. He later stated that on the way he was hit by allied air strikes, and the truck with the radio station was destroyed. But Hitler did not believe the field marshal, deciding that Kluge was trying to establish contact with an ally, Mi. On August 17, Field Marshal V. Model arrived with an order to accept the post of commander in chief. , Having transferred the post, G. Kluge on August 19 went home to Germany. Passing through Menz, where he fought during the First World War, Kluge got out of the car, spread out a blanket, lay down on it and swallowed an ampoule of Calcium Cyanide. Later, a suicide note was found in his pocket, in which he wrote:

· | "My Fuehrer.

I have always admired your greatness and your iron will ... And if your fate turns out to be stronger than both your "Will" and your genius, it is only because Providence wished it. You led a beautiful and worthy bit 3.

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History will witness this... I leave you,

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my Fuhrer, as one who was much closer to you than you might have thought, with the consciousness of a duty fulfilled to the end.

Hitler read this last letter of the Field Marshal without commenting on it. Then he ordered that G. von Kluge be buried quietly, without special military honors, but that the coffin be carried by the military. The official cause of his death was a cerebral hemorrhage (Mithras. Field Marshals of Hitler and their battles. - S. 408-433).

Goth Herman, a German commander of the Second World War, in the battle near Moscow commanded the 3rd Panzer Group, Colonel General.

G. Yut was born in 1885. Received a good military education, participated in the First World War. In the next he served in the Reichswehr in various command and staff positions. In the late 1930s, he specialized in the service in tank troops. Participated in the operations of German troops in Poland in 1939 and in Western Europe in 1940. Since 1940 Colonel-General rank. Commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, which led the attack on Moscow. Then he commanded the 17th field (1941-1942) and 4th tank armies (1942-1943). At the end of 1942, he conducted an unsuccessful offensive operation with the aim of deblocking the German group surrounded in the Stalingrad region. In 1943, he was removed from office by Hitler and did not hold any other prominent positions. After the war, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison, but then this term was reduced. He was released in the mid-1950s. He settled in Gözlar, where he died on January 25, 1971 at the age of 85.

Göpner Erich, a German commander during the Second World War, in the battle near Moscow commanded the 4th Panzer Group, Colonel General.

E. Goepner was born on September 14, 1886. He began his military service in March 1905 as a Fahnjunker (candidate officer) in the 13th Schleswig-Holstein Dragoon Regiment. In August 1906 he was promoted to lieutenant. Juice

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October 1913 until the outbreak of the First World War, he studied at the military academy in Berlin. Since February 1914 - Lieutenant.

— From the beginning of the war, he was a lieutenant officer at the headquarters of the 16th Army Corps. From June 1915 - captain (captain). Then he served in the headquarters of the corps-army level. He was awarded the Iron Crosses of both degrees and two more orders.

. After the war, he continued to serve in the Reichswehr, in

1921-1923 in the Ministry of War (in the inspection of the cavalry), then in the headquarters of the division level. From 1930 he was commander of the regiment (from February 1933 - colonel), from 1934 - chief of staff of the 1st army corps (Kenigsberg). Since January 1936, Major General. From November 1938 - commander of the 16th army corps (motorized), lieutenant general, from April 1939 - cavalry general.

| Since 1935, he maintained contacts with representatives of the Resistance in the Wehrmacht.

— Participated in the Polish campaign of 1939. For the Polish campaign he was awarded the Knight's Cross. Shaft participated in the invasion of France in 1940. After the French campaign, he was promoted to colonel general.

- From February 1941 - commander of the 4th tank troupe. In this capacity, he participated in the attack on Moscow. On January 8, 1942, he ignored the order of Hitler to hold out to the last and made a tactical retreat, for which he was removed from the post of commander of the 4th Panzer Army, with the wording "for cowardice and disobedience to orders." Discharged from the armed forces without the right to wear a military uniform and awards, as well as without the right to

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1" On July 20, 1944, Hoepner was arrested as a member of "Hey against Hitler", on August 8, 1944, sentenced to death and hanged in Plötzensee prison in Berlin.

". Awards: Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, Cross of the Royal Order of the House of Hohenzollern, Knight

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And...
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cross of the Iron Cross (October 27, 1939) (Zalessky K. A. Who was who in the Third Reich. - M.: AST, 2002. - 944 p.).

On the Soviet side, the troops of the 19th, 16th, and 20th armies of the Western Front, commanded by Generals M.F. Lukin, K.K. Rokossovsky, and F.A. Ershakov, were opposed to the enemy troops.

Lukin Mikhail Filippovich, during the battle near Moscow, commander of the 19th and 20th armies, lieutenant general.

M.F. Lukin was born on November 6, 1892 in the village of Poluhino, Zubtsovsky District, Tver Region. He was drafted into the Russian army in 1913. During the First World

war in [1915] graduated from the 5th Moscow school of ensigns. Fought on the Western Front, company commander. He was awarded the orders of St. Vladimir 4th degree, St. Anna 4th degree, St. Stanislav 3rd degree.

In the Red Army since 1918. In 1918 he graduated from the courses of scouts at the Field Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army. During the Civil War, battalion commander, assistant chief of a rifle division, commander of a rifle regiment, commander of a rifle brigade, chief of staff of the 1st Cavalry Division. After another wound, he became the commander of a rifle regiment and brigade. Awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

In the interwar years, M. F. Lukin in 1925 and 1931 completed advanced training courses for senior officers at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. He held the positions of head of infantry courses (Lubny), assistant commander of a rifle division. Since 1923 - chief of staff of a rifle division, since 1924 - head of the combat department of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district. Since 1927, he was the head of the 1st department of the Directorate for the command and command staff of the Red Army. Since 1929 - commander of a rifle division, since 1935 - commandant of Moscow. From December 1937 - deputy chief, then - chief of staff, from December 1939 - deputy commander of the troops

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Siberian military district. From June 1940 - Commander of the 16th Army of the Siberian Military District, Lieutenant General.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 16th Army was transferred to the Western Front in mid-July 1941. Participated in the battle of Smolensk. In the second half of July, army formations fought heavy defensive battles on the outskirts of Smolensk, then they found themselves surrounded. On August 2, the remnants of the troops of the 16th Army managed to break through the encirclement and connect with I. front forces.

In the hall of the Battle of Smolensk on August 20, M.F. Lu

Keane was appointed commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front, which fought stubborn defensive battles south of Yartsevo. For skillful actions in the battle of Smolensk, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. .. On September 10, 1941, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Val Front, whose troops, together with formations of the 20th, 24th and 32nd armies, were surrounded in the area west of Vyazma in early September. M. F. Lukin was instructed to organize a general withdrawal of troops from the encirclement. But while solving this problem, on October 14, he was heavily loaded and taken prisoner.

„ At first he was treated in German hospitals, and from 1943 he was in prisoner of war camps. While in 'Ulenu, he was repeatedly interrogated. The Nazis tried to draw the general into their plans to create a collaborative Rationist government. In particular, on December 12, 1942, M. F. Lukin said: "Answering the question why the Red Army and the Russian people, despite their hatred of the Soviet system, continue to resist and are not going to drive out the hated government, I must be frank with you. Bolshevism - "For an international and Jewish phenomenon alien to the Russian people ... The peasants are promised land, and the workers are taught to participate in industrial production. The peasants and workers were deceived. If the peasants today have nothing, and in the best case (as in Siberia) they receive 4 kilograms

about 111

bread for one working day, if the average worker receives 300-500 rubles a month (and cannot buy anything with that money), if want and terror reign everywhere, then it is not difficult to understand that people would gratefully accept their liberation from Bolshevik oppression... Despite all this, I do not believe in the possibility of either organized or spontaneous uprising in Russia. Too much blood has been shed by the people. All those who have risen against the Red authorities for two decades have been destroyed, burned or died out ... "But then M.F. Lukin expressed firm confidence in the high patriotic feelings of the Soviet people. "Red rulers are not friends, but an enemy is an enemy. Therefore, blood is shed on both sides," the general summed up. Later, the transcripts of these rather frank conversations ended up in the hands of the Soviet command.

M. F. Lukin was released from captivity by American troops in April 1945 and taken to Paris, and then handed over to the Soviet authorities. From May to December 1945, he was tested by the NKVD in Moscow. G.K. Zhukov gave the following assessment: "General Lukin is one of the outstanding commanders of the past war, his military prowess is comparable to the prowess of the heroes of the war of 1812 - Generals Raevsky and Bagration." He was returned to military service and placed at the disposal of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army. Reserved since November 1946.

Awarded with Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Red Banner of Labor of the Ukrainian SSR, Orders of the Red Star.

He died on May 25, 1970 in Moscow. In October 1993, M.F. Lukin was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).

Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich, commander of the 16th Army during the Battle of Moscow, major general.

K. K. Rokossovsky was born on December 9 (21), 1896 in the city of Velikiye Luki, Pskov province, in the family of a railway worker, his father was a Pole, his mother was Russian. After graduating

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Headquarters of the 16th Army. Commander K. K. Rokossovsky, chief of staff M. S. Malinin. November, 1941

four-year city school in Warsaw, Konstantin, began his working life. He worked at a confectioner, then at a hosiery factory. Member of the First World War. In August 1914, Konstantin was drafted into the army, a row, then a non-commissioned officer of the 5th Dragoon Kargopol- from the regiment, was awarded two St. George's crosses. In the Red Guard since December 1917. From September 1918, as part of the 3rd, then 4th Ural division, he taught and fought in battles with Kolchak's troops. Since May 1919, commander of the 2nd cavalry division of the cavalry Yul' of the 30th rifle division. He was awarded two orders of the Red Banner.

After the end of the Civil War, K. K. Rokossov

in RA. Guys V and him in October 1928

Bee,"

appointed commander of the 5th separate Kuban cavalry brigade, with which he participates in battles on the CER.

which cavalry division in the Belarusian military

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district. One of the commanders of the cavalry regiments in this division was G.K. Zhukov. In 1932, Konstantin Konstantinovich returned to Transbaikalia as commander of the 15th Cavalry Division. In 1936, he was appointed commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps stationed in Pskov.

In August 1937, Rokossovsky was arrested. During the investigation, he managed to prove his innocence. In March 1940, Rokossovsky's "case" was terminated, he was fully restored in his rights and offered to take command of the same 5th cavalry corps. Since December 1940, Major General. Soon he was appointed commander of the 9th mechanized

foot body.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 9th Mechanized Corps participated in the unsuccessful counterattack of the Southwestern Front in the Brody area.

From July 1, 1941 - commander of an army group, from July 22 - commander of the 16th Army on the Western Front. He participated in the battle of Smolensk, the defense of Vyazma, defensive battles on the Mozhaisk line of defense in the Volokolamsk direction. There he countered the powerful tank attack of the enemy with a deep and flexible anti-tank defense, activity and maneuver. In the course of the counteroffensive, in order to develop success, he created two mobile groups in the army, reasonably combined a frontal attack with a bypass and coverage of the enemy's flanks. During the fighting in the Sukhinichi area, Rokossovsky was seriously wounded.

On July 14, 1942, K.K. Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front, and two and a half months later he took command of the Don Front, which played a major role in the Battle of Stalingrad. Together with the armies of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, the troops under his command participated in breaking through the enemy defenses and encircling a 330,000-strong group of Nazi troops in the Sta

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lingrad. Then it was up to Konstantin Konstantinovich to complete the liquidation of the encircled troops.

In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central Front, which was commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky, during the fierce

To go on a counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the forces of the Western and Bryansk fronts, drive out the enemy of the Oryol salient.

Uripjat operation, defeated the 2nd German mission and successively crossed the Desna, Dnieper and Prypyat rivers, creating conditions for an offensive in Right-handed Ukraine and Belarus. In the autumn and winter of 1943-1944, the troops led by Rokossovsky carried out a number of operations that drew enemy forces from the Right-Bank Ukraine, the main events of the winter-spring campaign of 1944 took place, and created the conditions for conducting subsequent operations in Belarus. In the grandiose Belarusian strategic operation "The LawsUIT of the 1st Belorussian Front became the decisive force in the defeat of the enemy's Army Group Center. They are about the three most important operations (Bobruisk, Minsk and Pancake-Brest), went to the Vistula and Warsaw. Were

operational bridgeheads on the western bank of the lake have been vacated. During this operation, K.K. Rokossovsky became an eshal and a Hero of the Soviet Union. At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, Konstantin Konstantinovich commanded the wars of the 2nd Belorussian Front. His troops participated in the East Prussian, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations, completing together with other Soviet | | oh ntami defeat of the armies of fascist Germany.

. Great was the contribution to the victory of Marshal Rokossovsko

the front-line formations led by him in the period from

about 1942 to May 8, 1945 freed Terry

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thorium with an area of more than 240 thousand square kilometers. The troops under his command completely defeated three German armies and defeated the formations of three more armies.

Rokossovsky was one of the first commanders in whose troops defensive positions began to be equipped with continuous trenches and communications. As a soldier in the First World War, he not only understood but also felt the urgent need to use her experience in terms of the engineering equipment of the area. That is why in the 16th army, which he commanded in the battle of half Moscow, separate rifle trenches on the front line were connected by trenches and communications. A year and a half later, on the Central Front, each tactical and operational echelon began to have its own position or defensive line, fully equipped in terms of fortification. In April-June 1943, up to 5,000 kilometers of trenches and communication passages were dug in Rokossovsky's troops. Their density was more than 16 kilometers per kilometer of the defense front. The total depth of defense prepared in terms of engineering was 190 kilometers.

Rokossovsky paid special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense. He was the first to build it on the basis of anti-tank areas, combined into anti-tank sections. In the Battle of Kursk, anti-tank strongholds, combined into anti-tank areas, covered the entire zone of the expected enemy offensive with a continuous "carpet". As a result, the fascist tanks completely lost the ability to maneuver, encountering everywhere dense anti-tank fire, anti-tank artillery reserves and mobile obstacle detachments.

The military leadership talent of Konstantin Konstantinovich was most clearly manifested in the preparation and conduct! offensive operations of the fronts led by him. On the-

beginning with the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, troops under the command of Rokossovsky took part in seven

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in the most strategic offensive operations Sh'talingrad, Oryol, Chernihiv-Poltava, Eaklorusskaya, East Prussian, East Pomeranian

conducted five independent front-line operations (combat operations in the Sevsk direction, Gomel-Rechits-Kalinkovichsko-Mozyrskaya, Rogachevsko-Zhlobin-, Serotskaya offensive operations).

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interaction. In a number of cases, the tasks assigned to the front by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were greatly overestimated. Despite all this, the troops under the command of KK Rokossovsky in the vast majority of operations dos Chitali set the goal.

"Konstantin Konstantinovich always knew how to choose the method of defeating the enemy that suits the situation. The preference was given to cutting the enemy group and Revka by striking in several directions, one of which was the main one. At the same time, he successfully carried out a number of operations to encircle and subsequently destroy the enemy.

. (K, K. Rokossovsky paid special attention to the defeat of the enemy's defenses on the Neva. In his troops

for the first time, maximum densities of guns and mortars were created, artillery was carried out under a single and double fire shaft, aviation

'used mainly to support the offensive

`And escorting infantry and tanks in the depths of the enemy

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defense by massed strikes of bomber and ground attack aircraft. Marshal did not spare shells and bombs, but spared the life of a soldier...

Rokossovsky, one of the few Soviet military leaders of that period, refused to use tank formations and formations as a ram to break through the enemy's main line of defense, using them as echelons for developing the success of combined arms armies and

front.

In the course of offensive operations, Konstantin Konstantinovich demonstrated various methods of influencing the troops in order to unconditionally fulfill the tasks assigned to him. The most rapid and effective was the defeat of the enemy by air strikes. For example, on July 16, 1943, during the Kromsko-Oryol operation, the troops of the 13th Army, advancing in the direction of the main blow of the front, met stubborn resistance from the Nazi troops in the area of the settlements of Kunach and Kudeyarovo. On the orders of the front commander, aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered three massed strikes against the enemy's stronghold, making more than 1,300 sorties. The next day, facilitating the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Corps of the 2nd Panzer Army, the front's aviation inflicted massive strikes on the Nazis in the Arkhangelskoye and Ozerki regions. Cheerful Berezhok, Glasses, Falconers. In the following days, Konstantin Konstantinovich also repeatedly directed the 16th Air Army to actively support the advancing troops. In accordance with the instructions of the Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force of July 24, 1943, the experience of massive strikes of the 16th Air Army was also widely used in other air armies.

K. K. Rokossovsky was distinguished by a special style of working with subordinates. Konstantin Konstantinovich, with his usual tact, skillfully directed the work of the members of the Front's Military Council. He has always worked in a team and as a team. With this method, everyone felt

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I was an active and direct participant in the adoption of repertoire, joined in what can be conditionally called the deep meaning of the idea, imbued with a comprehensive understanding of its validity, feasibility, and, consequently, a sense of personal responsibility for its implementation. This helped the marshal take op

make the best decisions even in the most difficult combat situation of the EC and achieve their implementation.

Taking into account the vast experience and outstanding services of K. K. Rokossovsky, J. V. Stalin entrusted him and G. K. Zhukov to hold the historic Victory Parade, which took place in Moscow on Red Square on June 24, 1945.

, After the end of the war, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky from 1945 to 1949 was the commander-in-chief of the Northern Group of Forces. In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet side, he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR, he was assigned the

'Indian title of Marshal of Poland, he is elected a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP and a deputy of the Sejm. Upon his return to the USSR In 1956, K. K. Rokossovsky was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, and from October of the following year, when the international situation worsened, he was appointed Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962, he was Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. From April 1962, he became Inspector General of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense,

_ Twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945), holder of the Victory Oden, seven orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, twelve foreign orders. He was also awarded the Honorary Golden Weapon with the image of the State Emblem of the USSR B. He died on August 3, 1968, was buried in Moscow on Arasnyaya Square near the Kremlin wall.

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Ershakov Filipp Afanasyevich, during the battle of Moscow, commander of the 20th Army, lieutenant general.

F. A. Ershakov was born on January 9 (21), 1893 in the Taganka village of the Pyatnitskaya volost, Vyazemsky district, Smolensk province.

In the Russian army since 1915, ensign. In the Red Army since April 1918. During the Civil War, platoon commander, company commander, battalion commander. rifle regiment commander. Awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

In 1924 he graduated from the Shooting and Tactical Courses named after the Comintern "Shot", in 1930 - the courses of one-man commanders at the Military-Political Academy of the Red Army named after Tolmachev, in 1935 - the Special Faculty of the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M. V. Frunze. From January 1938, on the wave of repressions, he was deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov military district, from June of the same year - commander of the troops of the Ural military district, lieutenant general.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 22nd Army was formed on the basis of the Ural Military District, F.A. Ershakov took over its command. The army was transferred to the Pskov region, fought in the Vitebsk region. Then she fought near Smolensk.

In September-October - commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front. The army fought in the Yartsevo region, in the Vyazemsky defensive operation. In the course of the latter, due to the breakthrough of the enemy of the Western Front north of Yartsevo and south-west of Yelnya, as well as the exit

his shock groupings in the Vyazma region, the army troops were surrounded. Part of the troops was able to break through the encirclement and join with their own. F. A. Ershakov was taken prisoner. He was held in a POW camp near Berlin, where he died of a broken heart in July 1942.

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Tragedy near Bryansk and on the outskirts of Orel

The offensive of the German troops on the Orlovsky direction began as early as September 30, 1941, that is, three days earlier than near Vyazma. At the dawn of that day, the divisions of the 47th and 24th motorized corps of the 2nd tank division of General G. Guderian, concentrating the main forces on a relatively narrow sector of the front, struck at the claims of the left wing of the Bryansk Front and already in the first I VN offensive went to the rear of the 13th Soviet Army, separating it from the operational group of General A. N. Erm

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At 2 o'clock in the morning, the commander of the Bryansk Front, Colonel General A. I. Eremenko, called I: V. Stalin on the "HF" and demanded to report the situation.

, - The enemy went on the offensive yesterday morning, Yeremenko began in his voice. - On the left r: {3rd Army, he brought into battle up to 180 tanks. On the right roof and front, in the section of Yermakov's group, the offensive is being carried out by motorized infantry supported by up to 70 tanks. As a result, the enemy pressed our units somewhat and occupied SEVERAL minor settlements. Our 1st and 150th tank brigades destroyed up to 30 tanks | fogivnik, but they themselves suffered losses. "What are you going to do under these conditions? - ask - -. Stalin. "= Decided to group parts of the 121st and 150th tank brigades, transfer the 42nd tank brigade there and, in action with rifle units and cavalry, destroy the enemy, first in the direction of Tusha Ermakov, and then on the left flank of the 13th army "Very well," Stalin approved, "to solve this problem we will send you missiles and an aircraft

p "It is necessary to destroy the enemy who has crossed into

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| October formations of the 47th Corps captured Sevsk and rushed to the north. By the end of that day, the 24th Corps increased the depth of the breakthrough to 80 km. The 48th mechanized corps, operating on the right flank of the tank group, began to push the formations of the group of General Yer-

Makova to the south. The Germans surrounded two divisions of the 13th Army and cut off the left-flank group of General Ermakov from the main forces of the front.

The success of the 2nd Panzer Group was largely determined by the activity of the 2nd Luftwaffe Air Fleet. whose aviation formations were supported by Guderian's tanks. And although the inclement weather somewhat interfered with the work of German aviation, the bombardment of the troops of the Bryansk Front nevertheless began simultaneously with the artillery cannonade. In total, the Germans deployed about 300 combat vehicles here. German planes literally ironed the Soviet defensive positions. clearing the way for the mechanized columns of the Wehrmacht.

Due to the fact that the commander of the Oryol military district, due to lack of strength and time, did not fulfill the task of organizing the defense of the city of Orel and due to the low stability of the defense of the troops of the 13th Army, on October 3, the city of Orel was taken by the enemy's 24th motorized corps.

About how the breakthrough on Orel took place, General G. Guderian writes the following:

"The 48th Panzer Corps set out from the Gadyach, Shtepovka area and headed through Nedrigailov to Putivl. with the 9th Panzer Division ahead; it was followed by the 25th and 16th motorized divisions ...

The 24th Panzer Corps marched from Glukhov to Sevs. Eagle, with the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions in front, followed by the 10th Motorized Division.

The 47th Panzer Corps (18th and 17th Panzer Divisions) set out from Yampol, advancing with its right flank in the direction of Sevs.

The 29th Motorized Division was to follow a ledge to the left in the direction of Seredina Buda.

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YUO ZAPAMSHCHNY

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on [| October

= on October 10) |

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== for October 20-24 , 7: "A. :

Fighting in the Bryansk Front (October 1-24, 1941)

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Both corps, which were entrusted with the task of providing flanks, set out, moving part of their forces through Kostobobr, partly through Romny. The 1st cavalry division was located on the western bank of the river. Sudost in the area north and south of Pogar.

Our offensive was unexpected for the enemy. The 24th Panzer Corps, which reached the Khinel point, advanced especially rapidly. The 47th Panzer Corps occupied the settlement of Zhuravka and advanced further to the north-east ... [October 24th Panzer Corps occupied Sevs.

Our troops managed to break through the enemy front. As they received fuel, the troops continued to vigorously move forward. I left Glukhov and went through Esman to Sevs, to the 4th Panzer Division. Various wrecked Russian vehicles were parked along the road. which testified to the complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy. Near the road, on the hill where the windmill stood, I saw Generals von Geyer and von Langermann. Many units of the 4th Panzer Division had already reached Sevs. There were traces of fierce battles on the ground. On the way we saw dead Russians, met many wounded; on the short way from the road to the mill, I and the officers accompanying me took prisoner 14 Russians hiding in the grass, including one officer who was still in telephone contact with Sevs ... The advanced units of the 24th tank corps advanced beyond this day at 130 km!

On October 2, the offensive continued with all its might. the front was completely broken through, and the Russian 13th army was driven back to the northeast ... The 4th Panzer Division occupied Kromy, thereby reaching the highway leading to Orel. During these days we had very few losses. However, the total losses from the very beginning of the offensive were expressed in significant numbers ...

On October 3, the 4th Panzer Division captured Orel. This gave us the opportunity to get a good highway junction and master an important railway junction

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highways. which was to become the basis for our further actions. The capture of the city took place in such a way for the enemy that when our tanks entered Orel, trams were still running in the city. The evacuation of industrial plants, which is usually carefully prepared by the Russians, could not be carried out. Starting from factories and factories and up to the railway station itself, machine tools and boxes with factory equipment and raw materials lay everywhere on the streets "(Guderian G. - S. 309-311). As I remember, under these conditions, the commander of the Bryansk front decided to eliminate the breakthrough of the tank near the enemy corps with a strike by the group of General Ermakov with. south and two divisions of the 13th Army from the north. In its conception, this was a very bold idea, which, if successful, could, if not thwart, then stop the further advance of the 2nd Panzer Group on Moscow. But, as always, the daring plans of the Soviet command were not supported financially: there were not enough forces and means for delivering such a counterstrike, and the general situation was unclear. "Therefore, it is not surprising that the counterattack in the Sevs region was not successful. and on October 6 the enemy occupied Bryansk. On the same day, his 47th Panzer Corps occupied the city of Karachaevo, located on the Bryansk-Orel railway. By this time, formations of the German 2nd Field Army had reached Sukhinichi, and its 43rd Army Corps began to cover the 50th Army of the Bryansk Front from the north. By the end of this Day, the troops of the Bryansk Front were divided into three parts, and there was a real threat of encirclement of several Soviet armies in the region of Bryansk. ^ Under these conditions, in order to preserve the forces of the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Feshila withdraw the troops of the Bryansk Front to a new line of defense, which passed along the line of Mtsensk, Ponyri, Fatezh, Lgov. At the same time, in order to assist the withdrawal of the troops of the Bryansk Front, it was ordered to "RE-form the 1st Guards Rifle Corps (commander - Major General D. D. Lelyushenko) and

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7th Guards Rifle Division deliver counter strikes against the enemy.

But it was precisely at such a difficult time that communication between the Headquarters and the headquarters of the Bryansk Front was suddenly interrupted. It got to the point that the Chief of the General Staff, "due to the lack of communication with Yeremenko's headquarters," ordered the commander of the 50th Army, Major General M.P. Petrov, to temporarily take command of the front. It was only at the beginning of October 8 that Stavka managed to contact Eremenko. He was ordered to strike from the rear from the west to break the enemy's Orel grouping and go to the Mtsensk, Lgov front, covering the direction to Tambov and Voronezh.

But the enemy saw the development of the operation in the Bryansk-Orel area quite differently. Commissioning the completion of ok-

the destruction of Soviet troops in the Bryansk region by infantry formations, he ordered mobile tank and mechanized divisions to develop an offensive against Tula.

The withdrawal of the troops of the Bryansk Front, which began on October 9, took place in very difficult conditions. As a result of the division of the troops of the front into three isolated groups, the unity of command and control of them was violated. In addition, the front commander, General A. I. Eremenko, was wounded. The headquarters was forced to take the leadership of the front into its own hands, which further confused and aggravated the situation.

On October 9, 1941, units of the 2nd Army of General Weichs were able to connect with the 2nd Panzer Army of Guderian northwest of Bryansk, thereby dividing the Soviet group into two parts. In the north, in the area of Bryansk, there was the 50th Army, in the south, in the area of Trubchevsk, Suzemka, Navlya, the 13th and 3rd armies.

The 50th Army still had the opportunity to break through to the city of Belev, where on October 8 there were only units of the 112th and 52nd Infantry Divisions of the 2nd Army and the Germans did not have a continuous defense front. However, the beginning of a successful breakthrough of the 50th Soviet army to Belev was soon stopped by order of B. M. Shaposhnikov. All attempts by army units to break through in a southeasterly direction to

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Resset's flour were unsuccessful. And yet, losing

(above 80% of personnel and over 97% of artillery, or

after being commanded by General M.P. Petrov, the remnants

about the army left the encirclement, breaking through in the northeast direction to Belev.

„ The position of the 3rd army of General Kreizer, which fought in the Dmitrovsk-Orlov-(sky) area, was also very difficult. It suffered huge losses, and only three thousand people were able to break through from the encirclement in the area northeast of Ponyri, also ` _ Formations of the 13th army of General Gorodnyansky from the beginning made their way to the southeast, in the general direction to Sevs. As a result, a gap 4 km wide was formed on the road south of Zlobino, which the command of the 2nd tank group promptly could not close, and small groups from the 13th Army began to seep through it. However, on the afternoon of October 16, a German motorcycle battalion advancing from the south managed to establish contact with the 3rd battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment and thus close. On the night of October 17, only separate Soviet units managed to break through in the direction of the bridge over the Svapa River.

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Weichs Maximilian, baron, German commander of the Second World War, in the battle of Moscow commanded the 2nd Army, Field Marshal.

M. Weichs was born on November 12, 1881. Since July 1900 in military service, since 1902 - in officer positions. In 1911 he graduated from the military academy in the line of training officers of the General Staff. Member of the First World War, which was an officer of the General Staff at the headquarters of the infantry division and the army corps.

,Was left in the ranks of the Reichswehr. Since March 1930, the commander of the holes of the cavalry regiment, Colonel. In 1931-1932.

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Weichs was in the 2nd Army Group, and since 1933 - the commander of the cavalry division, then the commander of the military district in Nuremberg, the general of cavalry.

During the Polish campaign of 1939 - the commander of an army corps. The corps took part in the encirclement of Poznan and Lodz, the defeat of the Primorye army, and the advance on Warsaw. After the end of the Polish campaign, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Army.

Participated in hostilities in France in a secondary direction. Awarded the Knight's Cross. colonel general.

In the spring of 1941, he led the military operations of the troops of his army (four army corps, four infantry, two tank, one motorized and one mountain division each) in Yugoslavia. In November 1941 Zagreb was stormed. The whole operation lasted 12 days, during which the Germans lost 151 people killed and about 500 wounded. 254 thousand were taken prisoner

Yugoslavs.

In the summer of 1941, the army of M. Weichs is transferred to the Soviet-German front and immediately enters the battle: it participates in the liquidation of the "Bialystok cauldron", in which the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western Front fell, as a result of which they were taken prisoner about 300,000 Red Army soldiers and over 2,000 tanks captured; in the Battle of Gomel, during which 30 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were taken prisoner. Then, acting together with the tank group of G. Guderian, the troops of the 2nd Army participated in the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev and in the Bryansk region.

By that time, the health of 60-year-old M. Weiss had already been severely undermined. He was often ill, temporarily left the command of the troops, leaving for the rear for treatment. At the beginning of 1942, the 2nd Army passed under the command of Weichs - the 4th Panzer Army of General G. Goth and the 2nd Hungarian Army of General G. Jani. The Weichs Army Group took part in the battle of Voronezh in

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: ave Army Group "South" Field Marshal F. von Oka and ended in complete failure for the Germans.

— since July 1942, M. Weichs has been in command of Army Group 5, where, in addition to the 6th and 2nd armies, the Hungarian, Russian and Italian armies entered. The Weichs grouping was destroyed in the battle of Stalingrad. Despite the fact that on February 1, 1943, on the day of the surrender of F. Paulus, J. Weiss was promoted to field marshal general.

— ..In February 1943, Army Group "B", or rather, its wasps it was disbanded, and M. Weichs himself was appointed

s of Italy, where, under the onslaught of the Americans, he was forced to retreat to the area of Lake Balaton, where Weichs carried out an excellent offensive operation against the 2nd Ukrainian Front in Vinvare in 1945. At the end of March 1945, the army group

4 F "was disbanded, and M. Weichs was transferred to the reserve of the Wehrmacht high command, and then sent to 'Retirement.

- `In the summer of 1945, M. Weichs was arrested by the American forces by the occupation authorities. He spent some time in prison, but in 1947 he was released from custody for health reasons. He was the only one of the fascist field marshals who escaped trial as a war criminal. After his release, he led a medieval life in West Germany in the town of Rosberg Pett, where he died on September 27, 1954.

„ Biographer S. Mitcham writes:

“Tall and wiry, with thick glasses -] 'metal-rimmed, with the manners and manners of a native of the Viennese aristocrat, which he was, Baron Maxi

essor of history than to the Nazi Feldmar Zala... An old cavalryman, he must have been forced to juggle between his deep religious passions, on the one hand, and his adherence to Hitler, on the other. Nevertheless, he managed to keep the Fuhrer's spirit almost until the very end of the war, and after

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her graduation to avoid a military tribunal. As a result of the operations carried out, he earned himself a reputation as a thorough and skillful, although by no means brilliant, professional military man "(S. Mitcham. Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles. - P. 304-305).

Guderian Heinz, commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General.

G. Guderian was born in East Prussia in 1888. In military service since 1907, cadet. Member of the First World War, captain. After the war, he becomes a great champion in the use of tank troops. Since 1933, Colonel. Appointed commander of motorized units of the Wehrmacht. Since 1935, the commander of the 2nd Panzer Division, Major General. From April 1938 - commander of the XU motorized army corps, lieutenant general.

With the outbreak of World War II, G. Guderian became commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General. Active participant in the Moscow battle. The troops subordinate to him were attacking Moscow from the South-Western direction and reached the area north of Tula. But they couldn't go any further. On December 25, 1941, for retreating without an order, Hitler removed Guderian from command of the 2nd Panzer Group. On February 20, 1943, he was called to the Fuhrer's headquarters, which was at that time near Vinnitsa, and returned to service. Inspector General of the Armored Forces, and from July 1944 also the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. At the end of March 1945 he was again removed from his post. He was taken prisoner by the Americans and released in 1948. In 1951 he published the book Memoirs of a Soldier. He was awarded the Knight's Cross (1939) and the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross (1941).

Died in 1954.

In the Oryol direction, the troops of the Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel General A. I. Eremenko opposed the enemy troops.

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>: Eremenko Andrey Ivanovich, during the battle of Moscow 55th commander of the troops of the Western Front, General Nolkovnik.

V . A. I. Eremenko was born on October 2 (14), 1892 in the village

| m arkovka Yekaterinoslav province in a family of peasants.

V. In 1913 he was drafted into the army as a private. Member Gali

AND

ii battle, from the autumn of 1915 on the Romanian front to the reconnaissance team of an infantry regiment, corporal. Personal and skillful actions are marked with three medals.

`In the Red Army since the spring of 1918. Member of the Civil War. He fought on the Southern Front, then in the North Caucasus. Since the autumn of 1918, a member of the RCP (b). Detachment commander, military commissar of the Revolutionary Committee, head of intelligence, tsutaba of the cavalry brigade, assistant commander of the E regiment of the | th Cavalry Army.

After the end of the Civil War, in 1923 and 931, he graduated from advanced training courses for commanding staff, in 1935 - from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. Commander of a cavalry regiment, cavalry division, cavalry, and since June 1940 - mechanized corps. It proved itself well in solving problems during the campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and also in Lithuania. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since December 1940, commander of the | th Separate Red Banner Howling Army in the Far East, Major General.

". During the Great Patriotic War, Andrei Ivanovich from June 30 to July 2 - commander of the troops of the Western Front, then - deputy commander of the war Skami of the Western Front. He led the fighting of the troops of this front in the battle of Smolensk. In August he was appointed commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front, from September - Colonel General. In late September - early October 1941, he unsuccessfully carried out the Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation against the troops of the 2nd Army and the 2nd tank group of the enemy, who

encircle a significant part of the forces of the front. October 7th

was severely wounded and sent to the hospital for treatment.

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Since December 1941, he was commander of the 4th shock army, which defended the line along the eastern shore of lakes Vel' and Seliger. As part of the Kalinin Front, he took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmanskaya offensive operation, was again wounded.

In August 1942, he took command of the South-East (Stalingrad) Front, a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad. From January 1943, commander of the troops of the Southern, from April - Kalinin, from October of the 1st Baltic fronts, commander of the Separate

Noah Maritime Army, Colonel General. Since April 1944, commander of the troops of the 2nd Baltic. from March 1945 - 4th Ukrainian Fronts, army general. He successfully led the fighting in the counter offensive near Stalingrad, in the Smolensk operation. during the liberation of the Crimea, Latvia, Czechoslovakia.

In the postwar years, the commander of the troops of the Carpathian, West Siberian, North Caucasian military districts. Since 1955 Marshal of the Soviet Union. Since 1958, Inspector General of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1946, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Since 1956, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Hero of the Soviet Union (title awarded in 1944). [era of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (since 1970). Cavalier of fourteen domestic and nine foreign orders, including three orders of Suvorov 1st class and the Order of Kutuzov 1st class. Author of a number of memoirs, articles in military magazines on the issues of building the armed forces and military art. He died on November 19, 1970 in Moscow. The ashes rest in the Kremlin wall.

The results of the battle near Vyazma and Bryansk were the hardest for the Soviet troops. According to the OKH. in total, 7 out of 15 army field directorates, 64 out of 95 rifle divisions, [] from 13 tank brigades, 50 from 60 artillery regiments. October 14, 1941 to Hitler

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} it was reported that over 500,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were taken prisoner as a result of the operations carried out. German troops captured 3,000 guns, 800 tanks and other equipment. A little later, by October 318, the 2nd Field Army reported the capture of another 55 thousand people and the capture of 477 guns, 21 tanks, 1066 vehicles and other equipment. In the final summary of the German 'High Command', reports soon appeared about the capture of 663,000 Red Army soldiers and commanders, or the capture of 1,242 tanks and 5,412 guns. (But in these reports, we are talking mainly about trophies. The Germans practically did not count the dead Red Army soldiers at that time. According to recently published data, for the first two or three weeks of October in the Moscow direction, Soviet troops irretrievably lost about one or a million people. Considering that more than 66% of this number were captured, it is very difficult to say anything about the quality of the Soviet defense at that time. ° - Thus, only half a month after the defeat near Kiev and Smolensk The Red Army was beset near Vyazma and Bryansk by a new greatest disaster: A gap about 500 kilometers wide was formed in the Soviet strategic

meters, to close which there was practically nothing. On October 8, 1941, the department for the study of foreign armies of the East of the General Staff of the OKH stated that the enemy did not have large forces at his disposal to stop the advance of German troops east of Vyazma and northeast of Bryansk. But the German command, being in euphoria from the victories won, deviated from the most important law of military art - the concentration of forces in the direction of the main strike - and decided to expand the offensive zone to the north.

On October 8, 1941, at 11:10 p.m., the headquarters of the OKH sent a directive to the headquarters of Army Group Center, from which Roy followed that Hitler had decided to release the 3rd Panzer Group at Vyazma (performing its tasks

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assigned to the 4th Panzer Group) and send the tanks of General G. Hoth as soon as possible in a general northern direction to participate, together with units of the northern flank of the 9th Army and the southern flank of the 16th Army, in an operation to destroy the enemy in the area between the cities of Bely and Ostashkov. It was assumed that the offensive of the 16th army from the army group "North" and the 9th army and the 3rd tank group from the army group "Center" towards each other, if successful, could put not only the Soviet North in a critical situation - Western front, but also all the forces of the Red Army operating on the northern flank of the Soviet-German front.

The command of the Army Group "Center" did not object to this operation, since it was practically confident in the success of the upcoming offensive in the Valdai region. Von Bock was not embarrassed by the division of the main forces of the group into several directions. According to reconnaissance reports and the testimonies of prisoners of war, the enemy had in the Moscow area only separate units of the NKVD and the police, without artillery and heavy weapons. In front of the front of the 4th field army advancing on the capital, only one full-blooded Soviet formation was seen that appeared near Medyn. It was also assumed that there were no more than four or five Soviet rifle divisions in the sector from Kozelsk to Ruza.

Having launched an offensive according to this plan, the German units reached the Mozhaishk line of defense by October 0, and on October 14 formations of the 3rd Panzer Group broke into the outskirts of Kalinin. Moscow was under the threat that the capital would be engulfed from the north and south, while the enemy was simultaneously attacking it from the west.

But the defense of the Soviet troops every day becomes

became more and more stubborn. On October 31, F. von Bock wrote in his diary: "Our losses are becoming very tangible. In the formations of the army group, more than twenty battalions are commanded by chief lieutenants.

The loss of the officers of Army Group Center averaged 45 people daily (about 40%

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of all the losses of the officers on the Eastern Front), and they were especially great in the infantry, where the officers who were out of action had to be replaced by officers of other branches of the military.

At the Mozhaish line of defense

On October 14, 1941, the headquarters of Army Group Center issued a new order to continue operations in the Moscow direction. According to this order, the 2nd Panzer Army was to envelop Moscow from the southeast, and the 4th Army (together with the 4th Panzer Group) was to surround the capital from the south, west and north and, if possible, advance on Yaroslavl and Rybinsk. Other operational formations were to advance in divergent directions: the 2nd Army - on Yelets and Bogoroditsk; The 9th and 3rd Panzer Groups were sent to Torzhok and Vyshny Volochek, preventing "the withdrawal of enemy manpower facing the northern flank of the 9th Army and the southern flank of the 16th Army." The 9th Army and the right flank of the 3rd Panzer Group were also to destroy the Soviet units in the area of Rzhev, Zubtsov, Staritsa.

The decision of the headquarters of Army Group Center to encircle Moscow as a result of huge "pincers" looked quite logical. It was reminiscent of the decisions successfully implemented by the command of the Wehrmacht before that near Minsk, Smolensk, Uman, Kiev, Bryansk and Vyazma. Now, after the destruction of the Red Army forces near Vyazma, the German shock wedges were going to create another "cauldron" for the Soviet troops that directly covered Moscow. Operational calculations also relied on the fact that the strategic initiative was in the hands of the German command and that the situation in the Moscow region was extremely unfavorable for the Soviet troops.

On October 14, the 1st Panzer Division of the 41st Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group captured most of

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Kalinin. The rapid throw of the tank group on

northeast and the rapid capture of the city dealt a serious blow to the operational plans of the Soviet command. A major highway junction was taken, which was extremely important for supplying Army Group Center, and at the same time the retreat route for Red Army units across the Volga to the east was closed. In addition, with the capture of this city, the Germans greatly complicated the transfer of Soviet troops from the Valdai region to Moscow and the interaction between the center and the northern flank of the Western Front. In the central direction, German troops successfully advanced towards Volokolamsk and Mozhaisk.

From the southwestern direction, formations of the 2nd Panzer Group were irresistibly rushing towards Tula. To cover the approaches to Moscow from the southwest in the Mtsensk region, the 26th Army began to deploy on October 10, and immediately in Tula, the Tula combat sector was created as part of the 330th rifle division, the Tula military technical school and one reserve rifle division. brigades.

But all this looked only like darning holes. In mid-October, it seemed to the German generals that a further offensive against Moscow would go like clockwork. They were convinced that the main forces of the Red Army to the west of the capital had already been defeated. Consequently, it remained only to move forward and finish off the scattered Soviet units. The problem with the flanks could be solved along the way. But the fascist strategists did not take into account many factors, the main of which was the increased resistance of the Red Army troops, the introduction of fresh reserves into the battle and the emergency measures of the Soviet leadership to mobilize all resources to defend Moscow.

In the western direction, Soviet troops retreated to the Mozhaisk line of defense. It should be noted that the construction of this line by that time had already been underway for about a month. It was based on the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisky, Maloyaroslavsky and Kaluga fortified regions, engineering work on which by that time had been completed by 50-80%. However, these fortified

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The ions did not form a single line, and the gaps between them reached several tens of kilometers.

}. By that time, four rifle divisions were deployed on the Mozhaisk line of defense, the Moscow artillery and military-political schools, and the Moscow Chekhota School named after the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR

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'Podolsk Machine Gun Artillery School, three 'reserve rifle regiments and five machine gun battalions - ,NOV. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent five newly formed machine-gun battalions, ten anti-tank artillery regiments and five separate tank brigades to the Mozhaisk Defense Ministry.

„ On October 9, the Directorate of Troops of the Mozhaisk Line of Defense was renamed the Directorate of the Moscow Reserve Front, commanded by Lieutenant Teneral P. A. Artemiev, and on October 13 they were all included in the Western Front.

As a result, all the troops that acted on

The Moscow direction from the Volga reservoir to Kaluga, were united under the unified command of the teneral of the army G.K. Zhukov. On the right flank of this line of defense, — southwest of Volokolamsk, the 16th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General K.K. (commander Major General D. D. Lelyushenko), 'on the left flank, in the area of Borisovo, Vereya, the 43rd Army (commander Major General P. P. Sobennikov), and then, in the Kaluga direction, the 49th army. The administration of the 33rd Army was withdrawn to the front reserve in the area of Naro-Fominsk. „. A shock troupe of troops of Army Group Center acted against the troops of the Western Front. In order to break through the center of the Mozhaisk line, the German command would rule from near Vyazma the 40th and 46th motorized corps, followed by the rest of the forces (five army corps) of the 4th field army.

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Against the 16th Army, according to its commander, General K.K. Rokossovsky, the 5th Army, 46th and 40th Motorized Corps of the 4th Panzer Group were advancing. These troops included two infantry divisions, four tank divisions and a motorized division "Reich".

The actions of the troops of the 16th Army during the defense of Moscow were remembered by its commander, General K.K. Rokossovsky, in the book "Soldier's Duty". In it, he writes that after an unsuccessful attempt to organize a defense, he and a small group of staff officers of the 16th Army were forced to retreat to the east. As it moved, separate units joined it, and only on October 9, 40 kilometers from Mozhaisk, did K.K. Rokossovsky finally manage to contact the front headquarters, from which

Afterwards, he received an order to go to the Volokolamsk region. At the disposal of the commander of the 16th army came the 18th rifle division of the people's militia and everything that he could collect on his own. The defense sector was cut from the Moscow Sea to Ruza.

On October 14, the headquarters of the 16th Army arrived in Volokolamsk. Its commander immediately ordered officers to be sent to all parts to search for troops. The first to locate was the 3rd Cavalry Corps under the command of L.M. Dovator, which consisted of the 50th and 53rd Cavalry Divisions. Then other units approached, as well as two anti-tank artillery regiments, two cannon artillery regiments and three Katyusha divisions.

All the troops were drawn up in one echelon with the 18th division of the people's militia and one regiment of the 126th rifle division, which had previously left the encirclement, assigned to the reserve. On the right flank of the army, two cavalry divisions defended. To the left of the cavalymen was a combined regiment of cadets of the military school named after the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR under the command of Colonel S. I. Mladentsev. Further, the 316th Infantry Division of Major General I.V. Panfilov, which arrived from the reserve and was well equipped, defended itself. The total width of the defense line of the 16th Army was about one hundred kilometers.

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and K.K. Rokossovsky ordered to immediately start equipping the defense zone. Positions were prepared, minefields and wire barriers were set up. Mobile detachments of sappers with mines and explosive charges were created. anti-tank ditches were dug and mined between regiments. In particular, the left flank of the Panfilov division was covered by a 4-kilometer anti-tank ditch and 4,000 mines.

| On October 16, German troops went over to the offensive with the forces of two infantry and two tank divisions, inflicting the main blow on the left flank of the 16th Army, that is, on the Panfilov division and at the junction with the 5th Army.

On October 17 L. M. Dovator's corps was attacked north of Volokolamsk, and in the zone of the 316th Rifle Division the enemy managed to capture two settlements.

On October 18, the German command stepped up pressure in the Panfilov division zone, bringing up to 100 tanks into battle. -But the troops of the 16th Army held out and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

One can learn about the actions of the 5th Army on the Mozhaishk line of defense from the book by N.I. Krylov, N.I. Alekseev and V.I. G. Dragan "Towards victory." From it we learn that

-5th army, which was defeated in the first months of the Great Patriotic War along with other army

mi of the Southwestern Front, began to form anew `In the Moscow region in the early days of October 1941. It included the 32nd Rifle Division, which arrived from the Far East, the 18th and 19th Brigades, which were retreating from Vyazma, and the 20th and 22nd Tank Brigades, which arrived from Vladimir, as well as four anti-tank artillery which regiment. The army was to take up defensive positions based on the Mozhaishk fortified region.

The construction of the Mozhaishk fortified region "was started a month ago, and by the time the army forces advanced to this line, bunkers and wire barriers were ready there. True, the work on the pillboxes was completed

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only half, and many of the finished structures did not yet have weapons. Work continued on excavating anti-tank ditches and constructing anti-tank escarpes.

The main task of the 5th Army was to cover the 45-kilometer section of the front from Volokolamsk to the Nara River, south of Naro-Fominsk. The main transport arteries in this section towards Moscow were the Mozhaishkoye and Minskoye highways, as well as the Smolensk-Moscow railway, which ran less than one kilometer along the front. It is quite understandable that the main forces were concentrated to cover this sector: the 32nd Rifle Division, two tank brigades, three anti-tank artillery regiments, and part of the rocket artillery. Both roads were covered with minefields and other engineering barriers. The gaps on the flanks of the army from the side of the Volokolamsk fortified region were covered by the forces of a special cavalry regiment, on the left - by small mobile fighter detachments. Directly on the Borodino field, units of the 32nd Infantry Division (division commander Colonel V. I. Polosukhin) took up the defense.

The enemy offensive in the Mozhaishk direction began on the morning of October 13. Having stumbled upon a fairly well-prepared defense of the 5th Army, on that day the enemy had no success.

On the night of October 14, having regrouped and taking advantage of the bad weather, the enemy launched a new offensive on the flanks of the 5th Army. Then the troops in the central sector also went on the offensive. The defense of the troops of the 32nd Infantry Division was broken through in a number of directions.

The Soviet command began to feverishly reinforce the troops of the division with reserves, which immediately,

immediately rushed into battle. Two more tank brigades and a separate motorcycle regiment and other units were transferred to the 5th Army. Nevertheless, by the end of October 15, the enemy, having not achieved decisive success, was nevertheless

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AND

Commander of the 316th Rifle Division, Major General I. V. Panfilov (far left)

effectively wedged into the defense of the 32nd Infantry Division, as a result of which the enemy's breakthrough to Mozhaishk and the Minsk-Moscow highway became more real. The German troops even managed to break through to the command and observation post of the army and wound the commander. General D. D. Lelyushenko left for the hospital, Major General L. A. Govorov took command of the 5th Army.

The advance of the enemy continued. On October 16, German troops captured the Borodino station. On that day, on the Borodino field, battles were fought at the turn, where in 1812 the battery of General Raevsky stood. On October 17, the enemy increased pressure on the flanks of the 5th Army. On October 19, the remnants of the 32nd Infantry Division left the Borodino field and retreated further to the east.

On October 20, the enemy went on the offensive at the junction of the 5th Army and the 16th Army, which was defending to the north, and, turning the assault strike to the north, stumbled upon the left-flank regiment of the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov. The common front of the two armies was finally broken. 5th

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the army, fearing encirclement, was forced to continue the withdrawal of its troops to new lines. On October 21, the battle of the troops of the 5th Army on the Mozhaishk line of defense was practically

chesky ended.

Thus, in ten days, from October 11 to 20, on the Mozhaishk line of defense, the enemy was able to create a difficult situation in the defense zone of the 16th Army and to push the howl of the 5th Army in an easterly direction by 30-35 kilometers.

In this regard, on October 20, 1941, a special GKO decree No. 291 was published. According to this decree, the defense of Moscow on the lines 100-120 kilometers west of the capital was assigned to the troops of the Western Front. In order to strengthen the rear of the troops from October 20 in Moscow and adjacent regions

they declared a state of siege. In Moscow itself, which was intensively preparing for defense, from among the workers of industrial enterprises, students and even schoolchildren, 25 separate companies and battalions of up to 25 thousand people were formed.

This is what the defense of Moscow looked like from the side of the Soviet troops. But I also suggest looking at the described events from the German side. Thus, General F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, writes in his Military Diary:

"October 14, our entire operation to pursue the enemy, after a double battle in the Bryansk, Vyazma region, has now been suspended due to unfavorable autumn weather.

Army Group Center is pulling up the 2nd Army (reinforced with mobile formations) to Kursk in order to further develop the offensive against Voronezh. However, this is only in theory. In fact, the troops are stuck in the mud and should be satisfied that they manage to somehow ensure the supply of food with the help of tractors.

Guderian's tank army, advancing slowly and with difficulty, approached Tula (from Orel).

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G... 4th Army in cooperation with Panzer Group Götter broke through the defensive position of the enemy (covering Moscow) in the area from the Oka (near Kaluga) to Mozhaisk. However, the breakthrough of the tank group of Reinhardt (which received the 3rd tank group from Goth) to Klin, planned to the north of this sector, could not be carried out due to difficult road conditions. After heavy fighting, the 9th Army managed to stabilize the situation in the Kalinin region and create a fairly strong defense on its northern flank.

, The conditions for the supply of supplies are the main factor

rum, which determines the actions of our troops on the entire front those. , The situation on the communications of the 4th army and tank Goepner's group, marching through Yukhnov and Vyazma, is relatively tolerable, despite the incredible difficulties experienced by our troops. On the other hand, the conditions for transportation north of the Moscow-Minsk motorway are exceptionally difficult, and in connection with this, the possibility of carrying out a planned offensive south of the Moscow Sea against Klin and Rybinsk seems doubtful.

After the battle near Kiev in Ukraine, the enemy, as one would expect, is no longer able to defend on a solid front. He retreats with fights, trying to gain time. Personally, I think that he is able to hold only the Moscow region ... "(Halder F. Military diary. Vol. 3, book 2. - P. 29-31).

„... In the third decade of October 1941, the situation in polo All over the Western Front continued to heat up. The German command strove with all its might to continue the offensive in the chosen directions, feeding them solely through maneuvering troops. The Soviet command continuously increased the number of its troops due to the arrival of new reserves from the depths.

By that time, the enemy offensive in the zone of the 16th Army had already begun to have a clearly defined outline. In this regard, by the decision of K.K. Rokossovsky, the entire corps of the general was transferred to the threatened direction.

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la L. M. Dovator, the strip of which was occupied by the 126th rifle and 18th divisions of the people's militia advanced from the depths. In addition, on October 26, the 16th Army received two regiments of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns for reinforcement, which were immediately installed on tank-dangerous directions in the zone of the 316th Infantry Division. The pace of the enemy offensive in the Volokolamsk direction began to rapidly decline.

At the same time, the weakening of one section for the sake of strengthening another did not go unnoticed by the enemy. To the north of Volokolamsk, he managed to push the regiment of cadets, then "shatter" the defense in other directions. As a result, on October 25, in the zone of the 16th Army, the advanced units of the enemy occupied Bulychevo, Ostashkovo, crossed Ruza and approached Volokolomsk, and on October 27 they took possession of this city.

No less dramatic at the end of October 1941, events took place in the defense zone of the 5th Army of the Western Front (commanded by Major General L. A. Govorov). By that time, this army consisted of the 50th Rifle Division transferred to it, which was replenished with the remnants of the 19th and 103rd Rifle Divisions, as well as other units and groups withdrawn from Vyazma. In addition, the 144th rifle division, which had also previously participated in hostilities, was included in the army. The 18th, 19th, 20th and 22nd tank brigades, which were part of the army, were replenished with personnel and military equipment.

In connection with the narrowing of the army's defense zone, it was possible to increase the operational and tactical density of forces and means, concentrating most of them on the most probable direction of the enemy's main attack. Particular attention was paid to anti-tank defense. By order of the front command, detachments of tank destroyers were created in all formations and units of the army, consisting of an infantry platoon, an anti-tank rifle squad, and a sapper squad. They were equipped with anti-tank grenades, mines and Molotov cocktails. In ka-

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The commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, Major General L. M. Dovator (right) and the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division, Major General I. A. Pliev

each rifle regiment was created one such from the poison, in the division - two each. Subsequently, these formations were called mobile barrier detachments and became a common occurrence in the battle order of Soviet troops on the defensive.

„ On October 23, the enemy resumed the offensive in the zone of the 5th Army. As conceived by the commander of the 4th Army, Gene

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Field Marshal G. von Kluge, part of his troops were to pin down the troops of the center of the 5th Army, and with shock groups, inflicting strong flank attacks from the Ruza regions on Zvenigorod and Borovsk on Golitsino, encircle and destroy the main forces of the army in the Kubinka region. The solution of this problem was entrusted to the formations of the 7th and 9th army corps.

On the direction of the Minsk highway, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the 50th rifle division and the 22nd tank brigade. Then an army fighter detachment, a division of "Katyushas" and a battalion of a reserve rifle regiment were thrown there. But these forces, unable to hold back the pressure of the enemy, withdrew first to Dorohovo, and then even further east.

By noon on October 23, the situation in the area of the Minsk highway was extremely difficult. There were practically no infantry left in the ranks of the 5th Army in some directions, and individual tanks, artillery and sapper units, as well as an armored train pulled up here, fought the enemy. Moscow was less than 70 kilometers away.

At that time, the commander of the Western Front, General G.K. Zhukov, and a member of the Military Council of the Front, N.A. Bulganin, arrived in the combat area of the 5th Army. The last reserves of the front were also sent there: an artillery anti-tank regiment and another Katyusha division, as well as a fresh 82nd rifle division and a 25th tank brigade from Siberia. As a result of reinforcement by the end of October 23, the 5th Army, in addition to the remnants of the 32nd Infantry Division, also operated three more infantry divisions, five tank brigades, a separate motorcycle flight regiment, five separate anti-tank regiments of the RGK, two Katyusha divisions "and an armored train. The balance of forces and means began to change in favor of the Soviet troops. By October 31, moving east another 10 kilo-

meters, in the central direction the enemy ran out of steam and was stopped. Moscow was only 40 kilometers away.

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= Based on the results of the October battles of the 5th Army, on November 15, 1941, an article by L. A. Govorov "The experience of foes in the forests" was published. In particular, it was stated in it that during this time the army troops, retreating 20 kilometers, destroyed "thousands of enemy soldiers, many tanks, guns, mortars and other weapons." So, in only one battle, units of the army knocked out more than 70 fascist tanks. Even one of the partisan detachments operating

behind enemy lines in the zone of the 5th Army, destroyed 2 enemy tanks, an aircraft, 23 trucks and 14 wagons with cargo.

On the Kalinin direction

_ In November, the battles in the Kalinin direction, where the armies of the Kalinin Front were defending themselves, were quite fierce. So, on November 10, F. Halder notes in his Military Diary: "The isolated offensive of the 9th Army southeast of Kalinin without support on the entire front will bring us more dangers than benefits."

"And November. "The command of Army Group Center set itself in the order the immediate and final goals of the offensive. Von Bock believes that the condition of the troops makes it doubtful that even the nearest CHI task will be completed. Therefore, he set his troops a preliminary limited goal: access to the Moscow River in the Moscow region and to the Moscow-Volga canal ... Von Bock's point of view: a regrouping of troops is impossible. All that is needed is purposeful tactical actions, in accordance with the situation. and "On November 14, the weak covering forces of the 107th Rifle Division of the 30th Army were shot down by the enemy, and by the morning of the next day, the enemy, having reached the main defense line of the Ego formation, launched a decisive offensive. The offensive of the German troops was supported by aviation. By the middle of the day, the enemy troops, with difficulty overcoming the defense of the formations of the 30

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how many villages and moved to the east for 3-5 kilometers. On that day, F. Halder wrote in his diary: November 15th. "The formations on the eastern flank of the 9th Army went on the offensive. They, apparently, threw the enemy far away, who did not expect our strike at all.

Now let's see how the Soviet troops acted in the Kalinin direction after November 10, 1941.

On November 1, the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. that his armies "during the month from October 13 to November 11 inflicted serious losses on the enemy. According to preliminary estimates, the Germans in the operation on the Kalinin Front have up to 30,000 killed, and 150 tanks have been knocked out. 100 guns. 300 motorcycles were captured, up to 100 cars, not counting the wrecked ones. 50 aircraft shot down. The enemy's 3rd Panzer Group (1st, 6th and 36th MDs) suffered a serious defeat, and since October 18 it has not taken active action and, locked in the Kalinin area, is putting its material equipment in order. Part..."

At the same time, the commander indicates that the 30th Army occupies a front of 80 kilometers, having in its composition the 5th Rifle and the 107th Mechanized Division, which has emerged from the encirclement and is being restored, and the 21st Tank Brigade with 20 tanks. He asks to send 65 thousand people with weapons and a large amount of weapons to the troops.

It is not known how the Headquarters responded to the requests of the command of the Kalinin Front. But on November 16, she ordered to break the ice on the Moscow Sea with the aim of preventing the advance of the enemy by artillery fire, air strikes and the method of undermining engineering charges.

Of course, the enemy did not succeed in pushing the Soviet troops back to the east "far away". But in those conditions, the movement of German troops to the east, even for several kilometers, created a threat to cover Moscow from the north. JV Stalin called the commander of the Kalinin Front and demanded that the situation be restored.

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, I. S. Konev immediately responded to Ver's call
call He ordered the commander of the 30th Army on the night of November 16 to organize a counterattack, but, as usual, he did not allocate a pitchfork and funds for this. Therefore, there could be no talk of any: "counterstrike". The army troops continued their retreat. ∴ In the second half of November, after the capture of Rzhev, the 9th Field Army and the 41st Tank Corps - the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht rushed towards Kalinin, trying to capture Moscow from the north. This grouping included 39,000 personnel, 300 tanks, up to 650 guns and mortars, and 250 anti-tank guns. -. The enemy's blow was resisted by the already battered 30th Army, 31st and 29th Armies of the Kalinin Front. So, in two rifle, one motorized rifle, one cavalry divisions and two tank brigades

30th Army at the beginning of November, there were 23 thousand people personnel catcher, 20 tanks, 185 guns and mortars, ,25 anti-tank guns. The rest of the armies of the Kalinin Front had approximately the same forces. - Thus, as of November 16, 1941, `in the Kalinin direction, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of the number of personnel, had 'approximate equality in guns and mortars, but were inferior to the enemy in terms of the number of tanks and anti-tank weapons. s General F. [Halder, describing the actions of the German troops in the Kalinin direction, noted in his diary:

“ November 16th. "The enemy reacted rather quickly to yesterday's offensive of the 9th Army... Our troops, advancing southeast of Kalinin, continue to advance. The enemy retreats beyond the Volga. In front of the northern flank of the 9th Army, the enemy apparently For the next seven days, F. Halder notes that there were no special changes in the Kalinin region. But on November 24, he writes that in connection with the successful offensive of the 3rd

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tank group on Dmitrov, in the zone of its offensive, the transfer of reinforcements from the Kali region was started
Nina.

By the morning of November 16, a difficult situation had developed in the defense zone of the 30th Army, and a gap of 16-18 kilometers had formed between its left flank and the right flank of the neighboring 16th Army. Cavalry units were advanced by the commanders of the Kalinin Front to close this gap.

The enemy continued to advance. The troops of the 30th Army stubbornly tried to hold their positions. In just two days of fighting in the army zone, German troops lost 35 tanks, 28 armored vehicles, 18 artillery pieces, 38 anti-tank guns, about 2.5 thousand soldiers and officers. But the losses of the Soviet troops were also huge. There were 3-4 thousand people left in the rifle divisions. The 21st Tank Brigade lost all of its tanks and up to 35% of its personnel.

On November 17, fierce battles unfolded south of the Moscow Sea. The advancing 6th and 7th tank and 14th motorized divisions of the enemy, having broken the resistance of the Soviet troops of the 107th motorized rifle division, captured Novo-Zavidovsky. But the Soviet units, hastily advanced to this area, were able to blow up the railway and highway bridges across the Moscow Sea during the withdrawal.

At the end of the day, the 30th Army was transferred from the Kalininsky to the Western Front. Attempts by the enemy to cross the Moscow Sea on November 18 us-

did not have a foot. Regrouping their forces, they rushed to Moscow in the direction of Klin - Solnechnogorsk - Zelenograd.

On November 18, to reinforce the troops of the 30th Army, the 58th Panzer Division was transferred from the 16th Army, consisting of 15 tanks, 5 guns and 350 infantrymen. Of course, she could not solve a serious combat mission. Therefore, for the defense of Klin, on the orders of the commander of the Western Front, a special task force was formed.

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yes, under the command of General Zakharov, consisting of one infantry, one cavalry division, a cadet regiment and two tank brigades.

°. The enemy did not attack Klin from the front, but, as usual, tried to outflank this city. By the end of November 22, they managed to surround this city from the north, west and south. On November 23, German tanks broke into Klin from the northeast, encircling part of the forces of the 30th Army in the city. With difficulty, they managed to break through to their troops.

< Having captured Klin, the German tank wedge launched an offensive against Solnechnogorsk, which was defended by formations of the 16th Army of General K.K. Rokossovsky. Another part of the enemy forces launched an offensive in an easterly direction, broke into Rogachev and extended their operations to Dmitrov and Yakhroma.

On November 27, General F. Halder noted in his diary: "On the northern flank of the strike group advancing on Moscow, our troops feel confident and are pushing the enemy... west of Moscow. And although these are not large formations, but small groups, they are constantly arriving at the front and creating more and more new obstacles in the path of our tired troops. In front of the front of formations advancing on the Volga-Moscow Canal, the enemy slowly withdraws, waging "stubborn rearguard battles."

On November 28, without encountering due resistance, German tanks broke into Yakhroma, captured the bridge and crossed over to the eastern bank of the canal.

— The next day, German troops developed an offensive in an easterly direction from the canal line and even advanced several kilometers. But the Soviet troops, having carried out a counterattack, were able to throw them back, "Blowing up the bridge across the Moscow-Volga canal. And although Yakhroma remained in the hands of the enemy, he was no longer able to develop the offensive further.

On November 29, F. Halder had a conversation with the commander of the Army Troupe "Center", Field Marshal F. von

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Sideways. On that day, he wrote: "The command of the Army Group Center ... fears that if the offensive launched now against Moscow fails in the north, Moscow will become a new Verdun, that is, the battle will turn into a fierce frontal slaughter."

On November 30, a new entry appeared in his diary: "The northern wing of Army Group Center, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who is striving in any conceivable way (bringing reinforcements into battle, laying minefields) to delay our offensive, is advancing towards Moscow ... The shortfall on the Eastern Front is 340,000 men, that is, half of the combat strength of the infantry. Now companies have an average of 50-60 people ... In Termania, only 33,000 people are ready to be sent to the front ... The fleet has no more than 50 percent of serviceable vehicles ... The first mobile formations can be ready no earlier than the beginning of February. The rest of the mobile connections will be ready for departure from Germany no earlier than mid-May. For artillery shelling of Moscow, 10 batteries of 150-mm cannons (firing range of 11,300 m), 2 batteries of 150-mm cannons (15,300), 1 battery of 194 mm guns (20,800 m). These batteries will be sent to Army Group Center on 6.12.

Thus, based on German sources, we see how the battles unfolded on Kalinin in the rule north of Moscow. By the end of November 1941, the troops of the 9th Army and the 41st Tank Corps of the 3rd Tank Group were able to capture Kalinin and reach the Moscow-Volga canal in the area of Dmitrov and Yakhroma, but failed to capture these cities.

Defense of Tula

Leading the attack on Moscow from the southwest, on October 23, the enemy, using mobile formations of the 2nd tank group of General G. Guderian, approached the near approaches to Tula, which was the most important point in the administrative

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Among the others, only Yuzhna was well-equipped. The remaining divisions lacked personnel and, AE noe, artillery. In addition, in Tula itself there was a military force, the basis of which was the Tula military school and the reserve rifle brigade formed there. {Yes, and the so-called Tula workers' regiment.

d > In accordance with the work "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces

nyh Forces in the Great Patriotic War "On October 30, the south, advancing along the Mtsensk-Tula highway and knocking down the barriers of the Bovet troops, approached Tula. In the next three days, from October 30 to November 1, enemy troops, without tank divisions, fiercely attacked Tula, but

Yuovet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War

war." - S. 295).

General 1. V. Boldin was appointed commander of the 50th Army, who arrived in Tula in the evening of October 22. Later, in his memoirs, Ivan Vasilyevich recalled,

for his sake, he summoned the head directly to him

Mick of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov:

"So, my dear Ivan Vasilyevich," said Sha

ov, coming out from behind the desk and pacing

about cabinet no. "Our business is very serious. The enemy is not only

th refused to capture Moscow, but even increased the onslaught.

And. Boris Mikhailovich took a large pointer and went up to

Map hanging on the wall.

And. - Hitler threw his elite units into the Tula region, towards Yasnaya Polyana. Can you imagine: his vandals

If we desecrate the holy of holies of our people - the grave

To va Nikolaevich Tolstoy, they destroy his house, where it was

the ingenious creation of the human mind "War and

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city. The enemy's goal is to capture Tula and turn it into a springboard for an attack on Moscow.

I listen attentively to the marshal and follow the pointer he is pointing at the map.

"Given the current situation," continued Shaposhnikov, "the Headquarters decided to entrust the defense of Tula to the fiftieth army, and appoint you as its commander. I ask you to understand how responsible this task is. To defend Tula means not to allow the enemy to encircle Moscow!...

On October 25, the fascist divisions were already 60 kilometers west of Tula. But the enemy struck the main blow from the south along the Orlovsky highway, where he

completed most of all his tanks. For an auxiliary strike in the Belev area, he sent two infantry and one cavalry divisions.

From Belev, the Nazis advanced in two directions - northeast and southeast. Having captured Likhvin and advancing towards Khanino and Pamshino, they sought to bypass Tula from the north, breaking its connection with Moscow. The grouping, operating in a southeasterly direction, was supposed to reach the communications of the 50th Army in the Chern region and connect with its troops advancing through Mtsensk ...

On October 29, enemy troops, supported by dive bombers, broke through our defenses in the area of Yasnaya Polyana and captured it the next day, and then reached Kosaya Gora, a suburb of Tula. Using the numerical and technical superiority, the enemy, with the support of aviation, tried to capture Tula on the move. But, having met with determined resistance, he was forced to retreat.

And yet the enemy rushed forward. He pulled fresh troops to Tula. In just one day - October 31 - the Nazi infantry, supported by a hundred tanks, attacked the city eight times, and all was unsuccessful ...

On the night of November 3, the Nazis launched a psychic attack. Hitler's infantry supported by tanks. marching with headlights on, moved to the front

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edge of our defense. But this time the enemy's attempt

to please the city with the help of a frontal strike from the south of Provo

Itila. The Germans were powerless to break the stamina and mu

On the castle of the defenders of Tula. In this battle, the 2156th NKVD Rifle Regiment especially distinguished itself. They arrived in the 50th army

`New parts. This allowed the command to prepare

Sk sontrudar south of Tula.

=. On November 6, the first stage of the Tula defense ended

i operation. At dawn the next day, the 50th Army launched a counterattack, and by the end of the day on November 8, its troops had already come close to Kosaya Gora and knocked out the Nazis

"from several settlements" (Boldin V.I. Stra

And threads of life. - S. 140-149).

_In the capital work of the historian and writer B. Shaposh-

ho battles on the near approaches to Tula are described
VERY detailed. In particular, he writes:

o "In the afternoon of October 29, the enemy, escorted by dive bombers and stormtroopers, broke through the battle formation of the 290th Rifle Division. Yasnaya Polyana area. About 20-25 tanks broke into

, forest area to the north of it and, bypassing our infantry, advanced at 16 o'clock to Krasnaya Gora. At this time in the area

, Krasnaya Gora was located after a heavy 80-kilometer

trovov march 31st Cavalry Division. submachine gunners

'enemy, planted on tanks (4-5 people per

tank), dismounted, scattered through the forest, opened

row fire at the location of the 31st Cavalry

etam mountain guns of the division, firing at enemy tanks. Then the fascist tanks (12-15 tanks and "several armored vehicles") moved to Tula, on the outskirts of which they were repulsed by the 156th regiment of the NKVD and, chiefly, by the artillery of the 732nd air defense regiment.

_ The troops of the 50th Army withdrew to the north and organized

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And

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217, 173, 290, 260, 154th rifle divisions, 58th reserve rifle and 1005th rifle regiments.

The size of the divisions at that time was different: from 600 to two and a half thousand people ... The amount of artillery in the formations and units of the Tula combat area was insignificant, for example, in the 154th rifle division there were two 122-mm guns ... Things were no better with the provision of heavy machine guns, for example, in the 290th rifle division there was one heavy machine gun ...

Defensive work around the city began on October 20. The population of Tula was mobilized for work ... In total, three lines of defense were created. The first is on the outskirts of Tula. The second and third are directly in the city. The first consisted of field fortifications of the usual type (trenches, minefields, anti-tank ditches). The second and third lines of defense were a system of wooden barricades...

An attempt to capture the city on October 30 cost the enemy heavy losses, in addition, 31 tanks were destroyed.

On October 31, with forces of up to 100 tanks (of which 16 were destroyed) and up to a regiment of motorized infantry, the enemy went on the attack eight times in the direction of the southern outskirts of the city with the support of aviation ...

November 1 ... between 10 and 11 o'clock the Germans, with a force of up to two infantry battalions with 18 tanks, tried to attack Tula from the south. But their attacks during the day were repelled. 6 tanks were hit, | an armored vehicle, 25 vehicles and 2 enemy planes were shot down.

By this time, in addition to the arrival of the 32nd tank brigade, the commander of the 50th army received the 413th rifle division from the Far East, 16 echelons of which had already unloaded, and 4 were on the way.

Subsequently, directly south of Tula, the enemy did not stop his attacks, but they were undertaken

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"Smaller than before, forces ... "(Shaposhnikov B. Battle for Moscow. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2009. - P. 132-141).

- Now I propose to look at the events that took place in late October - early November near Tula through the eyes of the Germans. Thus, General G. Guderian, whose formations were directly attacking Tula, writes in his memoirs:

On October 29, our head tank units reached a point four kilometers from Tula. The attempt to capture the city on the move ran into strong anti-tank and anti-aircraft defenses and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers.

, _ I was visited by the commander of the 43rd Army Corps, General Neral Heinritz, who was always distinguished by his sober judgments, reported that his troops were poorly supplied, and that on October 20 they even stopped receiving bread.

_ By October 30, the 53rd army corps reached the Orel-Tula highway ... Information about the approach of the Russians from the east, received since October 27, forced me to transfer the 53rd army corps to the Epifan, Stalinogorsk sector in order to ensure the right flank .

_ The condition of the Orel-Tula highway by this time had become so bad that the 3rd Panzer Division, approaching Tula after Eberbach's group, was forced to be supplied by air.

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In view of the impossibility of taking Tula from the front, General Ba von Geyer proposed to bypass the city from the east. I agreed with this proposal ... "(Guderian G. - P. 332). # Another source that explains the events that took place near Tula in late October - early November 1941 in a different way. This is the work of the German historian V. Haupt "Battles of Army Group Center". In particular, he

shishet:

," "The battle near Tula began on October 29, when the general of the tank troops, Geir von Schweppenburg, swept the city from the south with his Mi motorized forces. By evening, the Advance Detachment of the 3rd Panzer Division under the command of

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Major Frank's ship came within 5 kilometers of the city's industrial area. The 6th Panzer Regiment of Colonel Muntzel, despite all the difficulties, reached the same line that night. The last tanks of the 24th Panzer Corps went on the attack the next morning after the first infantry battalions of the Grossdeutschland Regiment, under the command of Colonel Hoernlein, approached them. On the morning of October 30, the attack failed. Only 60 people from "Great Germany" broke through to the southern outskirts of Tula. Then they were thrown back. Colonel Muntzel's tanks stopped - gasoline ran out ... "

Further, he writes that due to the fact that, according to the German command, there was a GPU regiment in Tula itself and the city was mined and prepared for explosions, "the corps commander forbade taking the city from the south or entering it" (Haupt V The Battles of Army Group Center, p. 113).

Having failed in capturing Tula, the enemy began to develop an offensive on the flanks of the 50th Army, which on November 9 was reassigned to the commander of the Western Front.

On November 10, the enemy made an attempt to strike at the joint between the 49th and 50th armies in the area of the settlement of Kleshnya. By October 16, by desperate counterattacks by formations of these armies, the threat of an enemy breakthrough to the Tula-Moscow highway in this direction was eliminated.

In the defensive zone of the 50th Army, the enemy transferred his efforts to its left flank, striking at Venev and further on Kashira.

But the forces of the Soviet troops defending south of Moscow continued to build up. November 20 as part of the 50th

The 239th Rifle Division, which had arrived from the Far East, was transferred to the army. But, having entered the battle, under the pressure of the enemy tank units, this division was forced to begin a withdrawal in a northerly direction. On November 23 and 24, during the fighting near Stalinogorsk, this division was surrounded

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opponent. The next day, having lost contact with the headquarters of the Gum of the 50th Army, she began to independently break through from the encirclement to the northeast.

and s - G. Guderian writes in his memoirs:

: > "November 1, the 24th Panzer Corps reached the area west of Dedilovo.

∴ When the vanguard of the 53rd Army Corps approached the village of Teploye in November, it unexpectedly bumped into the enemy. This was a large Russian re, consisting of two Viy cavalry divisions, five rifle divisions and one tank brigade, advancing along the Efremov-Tula highway and, obviously, having the task of attacking the rear and flank of the formation of the 24th tank corps in the Tula region. The appearance of parts of the 3rd Army Corps turned out to be for the Russians, in Dima's opinion, the same surprise as their appearance for the Germans.

From November 3 to November 13, fighting broke out in the Teploe region, as a result of which the 53rd Army Corps, supported by Eberbach's tank brigade, managed to push the enemy back to Yefremov, while capturing more than 3,000 prisoners and a significant number of guns.

„> On November 5, Field Marshal von Bock visited me briefly. On November 4, the army group command concluded that the Russians were systematically clearing the area west of Yaon between Voronezh and Stalinogorsk, and reported this opinion to the high command of the ground forces. However, the situation in the zone of operations of the 2nd Panzer Army refuted this opinion. On the contrary, in the Teploye area, the enemy was advancing!

V. On November 6, I flew to the front. My impressions of this are evident from the following letter: "Our troops are in torment, and our cause is in disastrous condition, for the enemy is gaining time, and with our plans we are faced with the inevitability of conducting military operations in winter conditions. Therefore, my mood is very sad. Best Wishes Fail

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deliver a powerful blow to the enemy, everything disappears quickly

yards and faster, and I'm not sure she'll ever come back. God alone knows how things will turn out in the future. It is necessary to hope and not lose courage, but this is a difficult test ... "

On November 7, the frosts for the first time inflicted heavy losses on us. Information was received that the 1st Panzer Army, advancing on Rostov, on November 5, went to the Don.

On November 8, the 53rd Army Corps achieved success in the area of the settlement of Teploe, the 24th Tank Corps repelled enemy attacks from Tula.

On November 9, the enemy's intentions to launch a counterattack east and west of Tula became clear ... How tense was the situation in the Tula region these days. can be judged at least by the fact that the four weak battalions of the 4th Panzer Division occupied a front 35 km wide in order to provide communication between the 53rd Army Corps and the 3rd Panzer Division operating near Tula.

On November 12, the temperature dropped to 13 degrees below zero, on November 13 - to 22 degrees.

On this day in Orsha, under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, a meeting of the commanders of the armies of the Army Group Center was held and the "order for the autumn offensive of 1941" was announced. This order put before the 2nd Panzer Army the task of capturing the city of Gorky (former Nizhny Novgorod), located 600 km from Orel. Liebenstein immediately stated that the 2nd Panzer Army, under the present situation, was only capable of reaching Venev ... I fully shared the opinion of my chief of staff and immediately reported in writing to the commander of the army group that the tank army was not in a position to fulfill this under kaz" (Guderian G. — S. 332-335).

Thus, judging by the memoirs of G. Guderian, the counterattack of the 50th Army in early November in the Tula region looked completely different. A powerful counter strike force was directed at the enemy without

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At the headquarters of the Western Front: G. K. Zhukov, V. D. Sokolovsky, N. A. Bulganin. November 1941

Go preliminary reconnaissance, resulting in her meeting

who had fallen in the Teploe region with approximate equality or funds, were lost by the Soviet troops. At the same time, the position of the German troops was not

and other objective reasons, they were rapidly losing their offensive capabilities. But higher

still put forward large-scale offensive achievements. And G. Guderian did everything to fulfill them. We read further the memoirs of V. I. Boldin:

“And yet the Nazis did not abandon their plans. November, they struck at our troops for a hundred

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ke of the 49th and 50th armies and broke through to the Spas-Kanino area, spreading in the direction of Kleshnya, Sukhodol. In this way, the enemy was withdrawing his troops to the shortest route to Moscow, posing a threat to the entire left wing of the Western Front.

Two days later, the 49th and 50th armies jointly hit the enemy in the Sukhodol area, halted the enemy's offensive and prevented him from reaching the Tula-Mo highway.
squa...

After an unsuccessful attempt to cut the Moscow highway from the west, the Nazi command decided to try another option: to tie up our troops near Tula with part of the forces, and to concentrate the main blow of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army in the east, on the Dedilovo-Stalinogorsk direction, in order to reach the Tula highway— Venev, and then turn northwest towards the Tula-Serpukhov highway. Here Guderian planned to establish contact with the 43rd Army Corps and then break through to Moscow with a blow to Venev-Kashira. Thus, the main enemy forces advancing on Venev fell upon the 413th Rifle Division, while those operating in the direction of Dedilovo fell upon the 299th Rifle Division.

The whole day on November 18 there were bloody battles, especially heavy ones in the Dedilovsky direction. After a strong tank attack, the Nazis captured the settlement of Mokroe and approached Dedilovo. But several times individual houses along the village passed from hand to hand. Enemy tanks bypassed the settlement from the east, and units of the 299th Infantry Division were surrounded. However, this did not shake the morale of our troops, they continued to defend stubbornly, and then, supported by their tankers, broke through the enemy ring and retreated to a new line.

On November 21, a cavalry regiment, two tank and two infantry divisions of the enemy continued their offensive in the Venevsky, Stalinogorsk and Uzdok directions. bypassing the left flank of the 50th Army and moving to Epifan. By the end of the day, they broke through the defenses of the 413th and 299th strel-

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Tula. November 1941

new divisions in the Bolokhov-Aleksandrov section and you and to the Shat River in the Kukuy, Rybinka area. In addition, Azhe infantry, supported by forty tanks, broke through from Petrovskoye and Uzlovaya.

By decision of the command of the 50th Army, Venev was created

r and the 413th Infantry Division, Major General Tereshkov. asti of the Venevsky combat area continued heavy

I suffered heavy losses. The 31st Cavalry Division was forced to retreat along the highway to Venev. Harsh anguish fell on the 108th Panzer Division as well. Under the horde of superior enemy forces, she left rue Maclene - Riga and concentrated in Venev. The 299th Rifle Division suffered greatly. The ide was interrupted with her, and the command of the army did not eat any information from there”(Boldin V.I. Pages of life. - P. 150).

But then, oddly enough, the commander of the 50th Army stops describing the battles of his formations in the We

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Neva and begins to talk about the defense of Tula and about his distant memories associated with this city. And only many pages later, he again returns to the main events of the autumn of 1941. V. I. Boldin writes:

“Parts of the Venevsky combat area continue to conduct heavy defensive battles. November 24 was the critical moment. Large enemy forces, supported by several dozen tanks, occupied the settlements of Gati and Khavki, two to five kilometers south of Venev, and reached the Venev-Tula highway. By the end of the day, after many hours of exhausting battle with superior enemy forces, we were forced to leave Venev and retreat to the north ... Continuing to develop the offensive in the Kashira direction, the Nazis went to Grichino. Olenkovo, Mordves, and on the Mikhailovsky direction they managed to reach the regional center. By doing this, they cut the 50th army into two parts”(Boldin V.I. Pages of life. - M.: Voenizdat, 1961. - P. 162).

To stop the advance of the enemy on this

direction, the Soviet command urgently threw the 2nd cavalry corps of General P.A. Belov there, as well as the 112th tank division and the 9th separate tank brigade. By the end of the day, the 9th cavalry division concentrated in Sukhov, and the 5th cavalry division in Kashira. Tankers began to concentrate in the Serpukhov area. Gradually, a new powerful defensive barrier was created south of Moscow with a ledge to the south in the Tula region, in which part of the troops and the headquarters of the 50th Army were under the threat of encirclement.

To prevent this, the front commander ordered the 31st cavalry and 239th rifle divisions to start active operations behind enemy lines in the Kolomenskoye direction. At the same time, the 41st Cavalry Division received the task of destroying the enemy in the Mikhailov area. The main events of the battle for Moscow unfold a few tens of kilometers northeast of Tula, which by that time had already partially lost its operational significance. True, I command

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The 50th Army in his memoirs says practically nothing about the events in the Kashira region, continuing to describe in detail the defense of Tula, which is constantly attacked by large masses of enemy infantry with the support of up to 40 tanks. And only on November 31, having failed in another attack on the city from the side of the winery, did the enemy stop their attacks, being unable to defeat the Tu Laks.

!" We take the Camping diary of General P. A. Belov, on November 26, 1941, whose unit was renamed the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. On November 26, his divisions concentrated in the Kashira area. On November 27, enemy tanks and infantry were stopped four kilometers from this city.

_ On this day, "the commander of the 49th army, General Zakharkin, came to me. Confirmation has been received that the 173rd Rifle Division, which has more than 3,000 soldiers and one gun, is subordinate to me. Also, all units of the Kashira garrison are subordinate to me, plus a battalion of Komsomol members, residents of Kashira. However, I was given double subordination, that is, to the commander of the front and the commander of the 49th Army. It is inconvenient, unpleasant and deprives of independence ...".

,. With the arrival in the Kashira area, the formations of the corps are late. 29th of November. "There is still no tank brigade, no tank battalions. Colonel Taranov TSI. A. Taranov is a non-staff assistant to the commander of the 1st Tvardeysky cavalry corps for tank troops. - Auth.) Doesn't even convey anything. Milo Slavsky arrived and reported that Taranov was idle. ,Wrote an order to remove Taranov from duty

awn and ask the front commander to bring him to justice. Instead of Taranov and at the same time as the commander of the tank detachment, consisting of two battalions, I appoint Colonel Gretsov, chief of staff of the corps. I decided, without waiting for the Chunk Brigade, to strike Re on the enemy with two tank battalions ...

And

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|. 165

29th of November. "The enemy's attempt to capture Kashira failed, although the 173rd Rifle Division fought unstable and the enemy pushed it back ... I consider the moment the most successful for a counterattack ..."

November 30th. "The tank detachment of Colonel Gretsov successfully attacked the tank unit of the enemy in Barabanovka ... True, the Germans drove Gretsov's detachment out of Barabanovka by subsequent actions, but nevertheless the appearance of our tanks in the rear of the Germans continues to influence the course of events."

The approach of the 9th tank brigade is expected, which should reinforce the group of Colonel Gretsov, consisting of two tank battalions. But it turns out that a significant part of the tanks of this brigade on the way from Podolsk to Kolomna "fell behind allegedly for technical reasons."

On the night of November 28-29, the main forces of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps went on the offensive against the village of Pyatnitsa, where "there is an enemy tank battalion of about 30 tanks and motorized infantry." By morning, this village was occupied by Soviet troops. (Belov P. A. Camping diary. // Military Historical Archive. 2005. No. 2. - P. 51-53.)

But G. Guderian did not abandon either the plan to encircle the Soviet troops in the Tula region, or the general offensive against Moscow. V. I. Boldin writes: "On December 3, about sixty enemy tanks, together with motorized infantry, crossed the Tula-Serpukhov railway in the Revyakino region and occupied the settlements of Strunino, Zhely Benka, and Nefedovo. A small group of enemy tanks broke through Peshkovo, Gretsovo and occupied Nikolo-Vy Kun. By the end of the day, the advanced units of the enemy occupied Petrushino, Kostrovo, Sevryukovo. I was informed that the Nazis had cut off the Moscow Highway in several places, 15-20 kilometers north of Tula.

As a result of these actions of the enemy, part of the troops and the headquarters of the 50th Army were under the threat of encirclement. Tol-

to the joint actions of one of the rifle regiments

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:50- th army and a counterattack of the 112th tank division - > (commander Colonel Getman) the Soviet command "managed to somewhat push the enemy in the east on- . ,board and release the Moscow highway. In other directions, fresh forces were also brought into the battle. The turning point of the entire battle for Moscow was coming. yy Now let's see how General A. describes this time.

· Guderian, who in November and December directly led the military operations of troops in the Tula region. In order not to bore the reader, I have decided to omit some secondary points, focusing only on

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to the main ones. So, G. Guderian writes: | _— "On the morning of November 14, I visited the 167th Infantry Division and 'conversed with many officers and soldiers. Supply- . troops were bad. There was a lack of white camouflage gowns, shoe wax, linen, and, above all, cloth trousers. A significant part of the soldiers were dressed in cotton trousers, and this was at 22-degree weather. rose! An urgent need was also felt in boots and "stockings. In the afternoon I visited the 112th Infantry Division, where I saw the same picture. Our soldiers, dressed in Russian overcoats and fur hats, could only be recognized

by the emblem. Mom... Eberbach's heroic brigade had no more than 50 tanks left. There were about 600 tanks in three tank divisions. The sleet greatly hindered the actions of the tanks, especially since the spikes had not yet been obtained. } Because of the frost, the glasses of optical instruments were , sweating, and the special ointment that counteracted this still did not. "It was obtained. Before starting tank engines, they HAD to be warmed up. The fuel , partially froze, the oil thickened ... On November 15, the Russians continued their attacks on the positions of the 43rd Army Corps.

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|. On November 16, General Heinrici came to me: losses from frost, lack of uniforms, lice!

„.. On November 17, we received information about the unloading of Siberian-Kov at the Uzlovaya station, as well as about the unloading of other units

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on the Ryazan-Kolomna section. The 112th Infantry Division ran into fresh Siberian units. Due to the fact that at the same time the division was attacked by Russian tanks from the direction of Dedilovo, its weakened units were not able to withstand this onslaught ... It came to a

niki, which covered the front to Bogoroditsk. This panic, which arose for the first time since the beginning of the Russian campaign, was a serious warning indicating that our infantry had exhausted its combat capability and was no longer capable of major efforts

On November 18, the 2nd Panzer Army went on the offensive in accordance with the order received on November 13 in Orsha ... The offensive was attended by:

47th Panzer Corps:

The 18th Panzer Division was advancing on the factory town of Efremov; On November 20, after stubborn street fighting, the division captured this city and held it, despite fierce enemy counterattacks.

The 10th motorized division advanced on Epifan, Mikhailov; The 29th Motorized Division was advancing on Spasskoye and Gremyachey, having the task of securing the eastern flank of the army from a possible attack by fresh enemy forces from the Ryazan and Kolomna region.

By that time, the 25th motorized division was still engaged in one of the operations of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to destroy the encircled enemy and, after completing its task, was to form a corps reserve;

53rd Army Corps:

The 167th Infantry Division advanced through Stalinogorsk towards Venev;

The 112th Infantry Division was advancing on Stalinogorsk, where it was supposed to create a bridgehead on the river. Don; later, taking into account the losses of this division, it was supposed to be replaced by the 56th Infantry Division, which was part of the reserve of the army group and was supposed to approach from the Karachev area;

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"... The 24th Panzer Corps received the task of enveloping the city of Tula from two sides and seizing it; ahead The 24th Panzer and 53rd Army Corps were advancing on Kashira by the combat group of the 17th Panzer Division, with the task of capturing the bridge over the Oka and blocking enemy reinforcements from the Moscow region under the Oka.

, The 43rd Army Corps, with the forces of the 31st and 131st Infantry Divisions, advanced through Likhvin and Kaluga into the area located between the Upa and Oka rivers, with the task of clearing it of the enemy and ensuring communication between the 2- th Panzer Army and 4th Army.

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The 2nd Army, our neighbor on the right flank, was given the task of advancing east of Orel. There was no need to count on support from her side. It was known that to the west of the road Yelets, Efremov, the Russians were carrying out trench work, and the command of the 2nd Army concluded that the assumptions about the withdrawal of the Russians beyond the Don were not justified.

And the 4th Army, operating to the left of the 2nd Panzer Army, had the task of forcing the Oka north of Aleksin and advancing on Serpukhov; The army included up to 36 DIVISIONS. -

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On November 18, with strong air support, the 47th Tank Corps succeeded in capturing Epifan', and the 24th Tank Corps succeeded in capturing Dedilovo. On November 19, the 24th Panzer Corps reached Bolokhovo. On November 21, the 53rd Army Corps occupied Uzlovaya; On November 24, the 24th Panzer Corps occupied Venev and knocked out 50 Russian tanks while the 43rd Army Corps slowly advanced cr. Upa...

-. On November 21, in the area of operations of the forward units of the 47th Panzer Corps, dangerous fresh forces appeared near Tivnik - the 50th Russian Army, which included the 508th Tank Brigade, the 299th Rifle Division, the 31st Cavalry Division and other units. The situation is getting serious again...

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On the afternoon of November 23, I decided to personally go to the commander of Army Group Center and ask him to change the task assigned to me, which had become impossible. I reported to Field Marshal von Bock that the 2nd Panzer Army was in a very difficult situation and that its troops, especially the infantry units, were extremely tired; I pointed out the absence of winter uniforms, the poor work of the rear service, the insignificant number of tanks and guns, and also the threat to the strongly extended eastern flank from fresh enemy forces arriving from the Far East in the Ryazan-Kolomna region. Field Marshal von Bock answered me that he had already sent the texts of my previous reports to the High Command of the Ground Forces and that it was well aware of the true situation at the front. Von Bock then ordered me to put him on the phone with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and suggested that I put on headphones and listen to his conversation with the Commander-in-Chief. Having outlined the content of my report on the situation, von Bock asked the commander-in-chief to change the task assigned to me, cancel the order to advance and give the order to go over to the defensive in positions convenient in winter conditions.

The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, in all likelihood, was not free to make a decision. In its-

in their answers he tried to avoid the most difficult questions. Rejecting my proposals, he ordered the offensive to continue. After our urgent demands to indicate to us at least some achievable and not too distant goal, having reached which we could then create a defensive line, the commander-in-chief finally told us the Mikhailov-Zaraisk line and added that our most important task is the complete destruction of the Ryazan-Kolomna railway line.

I was dissatisfied with the results of my trip to Army Group Headquarters. On the same day, I sent for a report to the Chief of the General Staff, who was at my headquarters, the communications officer of the main command of the land

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troops of Lieutenant Colonel von Kalden. He was supposed to try to get an order to suspend the offensive, but he returned without achieving any results. The negative attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the Chief of the General Staff towards my proposals allows Lo to conclude that they themselves, and not only Hitler, are in favor of continuing the offensive. In any case, the high military command was no longer aware of the extremely difficult situation of my army, and I believed that Hitler was also informed about this in detail.

° On November 24, the 10th motorized division occupied Mikhailov, the 29th motorized division advanced 40 km north of the city of ĭEpifan. On November 25, the battle group of the 17th Panzer Division approached Kashira. Our neighbor on the right occupied Livny.

_ On November 26, the 53rd Army Corps approached the Don, crossed it with the forces of the 167th Infantry Division at Ivan Bzer and attacked the Siberians northeast of this settlement near Donskoy. The valiant division for enough 42 guns, a certain number of vehicles and up to 4000 prisoners. The 29th motorized division of the 47th tank corps was advancing on the Siberians from the east, as a result of which the enemy was surrounded.

- November 27 ... in the morning I arrived in Elifan, where General Lemelsen reported to me that at night the 29th motorized division was in a critical situation. The main forces of the 239th

The Siberian rifle division, leaving their artillery and vehicles, broke out of the encirclement and went to the east. The stretched line of encirclement from units of the 29th Moto DIVISION could not hold back the Russians that had broken through and suffered heavy losses ...

Our most urgent task was to master

To and to the north or to the east, i.e. in the direction of our immediate goals,
without first mastering this important junction of means of communication
And ram We wanted

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corps from the north and east and by the forces of the 43rd army corps from the west. During this operation, the 53rd Army Corps was supposed to provide our northern flank against the enemy forces operating from the Moscow direction, and the 47th Tank Corps - the extended eastern flank against the Siberians being transferred here, the 10th motorized division of this corps, having reached 27 November, in accordance with the order of the city of Mikhailov, sent groups of demolition men to blow up the railway in the Ryazan-Kolomna section, but, unfortunately, these groups could not fulfill their task: the Russian defense was too strong ...

On November 29, superior enemy forces for the first time put strong pressure on the 10th motorized division. Therefore, our troops were forced to leave Skopin. The 2nd Panzer Division of the 4th Army reached Krasnaya Polyana, 22 km northwest of Moscow... first of all, "break through to Tula."

_ On November 30, the main command of the ground forces expressed doubts about whether we had concentrated enough forces to carry out an offensive on Tula ...

We organized our advanced command post in Yasnaya Polyana, the former estate of Count Tolstoy. I visited the command post on 2 December. Yasnaya Polyana was behind the command post of the "Great Germany" regiment, 1/2 km south of Tula.

On December 2, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, as well as the Grossdeutschland Regiment, succeeded in penetrating the front line of the enemy defenses, for whom our offensive came as a complete surprise. The offensive continued on December 3 in conditions of heavy snow and wind. The roads were icy, movement was difficult, the 4th Panzer Division blew up the Tula-Moskva railway line and finally reached the Tula-Serpukhov highway. By this,

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Commander of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov (right) when making a decision

'however, the division's offensive strength was exhausted...

(Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - S. 337-349). Thus, the German offensive against Moscow from the south failed by the beginning of December 1941. The troops of the 49th and 5th armies were able to hold back the blow of the enemy's 2nd tank army and inflict a significant defeat on it. about the main thing in another. In the course of a fierce struggle in this direction, the Germans were forced, thanks to the defense of the Soviet troops in the Tula region, to weaken their tank fist and change the direction of its main attack in an easterly direction. | Also, one should not forget that the German troops were not ready to wage war in the conditions of the autumn thaw and the beginning of the Russian winter. Statements by Soviet historians that weather conditions did not play any role in the defense of Moscow are a common fabrication. In reality, the Germans faced something unusual for Western Europe

off-road, cold, rain. Sticky Russian mud

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crammed into the tank tracks, and the combat vehicles simply stopped. There was not enough fuel, and its delivery due to the lack of roads was very difficult. The soldiers, deprived of warm clothes, simply froze and, trying to hide in their living quarters, reluctantly went out into the open field.

In general, one must understand that the failure of the German plan of attack on Moscow was caused by a number of objective and subjective factors. Among them are impassability, and winter, and previous losses of the enemy and, of course, the increased resistance of the Soviet troops. Without taking into account all these factors, both individually and in their totality, it is impossible to understand what stopped the Wehrmacht near Moscow in the late autumn of 1941 of the year. For one side, it was a failure of the Barbarossa plan. For another, it is the first great victory over a strong and intelligent enemy, and the significance of this victory is difficult to overestimate.

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— IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRIKE

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In the first half of November 1941, the 262nd Infantry, 10th Panzer and Motorized SS Division "Reich", inflicting the main blow at the junction between the 16th and 5th armies, broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and captured Andreevskoe and Khustovo. In the defense zone of the 144th Infantry Division of the 5th Army, by the end of November 19, the German 78th Infantry Division broke through the positions of the Soviet troops and, having crossed the Moskva River, captured Vlasov and Ulit. The enemy came out to the positions of the 129th Rifle Division, which was in

15 kilometers behind the 144th, which was reinforced by the 22nd, a separate tank brigade. To strengthen the defense, at this line, another one was transferred from the zone of the 33rd Army - [08th Rifle Division. The period from 11 to 14 November in the zone of the 16th Army was marked by fighting in the area of the settlement of Skirmanovo. To defeat the enemy in this area, the forces of the 50th cavalry and 18th rifle (DIVISIONS of the people's militia, recently transferred to the army the 4th separate tank brigade of Colonel Katukova M.E. Katukov (17 combat vehicles) were allocated , as well as several 'artillery REGIMENTS AND A DIVISION "Katyusha". "The defeat of the fascist German troops occupying Skirmanovo and Yarugie villages was complete," writes K.K. _went to intercept the Volokolamsk highway, with heavy losses, rolled back far. On the field, the enemy left a dozen of wrecked and burned tanks, a lot of yelling

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diy, up to 150 mm guns, mortars,
hundreds of vehicles.

I propose to listen to the commander of the 4th (from November 11 - 1st Guards) separate tank brigade M.E. Katukov, a direct participant in the battles for Skirmanovo. "The Nazis foresaw that we could strike at their bridgehead. Therefore, they carefully fortified the settlements of Skirmanovo, Kozlovo, Maryino. There were especially many bunkers and dugouts near the Skirmanovsky cemetery. In the Maryino-Skirmanovo area, the enemy concentrated 35 tanks and an infantry battalion, submachine gunners dug in on the neighboring heights and tanks stood in ambush. In Kozlovo - 10 tanks and a company of infantry ...

In twelve hours of combat, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade destroyed 21 enemy tanks, 8 anti-tank guns, 5 mortars, 30 bunkers, 7 machine-gun nests, and about 50 enemy soldiers and officers.

Among the trophies, our attention was attracted by heavy guns. On their shields, a KV tank was painted in red paint and the inscription was: "Shoot only at the KV." The shells for these guns were of an unusual shape, then they were called sub-caliber. The outer shell was made of soft metal. He clothed a hardened core. It was these shells that pierced the powerful armor of the KV ... For the first time in the entire short history of its existence, the brigade suffered significant losses ...

The brigade fought for Kozlovo for thirty-eight hours. The tanks were replenished with ammunition five times. By eight in the evening (November 14), the Nazis were driven out of Kozlovo. Behind

three days of fighting they lost 34 tanks, 25 anti-tank guns, 8 tractors, 26 mortars, 5 heavy guns "(Katukov M.E. At the tip of the main blow. - M.: Voenizdat, 1976. - P. 66-68).

After these battles, in addition to the previously existing formations and units, the 17th, 20th, 24th and 44th cavalry divisions, which arrived from Siberia, were transferred to the 16th Army (commander Colonel A.P. Beloborodov), two tank

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| brigades with a small number of tanks and the 58th tank division (virtually without tanks. and "As part of the 5th army, four" rifle divisions, 18, 20, 22, 25 separate tank "brigades acted as before. Then it was reinforced by the 429th Rifle Division of Colonel A.V. Colonel G. I. Lizyukov, the 110th Infantry Division of the People's Militia, Colonel S. T. Gladyshev, and the 5th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Sakhno. The Western Front on the outskirts of Moscow managed to significantly increase the density of forces and means and build a deeper defense.

Thus, the defense of the 5th Army (50 kilometers wide) was built in two echelons. In the first echelon "there were four rifle divisions, one tank" brigade. In the second - three tank brigades, a separate motorcycle regiment and part of the forces of the 129th rifle division. The defense relied on a continuous network of trenches, in front of which there were barbed wire and minefields. On the paths of a probable offensive by enemy tanks, forces of the army and the front prepared

, 7 anti-tank areas, each of which had 15-20 anti-tank guns. The divisions in
their defense zones created 18 anti-tank strongholds with 4-10 anti-tank
guns each. All major

roads and bridges were mined. On average, by November 12, the 5th Army's defense zone had 6.8 guns and mortars and 1.3 tanks per kilometer of the front.

◊ In the first decade of November 1941, according to the memoirs of ◊G. K. Zhukov, I.V. Stalin called him:

"Shaposhnikov and I believe that it is necessary to frustrate the enemy's impending strikes on Moscow with our own counter-attacks," he said in a tone that did not allow any

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objections." But Zhukov nevertheless asked what forces the Headquarters orders the Western Front to carry out these counterattacks, if there are barely enough troops for defense?

"In the Serpukhov area, use Belov's cavalry corps, Hetman's tank division and part of the forces of the 49th Army," Stalin advised.

"This cannot be done now," Zhukov objected. "We cannot use the last reserves of the front for counterattacks, the success of which is doubtful. We will have nothing to reinforce the defense of the troops when the enemy goes on the offensive with his strike groups.

- Consider the issue of counterattacks resolved. Plan to communicate with me tonight," I. V. Sta LIN snapped with displeasure.

So, according to G.K. Zhukov, the counterattack in the Serpukhov area was personally appointed by I.V. Stalin. Moreover, he further writes:

"About fifteen minutes later, N. A. Bulganin (a member of the Military Council of the Western Front. - Auth.) came to me and said from the road:

— Nui was me now headwasher.

- Which? Zhukov asked.

- Stalin said: "You were arrogant there with Zhukov. But we will find control over you too!" He demanded from me that I immediately go to you and we immediately organized counterattacks "(Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections NIA. - P. 336).

Apparently, after this, on November 9, the commander of the 2nd cavalry corps, General P.A. Belov, received a task from the commander of the Western Front to form a special task force, which, in addition to the formations of the corps, was to include the 112th tank division, 31 -yu and the 145th tank brigades and the 415th rifle division. G.K. Zhukov warned that Belov's group would have to solve the responsible independent task of conducting a counterattack. How it was prepared and how it was conducted, Pavel Alekseevich described in sufficient detail in his Camping diary, which was

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Mounted patrol at the hotel "Moscow"

published in the almanac "Military Historical Archive" in 2005.

— P.A. Belov writes that on this occasion he and G.K. Zhukov
On November 10, I. V. Stalin personally received Kova. He listened to the decision of the commander of the task force and approved it. Aviation was allocated to ensure the success of ground operations. At the end of the meeting, I. V. Stalin listened to the requests of P. A. Belov for an additional

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providing the 2nd cavalry corps with 76-mm divisional cannons and automatic weapons, and also hinted that if the task was successfully completed, the corps could become a guards corps.

Preparations for the counterattack began on November 1 with the assignment of tasks to the division commanders of the 2nd Cavalry Corps. They were set on the basis that, according to Soviet intelligence, up to three enemy infantry battalions were defending in the direction of the counterattack, with large gaps between the defensive areas. Therefore, the Soviet command believed that breaking through such a defense would not be difficult. As proof of this, during the preparation of the operation, the task was assigned to the commander of a special detachment, Colonel S. I. Iovlev, who was supposed to break through to the rear of the enemy in the offensive zone of the Belov group and defeat his army headquarters.

But the next day, G.K. Zhukov called the HRC. A. Belova telephoned the headquarters of the 49th Army (astonishing as it may seem, but there was no direct connection between the headquarters of the counterattack task force and the headquarters of the Western Front) and reported significant changes in the counterattack plan. "According to these changes, the 49th Army is not advancing to the left of me, as previously assumed, but across the path of me, allegedly in order to subsequently cover my right flank," writes P. A. Belov. These changes create great difficulties and in my heart I really do not like it. I believe that the crossing of units of my group with units of the 49th Army will be inevitable. However, Zhukov does not give the right to make any changes."

On November 13, in order to organize interaction, P. A. Belov met with the chief of staff of the 49th Army, Colonel P. M. Verkhlovich, who, of course, already knew about the decision of the Headquarters and the headquarters of the Western Front. But, oddly enough, according to P. A. Belov, at this meeting they "didn't agree on anything", he was forced to go again to the headquarters of the 49th Army in Serpukhov, "in order to report to Zhukov by wire that Verkhlovich behaves

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. strange - promises some support with artillery fire and

'very avoids making commitments to any

'concrete actions of their infantry and tanks.'

.. In addition, during this conversation, P. A. Belov

| informed the commander of the Western Front that the tank division and two tank brigades assigned to him had not yet

'arrived, and asked to reschedule its start time by at least . "days. But G.K. Zhukov did not allow postponing the start of the counterattack. As a "consolation" in the evening of that day

P. A. Belov learned about the award of the Order of the Red Banner. <. The advance of

the troops of the 2nd cavalry corps to launch a counterattack began at 10 am on November 14th. By the end of that day, P. A. Belov arrived at the village of , Verkhnyaya Shekhlovo, where the command

, body point. The command post of the corps was not deployed (they did not find a crossing over the Nara River), there was no wire communication with divisions and higher headquarters, and there was no radio communication.

_ "November 5. The team has arrived in full. Wired communication is gradually established, but often breaks. A battle has begun, but there are no results so far ... The condition of the 415th rifle division attached to me is extremely terrible. This division was recently formed (in the Far East, arrived on the Western Front in early September 1941, commander

Kovnik GA. Latyshev. - Auth.). She is not knocked together, she has no combat experience. The horses are thin and have difficulty pulling guns and `cars. Fighters and officers find it difficult to orient themselves to the terrain and often go astray. and "November 16. The 5th cavalry division of the 2nd cavalry corps, having advanced somewhat, captured

la Ekaterinovka. The 9th Cavalry Division failed to take Vysokoe. |. Strange things are happening in the offensive zone of the 415th Rifle Division. Operations Commander

The group admits: "... what is being done in this division, no one knows. Neither the commander nor the headquarters of the division can order

, Tanize combat control. However, one lost

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the regiment accidentally entered the village of Trostye at night, in which the headquarters of the 55th German infantry regiment turned out to be, and defeated this headquarters. But after this incident, the Germans knocked out our regiment with an insignificant counterattack, and the regiment scattered through the forest.

Under these conditions, P. A. Belov decides to

the 112th Panzer Division (commander Colonel A. L. Getman), which had come from the Far East and approached, was to be brought into battle in the zone of the 5th Cavalry Division, where the success of the offensive was indicated.

In the evening of that day, P. A. Belov became aware that both tank brigades attached to him "still cannot collect most of their tanks, stretched from Moscow itself." And at night, he had an unpleasant conversation on the phone with G.K. Zhukov, who reproached the commander of the counterattack group for the fact that his troops were slowly moving forward.

November 17th. "Heavy forest battles are going on. We fight only at night, as we have very little artillery. There is absolutely no help from the 49th Army. Her artillery sometimes shoots, but they have so few shells that they cannot give much help. The infantry of the 49th Army has not yet moved...

The bleeding 9th cavalry division finally captured the village of Vysokoe ... It was established that three enemy infantry divisions were concentrated in the offensive zone of my group (instead of three battalions, as the front headquarters believed. - Auth.). According to the prisoners, there is still a motorized or tank division of the enemy in the second echelon ... "

November 18th. Finally, G.K. Zhukov realized the inefficiency of the counterattack of the group of General P.A. Belov, which had suffered heavy losses as a result of previous battles. Both tank brigades and one of the tank regiments of the 112th tank division were withdrawn from the operational group. The remaining formations, deprived of the support of tanks, could not advance further.

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Symbols position of the parties
on 16.11.

GRIT position of the parties

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Defense of the 316th Rifle Division under Major General I.V. Panfilov near Volokolamsk in November 1941

November 19th. "There is no promotion of my group. The commander of the 5th Cavalry Division, Baranov, drank in grief. His combat control is poor. Sent Colonel Gretsov and Regimental Commissar Miloslavsky to investigate. The 9th cavalry division cannot possibly take Maleevo.

20 November. Gretsov and Miloslavsky returned. According to their report, Baranov's business is bad. He went down. Oslikovsky (commander of the 9th cavalry division. - Author) has not yet taken Maleevo, although the fire preparation before the attack was good. This state of affairs is a bad sign for me. This means that the offensive has fizzled out and the fighting impulse has fallen. I requested official permission from the front commander to go on the defensive, since now the balance of forces is clearly not in our favor. No answer".

November 21. An affirmative answer was received to that request, but it was motivated as follows: "In connection with the failure of the task by the Belov group and the situation on the flanks of the front" (Travel diary of General P. A. Belov. // Military Historical Archive. 2005. No. 2. - S. 43-47).

So, the counterattack of the Western Front in the period from 15 to

November 20, 1941 in the Serpukhov area was unsuccessful. At the same time, it should be noted that in the actions of the commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, during its organization and conduct, a number of gross errors are clearly traced:

1. The idea of a front-line counterattack, which was approved on the evening of November 11, was radically changed the next day by G.K. Zhukov.
2. Inclusion in the counterattack group of the 415th Rifle Division, which has recently arrived from the Far East and has no combat experience.
3. Deep (ground and air) reconnaissance of the enemy opposing the counterattack group was not organized. Instead of three infantry battalions, the troops ran into three enemy infantry and one motorized divisions.

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4. When preparing a counterattack, G.K. Zhukov did not care
· about the organization of reliable communication between the headquarters of the OPEN group and the headquarters of the Western Front.

15. G.K. Zhukov, as a higher military commander, gave instructions on the organization of interaction between the counterattack baths of the 2nd cavalry corps

oh and attached to him by the 415th Infantry Division of the 49th Ar

fuck By order of G.K. Zhukov, the counterattack was launched only by the first part of the forces of the operational group, cavalry and infantry, before the tank formations attached to it.

7. The entry into battle of all tank units is not traced
task force to build on success.

Georgy Konstantinovich himself showed unusual restraint in his assessments of this and another, also unsuccessful, frontal counterattacks. He writes that these counterattacks, where Kon Nitsa mainly acted, did not give the positive results that the Supreme had expected. The enemy was strong enough, but his offensive fervor had not yet cooled down "(Zhukov G.K. Remember Nania and reflections. - P. 337).

, The situation was also unsuccessful on another sector of the Western Front. On November 15, General Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Group struck north of Lotoshin on Klin, at the junction of the 30th and 16th armies. The next day General Goepner's 4th Panzer Group launched an offensive from Volokolamsk-Ruza to Istra. November 18 from the area

Gula launched an attack on Moscow 2nd Panzer Group

General G. Guderian. Against the 16th and 5th armies on November 19, Ryl entered the battle of the 9th army corps (262nd, 87th and 8th infantry divisions). A new general attack on Tuplenie began on Moscow. On November 17, an order was issued by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command "On the creation of | special teams for the destruction and burning of settlements in the rear of the German troops. In accordance with y. By this order, the Military Councils of the fronts and individual Fmiy were prescribed ":

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"1. Destroy and burn to the ground all settlements in the rear of the German troops at a distance of 40-60 kilometers in depth from the front line and 20-30 kilometers to the right and left of the roads.

4. The military councils of the fronts and individual armies systematically check how the tasks of destroying settlements in the radius indicated above from the front line are being carried out. Headquarters every three days to report in a separate report how many and which settlements were destroyed over the past days and by what means these results were achieved "(TsAMO, F. 208, op. 2524, d. 1. L. 257-258).

The purpose of this order is "to deprive the German army of the opportunity to be located in villages and cities, to drive the German invaders out of the settlements into the cold and into the Field." But in reality it was also directed against the Soviet population, which found itself temporarily under enemy occupation. People who were forced to stay in their settlements were practically also equalized with the enemy and doomed to cold, hunger and slow death. It was ordered to destroy everything, not only houses, but also sheds, barns, rigs, baths with all the livestock and material supplies contained in them. Surviving the winter after such a pogrom was almost impossible.

Everyone is well aware of the story of the 17-year-old Moscow schoolgirl Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who, as part of a small group of Komsomol members, was sent to the rear of German troops in the zone of the 5th Army of the Western Front. On November 18, the group crossed the front line near Naro-Fominsk, and at the end of that month, Zoya was detained by the peasants of the village of Petrishchevo while trying to set fire to the barn and handed over to the Germans. In the morning of the next day, she was hanged on the central square of Petrishchevo. Posthumously, she was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the ashes were reburied at the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow. But how many other zois roamed the rear of the enemy and how many they burned peasant huts remained

known.

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Anti-aircraft crews on Moscow squares

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For the troops of the 16th Army, November 1941 became a memorable an unsuccessful counterattack in the Volokolamsk region, which was carried out on the orders of the commander of the Western Front, General G.K. Zhukov. Speaking about this counterattack, K.K. Rokossovsky writes: “The preparation period was determined in one night. Frankly, it was not clear to me, he was guided by the front commander, giving which order. We could allocate a little strength, time

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we were not allotted for preparation, the enemy himself was ready to move on us. My request to at least extend the preparation period was not taken into account. As was to be expected, the private counterattack, launched on November 16 on the orders of the front, did little good. At first, taking advantage of the surprise, we even managed to penetrate the location of the German troops for three kilometers. But at this time they launched an offensive on the entire front of the army. Our units that advanced forward had to hastily return.

In the defense zone of the 16th Army, the enemy continued to attack along the Volokolamsk highway. On the morning of November 18, they began to encircle the village of Gusenovo, where at that time the command post of the 316th Infantry Division was located. The commander of the division, Major General IV Panfilov, was killed.

On the evening of November 22, the troops received an order from G.K. Zhukov: "Not a step back, behind Moscow." Only 60 kilometers remained to Moscow, but the Soviet troops, snarling and suffering heavy losses, continued to back away. On November 23, the enemy captured Klin and Solnechnogorsk. On November 26, under the cover of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, units of the 16th Army crossed the Istra. By that time, about 35 tanks had already accumulated at the collection point for damaged vehicles in Snegiry.

As a result of the withdrawal and reinforcement by the end of November 1941, the troops of the 5th Army, consisting of six rifle divisions and five separate tank brigades, defended the line along the Nara River and the Moscow River. The enemy continued the offensive at the junction of the 5th and 16th armies, slowly advancing towards Zvenigorod and Istra. On November 24, having broken through the defenses of the 108th Infantry Division, the German units reached Istra and Pavlova Sloboda.

The intensity of the fighting in the Istra region can be judged from the reconnaissance reports of the 4th Panzer Group of the Germans, who were captured by the Soviet command. in 2007 published in the almanac "Military history

ric archive. I offer the reader individual fragments

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'cops from these documents concerning the Volokolamsk 'direction.

— November 23rd. "In front of the right flank of the 9th Army Corps, the enemy is stubbornly defending ... The 4th Tank Corps, overcoming strong enemy resistance, captured Pavlovskoye. and, waging strong street battles, the open point broke in. In front of the front of the 5th Army Corps, on the southern flank, in the second half of the day, enemy counterattacks were suspended, carried out by infantry, cavalry and tanks ... On November 23, destroyed or 15 tanks, 10 guns, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 27 anti-tank guns, 68 mortars, 71 machine guns were captured and 2,205 prisoners were taken.

For the week from November 16 to November 22, the 4th Panzer Group

"127 tanks, 119 guns, 39 anti-aircraft guns, 60 anti-tank guns, 55 mortars, 80 flamethrowers, 416 machine guns, 115 vehicles, 11,154 prisoners" were destroyed or captured.

, November 24th. "The enemy has greatly strengthened his positions on the Narva Ponds (north-west of Kubinka. - Auth.). After the capture of Solnechnogorsk, where 1 armored train and 36 rocket launchers were taken, in the afternoon and evening the enemy unsuccessfully tried to return the city with repeated counter-attacks supported by tanks. At the same time, 12 tanks were knocked out, of which 10 were T-34s ... In the Solnechnogorsk area, the 766th anti-tank regiment of the RG K was installed, with up to 20 65-mm guns ..

<. In front of the front of the 9th Army Corps, the enemy continues to defend very stubbornly ... The 40th Panzer Corps drove the enemy's weak subunits off the eastern bank of the river. Maglusha and took possession of Filatovo. The 46th tank corps north of Rummyantsevo cleared the enemy's mole positions, which he continued to stubbornly defend ENYAT.

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On November 24, 28 tanks, 4 guns, 3 anti-aircraft guns, 4 anti-tank guns, 24 bullets, 29 vehicles were destroyed and captured, and 930 prisoners were taken.

November 25. "The enemy, supported by a large number of rocket launchers, continues stubborn resistance. Between the rivers Maglusha and Istra, the resistance weakened. The 40th Army Corps on the left flank also pushed the enemy back to the Istra River.

Destroyed and captured 50 tanks, 11 guns, 15 anti-aircraft guns, 7 anti-tank guns, 4 mortars. 30 machine guns, 36 vehicles, 1553 prisoners taken.

November 26th. "The city of Istra is defended presumably by the enemy's rearguards, using artillery and anti-aircraft guns used against ground targets ... In front of the front of the 5th Army Corps, the enemy puts up fierce resistance, using a large number of the heaviest tanks and newly brought up forces, widely using mining and forest debris.

According to the trophy order and the testimonies of prisoners, it was established that the basis of the enemy's defense in the area south of Solnechnogorsk is the 19th tank brigade (commander - Colonel S. A. Kalikhovich. - Ed.), Replenished with the remnants of the defeated 1, 27 and tank brigades.

20 tanks, 2 guns, 8 anti-aircraft guns, 36 mortars, 10 machine guns were destroyed and captured, and 875 prisoners were taken.

November 27th. "After stubborn resistance, the 40th Panzer Corps drove the enemy out of Istra... In the sector of the 46th Panzer Corps against the 5th Panzer Division, the enemy launched attacks in the afternoon with the support of up to 20 tanks, artillery and rocket launchers. In front of the left flank of the corps, the enemy is stubbornly defending... The cavalry in the area south of Solnechnogorsk is supposedly united under the command of a very energetic General Dovator...

Destroyed and captured 3] tank, 7 guns, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 11 anti-tank guns, 8 machine guns and 760 prisoners taken.

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Cathedral in New Jerusalem, destroyed by the Nazis

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November 28. The 46th Panzer Corps repulsed numerous counterattacks in the second half of the day "(Summaries of times

'department to the command of the 4th tank group. // Military Historical Archive. 2007. No. 2. - S. 21-29).

| Events unfolded no less dramatically in the zone of defense of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. Having captured Istra, the German command sharply turned its 262nd and 78th Infantry Divisions to the south, behind the 108th and 78th Infantry Divisions, trying to break through to Golitsino and Odintsovo.

3" To reinforce these troops, General L. A. Govorov threw

,In battle, your last reserve: the 22nd separate tank

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a brigade (21 tanks), a motorcycle regiment, two motorized rifle battalions of the 18th separate tank brigade and a regiment of the 82nd motorized rifle division. These forces, as well as the approaching units of the 22nd separate tank brigade, the motorcycle regiment and the battalion of the 82nd motorized rifle division, stopped the further advance of the enemy on Odintsovo from the northwest. Moreover. On the morning of December 3, the troops of the right flank of the 5th Army themselves launched a counterattack and somewhat pushed the enemy back. Having suffered a defeat, the German troops in this area began to go over to the defensive.

In another direction, in the area north of Naro-Fo Minsk, the defense of the 5th Army was strengthened. Here | On December 258, the 258th Infantry Division went on the offensive against Nika, reinforced by the tanks of the 19th Panzer Division, part of the forces of the 292nd Infantry Division. The main blow was delivered at the junction between the 5th and 33rd armies, as well as at the battle lines of the 33rd army.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the German units managed to somewhat push back the troops of the 222nd Infantry Division of the 33rd Army and capture the villages of Novaya and Golovenki. Having reached the Naro-Fominsk-Kubinka highway, they turned sharply to the north, striking at the rear of the 32nd Rifle Division of the 5th Army. There was a threat to cover the left flank of the 5th army, and the area of the village of Akulovo acquired operational significance.

A fierce battle broke out for Akulovo. Akulovo's defenders set fire to a rampart made of firewood, straw and doused with fuel. A wall of fire rose up to 3 meters high. Enemy tanks, trying to bypass this barrage of fire, were forced to expose their sides to the fire of Soviet artillery. As a result, the enemy attack was thwarted.

But the enemy did not abandon his plans. At night

on December 2, leaving part of his forces at Akulovo, he turned the rest from Golovenek to Petrovskoye, trying to break through to Golitsino in this direction.

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and Combat operations of the 50th Infantry Division of the 5th Army in the Kubinka region (November 21 - December 3, 1941)

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At this time, judging by the memoirs of K. K. Rokossovsky. there was one significant event - the commander of the Western Front G.K. Zhukov arrived at the command post of the 16th Army and brought with him the commander of the 5th Army, General L.A. Govorov. Recalling this, K. K. Rokossovsky writes: "When I saw the commander, I prepared for the worst ... Addressing me in the presence of Govorov and my closest assistants, Zhukov said: "What, are the Germans chasing you again? You have more than enough strength, but you do not know how to use them. You don't know how to lead! Here [Govorov has more enemies than you have in front of you, but he holds him and does not let him through. So I brought him here only so that he would teach you how to fight."

Of course, speaking of enemy forces, Zhukov was wrong, because all the German tank divisions operated against the 16th Army, while against the 5th - only infantry. Having listened to the statement, I thanked the commander with the most serious look for giving me and my assistants the opportunity to learn ...

Leaving us with [the thieves, Zhukov went into another room... Suddenly Zhukov ran in, slamming the door. His appearance was menacing and very excited. Turning to Mr. Vorov, he shouted in a broken voice: "What are you doing? Who are you here to teach? Rokossovsky? It reflects the blows of all German panzer divisions and beats them. And some lousy motorized came against you and drove for tens of kilometers. Get out of here! And if not

you become a position ... ".

Poor Govorov could not utter a word. Turning pale, he quickly retreated ... After a stormy conversation with Govorov, the ardor of the commander somewhat diminished. Leaving, he slightly, in comparison with his usual intonations, scolded us and said that he was going to restore order at Govorov's (Rokossovsky K. K. Soldier's debt. - M ., 2000. - P. 133-134).

Now let's see how G.K. Zhukov himself explains this episode:

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Commander of the 5th Army, Lieutenant General L. A. Govorov (in the center) with staff officers

"TO; Somehow, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief received information that our troops had left the city of Dedovsk, northwest of Nakhabin. It was already very close to Moscow. I. V. Stalin, of course, was greatly disturbed by such a message ...

SI. V. Stalin called me to the phone:

) ') — Do you know that Dedovsk is occupied?

', - No, Comrade Stalin, it is not known.

„” The Supreme Commander was not slow to speak irritably about this: “The commander must know what he is doing at the front.” And he ordered to immediately go to the place in order to personally organize a counterattack and return Nut Dedovsk ...

) Having hung up, I immediately contacted K. K. Rokossovsky and demanded to explain why the front headquarters did not know anything about the abandonment of Dedovsk. And right away you saw that the city of Dedovsk was not occupied by the enemy, it could be about the village of Dedovo ...

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Clearly, there's been an error. I decided to call Stavka and explain that it was all a misunderstanding. But then, as they say, I found a scythe on a stone. The Supreme Commander became completely angry. He demanded to immediately go to K.K. Rokossovsky and make sure that this most ill-fated settlement was certainly taken from the enemy. Moreover, he ordered to take the commander of the 5th Army, L. A. Govorov, with him: “He is an artilleryman, let him help Rokossovsky organize an artillery

fire in the interests of the 16th Army.

It made no sense to object in such a situation ... "(Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. - P. 311).

This was the real G.K. Zhukov, and not the mythical commander to whom a monument was erected near Red Square in Moscow. Being the commander of the Western Front, whose troops covered Moscow from the west and who retreated to the near approaches to the capital, he could, without understanding the situation, throw the remnants of combat-ready formations into unprepared counterattacks and scold the commanders of subordinate armies for nothing. Lacking a specific plan for a front-line defensive operation, he demanded that the troops stand on their lines to the death and inflict losses on the enemy.

FRACTURE

By the end of November 1941, according to the memoirs of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General A.M. Vasilevsky, the Army Group Center operating in the Moscow direction, together with the air force, had 1.7 million people, 1170 tanks, about 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, 650 combat

aircraft.

, From the Soviet side by the end of November - beginning of December

the 1st shock and 20th armies arrived in the Moscow region, the 10th, 26th and 61st reserve armies began to approach. They advanced to the flanks of the Western Front and to the junction with the Southwestern Front. Formations from other reserve armies and internal military districts also arrived on the Western Front. The troops of the Kalinin Front were also replenished. As a result, by the beginning of December, in the Moscow direction, the Soviet command had 1.1 million people, 774 tanks, 7.7 thousand guns and mortars, and 1,000 aircraft (Vasilevsky A. M. Delo all life. - P. 130).

. But even in early December 1941, the command of Army Group Center did not abandon its plans to take Moscow, which was only a few tens of meters away. Despite the lack of manpower and resources, difficulties with the supply of ammunition and fuel, the Wehrmacht formations continued to look for weaknesses in the Soviet defense © with the aim of delivering crushing blows there. At this time, decisive action becomes the basis of the actions of their compounds

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maneuver of forces and means along the front, the concentration of forces in the chosen direction and the delivery of a decisive blow by infantry with the support of tanks. The managerial role of military headquarters is raised to the limit, and any offensive initiative by subunit commanders is encouraged. But it is becoming more and more difficult to link all these tactical actions on disparate sectors within the framework of an operation.

In the first days of December, after making sure that the 16th Army as a whole was successfully fulfilling the task of containing the enemy, G.K. Zhukov shifted his attention to another direction, in which at that time the most threatening situation for Moscow had developed.

It follows from this study that on December 1, the 292nd and 258th infantry divisions of the Germans broke through the defenses of the 222nd rifle division of the 33rd army and, having introduced up to 70 tanks into the gap, reached the Naro-Fominsk-Kubinka highway by 14:00, going almost to the rear of the 33rd and 5th armies of the Western Front. Parts of the 292nd Infantry Division took the village of Akulovo. By the end of the day, one of the regiments of the 258th Infantry Division, reinforced to 30 tanks, turned east from the village of Golovenki along a country road to the Alabinsky training ground and reached the Searchlight height.

On the morning of December 2, all attempts to break through from the height of the "Projector" to the Kiev highway were unsuccessful. By the middle of the day, the enemy units withdrew and occupied the villages of Petrovskoye and Burtsevo. The outskirts of Moscow were less than 30 kilometers away. It is quite clear that this breakthrough of the defense of the 33rd Army to a depth of 25 kilometers was one of the most dangerous. There were 6 kilometers to Golitsyno, and 2.5 kilometers to Sofyino. In the forthcoming issues of the Berlin newspapers, it was ordered to leave space for an emergency report about the capture of Moscow.

Under these conditions, the commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, ordered the commander of the 33rd Army, M.G. Efremov, on the morning of December 3, to launch a counterattack on the enemy that had broken through in the direction of Yushkovo. A rifle brigade was assigned to carry it out.

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Defense of the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division of the 33rd Army in the Naro-Fominsk area in November-December 1941

(4.5 thousand people), two ski battalions, a tank battalion and an additional 15 tanks (a total of 30 T-34 and KV tanks), three artillery batteries (a total of 7 guns and mortars), a rocket artillery unit. The army commander ordered the counterattack group to be led by Colonel M.P. Safir.

On the morning of December 3, the 20th brigade (9 tanks) of the 5th Army blocked the Yushkovo-Golitsyno road, thus covering the Minsk highway. At 5:30 p.m., M.P. Safir's group struck. The Yukhnov grouping of the enemy was defeated, and its remnants began to retreat to their original position.

Subdivisions of MP Safir's group began pursuing the enemy only on the morning of December 4th. At 9 o'clock they

captured Akulovo. By 15 o'clock the 18th separate rifle brigade concentrated in Golovenki. At the same time, in the Golovenka area, Soviet units were hit by their own aircraft, which mistook them for the enemy.

At the end of the fighting in the Yushkovo area, M. G. Efremov reported to G. K. Zhukov that the enemy that had penetrated the defenses of his army had been defeated and "according to preliminary data. during the period of hostilities, army units killed at least 2000 soldiers and officers, 11 tanks, 2 armored personnel carriers and captured 35 guns of various calibers "(TsAMO. f. 388, op. 8712, file 15. sheet 62).

Thus, the breakthrough of the enemy grouping in the Naro-Fominsk area in early December 1941 was eliminated. At the same time, one must understand that in this battle, enemy units faced a fairly powerful grouping of Soviet troops for that time and new Soviet tanks "T-34" and "KV". At the same time, the enemy, having been defeated, was able to avoid encirclement and! relatively safely withdrew his troops to the iskhohol

new position.

Subsequently, in connection with the tense relations between G.K. Zhukov and M.G. Efremov, which developed due to the unsuccessful conduct of the command of the Western Front of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation and the death of V

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In April 1942, Commander-33, the significance of the fighting in the rear of the 5th Army in early December 1941 was deliberately underestimated.

, Due to the halt and partial defeat of the formations of the Army Group Center, the strategic offensive operation of the German troops on Moscow, which lasted 67 days, from September 30 to December 5, 1941, ended unsuccessfully. After the failure of the attempt to seize Leningrad, this was the largest strategic failure of the Wehrmacht in the campaign of 1941, which had not only military, but also great political, economic, ideological, moral and psychological significance. Set up exclusively for victories, working flawlessly for more than three years and achieving hitherto unseen results, the German military machine failed for the first time, which the whole world saw, every citizen and soldier of the Third Reich. It was a public 'big slap in the face to the painfully suspicious A. Hitler, the arrogant German military leaders, the entire fascist ideology, which claimed world domination. Until that time, the Wehrmacht, undefeated, got stuck in the resisting masses of Soviet troops, stalled in the Russian mud and froze in the snows of the Moscow region. The blow of the steel tank fists did not achieve the set goals, and the infantry, exhausted by the battles, was unable to pave the way for the combat vehicles. An offensive operation planned according to the best

achievements of military thought and successfully launched by the howls of Army Group Center, despite all the efforts and sacrifices, was brought to an end. And. At the same time, the role of the military art of the Wehrmacht during the attack on Moscow should not be underestimated, considering it from the point of view of military strategy. The total base of the Moscow strategic operation of the German troops was about 500 kilometers along the front and up to 250-300 kilometers in depth and consisted of several smaller operations. At the first stage of the strategic operation, almost parallel

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we have two operations in the areas of Yelnya and Bryansk. The encirclement operation in the Yelnya area was carried out on a front of more than 200 kilometers and to a depth of up to 130 kilometers. The encirclement operation in the Bryansk region was carried out along a front of up to 120 kilometers and had a depth of about 100 kilometers.

After the successful completion of these two operations, the German command decided to capture Moscow as a result of a large-scale encirclement operation, which was carried out on a front of up to 400 kilometers with the participation of three tank groups. The maximum advance of German troops during this operation did not exceed 200 kilometers. The operation did not achieve its goals. According to the Wehrmacht generals, the main reasons for the failure of the German troops in this operation were difficult weather conditions and heavy losses suffered by the troops during the operations.

At the same time, the German command does not give an exact figure for the losses of fascist troops near Moscow. But, relying on the "War Diary" by F. Halder, we see that the total losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces from September 30 to December 12, 1941 slightly exceeded 200 thousand people. Even if we assume that the most active battles at that time took place in the Moscow direction, and in others - private, then the losses of the Germans during the defensive operation near Moscow can be estimated as an example of Nov [50 thousand people (Halder F. Military Diary. Vol. 3 Book 2. - S. 14, 120).

In Soviet times, writing about the losses of Soviet troops during their defensive operations in the Moscow direction was not accepted. Later, some fragmentary data began to appear. And only relatively recently, after the publication of the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century," it became known that during the Moscow strategic defensive operation, Soviet troops irrevocably lost (killed, missing and

prisoners) 514.3 thousand people, wounded and frostbitten - 144 thousand people, and in total - 658.3 thousand

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\, Analyzing the actions of the German troops at the final stage of the offensive against Moscow, we should note that the offensive of the Army Group Center in divergent directions, provided for by the order of October 14, 1941, led to an unreasonable dispersion of forces on a broad front, reduced the density troops and, above all, the strength of the main blows delivered directly to Moscow. It can be stated that the gigantic mania of Hitler's strategic plans, which was based on the desire to follow the "blitzkrieg tactics", which had proved itself so well in the summer and at the beginning autumn 3941, then completely exhausted itself, which led to the disruption of the entire offensive against Moscow.

2 It would be appropriate to ask ourselves the question - why were the Wehrmacht troops in the second half of October and in November 1941 unable to break through to the capital? The documents of the German command help us to answer this question.

_ On October 18, 1941, the department for the study of foreign armies of the East in its report stated: "During the last days of fighting near Maloyaroslavets, Vereya, Mozhaysk, which can be described as the most difficult for this campaign, the high defense capability of the Russians was achieved mainly due to good equipment of Moscow defensive positions and the use of a large number of heavy tanks ... "

. Later, the German historian K. Reinhard wrote: "Stubborn fighting along the highway, huge losses from Russian mines and anti-tank weapons gave Bock doubts about the success of the offensive. The offensive actions of the Viy of the 3rd Panzer Group in the south did not give the desired result, since its forces became too few in number, and the Russians continuously threw them under the Fortifications. For example, in a report from the headquarters of the 6th Panzer Division on December 2 and 3, 80 cases were reported when soldiers fainted from exhaustion. As of November 30, the 3rd Panzer Group had the following

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the number of tanks: in the 1st Panzer Division - 37 tanks, in the 6th Panzer Division - 4 tanks, in the 7th Panzer Division

zii - 36 tanks, that is, a total of 77 tanks. On October 16, the tank group consisted of 259 tanks.

Thus, by the end of November 1941, the offensive of the troops of the Army Group "Center" on Moscow was drowned in Russian mud, impassability and huge masses of opposing troops, who tried in every possible way to keep every inch of their native land. At the same time, while quite justified claims can be made against the military art of a number of the highest military leaders of the Red Army, the heroism and courage of the overwhelming majority of junior commanders and rank and file do not raise any doubts. It was a simple Soviet soldier who became an insurmountable obstacle on the way of the enemy tank armadas to the Soviet capital and stopped these tanks at the cost of his own LIFE.

At the same time, one cannot but say that already from the twentieth of November 1941, when defensive battles with the enemy were still ongoing on the near approaches to the capital, [the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov, began developing a plan counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow VOY.

A. M. Vasilevsky, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, wrote: "The very idea of a counter-offensive near Moscow arose at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in early November, after the enemy's first attempt to break through to the capital was thwarted. But then it had to be abandoned as a result of the fascist onslaught, to repulse which the reserves we had were required. Only at the end of November. when the enemy had exhausted his offensive capabilities, his strike groupings were stretched out on a wide front and he did not have time to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, the Headquarters returned to the idea of a counteroffensive ... The General Staff, headed by B. M. Shaposhnikov, returned to Moscow still on the 20th of November and here

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more involved in the preparation of the counteroffensive "Aries M. A matter of a lifetime. - S. 130-131).

— In the last days of November, the following formations were transferred to the Western Front from the Moscow area and from other sectors of the front: eight rifle and seven cavalry divisions, four rifle brigades, one airborne corps, as well as a number of special parts. Only the 16th Army received reinforcements these days as part of the 354th Rifle Division, the 36th, 37th, 40th, and 53rd Rifle Brigades, as well as reinforcements for the rest of the formations. The 30th Army received the 271st, 348th, 365th and 379th Rifle DIVISIONS as reinforcements, as well as reinforcements for other formations. The decisive factor was the strengthening of the Western Front with tanks, which Stalin initially refused him. West

In the last days of November, the front received 15 separate tank battalions, as well as more than 100 tanks to replenish tank brigades. Tank units on the Kalinin and South-Western fronts also received smaller reinforcements. The troops west of Moscow had a total of one tank division, 16 tank brigades and 20 independent tank battalions, for a total of 1,068 tanks.

The command of the 4th tank group, which stopped on the highway west of Kubinka and east of Isra, at the turn of Bely Rast, Krasnaya Polyana, Kryukovo, which had battered divisions incapable of further advance, was forced to do so, on December 3. It can be said that the offensive capabilities of the troops of the group are at the limit. On December 2, the commander of the 4th tank group, Charles

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ne: Beaulieu reported to the headquarters of Army Group Center: "Lich Gyi, the composition of the 10th Panzer Division is very tired. At the current moment, the division is not in a position to conduct offensive operations. 06 of the remaining formations of the tank group, he reported the following: "People are so exhausted that with them

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nothing can be done. The reason is the terrible cold, poor quartering conditions and endless fighting.

Bock's hopes that the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Group would still be able to somehow support the offensive impulse in Göpner's troops did not come true. On December 4, the 3rd Panzer Group was attacked by a superior enemy and had to withdraw from its positions, despite the use of all its available reserves. Russian, undertaking with | On December 1, 1st Shock Army's offensive operations against the eastern flank of the 3rd Panzer Group, in order to link up with units of Zakharov's group still located west of the canal, forced Reinhardt to suspend the offensive in the southern direction on December 5.

"Active action is impossible. It is necessary to decide which line to take so that it can be held in winter," Reinhardt demanded. Bock authorized the cessation of the advance of the 3rd Panzer Group and ordered it to go on the defensive. The offensive of the 4th Panzer Group was also stopped.

Thus, offensive operations on the entire northern flank of the army group were suspended. This stop of the offensive right at the gates of Moscow was due to the lack of forces, as well as the ever-increasing resistance of the enemy. The situation at the front demanded from the military leadership the adoption of far-sighted,

independent decisions, if it did not want to senselessly sacrifice its remaining troops.

The positions occupied by the troops on December 5 were, however, extremely unfavorable, since the flanks turned out to be extended and uncovered. They could only be improved by a quick withdrawal of troops and a reduction in the front line. But the Supreme Command did not agree to such a decision. As a result, the German formations had to go over to the defensive where they stopped their offensive and where sometimes the terrain conditions and supply routes were unfavorable for conducting

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defensive battles. But it was not only the formations advancing on the northern flank of Army Group Center that were stopped immediately in front of Moscow. The northern and the southern flank formations did not achieve.

After the OKH decided on November 23 that Guderian's troops should continue the offensive, the 9th Panzer Army succeeded in capturing Venev and Mikhailov with a surprise attack on November 24. In order to take advantage of this success, Guderian immediately threw part of his formations further in the direction of Kashira, which the Russians had to keep at all costs, since it supplied electricity to Tula. The Russians were afraid of losing Kashira, believing that the Germans could seize the crossing over the Oka there and thereby create a threat to the southern flank and even the rear of the Russian troops. But the Russian defending troops took advantage of the fact that tank losses in the 24th Panzer Corps had greatly increased and that the remaining tanks were unfit for combat due to lack of fuel. Thus, the "Eberbach" group, which consisted of the 6th, 35th and 39th tank regiments and had 110 tanks by the beginning of the offensive on November 18, on November 24 had only 32 tanks. By the evening of the same day, the 17th Panzer Division had only 5 tanks (K. Reinhardt, Gate near Moscow. The collapse of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42: A historical essay. - M.: Voenizdat, 1980. - P. 193-196) .

* To some extent, this was true. The Soviet government spared no effort and means to cover the Moscow direction. Starting from the second half of October 1941, all new echelons with Soviet troops hurriedly approached Moscow from the rear regions of the USSR and from other sectors of the front. They practically went into battle on the move. This was not slow to affect the operational situation to the west of the capital. By October 22, in front of the front of the Army Group Center, the German command already had the forces of 38 rifle, 8 Ryan cavalry, 2 tank divisions and 17 tank brigades of the Red Army. Indeed, it has been noted that most of these

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formations was concentrated southwest of Moscow, near Kalinin and north of Rzhev, and their combat effectiveness was different. However, practically all the reports spoke of the exceptional dedication of the units of the Red Army.

The stubbornness of the Soviet soldiers in defense surprised the field commanders of Army Group Center. Thus, the command of the 5th Army Corps in a report on the situation at the front of October 23, 1941 wrote that "the 316th Russian division (commander Major General M. M. Panfilov), which remained undefeated and has in its composition many well-trained soldiers, fighting an amazingly stubborn fight. This division has a lot of heavy infantry weapons, relatively little infantry artillery, but still has heavy artillery, and in some places it goes into counterattacks along with tanks ... "The report also noted the difficulties of advancing due to bad weather. Mention was made of "soaked soil against which man and horse have been fighting for many days ...", as well as fuel shortages, "in connection with which any movement forward and the work of a significant part of the means of communication were paralyzed."

It should also be noted that the tactics chosen by the command of the Western Front to cover the main directions of the possible advance of the German troops to Moscow (including the main roads) forced the Wehrmacht units either to attack the Soviet fortified positions in the forehead, or bypass them off-road. Both that, and another led, first of all, to the big loss of time.

It turned out that the German command was not ready for a clash with Soviet tanks either. The commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal von Kluge, reported to von Bock's headquarters on November 2: during which, from a distance of 500 to 25 meters, tanks were fired alternately 30 armor-piercing and blasting shells and 10 shells

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Defensive operations of the Soviet

troops on the outskirts of Moscow

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10 sample 1939. Having destroyed 3 light field howitzers, 7 medium howitzers and one light anti-tank gun, the tanks retreated... Despite numerous hits of armor-piercing shells, including in the turret, enemy tanks are not quickly put out of action and do not penetrate through. Recently, the Russians use up to 80% of all tanks - G-34 tanks. In the event of an attack by a large number of such tanks, we could

suffer local defeat.

The supply of Army Group Center was also not up to the mark. In order to ensure the uninterrupted movement of goods, the German command had to allocate significant resources to restore transport links. On October 26, 1941, the movement of German trains to the Vyazma station was opened. The troops of the 4th Army and the 4th Panzer Group were thus in a better position than the rest of the formations of the army group. However, for the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group, whose formations operated far on the flank of Army Group Center, the supply problem remained quite serious all the time that followed. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General Reinhardt (appointed to replace G. Hoth on October 5, 1941) reported that the daily supply of supplies covered only the current needs of the tank group, but did not meet the needs of the offensive.

The absence of sufficient reserves in Army Group Center also had an effect. Already a few days after the start of Operation Typhoon, on October 3, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army Group Center, General Greifenberg, transmitted the order of the OKH to his subordinate authorities: to disband, if necessary, entire battalions in regiments and companies in battalions and transfer personal composition for the staffing of unoccupied staff positions.

All this in combination had a negative impact on the art of the Wehrmacht to conduct major offensive operations at a high pace. Previously developed plans for a strategic offensive operation were constantly frustrated and changed. This forced, in turn, constantly

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To change previously developed and approved plans at the level of army headquarters and army corps. As a result of such a high activity of staff work, failures, difficulties and errors inevitably arose, which negatively affected the direct combat operations of the troops. „ Despite the difference in points of view, the lack of reliable sources, the imperfection of research, and other factors, it must be admitted that the turning point in the war "of the USSR and Germany occurred precisely near Moscow at the end of 1941. The Red Army stopped the offensive of the Wehrmacht's strike groups and forced them cross over

To a hasty defense.

, By the end of November 1941, the Soviet leadership had accumulated the necessary reserves to launch a counteroffensive. So, in the last days of November 1941 in addition to the forces already available there, the following were sent to the Moscow direction: the 10th reserve army of Lieutenant General F.I. , Kolomna, the 26th reserve army of Major General A. V. Kurkin and in the Staro Yuryevo area - the 61st reserve army of Lieutenant General M. M. Popov. Each of these armies consisted of seven rifle and two cavalry divisions, had artillery, combat support units, stocks of ammunition, fuel, food, fodder brought to the norm, as well as warm uniforms for personnel. The concentration of these armies was ordered to be completed in the indicated areas in the period from December 2 to December 5, 1941 (Russian archive. TT. 15 (4-1). - P. 151-153).

∴ On the morning of November 27, negotiations were held on the direct Zirovod of I. V. Stalin with the commander of the Kalinin `front, I. S. Konev. I. V. was clearly annoyed:

(. - The enemy has occupied Rogachevo. He may soon bypass Moscow or your front, - said Stalin. - At the same time, we know that the enemy has collected an hour of Ti from your front and transferred it to Moscow. You are given the opportunity to strike at the enemy, draw on his forces, avoid Yubhod his rear and secure the position of the Western

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front, whose troops are shedding blood. [Where do you think to hit the enemy, in what area? The blow must be taken today.

I. S. Konev realized that it was useless to deny it and that the Headquarters would either hear a positive answer from him, or he would be immediately removed from his post. The latter suited Ivan Stepanovich least of all.

"I decided to strike northwest of Kalinin in the direction of Oparino and south of Kalinin in the direction of Bortnikovo," he reported. - At the same time, he ordered the 29th Army to advance on its right flank in the direction of Martynovo and the 22nd Army - on the left flank in the direction of Mikhailovo, Vysokoye. The rest of the grouping remains in front of our front. Today we are celebrating the approach of fresh enemy forces to Kalinin. I understand the situation. I am taking all measures to organize an offensive. In order to better prepare, I ask permission to start the offensive at dawn on November 28th.

"We consider it most expedient to launch the offensive on November 27 in the afternoon," remarked I. V. Stalin. - Every hour is precious, and it is not wise to postpone. Put all your strength into action and start this afternoon.

- Eat. Accepted for execution, - I. S. Konev hastened to agree. "I will immediately give all the necessary orders (TsAMO, f. 96a, op. 2011, d. 5, l. 174-175).

Meanwhile, the enemy still did not abandon his plans to capture Moscow. At 17 o'clock | In December, the headquarters of the Western Front received an operational report from the headquarters of the 33rd Army about the enemy going on the offensive in the Naro-Fominsk region. It stated: "In the area of the 222nd Infantry Division, the enemy, with a force of up to an infantry battalion with tanks, advancing from the Tashirovo region, breaking through in the direction of Novaya at 9.30, captured the latter and continued to advance on Inevka. 60-70 tanks against the nickname with motorized infantry, breaking through on the Naro-Fominsk-Kubinka highway from 13.40, moving from Golovenka to the North. At 16.00, the motorized infantry, having unloaded in Golovenki,

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and Soviet armored forces in defensive battles and near Moscow

hits in the direction of the command post of the division. The | th Guards
Motorized Rifle Division is engaged in stubborn battles with the enemy
that has broken through into the area of the pioneer camp, and the 113th
Rifle Division is fighting with infantry and tanks that have broken through
from the north-west to the Klovo region, which is occupied by the enemy
(TsAMO, F. 388 , inventory 8712, file 14, sheets 107-108).

On November 30, the commanders of all the fronts that were fighting in the
Moscow region presented JV Stalin with maps with a counteroffensive plan and
explanatory notes to them. So, in the explanatory note to the plan of counter-offensive
of the armies of the Western Front, it was indicated that "based on the timing of the
unloading and concentration of troops."

The 1st shock, 20th and 16th armies will be able to launch a counteroffensive on December 3-4, and the 10th and 30th armies a day later. The immediate task of these troops was to "hit Klin, Solnechnogorsk and in the Istra direction to defeat the main enemy grouping on the right wing and strike on Uzlovaya and Bogoroditsk in the flank and rear of the Guderian group to defeat the enemy on the left wing of the front of the armies of the Western Front." The remaining armies of the front were to go on the offensive on December 4-5 with limited targets (TsAMO, f. 16a, op. 947, d. 36, l. 70-72).

But the Stavka demanded more. In particular, the troops of the Kalinin Front were ordered on the morning of December 1 to strike at the enemy in the direction of Mikulino Gorodishche, Turginovo with the task of reaching the rear of the Klin group of the enemy.

I. S. Konev tried to prove that the Kalinin Front did not have the strength for such a counterattack.

"All divisions average two and a half to three thousand men," he said. - There are no tanks in the front at all, and a number of formations are engaged in battle with the enemy in other directions. Based on real possibilities, I decided to regroup and, on the morning of December 3rd, continue the offensive to capture Kalinin and cut off the roads leading from this city to Staritsa. But to fulfill

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Tanks on the streets of Moscow. November 1941

task, I ask you to strengthen the front with two rifle divisions and at least one tank brigade. ' General A. M. Vasilevsky, who negotiated with the commander of the Kalinin Front on this issue, had a slightly different opinion. "The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers a counterattack by the troops of your front not only possible, but also extremely necessary," he said. - I do not understand your statement that all divisions have only two or three thousand people in their composition. Before me is a report from your headquarters received on November 24, 1941 according to which the 246th Rifle Division has 6,800 men, the 119th 7,200, the 252nd 5,800, the 256th 6,000, and so on. These forces are quite enough to carry out a counterattack. If in these divisions, as you stated, the artillery is really weak, then you can strengthen them with artillery regiments of the RGK, of which you have nine. On the question of tanks, I will report to the Supreme Commander and give an answer later. — But you do not take into account the losses for the last four

"I understand that," A. M. Vasilevsky retorted. —

But, according to a report from your headquarters, during the last offensive operation, the troops of the front lost only up to two thousand people. I repeat once again that the General Headquarters is strongly interested in your offensive. By the morning of December 4, the 262nd Rifle Division from the North-Western Front will arrive to reinforce you.

- Fine. I will take all measures to be ready as soon as possible,
- I. S. Konev promised. - The 29th Army will include five rifle divisions, and the strike force will be headed by the commander of the 31st Army, General Yushkevich. But, Comrade Vasilevsky, you must know that in such a situation the operational formation of the 29th Army will be in one echelon without divisional and regimental reserves. And it provides three important directions: to Torzhok. to Mednoe and Kalinin. This is a big risk, which I am forced to take only under pressure from the Stakes.

But A. M. Vasilevsky no longer listened to the complaints of the commander of the Kalinin Front and hung up.

On December 2, G.K. Zhukov reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the situation in the army zones and the decision he had made. According to his report, all attacks against the nickname in the defense zone of the 16th army of K.K. Rokossovsky were successfully repulsed. The next day, a counterattack was prepared against the grandfather's enemy grouping by the forces of the 9th Guards and part of the forces of the 18th Rifle Division, as well as the 40th Rifle Brigade, with the support of 70 tanks, 100 guns, three Katyusha divisions and a front aviation.

Georgy Konstantinovich also reported on the difficult situation in the defense zone of the 5th Army of General L.A. [about the thieves and the 33rd Army of General M.G. at the expense of reserves and the transfer of troops from other directions (TsAMO, f. 208, op. 2511. d. 1026, l. 26-29).

The turning point that occurred near Moscow in late November
- early December 1941, in Soviet sources

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kah is unequivocally regarded as a merit of the leadership of the Zhommunist Party, a manifestation of the talent of the Soviet military leaders and the result of the high fighting spirit of the Fovet troops. In this regard, it is of particular interest to see how this turning point was seen by its direct participants.

“ The commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, later wrote:

, “In the early days of December, by the nature of the actions and the strength 'blows of all groupings of German troops felt

that the enemy is running out of steam and he no longer has the strength or means to conduct offensive operations.

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Deploying shock groups on a wide front and swinging far with his armored fist, the enemy during the battle for Moscow stretched his troops along the front to such an extent that in the final battles on the near approaches to Moscow he lost his penetrating ability. The Hitlerite command did not expect such heavy losses in the battle for Moscow, but they were unable to make up for these losses and strengthen their Moscow grouping.

· _ From the interrogation of prisoners, it was found that in some 20-30 companies remained, the morale of the German troops deteriorated sharply, there is no longer any belief in the possibility of capturing Moscow ...

, For 20 days of the second stage of its offensive on Moscow The Germans lost over 155,000 killed and wounded, about 500 tanks, at least 300 guns, and a significant number of aircraft. Heavy losses, incompleteness in the implementation of strategic tasks sowed doubts in the masses of the German troops about the successful outcome of the war as a whole. The fascist military-political leadership has lost the prestige of invincibility in the eyes of world opinion.

`Former Hitlerite generals and field marshals you blame Hitler for the failure of the plan to capture Moscow and plans for war & in general, who allegedly did not consider their advice and suspended the movement of the group in August

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armies "Center" to Moscow, turning part of its troops to Ukraine.

Generals G. Guderian, G. Toth and others consider the harsh Russian climate, along with Hitler's mistakes, to be the main reason for the defeat of their troops near Moscow.

Of course, both the weather and nature play a role in any military action. True, all this equally affects the warring parties ... "(Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. - P. 342-343).

The commander of the 16th Army, General K.K. Rokossovsky, noted in his memoirs:

"Failing to break through the defenses of our troops across Moscow, the German strike groups completely used up all the reserves. And the enemy command was forced to think about defense. We all felt it. The active actions of the enemy in the last days of our defensive battle were just an attempt to gain time in order to gain a foothold and at all costs to stay on the achieved lines close to

Moscow.

This plan had to be thwarted. And such a decision was temporarily taken by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The counteroffensive near Moscow left no time for the enemy to organize a defense.

Even before going over to the counteroffensive, the Stavka considered it necessary to somewhat reinforce the defending troops, allocating part of the forces at the disposal of the command of the Western Front. Of these, three rifle brigades were transferred to our army. In fact, each was little more than a reinforced rifle regiment. But it still reinforced the army, and we were glad "(Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty - P. 135).

The commander of the 50th Army, General I.V. Boldin, in relation to the fracture that had occurred, wrote:

"Our scouts also captured another curious document from the headquarters of the 43rd Army Corps. It also very clearly reflected the unfavorable situation in which the German troops found themselves near Tula. Here

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rocks from this document: "... When the 1st Infantry Division set out at night, an unheard-of thirty-five degree frost struck. Simultaneously with the frost, a strong enemy came out against us. We had heavy losses of people and materials ... The enemy brought new tank forces against us, especially north of Tula, which were constantly increasing. The army was forced to interrupt Shii's opera and withdraw the troops to their original position.

And. The commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, General P. A. Belov, pointed out that "after the war, German generals tried to justify their defeat near Moscow by bad weather and the numerical superiority of Soviet troops. But the weather was then the same for us and for the Germans. The fascists, as the defending side, even had a number of advantages in this sense: they sat in whitewashed posts, firing from windows and cellars, slept in houses, having the opportunity to warm themselves. Retreating, the Germans burned the villages. And our Red Army soldiers and commanders remained for several days in the cold, in an open pier. |

,(. The data on the balance of forces near Moscow were published, I will not repeat them. I will tell you about my sector. In terms of the numerical composition of the forces of the parties during the battles near Mordves, they were approximately equal. But the Nazis surpassed us in the number of guns and mortars, "We had much more tanks. And yet we attacked and kept the initiative in our hands. This is where the high moral qualities of our troops were manifested (Belov P. A. Moscow behind us. - M.: Voenizdat, 1963. - 336 p.).

y. "The commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, General K.S. Moskalenko, wrote: "Stubbornly defending, and in a number of places and retreating under the onslaught of the enemy furiously rushing towards Moscow, the Red Army was preparing for a counteroffensive, and already had specially designed L. of this powerful reserves. Of course, both the figures of the losses of the German-fascist army, and information about the forces of the Red Army and the Mission were not then in the public domain. Even the link of Soviet commanders, to which

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sorry for me, they were not known in their entirety. However, the losses of the Wehrmacht, quite understandably, had a very clear idea of the entire personnel of the troops who participated continuously in battles and battles from the first days of the war and in the defense of Moscow. And the fact that somewhere not far away stand ready forces capable of inflicting a powerful blow on the enemy at the right time, every fighter, commander, political worker knew, felt with his mind and heart "(Moskalenko K. S. - p. 100).

FIRST STRIKE

Yu. By the end of November 1941, the Soviet command managed to gather significant forces of its troops in the Moscow direction, which were distributed along the fronts: Kalinin, Western and South-West.

and the wings of the Southwestern Fronts to defeat the shock Squadrons of German troops operating to the north and

to fall and. the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of the Army Group Threat "Center".

During the offensive, he outnumbered the enemy in terms of personnel by about 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - in 3 times, in tanks - 1.5 times. For one rifle or

The cavalry division had more than 8 kilometers of front. On each kilometer of the front, Fyt could use from 10 to 12 guns and mortars, about 100 tanks. To attack with such superiority was laborious but it is quite POSSIBLE.

they won't be able to, but at Hitler's headquarters they didn't allow this - "So, G. Guderian in his book "Memoirs

The avnoe command of the ground forces, being in da Coy from the front of East Prussia, had no

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his idea of the actual situation of his TROOPS ...

The timely withdrawal of troops and the occupation of the defense at a favorable and previously prepared line would be the best and most effective means for this. to restore position and gain a foothold before the onset of spring. In the zone of operations of the 2nd Panzer Army, such a line could be the line of defense it occupied in October along the Zusha and Oka rivers. However, it was precisely with this that Hitler did not agree "(Guderian G. "Memoirs of a Soldier". - S. 351-352).

Troops of the 16th Army with reinforcements were advancing in the Volokolamsk direction. The first powerful stronghold of the enemy on their way was the small town of Kryukovo. The battles for this city were fought for several days and were quite dramatic.

According to Soviet intelligence, the enemy managed to gain a good foothold in Kryukovo and concentrated up to 60 tanks there. There are no more precise data on the composition of the forces and means of the defending enemy grouping. But, based on the size of this settlement, it can be assumed that it consisted of no more than an infantry regiment, a tank regiment, up to an artillery battalion and several batteries of anti-tank guns.

There are also some differences regarding the composition of the Soviet grouping. Thus, the commander of the 16th Army, General K.K. Katyusha divisions. M. E. Katukov says that his entire 10th Guards Tank Brigade was allocated for the attack on Kryukovo.

Thus, the Soviet troops many times outnumbered the enemy in terms of the number of infantry and artillery. but somewhat inferior in the number of tanks. Besides. the enemy relied on hastily prepared defenses. Sun®

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Moscow's appointee, and took over the division after the death of `V. Panfilov. Accordingly, management experience

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this general did not have military operations, so bd. more on the scale of temporary association. There was very little information about the enemy's defense, time for under. there was practically no preparation for the offensive.

The offensive began on the morning of December 4 after a short artillery preparation, which was planned not for specific targets, but for areas. Therefore, its efficiency was extremely low. Then the infantry went on the attack, which was met by a shower of machine-gun fire from the enemy. She did not even reach the outskirts of Kryukov, lay down, and then was forced to retreat back to her original position.

A participant in this offensive, at that time the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel M. E. Katukov, in his book "On the Edge of the Main Strike" writes:

"It seemed that after that it was necessary to revise the plan for the assault on the Kryukov bridgehead of the Nazis. It was clear. that a frontal attack, and even in severe frost and deep snow, nothing can be done here ... However, the commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Division nevertheless decided to repeat the attack on the night of December 5th. The attack was repeated, but again they were not successful. Our brigade units suffered significant losses. Two KV tanks, four T-34 tanks and three G-60 tanks were out of order ... "(Katukov M.E. At the tip of the main blow. - P. 120).

South of Moscow, on the 350-kilometer line along the line of Tula, Serebryannye Prudy, Mikhailov, Chernava, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were stopped. The front line of defense of the tank army was occupied by the 24th tank, 53rd army and 47th tank corps. having divisions in one line with very small reserves. All divisions were stretched along the front from 25 to 50 kilometers and had regiments, also lined up in one line, and regiments - one line of battalions. Thus, in view of the one-echelon formation of the battle order of formations, the depth of the main defensive line of the German troops did not exceed 3-4 kilometers. Only two divisions were left in the reserve of the tank army - the 25th

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in the Ugorized and the 112th Infantry, which were located |. responsibly in the districts of Venev and Stalinogorsk.

and On the main line of the German defense there was no line and no front. The troops were garrisoned in the evicted points, which were turned into strongholds: e points and adapted for all-round defense. Between

There were significant gaps in VIS points, in some cases they were not engaged in troops, in engineering terms they were not equipped, but according to the plan of the command, they were to be shot through with artillery and rifle and cannon fire. On the outskirts of strongholds were

The minefields have not been updated.

> Usually nodes of resistance in large populated areas were defended by forces up to an infantry battalion, mustache tanks. Smaller villages housed Vekhotnye or tank companies. Larger forces were located in the cities. So, in Serebryanye Prudy there was an infantry regiment, in Mikhailov - two motorized infantry and 1 kin artillery regiment. In the operational depth of the defense, the defensive lines along the western banks of the rivers Gronya and Don were prepared in terms of engineering by the forces of the local population, but were not engaged in troops.

. "For the attack on Mikhailov, the proposals of the 10th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General Ya. F. Golikov), which, by decision of the Headquarters, were only 2 de

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o 254 field guns, 81 anti-tank guns, 7 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber. In front of the front of the invasion of the army there was one motorized division, reinforced with tanks.

\ „Neighbor of the 10th Army on the right was the group of General R GA. Below as part of a cavalry corps, one regimental division, a tank brigade and a separate Wick battalion. Still further in the Tula region, find the Yu 50th Army. Moved south to advance with

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the 61st district of Ryazhi and the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front was preparing for the offensive.

Thus, in the area east of Tula, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were practically in a deep pocket, the neck of which the Soviet troops could slam with counter attacks from the direction of Tula to the south and from the direction of Efremov to the north.

Under these conditions, General G. [Guderian decides to withdraw his subordinate troops, covering the withdrawal with defense. In his memoirs, he writes: "In the face of a threat to my flanks and rear, and in view of the onset of incredibly cold weather, as a result of which the troops lost their MOBILITY, I, ON THE NIGHT OF December 5 to 6, for the first time since the start of this war, decided to end this isolated offensive and withdraw far advanced units to the line of the upper reaches of the river. Don, r. Shat, r. Upa.

where to take up defense "(Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier that. - P. 350).

Thus, the defense of the German troops east of Tula should be regarded not as a well-prepared defensive operation of the 2nd Panzer Army, but as a tactical defense conducted with the aim of securing an exit from the battle and the withdrawal of the main grouping of troops.

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the 10th Army began on December 6, and during the day, slowly through the deep snow cover, its formations approached the city of Mikhailov. At 24:00 on December 6, after a 19-minute artillery preparation, the Soviet regiments again went on the attack. At 2 o'clock on December 7, they broke into the city and completely liberated it by 7 o'clock. The Germans systematically withdrew troops from Mikhailov to the west.

Information about how the battles for Mikhailov were fought is contained in the textbook of the Department of the History of Military Art of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy "Preparing and conducting an offensive with the advancement of the 10th Army formations from the depths in the counteroffensive near Moscow." In particular, it says: "By 2 o'clock on December 7, the troops of the 330th Infantry Division broke into the city.

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The general plan of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops near Moscow

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Regimental artillery, being in combat formations of infantry, destroyed enemy firing points with direct fire. The enemy troops began to panic. In order to cut off the escape routes for the Germans, the division commander ordered the commander of the 1111th Infantry Regiment to send one battalion to the road southwest of Mikhailov and block the enemy's withdrawal routes. But because of the deep snow, the battalion did not complete the task. The remnants of the broken parts of the enemy succeeded under the cover of darkness unhindered

move out in a southwesterly direction.

In the battles for Mikhailov, the 330th Rifle Division captured about 50 people, captured 16 guns, 6 vehicles, one tank, 16 motorcycles, a large amount of ammunition, as well as documents from the 32nd, 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd motorized artillery regiments 10 th Motorized Division.

The tank battalion, attached to the 330th rifle division, did not participate in the battle due to the failure of the materiel. On the first day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division, in the interests of reconnaissance and with the aim of defeating the enemy in the city of Mikhailov, carried out (in total - Auth.) 11 sorties. Other formations of the army on December 6 acted less successfully "(Alekseev P.D. Preparation and conduct of the offensive with the advancement of the formations of the 10th Army from the depths in the counteroffensive near Moscow. - M. 1997. - P. 24-25).

Now let's see how Soviet military leaders and researchers describe the first decade of the counteroffensive near Moscow. In particular, they point out that on December 6, the troops of the Western Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov launched a counteroffensive from the line Sverdlov, Dmitrov, Krasnaya Polyana, the Nara River. The Tula offensive operation of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front began. The troops of the Western Front liberated Yakhroma and Mikhailov and rushed to Venev, Stalinogorsk, and Epifan. The operational group of Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Livny. The 13th Army of the Southwestern Front started fighting for Yelets (History of the Great Patriotic

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Zolina. Genuine chronicle of 1418 days/1418 nights. —M., 5010. — S. 183).

t AM Vasilevsky, at that time due to illness |. M. Shaposhnikova, Acting Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army: "The Headquarters determined the start of the counteroffensive on December 5-6. In fact, the events unfolded like this. After the strikes of the Wiashia and artillery preparation, the execution of the flame of the counteroffensive began by the troops of the Kalinin Front on December 5, and by the troops of the shock groupings beyond the Nadny and Southwestern Fronts on December 6. A huge battle broke out. The success grew every day. The initiative undoubtedly passed to us. Unexpectedly, this blow of the Soviet troops made a stunning impression on the enemy. On December 8, Hitler signed the so-called Directive No. 39, which provided for the "general transfer of German troops near Moscow to the defense." - S. 166).

„ SC. Zhukov, since October 10 - commander of the Western Front.

1. "Here came December 6, 1941. The troops of the Western Front north and south of the capital launched a counteroffensive ... December 6 entered the battle and the 10th Army went to paradise

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E so that the flank of the retreating 2nd Panzer Army. On December 8, the rest of the troops of the 50th Army went on the offensive from the Tula region, threatening to cut off the paths from the enemy's course from Venev and Mikhailov. The aviation of the front and Headquarters continuously supported the strikes of the cavalry corps of General P. A. Belov, as well as the actions of the 50th and I armies.

"During the ten-day battles, the troops of the left wing West from the front inflicted a serious defeat on Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army and advanced 130 kilos and troves" (Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. - No. 366-367).

"_ Yeshe: "On the left wing of the front on December 3, the troops of the 50th mn and the cavalry corps of General P. A. Belov at

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set out to defeat Guderian's tank group in the Tula region. The 3rd, 17th tank and 29th motorized divisions of the Guderian army, leaving up to 70 tanks on the battlefield, began to hastily roll back to Venev "(Marshal Zhukov As we remember him. - P. 82).

It should be remembered that near Moscow, the experience of conducting offensive operations by Red Army formations was just emerging. Therefore, there were a lot of shortcomings and miscalculations. You can read about it, for example. in the textbook of the teacher of the Department of the History of Military Art of the M. V. Frunze Military Academy P. D. Alekseev "Preparation and conduct of an offensive with the advancement from the depths of the formations of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow".

From this we learn that the commander of the Western Front, G. K. Zhukov, ordered the 10th Army on December 6 to go on the offensive against Mikhailov on a front 115 kilometers wide after marching to a distance of 50 to 70 kilometers from the front line of the enemy. Undoubtedly, under such conditions, the army commander had no opportunity for reconnaissance of the enemy, preparation of the lines of advance and deployment of troops, and, finally, the line of attack itself. In addition, the army had very little artillery and practically no tanks (only 12 ma SHIN).

Despite this, G.K. Zhukov ordered the troops of the 10th

armies to attack simultaneously in three directions, which were significantly distant from each other, at a rate of 12 kilometers per day, which, in conditions of insufficient reconnaissance, weak enemy fire damage and a snowy winter, was clearly overestimated.

The operational formation of the army was ordered to be in one echelon with the allocation of two rifle and one cavalry divisions to the combined arms reserve. It would seem that these forces could be sufficient to develop an offensive in a decisive direction. But G.K. Zhukov ordered to distribute them in three directions, as a result of which there was a dispersion of reserves along the front

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efforts in the mainstream.

It was decided to control the army from a settlement point, which was located 85 kilometers from the first echelon of the army, as well as through two-way groups. At the same time, it is important that the Army troops do not

and batteries and there was not enough wire to organize wired communication. Thus, there was no question of any reliable command and control of the troops of the army.

As a result of such preparation, the following shortcomings occurred in the offensive of the 10th FMI: the delay in the advance of divisions of the first echelon to the attack line by four hours; non-simultaneous attack of most of the divisions; weak fire damage to the enemy in front of the beginning of the attack and practically no defeat of his troops in the depths by artillery fire and air strikes; for the offensive of the 330th rifle division in connection with its knitting into battle for the city of Mikhailov; uneven movement of all divisions in depth; loss of IVIZIA control by the army during the battle.

From this academic textbook, one can draw reasoned conclusions that the offensive of the troops of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow was very bad. The Soviet troops entered on a broad front after moving out of the depths for a long distance. Preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy was not carried out. There was no artillery and air preparation for the offensive. Tanks in

they participated. However, release

. about presented as a big win.

} Thus, in due time, none of

Uvisiy, operating in the first echelon of the 10th Army, despite the almost absence of resistance from

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from the area of concentration to the front line of the enemy's defenses at a distance of 25-30 kilometers and the capture of his tactical defense zone at a depth of 4-6 kilometers.

Subsequently, the advance of the troops of the 10th Army continued at a slow pace. Not knowing the situation on the front and not having a specific task, the division commanders acted slowly, cautiously and without initiative. When intelligence reported to the commander of the 323rd Infantry Division that a column of German vehicles with troops was moving along the highway from Mikhailovo to Stalinogorsk, he did not hesitate to take any measures to cut the highway and destroy the enemy. In general, the advance of the army troops on the second day of the operation, despite the absence of resistance from the enemy in front of all divisions. with the exception of one 322nd, it was insignificant.

The 322nd Rifle Division was advancing on the city of Serebryanye Prudy, which also represented a center of resistance. On December 7, by 15 o'clock, having covered 8 kilometers off-road, the regiments of the division reached the city. But it was not possible to take it on the move. The attack of the Soviet infantry was repelled by machine gun and artillery fire. The troops lay down and were forced to hold in this position for several

by hours.

With the onset of darkness, units of the 322nd Rifle Division again launched an attack on Serebryanye Prudy. EU units covered the city from the north and south. German troops not only repulsed attacks from a place, but also tried to go on a counterattack. By 20 o'clock the city was captured by the Soviet units, who captured 50 prisoners, 6 artillery guns and about 30 motorcycles in it (TsAMO, F. 353. d. 66077, d. 2, l. 617).

In the other direction, the 326th Rifle Division at 7 o'clock in the morning, without much resistance from the enemy, captured the village of Gryaznoye, after which its commander, Colonel V.S. Komai dir of the 41st cavalry division brigade commander P. M. Davydov. which was advancing on the left flank of the 10th Army, on the second

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The operation made no attempt at all to continue the offensive. On the second day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division of Iya made only 24

eto- -departure.

The offensive on the left flank of the army developed even more slowly. The 10th Army did not have an elbow connection with the neighbor on the Left, which the German troops defending immediately took advantage of. On December 8, G. Guderian ordered Khilami of the 40th communications regiment to counterattack on the flank of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was forced to stop the offensive and begin a retreat in the eastern direction of Lenia. Only after December 9 the commander

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The 10th Army sent the 41st and 57th Cavalry Divisions to reinforce, the offensive resumed and the Soviet troops were able to occupy the Tabola settlement by the end of December 10th.

Thus, during the first four days of the operation, the German troops were practically pushed out of the Stalinogorsk sack. By the end of December 10, the 330th Infantry Division reached the approaches to the Don near the settlement of Krutoye. The 328th Infantry Division captured Dubovo. And only the 324th Rifle Division completed the task of the first day of the operation and reached the Don. In four days of the offensive, they covered 35-40 kilometers, advancing at an average rate of 8-10 kilometers per day. By that time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the 322nd Rifle Division of the 10th Army, had captured the city of Venev.

On December 10, General G. Guderian reported the situation to Hitler's chief adjutant General Schmundt and the chief of personnel of the main command of the ground forces, warning that if effective measures were not taken in this direction, then they should not

no illusions about the successful operations of the German troops there.

On December 12, Soviet troops occupied Efremov, on December 13, after a long battle, they captured the city of Epifan. | th Guards Cavalry Corps advanced several kilometers south of Venev.

As a result, by the end of December 13, the 10th Army had only partially reached the milestone defined by it in the framework of the first offensive operation. The average rate of advance of its formations fell to 4-5 kilometers per day. The opposing formations of the 2nd Panzer Army, having avoided encirclement, were able to delay the offensive of the Soviet troops by the defense of the rear guards and systematically retreat to a new rear line of defense.

The offensive of the 10th Army, which lasted seven days (December 6-13) and reached a depth of 60 kilometers, practically ended with the displacement against

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“ The battle of the 33rd Infantry Division of the 10th Army for the city of Mikhailov on December 6-7, 1941, a peak from the area occupied by it. The average rate of advance of the army was 7.5 kilometers per day, that is, almost two times less than that envisaged by the plan of operation. The German command was able, leading the rearguard of thousands of battles, to withdraw its troops from the threatened area and escape the encirclement (Alekseev P.D. Preparation and conduct of the offensive with the advancement from the depths of the formations of the 0th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow. - M.: Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze, 1997). "During the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow, the People's Commissar of Defense issued several orders - Among them was an order dated December 17 with the announcement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On granting the Military Councils of the fronts and fleets the right to expunge the criminal record from military personnel, distinguished themselves in battles by the 'German invaders.'

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nistiya for persons repressed earlier, and then directed. lennyh on the formation of disciplinary companies. In practice, however, few have exercised this right. The life of a penal in the period of active offensive operations, as a rule, was not measured in months and days.

but only for hours.

Nevertheless, individual servicemen, previously convicted under political and criminal charges, took advantage of this opportunity. Among them was the later famous military intelligence officer, [Hero of the Soviet Union, writer Vladimir Vasilyevich Karpov.

On December 28, an order was issued to introduce the position of military commissar in the battalions of rifle divisions "in order to strengthen educational work among personal

stav."

On December 31, an order "On the formation of the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps" appears. Colonel A. S. Gryaznoy, who had previously commanded the 7th Guards Rifle Division, was appointed commander of the | th Guards Rifle Corps. The commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps was Colonel A.I. Lizyukov. In terms of composition, the guards rifle corps were to become the strongest formations. In addition to three four rifle divisions and one or two separate brigades, these corps included three separate

ski battalions, one tank brigade each consisting of 10 KV tanks, 16 T-34 tanks and 20 T-60 tanks, one Katyusha Guards mortar division each consisting of 12 installations, one communication battalion and one to a supply battalion consisting of an auto company (150 vehicles) and a horse-drawn transport company (250 sledges). The guards rifle divisions that were part of these corps were also reinforced. In each of them, about 1,000 people were armed with PPISH machine guns, there were 144 anti-tank rifles, 20 pieces of 76-mm guns and 12 units of 122-mm howitzers.

In general, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 achieved its goal. Discarding

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} gift grouping of the enemy to the west and inflicting . serious losses, the Red Army eliminated the danger hanging over Moscow. The counteroffensive lasted 34 days. The total width of the combat front was 1,000 kilometers, and the depth of advance of the Soviet troops was 100-250 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance of infantry formations was 3-6 km.

6 ,. During this operation, the enemy's plan for

the capture of Moscow, the troops of the Army Group Center were defeated and the myth of the invincibility of the German troops was dispelled.

The German command does not publish the exact number of losses during the Soviet offensive near Moscow. But, referring to the "War Diary" of F. [alder, we can calculate that from December 10, 1941 to February 10, 1942, the German ground forces lost 191 thousand people on the Eastern Front. A significant part of these forces was located near Moscow.

, It is known that during the operation, Soviet troops lost 139.6 thousand people without return, wounded and

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nevnik. T.3. Part 2. - S. 120, 195. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. - S. 275).

— But this is information on the one hand. Now look
And how about the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow
They write in their memoirs the major German military commanders.

· | 5th of December

-F. Halder: "Guderian decided to withdraw troops from Tula. b Frost 36 degrees below zero. The planned offensive of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups must be cancelled. The enemy broke through our front in the area east of Kalinin. Von Bock reports: the forces are exhausted. The 4th Panzer Group Avtra will no longer be able to advance. Tomorrow he will inform, there is also a need to withdraw the troops "(Halder F. Military Anevnik. T. 3, book 2. - P. 96-97).

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From the order of the headquarters of the army group "Center" to the commander of the 4th army, 4th, 3rd tank groups No. 2870:

"In case there is an order to partially break away from the enemy and to take up defense, the army group establishes the following common line: Nar Ponds. the course of the river. Moscow to Karinsky, Istra reservoir, Lake Senezh, the area east of Klin, the left flank of the 36th motorized division in the area of the Volga reservoir ...

The start of the withdrawal, which, according to the calculations of the army group, will require two nights, will be scheduled for the evening of 6.12. which will be announced in a special order.

The 4th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group are to outline and report to Army Group Headquarters an intermediate line that they can reach on the first night of the retreat. This is necessary to achieve full consistency between both formations during the withdrawal "(Russian archive. Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4-1). - P. 204).

G. Guderian: "It's good that on December 5 I independently decided to stop the offensive, because otherwise the catastrophe would have been inevitable" (Guderian an G. Memoirs of a soldier. - P. 355).

December 6

F. Halder writes that at a meeting with Hitler, the Fuhrer said: "And the fact that our divisions hold 30 kilometers each (the width of the defense zone) only confirms the insufficiency of the enemy's forces ...

In principle, there are no doubts or hesitations regarding the reduction of the front line. However, first you need to prepare this new frontier, dig rifle trenches, install furnaces, etc."

A few below:

"As a result of the enemy's offensive on the northern flank of the 3rd Panzer Group, it became necessary for our troops located south of the Volzhsky

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'reservoirs. They need to be taken to Klin ... "(Halder and the Military Diary. Vol. 3, book 2. - P. 98).

„ From the order of Army Group Center:

"The right flank of the 3rd Panzer Group withdraws: on the night of 6.6 on 7. 12. to the line of Oudinot, Kamenka, Olgovo; on the night from 7 to 8.12 - to the line Kochergino, Rogachevo. Then, if necessary, on the night from 8 to 9.12 - to the line of the northern tip of Lake Senezh, Aladyino, Dorshevo. The 4th Panzer Group, in close cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Group, withdraws its northern flank, respectively, by withdrawing the southern flank of the 3rd Panzer Group, to the area of Lake Senezh. The question of the withdrawal of all other formations of the 4th Panzer groups to the line indicated in the order of Army Group Center No. 2870 dated

December 5, 1941, the commander of the 4th Army has the right to allow (Russian archive. T. 15 (4-1). - "S. 205). IP

b December 7

„

F. Halder: "The withdrawal of the 10th motorized division from" Mikhailov (Guderian's army), in all likelihood, will "have very unpleasant consequences. A very tense situation has developed on the northern flank of the 4th army" (in the zone 4- th tank group) and at the front of the 3rd tank troupe. The enemy made a breakthrough from the north to Klin. In the area east of Kalinin, the enemy penetrated our front in a number of sectors, but these penetrations have not yet been located.

, A few below:

]. "The events of this day are again horrifying and shameful. 'Yalavkom turned into a simple letter carrier. The Fuhrer, 'not noticing him, himself communicates with the commanders of the army groups. The worst thing is that the OKW does not understand the condition of our troops and is busy patching up holes instead of making principled strategic decisions. One of the solutions of this kind should

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be given an order to withdraw the troops of Army Group Center to the Ruza, Ostashkov line "(Halder F. Military diary. T. 3, book 2. - S. 192-103).

From the report of the operational department of the headquarters of the 2nd Army to the headquarters of Army Group Center, transmitted at 23:00: "Our army has now gone over to the defensive. In the future, the offensive initiative passes into the hands of the enemy, who gets freedom of action in regrouping and concentrating forces. A front of 260 km makes it necessary to deploy an infantry division on an average line of 40 km and a motorized division of 30 km. These forces can only provide protection, but it is impossible to organize interacting protection. Such a width of the sector and the current communication between divisions along the front do not make it possible to use significant reserves "(Russian archive. Vol. 15 (4-1). - P. 206-207).

December 8

F. [alder: "On the front of the 2nd and 2nd Panzer armies, events are developing satisfactorily. It is already possible to think about a stable defense at the final line (?) On December 6, the 20th Russian Army began to operate in the area northwest of Moscow. We can expect increased pressure from the enemy in this sector of the front. However, it is not felt yet. The troops were withdrawn from Yakhroma without any difficulty. As a result of the withdrawal, small forces were released, which will be sent to liquidate the breakthrough of the opponents of Kau Klin. Almost all the troops have already reached the planned cut-off line. However, the situation remains tense. I consider this section of the front to be the most dangerous, since here we have no troops in the second line.

A few below:

"Conversation with von Bock. We discussed the situation on the front of his army group. The result of this is the following conclusion: in no sector of the front is an army group in a position to hold back a major offensive (against

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kick. - Auth.). The left flank causes great concern | Guderian's group and the right flank of Kluge's army ... If 3 decide to withdraw, then we will lose pain

p the enemy will launch a large offensive, then his | | The consequences are hard to predict. Therefore, if 4 fail to create reserves, we are in danger of being overwhelmed...

, , Setting in the evening. At the front of Army Group Center

'is broken through by newly arrived cavalry divisions (and two divisions). Guderian, apparently, leads to

Order your troops. The enemy, by rail and in marching order, throws up troops against the eastern flank of the group [uderian. The situation here is very difficult.

'. The enemy succeeded in making a breakthrough on the fronts of the 3rd Panzer Group. The 4th Panzer Group takes over the chalet of the 3rd Panzer Group.

O " In the area east of Kalinin, the enemy also tore our front" (Halder F. Military diary. Vol. 3, .2. - S. 105-107).

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. F. Halder: "The enemy is increasing pressure on the 2nd ar- (where a breakthrough was made by the forces of one cavalry Zhiviziya) and on the eastern sector of the front of the 2nd tank army. Without a doubt, the enemy threw hedgehogs of FORCE into this area ...

"" A very tense situation on the northern flank of the army. Since radio reconnaissance did not reveal new targets, enemy attacks cannot be sufficiently echeloned in depth, and, therefore, Xx must be considered only as tactical. Extremely strong pressure of the enemy south-east of Kalinin, Apparently, will allow him to retake the city.

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Conversation with von Bock. He reported Gu's report. Derian that the state of his troops is very dangerous and that he does not know whether they will cope with the task of repulsing the Russian offensive. Troops lose confidence in their command. The combat power of the infantry has decreased! Measures are being taken to comb the rear (it has been found that an additional 1,600 bayonets can be recruited from a panzer division alone)... The Army Group needs men! The apparent inability of the commander of the 27th army corps (Wager) (Halder F. Military diary. T. 3, book 2. - P. 108).

From the report of the headquarters of the 2nd Army to the command of the Army Group "Center", transmitted at 8 hours 30 minutes: and on the night of December 9, 1941, they report their arrival in Sukhoi (10 km south of Chernav) ... Livny is defended by the forces of the sapper battalion and rear units. In other sectors, the army retreats to the Kshen line, the sector before the confluence with the river. Sosnu, Izmalkovo, Efremov ...) (Russian archive. T. 15 (4-1). - P. 208).

December 10

F. Halder: "The enemy has stepped up pressure on the sector between Yelets and Livny... The enemy is attacking the positions of the 2nd Panzer Division (three new Russian divisions are operating). In the area west of Tula, as a result of the withdrawal of our 206th Infantry Division, a gap in the front line was formed. What impact it will have on future events cannot yet be foreseen. In front of the front of the 4th Army, it is relatively calm. Reserves released from the front are withdrawn to the rear.

In the area north of Klin, the situation is becoming more and more tense. The arrival of a new enemy division was noted. In the area southeast of Kalinin, the front how restored...

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_ 23.45. Phone call from Field Marshal von Bock. he reported that the front of the 2nd Army had been broken through near Liven by the 2nd and 14th cavalry divisions and one Russian guard division ... the 95th and 134th infantry divisions from motana. A large gap has formed in the front line, Zhotory continues to expand. Guderian brings half of the units of the 293rd Infantry Division to this sector.. honey Military diary. T. 3, book. 2. - S. 110 - And

From the report of the commander of the 2nd Army to the headquarters of the group

5 ... It about the "Center", transmitted at 19 hours 45 minutes: dy _
_ is impossible to defend without reserves, especially
along the river: 300 km wide, on which seven weak divisions are
concentrated, the combat composition of which is at most only four divisions.
This front must break... And it is currently broken. The Russians, 'who are
probably not going to launch a big offensive, have now recognized the weakness
of the army, so it is to be expected that they will start attacking the front line
'occupied by us ... There will be nothing to prevent them (he) and he (they) will be
successful (Russian archive. T. 15 (4-1). - P. 209).

December 11th

„ F. Halder: "The tension on the front of the 2nd Army has not yet reached its
climax.

„. The enemy's 10th army is operating against the 2nd tank army, consisting
of six infantry and one cavalry DIVISIONS. The army is advancing from the
Mikhailov region in the direction of Tula. Five divisions of this enemy army
are newly formed formations.

On the southern sector of the front of the 4th Army, the enemy did not
receive intensified artillery fire. The main direction of his offensive was the
zone of the 5th Army Corps and to the north. The rupture of the front at Klin
has not yet been eliminated AGolder F. Military diary. T. 3, book. 2. - S.
112).

_ , From the orders of the headquarters of Army Group Center to the
commands of the 4th and 9th armies: "... it is necessary to reconnoiter, suggest

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keep and, if possible, prepare cut-off positions at the line: Narskiye Prudy,
Teryaev, Osheikino, [Nezdovo, Spas-Dary, Podol ... Both armies should
submit maps to the army group headquarters as soon as possible ... with
cut-off positions ... " .

From the report of the operational department of the headquarters of
the 2nd Army to the headquarters of Army Group Center, transmitted at
1430 hours: "The enemy broke through the forces of the 1st Cavalry
Corps, consisting of three cavalry divisions and one infantry division, the
front line of the army with the direction of the blow Novosil, Eagle. New
forces follow the broken enemy. The enemy, located in the area of the
southern and northern flanks of the army, is showing

activity and does not allow the transfer of forces from this far-stretched guard position. The 95th Infantry Division lost a whole third of the already weakened combat forces ... In addition, a gap over 30 km wide remains completely open ... "(Russian archive. T. 15 (4-1). - P. 219- 211).

12 December

F. Halder: "The situation on the front of the 2nd Army is critical. Units of the 2nd Panzer Army repel enemy attacks. Unfortunately, it is not possible to close the gap in the front line between the 296th and 31st Infantry Divisions. The situation at Klin does not yet allow drawing any conclusions, but it is still tense. The enemy strengthened his grouping near Kalinin.

Conversation with Field Marshal von Bock:

The situation has reached a particularly critical stage.

The 134th and 45th Infantry Divisions are generally no longer capable of combat. There is no supply. The command of the troops (the command of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Army. - Auth.) in the sector between Tula and Kursk suffered complete bankruptcy.

The army group developed a plan to withdraw to the Tula line,

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\Novosil, Tim. The retreating units will resist the enemy at intermediate lines ...

A very difficult situation developed on the northern flank of the 4th Panzer Group (36th Motorized Division). Planned withdrawal of the 7th Army Corps to the cut-off

I eat Kalinin.

. ' The situation at the front in the evening:

. The 2nd Army was placed under the control of the 2nd Tank Army. The situation on the front of the 2nd Army was very tense. The enemy attacked the sector of the 9th Panzer Division. iu Bureloma.

_ The 2nd Panzer Army repulsed the enemy offensive. The situation at Tula is difficult. It is unacceptable to withdraw the front of the 2nd and 2nd Panzer Armies in this way, as noted by the command of the army group ...

„On the front of the 4th Panzer Group, the enemy offensive was repulsed. According to unspecified data, the current

'capturing the enemy and at the front of the 3rd tank group near Kalinin (Halder F. Military diary. T. 3, book 2. - S. 113-116).

> From the directive of the command of the Army Group "Center", "sent to the troops at 13 hours 35 minutes:" The 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Army are temporarily reduced to the "Army Troupe of Guderian" ... The task of Guderian's army group is to stop the advance the enemy broke through to the line: the area east of Kursk, Novosil, Aleksin "(Russian archive. T. 15 (4-1). - P. 211).

G. Guderian: "A threat loomed over Efremov, and on December 12 he was surrendered. In order to close the gap that appeared on the front of the 43rd Army Corps, the 4th Army was ordered to send the 137th Infantry Division there. 'However, it took some time for di Visia to be able to approach this area due to the considerable distance and bad weather. Therefore, during December 12, we were forced to send all our available mobile forces to help the neighbor on the right who was in trouble "{Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - S. 355).

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December 13th

F. Halder: "Army Group Center". In the area of the 9th Panzer Division, an enemy attack was repulsed along the motorway. According to preliminary data, the rest of the enemy attacks were also repelled. According to unspecified data, the German units encircled near Efremov left the encirclement.

On the sector between Tula and Epifan, the presence of two new enemy divisions was established. Enemy attacks are repulsed with heavy losses for him. In the area west of Tula, units against

Nika.

North-west of Moscow, the operation of one new enemy rifle and one tank brigades was established.

The situation in the Klin area, which is still in our hands, has somewhat improved. The 2nd Panzer Division closed the gap on the front south of the 36th Motorized Division.

Our troops successfully retreated to a new line in the area southeast of Kalinin. Kalinin is held on shimi parts.

Atmosphere in the evening:

Attempts are continuing to localize the enemy's breakthrough in the sector of the 34th Army Corps. However, kava

enemy units with artillery are already far behind the front line. The position of the divisions of the corps is still not clear. (Soviet troops surrounded the main forces of the 45th and 134th infantry divisions of the 34th army corps, then dismembered them into parts and partially destroyed them on December 16. Nevertheless, the remnants of these divisions managed to break out of the encirclement. - Auth.) in the remaining sectors of the front of the army group, enemy attacks were repelled.

In the area west of Tula, a small enemy force broke through. But this breakthrough is so deep that you need us to pull the front line back. The withdrawal of troops is hampered by sleet.

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A column of armored vehicles near Mozhaisk

On the front of the 4th Army, the combat activity of the enemy, which in some places wedged into our position, was intensified. Our forward units at Kalinin have been pulled back, and that Kim has thus closed the gap in the front line. It is planned to go to the line of Lama. In the area southeast of Kalini, our troops were also withdrawn back ... "(Halder F. Military diary. T. 3, book 2. - S. 117-118).

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December 14

F. Halder: "Army Group Center". There were no alarming reports from the southern front of the 2nd Army. On the central sector and the northern flank, the situation improved somewhat. Guderian appears to have a firm grip on his 2nd Panzer Army and is gradually drawing it back.

The gap in the front that formed southwest of Tula is extremely unpleasant (the breakthrough of the 258th rifle division of the 50th army from the Pyatnitskoye area (northwest of Tula) in a southwestern direction to Voskresenskoye. - Auth.). So far, no measures have been found that could remedy this situation.

On the sector of the 4th Army, the enemy managed to achieve no large penetrations of tactical significance. On the whole, the situation at the front of the army does not cause concern. At Klee, the situation is gradually stabilizing. Kalinin is fighting with varying success. So far, the results of these battles are generally favorable for us.

At 18.30 during a telephone conversation with the field marsh-

scrap von Brauchitsch, who had previously discussed the situation with von Bock, Kluge and Guderian:

The situation on the front of the 2nd Panzer Army: Has the gap between the 45th and 134th Infantry Divisions been eliminated yet? The troops scheduled to close this gap are moving up very slowly. Farther north, units of the army deliberately retreat from line to line. A difficult situation developed in the area west of Tula. The gap in the front has been eliminated here. From the north, the 137th Infantry Division is being transferred to this sector of the PS. Her whereabouts are currently unknown.

The situation on the front of the 4th Army; The front has stabilized, but it is held by very weak forces. There are no reserves in the rear ...

Kluge will decide tomorrow whether he can hold the front he occupies. Further advance of the enemy in the zone of the 255th Infantry Division

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Machine gunners in the battle for Mozhaisk

poses a threat to movement along the road Mozhaisk - Volokolamsk. A report was received from the 3rd Panzer Group, speaking of a serious situation on its front ... "

; December 15

F. Halder: "Army Group Center". The enemy is conducting an offensive against the 2nd Army. In addition, he tries

on the southern flank, expand the breakthrough area near Livna. In the rest of the sectors, the enemy troops will not advance

lean forward...

at 249

The 2nd Panzer Army is withdrawing in perfect order...

4th army. The enemy attacks the 255th division. Possibly, the units located to the north of this division will have to be withdrawn. The troops of the 5th Army Corps are also under increased pressure from the enemy. In the Klin area, the situation is relatively calm ... "

Thus, we see that the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow during the first ten days of December 1941 achieved certain successes.

Soviet sources indicate that by the end of December 15, northwest of Moscow, the enemy's Kalinin grouping was under the threat of imminent encirclement. The reserves of the fascist command were completely used up. His grouping, located in Kalinin, was engulfed from both flanks.

Southwest of Moscow, the 217th Rifle and 112th Tank Divisions liberated Yasnaya Polyana and then Shcheki no. On this day, in his report to I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov noted: "Prisoners from the Guderian group show that they are now allowed to put on parade uniforms, which they took with them for the parade in Moscow, due to the cold weather."

And only in the central sector of the front did the offensive of the Soviet troops develop less successfully. By mid-December, the Germans retreated somewhat and dug in along the banks of the Ruza, Nara, and Oka rivers. Nearby settlements were turned into carefully equipped centers of resistance.

German sources comment on the first ten days of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow much more modestly. There are battles with varying success, a systematic withdrawal to the rear or cut-off positions. At the same time, the command of the Wehrmacht does not hide the fact that the situation in the bands of a number of formations and formations was rather difficult on certain days.

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Only forward!

,. On December 16, the second decade of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow began. On this day in the Kremlin

Tan set out his views on post-war territorial boundaries in Europe. He noted that all countries previously occupied by Germany and its allies, 7? s be restored to their pre-war borders. Eden believed that it was somewhat premature to conduct negotiations on this subject at a time when German troops were not far from Moscow. But he didn't argue. V. Stalin. №. _ On that day, the Yelets offensive operation of the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, which began on December 6, ended. During this time, Soviet troops advanced 80-100 kilometers, destroying almost 16 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, freeing about

300 settlements. } The Tula operation is over. As a result of its implementation, the siege of Tula was lifted and a significant time was inflicted on Zhenya of the 2nd tank army of the enemy, the remnants of which were to retreat 130 kilometers.

, The troops of the Western Front liberated the city of Vyso Kovsk, the troops of the Kalinin Front liberated the city

Kalinin.

December 16

, Diary of F. Halder: "Army Group Center". The 134th Zy division (34th army corps. - Auth.) Broke through the encirclement. The enemy from the Efremov area, Yelets, is pulling up fresh forces to the breakthrough site.

/derian walks away. The enemy is exerting strong pressure on the 3rd Panzer Division, as well as on the sector of the front south of Ne Aleksin.

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At midnight, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, F. Halder and the head of the operations department, General Paulus, were summoned to the Fuhrer. A. Hitler said that there could be no question of a large-scale march of German troops near Moscow. He demanded that troops be withdrawn only from those sectors where the enemy had achieved a deep breakthrough.

"The creation of rear lines is a fantasy," the Fuhrer remarked. "We must do our best to keep the front lines. The front suffers from only one thing: the enemy has more soldiers. But he does not have a lot of artillery. I demand the maximum use of this advantage, which can solve many of our problems. The enemy is in a much worse position.

than ours.

Several decisions are made. First, the infantry was supported by four groups of bombers and two groups of fighter-bombers. Secondly, retreat to cut-off positions should be carried out only if there is a sufficient number of infantry to occupy them. Thirdly, in the Dubna area, to bring new divisions into battle, also reinforcing the troops of the 4th and 3rd tank groups. Fourthly, for the transfer of reserves, allocate 200 transport aircraft and transport aircraft from Army Group South.

December 17

The Kaluga offensive operation of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front began. Soviet troops moved in the direction of Kaluga, Likhvin, Sukhinichi.

From the diary of F. Halder: "Center Army Group". In the area south of Liven - nothing significant. The enemy is exerting increased pressure on the 112th Infantry Division (2nd Panzer Group). Pressure increased on the positions of the 31st Infantry Division west of Tula. Still

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The offensive of the 82nd motorized rifle division of the 5th army in the area of Mozhaisk. January 1942

`On the site of the 9th Army Corps, apparently, a disgrace is being stolen. Part of the divisions withdrew, and part of the rest

heavy guns and vehicles.

At the front of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, the situation is even more obscure ... The 9th Army has withdrawn its troops somewhat, and is now firmly holding its occupied line.

December 19th

Soviet troops liberated the city of Tarusa. On this day, the commander of the Cavaria Corps, Major General L. M. Dovator, died in battle in Ruza, near Moscow.

From the diary of F. Halder: "Army Group Center". tgivnik is advancing on all fronts. More new divisions have been established...

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13.00 - Summoned to the Fuhrer. The Fuhrer intends to take command of the ground forces, since the heads. who is retiring due to illness...

In the evening: On the front of the 2nd Army, a major attack was repulsed: the enemy ... The 4th Army is in danger of being surrounded by it as a result of an enemy strike from Kaluga. The enemy broke through the front on both sides of Tarusa and Aleksin. The situation is very tense. At Ruza, the enemy broke through from the northwest. The 5th Army Corps is retreating with fighting. The enemy is pursuing."

On this day, great changes took place in the German High Command. A. Hitler accepted the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, and entrusted these duties to himself. But practically the main command of all the operations of the ground forces was to be carried out by Keitel. F. Halder, by prior agreement with Brauchitsch, also had to resign. But Brauchitsch, in connection with the difficult situation on the Eastern Front, persuaded him to remain at his post. It was also taken into account that, according to Brauchitsch and other conspirators, only F. Halder would henceforth be able to defend their point of view before Hitler, who increasingly began to distrust the generals.

20th of December

Soviet troops liberated Volokolamsk after bloody battles.

From the diary of F. Halder: "Army Group Center". The enemy attacked the right flank of the 2nd Army and achieved little success ... In the area of \u200b\u200bthe front gap west of Tula, the enemy broke through to our rear and from there with his ski and cavalry units went to the area south of Kaluga ... On the remaining sectors of the front, the enemy launched strong attacks , however, our units retreated only in some areas ... "

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#1. On this day, A. Hitler held the first meeting already in Ya

in honor of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces

direct forces systematically to the populated Munkty, occupied by the enemy. Also influence Um with artillery fire. Provide protection against enemy subdivisions infiltrating our rear. Troop units to form fighter teams - mobile combat groups with strength from a company to a battalion, designed to destroy the infiltrating enemy. From prisoners and local residents

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Fezovogovorochno to select winter clothes. left behind

21 December

` . The mobile group of the 50th Army of the Western Front moved to Kaluga and started street fighting. and From the diary of F. Halder: "The critical situation of Ol lived south of Kaluga. Here the enemy broke into Kaluga with a blow from Odoev. It was only possible to throw it away. After the approach of the security regiment. However, the tanks of the enemy are still in Kaluga ... The Korus commanders report that their troops are exhausted and cannot resist

To resist further attacks of the enemy ... " .

December 22

In the EU of this time, massive enemy air raids on Moscow ceased. In total, up to this time, the enemy had made 122 raids on the capital, in which

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Of these, 8 thousand aircraft participated, but only 229 broke through to the city.

From the diary of F. Halder:

"The troops of the southern flank of the 4th Army southeast of Kaluga are surrounded by the enemy, who is simultaneously developing an offensive from Tarusa. In this sector, the situation is unusually difficult ... Despite this, the order to withdraw along the entire front was not given. An order has been given for the use of cumulative projectiles. (These anti-tank projectiles, which had greater armor penetration due to the cumulative funnel, were used for the first time. - Auth.)

December 24

Troops of the Kalinin Front launched an offensive against Rzhev.

From the diary of F. Halder: "Army Group Center". The enemy continues to press on the front of the 2nd and 4th tank armies. He has been successful in some areas. Especially energetically, he attacks the troops on the northern flank of the 2nd Panzer Army. Here our troops had to withdraw. A threatened situation was created in the sector of the breakthrough between the northern flank of the 2nd Army and the southern flank of the 4th Army.

A dangerous situation in the area of Maloyaroslavets, where the enemy broke through with large forces ... An order was given to withdraw the troops of the southern flank of the 4th Army. The 9th Army retreats in perfect order. The enemy exerts pressure

coming from the north.

December 25

The Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk operation was confirmed, as a result of which the Soviet troops defeated the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy and advanced 990-110 kilometers to the west. The threat of bypassing Moscow from the north was eliminated.

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The counteroffensive and the general offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow (December 5 - April 20, 1941)

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The troops of the Bryansk Front, having pressed the formations of the 2nd Panzer Group of the enemy, liberated the cities of Chern and Livny.

From the diary of F. Halder: "A very difficult day ... At the front of Army Group Center, this day was one of the most critical days. The enemy breakthrough forced the units of the 2nd Army to withdraw. Guderian, not considering it necessary to consult with the command of the army group, also retreats to the line of the Oka and Zushi. In this regard, the command of the army group demanded that Guderian be immediately removed. which the Fuhrer immediately carried out..."

G. Guderian himself explains this event as a consequence of his disagreement with the assessment of the situation with the supreme command, including Hitler himself. In particular, he writes that as early as December 20, in order to clarify the situation, he flew to Rastenburg (Rostembork), where the Fuhrer's headquarters were located. But then Hitler and his inner circle did not understand the general.

After that, only a few days passed. "December 25 ... in the evening I again had a sharp clash with Field Marshal von Kluge, who reproached me for having presented him with an incorrect official report: he hung up, saying: "I will report you to the Führer." It was already too much. I informed the chief of staff of the army group that, after such an appeal, I no longer considered it possible to command the army and asked to be relieved of my post. I immediately communicated this decision of mine also by telegraph. Field Marshal von Kluge had preempted me in this regard, and even earlier applied to the High Command of the Ground Forces with a request for my change. On the morning of December 26, I received Hitler's order to transfer me to the reserve of the High Command of the Ground Forces. My successor would be the commander of the 2nd Army, General Rudolf Schmidt "(/} - Derian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - S. 367-368).

Thus, the second decade of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow, according to Soviet sources:

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'brought the Red Army new tangible victories over the tsurotivnik.

This is also confirmed by German sources. Mr. Guderian constantly points out the plight of the German troops near Moscow, the need for their weight and retreat. The reaction of A. Hitler to these events was also very sharp - he removed from his post the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, General

-Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, and then I command his 2nd Panzer Army, General Guderian. Many other generals and officers lost their posts.

, Events developed quite dramatically southwest of Moscow. On December 30, the 33rd and 43rd Armies of the Western Front broke through the defenses of the 15th Infantry Division, which had been weakened in previous battles, forcing it to begin a retreat. Hitler personally ordered the commander of this division to hold the occupied shirt, but the new commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal G. von Kluge, answered MIL that "the state of the 15th division is such that it can do whatever it wants, but it no longer has the power."

, By the end of December, in the Kaluga region, the 43rd Army managed to barks Maloyaroslavets, and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of General Belov approached Yukhnov, jeopardizing the supply routes of the 4th Army. The situation was not the best on the 32nd flank of the Army Group Center, where the troops of the Soviet of the Kalinin Front were opposed by formations of the 5th German Army, as well as the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups. a consequence of large snow drifts from December 25 to

For several days fuel, ammunition and food were not delivered to the front. The combat capability of the Yemetsky troops was rapidly declining. Thus, in the journal of the zoi operations of the 3rd Panzer Group, it was said that Fitzer, who arrived from the Fuhrer's headquarters in order to study the situation, "came to the following conclusion: there would not be enough human strength to fulfill the demanded demands. The head of the rear of the army stressed

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that it is regrettable that the highest commanding authorities are little informed about the state of affairs with supplies.

On December 29, the main forces of the 6th Army Corps of the 9th Army were defeated by the troops of the 29th Army. Hitler was enraged by this news and ordered the immediate dismissal of General O. Furster from command of the corps, replacing him with General W. von Richthofen. He, being an aviator and a rather superficial military leader. not understanding the situation, he immediately reported to the Fuhrer on the basis of aerial reconnaissance that "various settlements, which, according to ground troops. occupied by the enemy, are still in our hands. The enemy retreats in panic under counterattacks, and that the Russian cavalry, allegedly breaking through in the southeast direction, is not visible.

At Hitler's headquarters, Richthofen's report was treated very positively.

"I have said more than once that it is precisely the alarmists in the gene-

ral epaulettes deprive my troops of victories that have already been practically achieved," said Hitler. And even after it became known on December 31 that the formations of the 6th Army were finally defeated, the Fuhrer continued to insist on his order to hold on.

On December 27, the commander of the 10th Army of the Western Front, General F. I. Golikov, received an order to occupy the Sukhinichi railway junction and simultaneously advance in the direction of Kirov in order to cut the Vyazma-Bryansk road. From December 27 to 31, she fought heavy battles for Belev. But the battles for Sukhinichi, which began on December 29, did not lead to success. True, the Soviet troops succeeded. moving forward in other directions, encircle the German troops defending in Sukhinichi.

The 2nd Panzer Army received an order from Hitler to release Sukhinichi, striking at the flank of the 10th Army. January 16, regrouping forces, she moved into the offensive
captivity.

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Soviet armored forces in the counteroffensive near Moscow

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The German offensive for the headquarters of the 10th Army was a complete surprise. By that time, her formations had been severely weakened by previous battles. Rifle regiments had an average of 250 men. There was not enough ammunition, part of the artillery was disabled.

The 24th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army without much difficulty broke into the hastily occupied defenses of the 10th Army. F. I. Golikov turned to the commander of the Western Front for help, but G. K. Zhukov replied that no help should be expected in the near future. On January 24, the forward units of the 24th Panzer Corps established contact with the encircled troops.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, fearing a new blow from the Sukhini region, urgently transferred the headquarters of the 16th army of General K.K. Rokossovsky there in order to receive the troops stationed there and restore the situation. General F. I. Golikov, who had not distinguished himself in any way before, handed over command to General V. S. Popov and departed as commander of the 4th shock army to the Kalinin Front. The commander of the 324th Infantry Division, General N. I. Kiryukhin, reported to K. K. Rokossovsky:

“We surrounded them, you know, with flags. There are no forces for a competent environment. I am afraid that I myself will not be in a trap.

As a result of the successfully developing offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow, conditions were created for the deployment of a general offensive of the Red Army on most of the Soviet-German front.

At the end of this chapter, I would like to try to dispel one more of the myths of the Great Patriotic War, connected with the role of General A. A. Vlasov in the battle near Moscow in December 1941.

Yes, he was appointed commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front, which led the offensive in the direction of Solnechnogorsk, Volokolamsk and liberated a number of cities. But Vlasov personally to these military affairs is practically
had no relationship.

A. A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 20th Army, which was in a hundred formations, on November 20, 41, but did not take command for the reason that at that time he was in the hospital, where he treated inflammation of the 12th middle ear. Initially, the doctors believed that the army could be completed before November 26, but they were wrong. Vlasov continued to get sick on December 4, 1941, when the concentration of troops ended, and on December 6, when the army received the order to advance on Solnechnogorsk. it was his army and December 10, when the troops went to the beige Vekshigino - Nikolskoye. True, the Central Zetas reported on December 13 that "the troops of General Vlav, pursuing the 2nd Panzer and 106th Infantry Divisions of the Yutivnik, occupied the city of Solnechnogorsk." But Solnech Zhgorsk was also taken on December 12, 1941 without Vlasov. . Confirmation of this can be found in the memoirs of the Chief of Staff of the 20th Army, Major General L. M. Sandalov. WHI, in particular, he writes:

"At noon on December 19, an army command post began deploying in Chismeny. When Kulikov, a member of the Voy Council, and I were clarifying the last possible arrival of the troops at the communication center, the adjutant of the commander entered there and reported to us about his arrival. Through the window it was visible how a tall Yeral in dark glasses got out of the car that had started up near the house. He was wearing a fur coat with a collar removed, he was shod in cloaks. It was the cephal Vlasov. He went to the communication center, and here the first meeting with him took place.

"Showing the position of the troops on the map, I reported that the Manding of the Front was very dissatisfied with the slow movement of the Front and to help us threw a group of Katukov from the 16th Army to Voloko Msk. Kulikov supplemented \ the report with a message that Army General Zhukov indicated a passive role in commanding the troops of the army commander and required his personal signature on operational

"In silence, frowning, Vlasov listened to all this. Several

once asked us again, referring to the fact that due to illness

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to 263

his ears are hard of hearing. Then, with a gloomy look, I will grumble to us that I feel better, and in a day or two, take control of the army completely into my own hands. After this conversation, he immediately went to the army headquarters in a car that was waiting for him, which moved to Nudol-Shari_no.

On December 20, Volokolamsk was liberated.

The successes of the Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow put General A. A. Vlasov among the heroes. On the occasion of the New Year, he received gifts from the military

Western Front: 500 grams of caviar, a kilogram of salmon. several boxes of chocolates and chocolate bars, cognac, wine, apples, a sweater, underwear, warm socks and more.

On December 31, 1941, the newspaper Izvestia published an article on the front page entitled "The failure of the German plan to encircle and capture Moscow." At the bottom were placed photographs of nine distinguished generals, among which a photograph of General Vlasov was placed in the bottom row. For the successful control of the troops of the 20th Army in the hall of the counteroffensive on January 6, 1942, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. On February 11, 1942, A. A. Vlasov was awarded a personal audience with I. V. Stalin, which lasted from up to 23 hours 25 minutes (1 hour 10 minutes!). And finally, on February 22, he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Offering this brief information about the "contribution" of A. A. Vlasov to the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 of the year, I do not at all pursue the goal of once again "butting" the person who, shortly after these historical events, having changed his oath, went over to the side of the enemy. Quite a lot and truthfully written about Vlasov by other authors.

I want to draw the reader's attention to something completely different: during the victory euphoria, and at the end of December 1941, she certainly hovered over the Kremlin, the top leadership of the country and the Red Army, when assessing personal merits! each military leader often relied not on the horse"

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the bottom of the proven facts, but on their own sentiments. As a result of this, the lists of winners turned out to be itza, which had practically nothing to do with fleurance victories. At the end of 1941, this happened to KA. A. Vlasov, and subsequently repeated MYUS with other people more than once. And then these people, who did not possess the qualities artificially ascribed to them, received

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high positions and "filled up" the affairs entrusted to them,

paying for "mistakes of leadership" by thousands of people

some lives.

THROUGH THE JANUARY BLINDERS

By the end of December 1941, the Soviet command

succeeded in averting the enormous danger hanging over the Soviet capital and pushing back the German troops in separate directions up to 250 kilometers. By this time, in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, in particular, near Tikhvin and Rostov, Soviet troops also achieved some success. Fear for Moscow receded a little. Schools, cinemas, theaters reopened in the capital, and the mood of Muscovites improved somewhat.

The Soviet soldiers, elated by their successes, although they came at a high price, finally felt their superiority over the enemy. I. V. Stalin tried to use this. However, he, like A. Hitler, overestimated the combat effectiveness of his troops and underestimated the strength of the resistance of the German formations. J. V. Stalin did not heed the opinions of the front commanders, who were daily compelled to note that the German formations, out of fear of being cut off and surrounded, were fighting not for life but for death, and that, having strengthened themselves in their defensive positions, they were able to provide more stubborn resistance. In addition, the front commanders repeatedly reported to Headquarters 0 the poor supply of their troops with people and equipment, as well as difficulties in command and control. But the Kremlin, while sewing its own plans, did not want to listen to their opinion.

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V. The operational plan of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was that the forces of the Bryansk Front on M

take a blow in the direction of Orel and bypass the enemy mon Bolkhova from the north. Western front should

to form a huge cauldron in which the main forces of Army Group Center could be destroyed.

>. In order to dismember the grouping in this cauldron, the 20th Army received the task of breaking through the German defenses on the right flank of the Western Front, in the Voloko-Eamsk region, and advancing in the direction of [Zhatsk. At this time, the Kalinin Front with one of its groupings was to strike at the enemy in the Rzhev region, and the other - to move to Vyazma in order to link up with the troops of the Western Front there. At the same time, this grouping over

to the m front to conduct an offensive through Toropets, Velizh No. Rudny to cut off the enemy's escape route west No Smolensk.

On January 5, 1942, I.V. Stalin convened a Military

council to discuss a plan for further operations against the Germans.
He believed that, despite the losses,

and, and

And. But the German command is also not about YOS easily give their positions. On January 2, 1942, G. von Klu-No. gave the order to the 9th Army, despite the threat of enveloping it; 'flanks, do not retreat a single step back. TO; At that time, the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front managed to break through

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below Rzhev and threaten the capture of Sychevka. Seeing this and anticipating a catastrophe, the commander of the 27th Army Corps of the 9th Army, Lieutenant General E. von Gablen Z, who was very worried about the defeat of his troops, no longer able to fulfill the Fuhrer's order, filed a report on his removal from office.

But Hitler continued to demand decisive action from H. von Kluge, primarily on the right flank of Army Group Center, whose troops were closest to Moscow. To achieve this goal, the commander of Army Group Center ordered the strengthening of the 4th Panzer Army (on January 1, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were renamed tank armies) by the 20th Army Corps.

But General Goepner could no longer stop the withdrawal of his troops. On January 8, the Soviet troops, turning to Vereya, cut off the communications of the 20th Army Corps and created a threat to its encirclement. Hoepner asked for permission to withdraw. G. von Kluge did not dare to give such an order and called F. Halder. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, in turn, decided to turn to Hitler. But he was slow to respond.

At this time, Kluge ordered Hoepner to detach part of the forces from the 4th Panzer Army to transfer them to the 4th Army zone, which was operating much to the south. Based on this, Göpner realized that the issue of the withdrawal of his tank army had already been resolved. Just in case, he tried to contact G[alder] personally, but all attempts were unsuccessful. Then he independently decided to begin the withdrawal of the 20th Corps in the evening in order to reduce the front of defense. At about 7 p.m., he reported his decision to Kluge, but the commander of the Army Group Center declared that he could not approve his order without permission from above, at the same time reporting this to Hitler. At 11:35 p.m. Hoepner was informed that the Führer was immediately removing him from office.

In connection with this incident, F. Halder wrote in his Military Diary: "Kluge reports that Goepner, on his own initiative, gave the order to withdraw, without

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Attack of the Soviet cavalry

this to the knowledge of the command of the army group. The Führer
"immediately issues his usual order to expel Hoepner from the army, with all
the ensuing consequences."

'In fact, only the right to carry the uniform remained for Göpner. But there
were no criminal cases against him.

The new commander of the 4th Panzer Army was Richard Ruoff, who
had previously been commander of the 5th Army Corps. At the same time
there was

Tier decided to give carte blanche to the new command of the 4th Nc Army
and allowed it to withdraw to a new line. `At this time, south of Moscow, the
2nd Army, after

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Hitler decided to transfer the 2nd Army (without the 35th Army Corps) to the
command of Army Group South.

The transfer of troops from one headquarters to another is always associated
with certain difficulties and threatens with a temporary loss of control. Such a
situation developed at the junction of the 2nd field and 2nd tank armies.

As part of a general offensive on all fronts, on January 8, 1942, the Rzhev-
Vyazemskaya and Sychevsko-Vyazemskaya offensive operations were carried
out.

The Sychevsko-Vyazemsky operation was carried out by the troops of the Kalinin Front. Going on the offensive on January 8. they, with a common front of 280 kilometers, having concentrated their efforts in a zone of 85 kilometers, broke through the enemy defenses and advanced 80-90 kilometers.

As a result of the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the Western direction in January-April 1942, the enemy was thrown back another 60-150 kilometers from the defensive line, which he occupied by the beginning of January. Soviet troops reached the line Kholm, Velizh, Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Kirov, where they went over to the defensive.

At the final stage of the battle near Moscow, in order to complete the encirclement of the enemy grouping, by decision of the Headquarters of the GVK, the Vyazemsky airborne operation was carried out by the forces of the 4th airborne corps, which on January 27, 1942 began landing 30 kilometers southwest of Vyazma. But the concentration of the 4th Airborne Corps in the initial area for landing was carried out in the presence of major miscalculations and shortcomings. So, the plan was drawn up without the participation of the headquarters of the Western Front, which led to miscalculations in the timing of the transportation of the corps to Kaluga. Sufficiently accurate measures to ensure the secrecy of transportation were not taken. The preparation of the airborne operation was carried out with an acute shortage of time, means of landing, air and anti-aircraft cover, and the Soviet command had no experience of such actions.

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Meeting the liberator

Irovki flight crew was thrown into another area, also scattered within a radius of 20 to 25 kilometers. The collection of the train was extremely slow. By the morning

and skis dropped by parachute could not be found. It was also not possible to establish a connection between the forward detachment and the main forces of the brigade. Despite this, the commander of the forward detachment succeeded in capturing the indicated area, where on the night of January 28 more than 1,500 people were thrown out.

Subsequently, due to a number of circumstances, primarily the lack of aviation, the landing of the remaining parts of the corps was suspended. Therefore, the 8th airborne brigade was unable to fulfill the task assigned to it and switched to actions according to an independent plan.

In the second half of February, the 4th Airborne Corps received a new combat mission. However, when preparing

The same mistakes were made in the execution of the operation as before. The landing began on 18 February. But of the 20 aircraft that took off on the first flight, not one of them completed the task, since there were too many fires on the ground and it was difficult to establish which one is the reference. On the second flight, you flew 18 aircraft, but only 7 of them completed the task. Nevertheless, by February 23, 7373 people were landed behind enemy lines and 1525 bags with weapons, ammunition and various property were thrown out.

On the night of February 23, the command and headquarters of the 4th Airborne Corps landed. But at this time, the plane, on which the corps command was located, was attacked by enemy fighters. The corps commander, Major General A.F. Levashov, was killed. The command was taken over by the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel A.F. Kazankin.

And again, the collection of personnel after the landing was carried out extremely slowly. Four days later, only about half of the people were gathered, and a lot of weapons, ammunition and other property were lost.

On the night of February 24, the corps began to carry out the assigned combat mission. But the promised support

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German soldiers captured during the counter-offensive near Moscow

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December 1941

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there were no air strikes and artillery fire from the corps. Therefore, significant progress has not been achieved. Despite this, as a result of the February battles, parts of the corps were still able to reach the line where they were supposed to meet with the troops of the 50th Army. But the army was unable to break the resistance of the enemy and reach the connection to the corps in time. The corps went over to the defense of the occupied line, which it defended for more than a month.

April 12 Commander of the Western Front

gave the order to the corps commander to go on the offensive in order to reach the troops of the 50th Army. The offensive began on April 14, but was not successful. On the morning of May 24, the enemy went on the offensive. The corps began to retreat and on May 30 went to the location of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Thus, the Vyazemskaya airborne operation became the first combat experience of the use of an operational airborne assault by the Soviet command. The command of the Airborne Forces undertook the impossible task of preparing for the landing of troops, having no funds for this and not knowing the operational situation and the plan of the offensive operation of the front. It did not carry out proper preparation and airborne assault. did not ensure its survivability. As a result of all this, the planned operation did not achieve its goals.

Despite this, the counteroffensive and the general offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow was highly appreciated by historians. In the fundamental scientific work "The Defeat of the German-Fascist Troops near Moscow", published in 1964 under the editorship of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. values." At the same time, referring to F. Halder, it is said that from September 30, 1941 to February 28, 1942, the losses of German troops amounted to about half a million people. The checkmate was also high<"

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"real losses of German troops. Only one 4th field army in these battles lost more than 40 heavy howitzers, 45 150-mm and 100-mm guns, more than 70 assault guns, 28 mortars, 230 tractors. About the same The situation was also observed in other armies. Of course, "These were tangible losses for Germany, which, after them, found it increasingly difficult to achieve new victories over

, „Red Army.

COMMANDERS OF THE WEHRMACHT

All the top German military leaders who participated in the battle for Moscow had a good military education and many years of combat experience in the First and Second World Wars. On their account was the development and conduct of a number of successful offensive operations in close cooperation with various branches of the armed forces. Almost all of them had experience of serving in large military headquarters, they knew and understood the importance of careful staff work in preparation for and during operations. Without exaggeration

we can say that these people represented the color of the world military caste, which managed to be preserved in the conditions of Germany.

At the same time, a number of German generals were secretly or openly in opposition to Hitler and the fascist regime, which left a certain imprint on their military activities and personal fate. Some of them were relieved of their positions, far from fully realizing their potential as a military leader. Others, being forced to combine personal dissatisfaction with Hitler's orders, played a double game, which also had a negative effect on the effectiveness of operations and battles, including during the period of hostilities in the Moscow area.

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Brauchitsch Walter

The leading role in the operations of the Wehrmacht troops in the Moscow region was played by the German ground forces, whose commander-in-chief was Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, the last professional soldier in this post in the German army during the Second World War .

, W. von Brauchitsch was born in 1881 in Berlin into a family 'Prussian cavalry general. He began his civil service with a career as a page at the imperial court. In military service since 1898. In 1900, W. Brauhich passed the exams and received the first officer rank of lieutenant. In the next 14 years, serving in the artillery,

He went through a number of staff posts at the tactical level of 'administration, graduated from the military academy, and in 1912 'was assigned to the service of the General Staff.

. Member of the First World War. He started it at the headquarters of the army with the rank of captain. During the war years he also served in the divisional and corps headquarters. He finished the war with the rank of major, was awarded one of the highest awards of the Imperial Army - the Order of the House of Hohenzollern.

\ Between 1919 and 1933, W. von Brauchitsch held command and staff positions in the Reichswehr. Since 1933, commander of the troops of the 1st military district (East Prussia), 1st army corps. From the beginning of 1938 - 'commander of the 4th Army Group, General Artillerie' On January 26, 1938, Field Marshal W. von Blomberg was relieved of the post of Minister of War In view of the fact that it became known that he had married a prostitute. This post was assumed by A. Hitler. On February 4 of the same year, V. von Brauchitsch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces with promotion to the rank of Colonel General. Led the occupation

: Austria, the capture of Czechoslovakia and military operations against Poland. Moreover, the operation against Wormwood was "Mastol well designed and was so successful,

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that did not require anyone's intervention, including A. Hitler. Since 1940 - Field Marshal.

An active participant in the development of a war plan against the USSR. In dealing with Hitler and other senior officials of the Third Reich, he never questioned the thesis of the need to attack the USSR, despite the fact that all three commanders of the army groups were opposed to a war on two fronts. Brauchitsch replied that he shared their fears, but was unable to change anything.

With the beginning of the aggression against the Soviet Union, W. von Brauchitsch formally controlled all the ground forces, although A. Hitler repeatedly, starting from June 25. directly gave orders to the commanders of army groups, bypassing the General Staff of the ground forces. After the defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, he joined the ranks of those military leaders who insisted on an immediate advance on Moscow. A. Hitler accused V. Brauchitsch of being too easily influenced by the commanders of army groups, and insisted on carrying out an operation to encircle the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Kiev area. This operation, which ended successfully, gave a new reason for dissatisfaction with the Field Marshal General from A. Hitler and his inner circle.

But then A. Hitler nevertheless succumbed to the persistent proposals of V. von Brauchitsch and other generals to start an autumn offensive against Moscow, despite the wear of the engines and chassis of the tanks, heavy losses and fatigue of the personnel, the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht to conduct large-scale operations in the conditions of the autumn off-road and harsh winter.

On the way to Moscow, the German troops ran into ever-increasing opposition from the Soviet troops. A. Hitler constantly reproached W. von Brauchitsch for all military failures. On November 10, after another conversation with the Fuhrer, he had his first heart attack. A week later, he returned to his official duties, but only to learn about new failures in the offensive of the troops of Army Group Center.

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On December 5, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow began, and on December 6, V. von Brauchitsch submitted a letter of resignation. A. Hitler did not want to accept it, claiming

But it is impossible to replace the commanders-in-chief of the land arena at such a crucial moment.

December 16, when in a number of operational areas The German troops had already been forced to retreat, A. Gietwer was informed that V. von Brauchitsch and his head of the Ugtaba secretly from the Fuhrer were discussing a plan for retreat and establishing a winter front line at a considerable distance from Moscow. The Fuhrer was furious. A few days later W. von Brauchitsch was relieved of his post. The main blame for the defeat of the German troops near Moscow was assigned to him. - / Nevertheless, there were no reprisals against the retired general - field marshal. He lived comfortably in private on his estate in Schleswing-Holstein. In 1945 he was arrested by American troops. He was held in a Münster prison. In 1949, he was to appear before a British military court as a war criminal, but on October 18, without waiting for p, he died in a prisoner of war hospital.

„... E. von Manstein in the book "Lost Victories" pi diets: b. "The future Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was a very amiable general. True, during the inspection and military trips of the officers [of the General Staff, in which I acted under the leadership of Generals Baron von Merstein and Adam, he showed himself not to the same extent as Generals Baron von Fritsch, Beck, von Rundstedt, von river von Leeb, but it could, in any case,

As for his character, his nobility is beyond eats doubt. It is also impossible to deny that he had the strength of Yulia, although, according to my impressions, her manifestations were rather negative in nature, for she poured into

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some stubbornness, and was not constructive. He was more willing to listen to other people's decisions, instead of what. accept them and work towards their implementation. Sometimes he apparently avoided taking them in order to avoid a struggle for which he did not consider himself prepared. Brauchitsch boldly defended the interests of the army on many occasions, for example, when he pressed Hitler for the public rehabilitation of Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, although he knew that this would incur Hitler's displeasure. The order for the army, which he gave in connection with the death of von Fritsch, was a sign of courage. But in the proper sense of the word, he could not be called a fighter. To exert all his strength to implement his decision was not his element. In any case, Colonel General Beck once bitterly said to the MNS. that during the Czechoslovakian crisis Brauchitsch defended the point of view of the OKH without much energy and left Beck to lead the fight himself. On the other hand, however, those who reproach von Brauchitsch for indecisiveness in raising the question of the violent overthrow of Hitler, how

For example, the former ambassador to Rome von Hassel, it is necessary to answer the following: it is quite another matter to hatch, as is typical for political figures, plans for a coup d'état at the desk, without feeling any responsibility for oneself (as Herr von Hassel once did), how, being at the head of the army, to carry out such a coup, leading in peacetime to the danger of a fratricidal war, and in time of war - to the victory of an external enemy.

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, an elegant man of a distinctly aristocratic type, behaved very dignifiedly. He was correct and polite, even amiable, although his amiability did not impress his interlocutor with a warm attitude. Just like his appearance, nothing resembled a fighter inspiring respect or at least caution to his opponent, so it was impossible to detect energy capable of captivating her? everyone, and a creative beginning. He produced in general.

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, the impression of a cold and reserved person. Often it seemed that he was somehow constrained; he was certainly very scrupulous. By these qualities of his character, he won authority from his closest subordinates, who respected him as a "gentleman", ::, but they were not enough to ensure him the complete "confidence of the troops, which such a man as a general had" Neral Colonel Baron von Fritsch; it was also difficult for a man like Tytler to impress him. It is true that "General von Seeckt was even colder in manner and even impregnable, but everyone felt the inner 3 } FIRE that raged in this man, the iron will that made him "master." Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was not endowed with these character traits; he also did not have that immediacy of a soldier, which helped this predecessor, Colonel-General Baron von Fritsch, not to mention his great military ability, to win the hearts of the soldiers. h If we now turn to the relationship between . 'Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and Hitler, I am convinced . That the field marshal had exhausted his forces in the fight against this go-; a strong-willed person for everything. His inclinations, origin and upbringing did not allow him to fight this man with the same weapons that Hitler, while in office as head of state, used without hesitation.

Brau-. kitsch suppressed his discontent and indignation in himself, especially since he was inferior to Hitler in a verbal duel. He sapped his inner strength until Wynn's heart disease finally forced him to resign, which Gitper came in very handy.

In ori, the commander-in-chief, became not only the head of the State, but also the direct head of all military

Neither

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forces, he dealt the last blow to the army, although, apparently, Hitler would have taken this step even without Blomberg's proposal

But, above all, it is important that by the time Brauchitsch took office, Hitler began to take a completely different position in relation to the army and, above all, to the OKH, than in previous years. In the first period after coming to power, Hitler, of course, still showed a sense of respect for the military leaders and appreciated their authority. He retained this attitude towards Field Marshal von Rundstedt to the end, although during the war he twice

removed him from his post.

Thus, it is clear that Colonel-General W. von Brauchitsch was in a difficult position from the very beginning in his relations with Hitler. A fatal role, in addition, was undoubtedly played by the fact that, upon taking office, he agreed to a number of changes in the higher cadres of the army, in particular, to the completely unjustified resignation of the generals who had great merit and to the appointment of the head of the personnel department of the ground forces by his brother General Keitel. This meant Brauchitsch's first step towards the abyss" (Manstein. E. Lost Victories. - P. 77-79).

Halder Franz

The development of all operations of the Wehrmacht, which were carried out within the framework of the Moscow battle, was led by the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Mr. Neral-Colonel F. Halder.

Franz Halder was born in 1884 into a hereditary military family that for 300 years supplied soldiers for German princes, kings and kaisers. In military service since 1902, having entered the Bavarian artillery regiment "Mother Queen". In 1914 he graduated from the Bavarian military academy. He was sent to headquarters work. Member of the First World War. During this time

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I went through all the levels of the staff service - from the division to the army troupe. After the war, he remained in the service of the Reichswehr. He held the positions of a teacher of tactics at the headquarters of the 9th military district (Munich), an employee of the Combat Training Department of the Ministry of the Reichswehr. With coming to power

fascists began to actively cooperate with this regime. Subsequently, he served in the positions of chief of the headquarters of the 6th military district (Munster), commander of the 7th Bavarian division, 2nd, then 1st chief quartermaster of the Tenth headquarters, who led the combat training of the ground forces. On August 27, 1938, he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces instead of the dismissed General L. Beck. (On this day, A. Hitler became the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Germany.) Colonel General. After the removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Brauchitsch in December 1941, he began to report directly to A. Hitler.

After the failure of the blitzkrieg plan to enter the USSR on September 24, 1942, he was dismissed. At the beginning of 1943 he moved from Berlin to Aachen, taking with him all the notebooks of the diary. At the end of 1943, the fascist elite behind the scenes held a public trial of Halder, blaming him for the defeats of the German troops in 1941-1942. On July 23 he was arrested. But the trial, due to the lack of direct evidence of the general's guilt, was clearly frustrated. On April 28, 1945, he was captured in one of the camps in South Tyrol by American troops; in June 1945, Halder handed over his diary to the Americans, who sent it to the central archive of documents of the Nuremberg Court. On the instructions of the historical department of the US Army in Europe, together with Generals Zeitzler, Guderian, Heusinger, Speidel, G. Kreipe and others, he worked on summarizing the experience of the war against the Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1949, he published a brochure "Hitler as a commander", in which all the blame for

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the defeat of Germany blames on A. Hitler. In 1950, the "Halder Workers Headquarters" was created, and in the same year the "Halder Plan" for the re-establishment of the [Germany] Armed Forces was presented to the Bonn government. Under his leadership, the first post-war strategic plan for the war against the USSR was drawn up. At the same time, he works as a consultant at the War Ministry of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and at the NATO command. In 1962-1964, Halder's War Diary was published in Germany in three volumes. In 1961 he was awarded the American Order of Valor.

E. von Manstein in the book "Lost Victories" p. 10
shet:

"The second person who, after the resignation of Beck, came out against Hitler as an important figure in the OKH, was the future Colonel-General Halder, who, in regard to his military abilities, was a worthy assistant to Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch. In any case, they experienced each other in their joint

activities full confidence. It seems to me that Brauchitsch always agreed with Halder's proposals to carry out operations not out of duty, but out of conviction. Like most of the officers who came out of the Bavarian General Staff, Halder knew perfectly well the work of the various departments [of the General Staff. He was a tireless worker. Moltke's words "genius is diligence" obviously served as his motto. The sacred fire, which should inspire a real commander, however, hardly burned in him. His sense of great responsibility is evidenced by the fact that, before the Russian campaign, he instructed the head of the 1st Directorate, General Paulus, and the chiefs of staff of the army groups to develop a plan of operations. But the main concept of the campaign plan should, apparently, be born in the head of that one. who will lead it. Halder lacked von Brauchitsch's subtlety. Halder's statements differed PR "" efficiently businesslike character. I myself witnessed the persistence with which he defended his point of view

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'before Hitler. At the same time, it was very revealing how ardently Halder advocated the interests of the troops, how keenly he experienced together with them the wrong decisions imposed on him. But sober efficiency alone was not a quality that could impress Hitler. The hot love of Charmia made no impression on him.

"Halder, in my opinion, suffered in the end, because of the duality of his aspirations. When he became Beck's successor, he was already a clear enemy of Hitler. According to Walther Görnitz ("German General Staff"), Halder, on taking office, told General Molkovnik von Brauchitsch that he was doing this only to fight against Hitler's military policy. and on the available information, he more than once cherished plans for

fenia of Hitler, no matter how things were with the practical

July of the time when Hitler took over the command of the land forces. Maybe a politician is able to play the dual role of a responsible council

the chief of the General Staff would be an insoluble problem. The duty of Halder, as the head of General 8 Gab, was to provide with all his might 4 6% of the du army, for the leadership of which, and consequently, for the success of the plans of his commander, he, along with others, was responsible. In his second role, however, Vne could have desired this victory. Can't be subject to any

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there is no doubt that Colonel General Halder once resolved this dilemma by deciding in favor of his military duty, and did his best to faithfully serve the German army in this difficult struggle. On the other hand, his second role required him to remain at his post under any circumstances, with the aim, he hoped, to keep the opportunity in one! perfect day to overthrow Hitler. To do this, however, he was forced to obey his decisions in the field of waging WAR AND in those cases when he did not agree with them. He remained in this post primarily because he believed that his waiting tactics as Chief [of the General Staff] would save the army from the consequences of Hitler's military mistakes. But for this he was forced to pay the price of carrying out Hitler's orders, with which, in his military convictions, he could not agree. This contradiction was to undermine his inner strength and, finally, lead him to collapse. It is only clear that Colonel-General Halder remained as chief of the General Staff for so long in the interests of the cause, and not in his own interests "(Manstein E. Lost Victories. - P. 82-83).

Bok Fedor

The commander of Army Group Center, which fought in the Moscow direction, from June 22 to December 16, 1941, was Field Marshal Fedor von Bock.

Bock Fedor was born in the family of a prominent Prussian general in 1880 and by the beginning of the Second World War he had already come to a mature 59-year-old military leader. He entered the military service back in 1898, since 1910 he was an officer of the General Staff, participated in the First World War, which he graduated with the rank of major. After the war, he was Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of Germany, was Chief of Staff and Command"

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large formations and associations of land

, Although F. von Bock was not a Nazi (however, as well as a shatinatist). he wholeheartedly supported Hitler's military policy. At the same time, the Fuhrer's domestic and foreign policy did not care much for him. He commanded in good faith the German occupation forces stationed in Austria, and later commanded the army group headquartered in Berlin.

,One of his contemporaries, who knew F. fon well

in wrote the following about him: "His mind was deaf to everything except the very immediate consequences of "serving the trout". The Prussian spirit of Friedrich's leaven was deeply embedded in his character. He was a fierce nationalist, my new lover of order, who was exclusively concerned with strengthening the army and developing his own military career. Moreover, he was distinguished rather by perseverance and determination than by talent. During the field

By September 17, General G. Guderian's innocence took possession of Vrest. These actions, although not met with serious

\ lashed out at the authority of the commander, who chalked into the clip of the best German military leaders of that

mYumu of the troops of the Western Front east of Minsk, withdrew

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and were called and almost immediately took possession of Smolensk.

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"Center". In mid-January 1942, a commander was appointed. blowing Army Group "South". Carried out the encirclement and defeat of Soviet troops near Kharkov.

After that, he was appointed commander of Army Group B, which was supposed to lead an offensive on the Volga. But Hitler was dissatisfied with the slowness of the advance of the troops of this army group. On July 15, F. von Bock was removed from command and enrolled in the Fuhrer's reserve. He didn't need it anymore.

In 1945, when Soviet troops were already on the outskirts of Berlin, he was called to form a new association. On May 4, his car came under fire from a British bomber. F. von Bock died. He became the only one of the German field marshals who fell from an enemy bullet. He was 64 years old (Mitchel S. Field Marshals of Tytler and their battles. - M. Smolensk. 1998. - S. 203-2004).

Kluge Hans

After the removal of F. von Bock from the command of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Hans Ponter von Kluge, who had previously commanded the 4th field army advancing on Moscow from Smolensk and Vyazma, was appointed to this position.

G. von Kluge was born in Poznan (Prussia) on October 30, 1882. After completing his studies at a military school, he enters the service of the imperial army and in 1901 will receive the rank of second lieutenant. In 1912 he graduated from the military academy, where he received training through the service of the General Staff.

Member of the First World War. He commanded a battalion, was a representative of the General Staff at the headquarters of the infantry division and the Alpine Corps. [Rini took part in the battles on the Western Front, was wounded. "Captain. He has proven himself to be a good staff officer with a pen.

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> After the war, he was left in the service of the Reichswehr. He worked in the Ministry of Defense, was a battalion commander, chief of staff of a cavalry division, and commander of an artillery regiment. Since 1933 - inspector of the signal troops, major general. Since 1934 - command

ortiy military district in Münster, lieutenant general. 7 7 1936 - General of Artillery.

—. At the same time, H. von Kluge was a supporter of the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, W. von Fritsch, who was removed from his post in February 1938 on the basis of accusations of homosexuality. In mid-1938, he was also dismissed. But in connection with the approach of the war, A. Hitler ordered the return of von Kluge to the army, and he was appointed commander of the newly created 6th Army Group.

During the Second World War, during the attack on Poland, he commanded the 4th Army. This army cut the Polish corridor in three days, and then paved the way for Warsaw from the northwest. This campaign raised Kluge's standing in Hitler's eyes. Colonel General.

| Yo When the French army was defeated on the Western Front, the Go army operated in the main direction, where the French

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field marshals.

) 'On the Soviet-German front, General G. von Kluge Zhomandoval 4th field army. His army participated in the Encirclement and captivity of the 10th Soviet Army near Minkom. Participated in the battle near Smolensk.

Ire spoke out as an opponent of a decisive offensive

And / ia to Moscow. But F. von Bock ordered him to take over the 4th Army, on which acted

attack pace. 1. On

December 25, he replaced F. von Bock as commander-in-chief of the Army Group Center. In this capacity, he began

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to take revenge on those generals who had previously criticized his actions. General G. Guderian was the first to achieve the removal of General G. Guderian, then the commander of the 4th Army, General L. Kübler, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Hoepner, and the commander of the 9th Army, General A. Strauss, were removed.

In 1942, the troops of Army Group Center fought local battles. As victories on their account were the defeat of the formations of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the General of the HRC. A. Belova near Kirov, Kaluga region, the defeat of the troops of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps near the city of Bely, the disruption of the Soviet offensive near Rzhev.

In 1944, Hitler appointed Field Marshal H. von Kluge as commander-in-chief of the troops on the Western Front, where the Anglo-American army inflicted a number of defeats on the Germans. Assuming command of the German troops in the West, Kluge developed and successfully carried out the Ardennes Offensive, which resulted in a serious defeat for the Allies.

Field Marshal H. von Kluge was connected with the participants in the conspiracy against Hitler, but at the decisive moment he did not support them. Later, one of the biographers of the Wehrmacht commanders wrote that Kluge was a Prussian officer - an adherent of the traditions of the military caste, who had significant abilities in his chosen field of activity. But he was also distinguished by an indecisive character and opportunism, bordering on weakness of will. With his penetrating mind, Kluge understood the enormity of the Nazi regime, but at the same time he saw significant personal and professional benefits from cooperation with him. Throughout World War II, he knew he should join the anti-Hitler plot, but wavered between duty and personal gain. Until the end, he never made a final decision. For this double game, get the "sly fox" nickname.

, After the failed plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944, he helped part of the conspirators escape, after which he sent a letter to the Fuhrer, in which he called the conspirators "ruthless killers" and assured Hitler of his "unfailing loyalty." But the arrested conspirators named Kluge among their accomplices. A. Hitler immediately "did not take any repressive measures against Kluge, but made it clear that he no longer trusted him as before.

d In July 1944, H. von Kluge was unable to prevent an Allied landing in Normandy. He removed a number of German military commanders from their positions, but the situation did not get any better. Hitler ordered him to counterattack the enemy and throw him into the sea. But this task failed.

K. On August 15, G. von Kluge left his headquarters for the troops and disappeared for 12 hours. He later stated that on the way he suffered from allied air strikes, and the truck with the radio station was destroyed. But A. Hitler did not believe the field marshal, deciding that Kluge was trying to establish contact with the allies. On August 1, Field-General Marshal V. Model arrived with an order to accept the post of commander in chief.

o Having handed over the post, H. von Kluge on August 19 went home to [Germany]. Driving through Menz, where he fought during the First World War, Kluge got out of the car, spread out a blanket, lay down on it and swallowed a pool with calcium cyanide. Later, a suicide note was found in his pocket, in which he wrote:

l. "My Fuehrer.

and I have always admired your greatness and your glands, my will ... And if your fate turns out to be stronger than both your Will and your genius, it is only because this is not enough for Providence. You fought a wonderful and worthy battle. History will be a witness to this ... I leave you, My Fuhrer, as one who was much closer to you than Threat, you might have thought, with consciousness to the end, fulfilled his duty.

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Hitler read this last letter of the Field Marshal without commenting on it. Then he ordered that G. von Kluge be buried quietly, without special military honors, but that the coffin be carried by the military. The official cause of his death was a cerebral hemorrhage (Mitch S. Field Marshals of Hitler and their battles. - S. 408-433).

Strauss Adolf

On the right wing of Army Group Center, in the Kalinin direction, the 9th German field army operated, which until mid-January 1942 was commanded by Colonel General Adolf Strauss, and then by Colonel General Walter Model.

A. Strauss was born in 1879. Since March 1898 in military service in the ground forces. Member of the First World War, officer. After the end of the war, he was left in the service of the Reichswehr. Chief of staff of an infantry regiment, since 1937 - inspector of infantry, and since 1935 - commander of an infantry division. Since 1938 - commander of the army corps.

For participation in the Polish (1939) and French (1940) campaigns he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. From July 1940 he was commander of the 9th Army, which was assigned the leading role in carrying out Operation Gelb, the invasion of the British Isles.

In the summer of 1941, the 9th Army was transferred to the Eastern Front, where it operated as part of Army Group Center. Carried out a number of successful operations against Soviet troops in the areas of Bialystok, Smolensk, Rzhev and Kalinin. However, in December 1941, his formations were so exhausted by the battles that they could no longer resist the rapid advance of the Red Army. Despite Hitler's categorical prohibition to retreat, A. Strauss gave the order to withdraw from their positions, thereby saving the lives of thousands of his soldiers and officers.

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_ In January 1942, by order of A. Hitler, he was dismissed. He led a private life. In January 1945 he was appointed to the post of commander of the fortified area "Vostok". In May 1945 he surrendered to the British. For some time he was kept in prison, then he was released. He returned to his homeland, lived in West Germany. Died in 1973.

Model Walter

V. Model was born on January 24, 1891 in the family of a music teacher. He entered the military service at the beginning of 1909, from 1910 in officer positions. Member of the First World War, fought on the Western Front. For his bravery he was awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class. Finished the war with the rank of captain.

' After the war, he served in the Reichswehr in various command positions. In 1929, according to the term of service, he was promoted to the rank of major. Within the framework of military cooperation between Germany and the USSR, V. Model as a talented specialist

the sheet was sent to the Soviet Union for the exchange of experience. In 1932, Model became a lieutenant colonel. In October 1934, already in the rank of colonel, he became commander of an infantry regiment, and in 1938 he was promoted to the rank of teneral major.

5. General Model began World War II as chief of staff of an army corps. After the completion of the Polish campaign, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army and transferred to the Western Front. In November 1940, V. Model received the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of a tank division, which was part of Army Group Center.

t During the attack on the USSR, the tank division of V. Model was distinguished already in the first battles. On the second day of the war, her tanks advanced 60 kilometers east of Brest, and on July 2 General Model's division was already in front of Roga Chev. On this day, V. Model received the Knight's Cross.

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It was V. Model who went to the forefront of G. Guderian's tank group, which engulfed the Kyiv grouping of Soviet troops from the north and, together with tank formations of the 1st tank group, ensured its encirclement and subsequent destruction.

In September 1941, General V. Model was appointed commander of a tank corps operating as part of the 3rd Panzer Group during the attack on Moscow. His units went to the upper reaches of the Volga.

In January 1942, Hitler appointed V. Model as commander of the 9th Army, which was on the defensive in the Rzhev area. Hitler believed that this energetic and determined general would stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. Model justified the confidence of the German high command. For almost a year, the troops of the Kalinin Front could not break through the defense front of the Model army. Walter Model became a colonel general, he reported: "The future battle bled the Russian divisions bled ...".

In the spring of 1943, the 9th Army of V. Model was transferred to Orel, where a major battle was planned in the Kursk region. The actions of his troops against the troops of the Soviet Central Front ended in failure. The army lost up to 20 thousand people without breaking through the defenses of the Soviet TROOPS.

During the counter-offensive of the Red Army, the troops of V. Model defended themselves staunchly. Hitler even praised him for the brilliant retreat and the low loss of life and

technique. During the retreat, the troops of V. Model used the "scorched earth tactics." They destroyed crops, cattle and even people were stolen. Everything that the Germans could not take was destroyed.

In January 1944, Field Marshal V. Model was appointed commander of Army Group North. He began to carry out operations based on a systematic retreat of troops, followed by powerful counterattacks, which were called "shield and me. The conduct of such operations was approved even by A. Hitler, who was opposed to retreats. ,

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April 2, 1944 V. Model took command

Group of armies "Northern Ukraine". Hitler hoped that Model would stop the rapid advance of the Soviet army in the Right-Bank Ukraine, but he could not complete THIS task. - On June 28, 1944, Hitler appointed Field Marshal V. Model as commander of Army Group Center. free of this, V. Model retained his post and commanded the army group "Northern Ukraine". During the entire war, the Hitler did not provide any commander with such extensive military powers. Model became famous as a master of digressions. Hitler put him on the threatened sectors of the front in order to restore the situation, and V. Model successfully achieved this. He showed amazing resourcefulness in battles, sometimes getting out into the most hopeless situations.

. Such a situation, in particular, developed on the Western front, where the American army, having defeated Field Marshal Kluge's Army Group B, was rapidly advancing deep into Germany. | August 7, 1944 V. Model replaced Kluge in the post of Army Group "B". From that day on, Model led the action of Army Group B and Army Group D on the Western Front. In his submission was also the army group p under the command of General Blaskowitz. B. The model could temporarily stabilize the Western Front, where the Anglo-American troops went on the defensive.

and "On December 16, 1944, the troops of V. Model went over to the offensive. The Americans were completely confused - > their disorderly retreat began. But this investment did not last long. The Model did not have reserves. This offensive did not last long, the Americans with their forces in the second half of January 1945 went on a counteroffensive. The troops of V. Model were ok

. On April 11, V. Model ordered the troops to cease resistance and announced the disbandment of his units. The soldiers were allowed to go home, and the encircled garrisons to surrender.

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During these battles, he himself, being an opponent of surrender, repeatedly went to the front line, hoping to be killed. But the bullets didn't take him. On April 21, 1945, Field Marshal Model shot himself at his headquarters in Dintorf.

Biographer S. Mitchell writes:

"A separate book should be written about his military campaigns. Model's military operations were the most successful compared to those of other Nazi generals. He was the one whom Hitler sent again and again into the weakest parts of his crumbling empire... He was an energetic man, fond of innovation and possessed undeniable personal courage. Model had a tendency to delve into all the little things and often interfered in the internal affairs of subdivisions subordinate to him, in matters that simply did not concern him. He was distinguished by warmth and friendliness with ordinary soldiers, and they loved him very much, but he was often harsh and cruel with officers. He could be very selfish and did not hesitate at times to "steal" units and subunits from other commanders."

Goth German

On the right flank of the 9th Army, the 3rd Panzer Group operated, which was initially commanded by Colonel General Herman Goth, and on October 8, 1941 by Colonel General Georg Hans Reinhardt.

G. Goth was born in 1885. Received a good military education, participated in the First World War. In the following he served in the Reichswehr in various command and staff positions. In the late 30s, specialists? zirovalsya in the service in the tank troops. Participated in the operations of German troops in Poland in 1939 and in 3 "western Europe in 1940. Since 1940, a regiment general!" nick Commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, which attacked Moscow, then commanded the 17th Field

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; (1941-1942) and the 4th tank armies (1942-1943). At the end of 1942, he carried out an unsuccessful offensive operation: with the aim of deblocking the German group, surrounded in the Stalingrad region. In 1943 he was dismissed by Hitler. from office and did not hold any other prominent positions. After the war, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison, but then this term was reduced. In the mid 50s

, was released. He settled in Gozlar, where he died in vain on January 25, 1971 at the age of 85.

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Reinhardt Georg

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„ After the appointment of G. Goth to a higher position commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, which was supposed to “envelop Moscow from the north, was appointed 'teneral-colonel Georg Hans Reinhardt.

I G. Reinhardt was born in 1887. In the army since March {1907. Member of the First World War. From 1920 to 1938, he held various positions in the ground forces, from 1939 - the commander of a tank division. Member of the Second World War. In battle in France. (1940) defeated the 41st corps and the 2nd armored division of the French. Since July 1940, the corps commander.

a From June 1941 on the Soviet-German front.

During the battle near Smolensk he defeated two

Psoviet corps, capturing more than 15 thousand Red Army

| Meytsev and commanders. However, in August 1941 the corps

"Reinhardt suffered heavy losses and was taken to the

| 'formation.

In October of the same year, G. Reinhardt was appointed

appointment to the post of commander of the 3rd tank group instead of

Peneral G. Gotha, who led the attack on Moscow,

Etremyaso cover this city from the north. In battles on

`In the eastern front 1941-1942. showed high org

Nizatorsky abilities and was considered one of the talents

s generals in the Wehrmacht. He repeatedly received awards and praise from the Supreme Chief

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command, and in May 1944 was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords by Hitler.

In August 1944, G. Reinhardt was appointed commander of Army Group Center. Surrendered to the Americans. Kept in jail. In October 1948, at the trial of the American military tribunal in the case of the high command of the Wehrmacht, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He was released in February 1952 and died in 1953.

Hoepner Erich

The 4th Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht operated in the offensive zone of the 4th Field Army, which until January 8, 1942 was commanded by Colonel General Erich Hoepner, and then by Colonel General Richard Ruoff.

E. Goepner was born on September 14, 1886. He began his military service in March 1905 as a Fanenjunker (candidate officer) in the 13th Schleswig-Holstein Dragoon Regiment. In August 1906 he was promoted to lieutenant. From October 1913 until the outbreak of the First World War, he studied at the military academy in Berlin. Since February 1914 - Lieutenant.

From the beginning of the war, he was a lieutenant officer at the headquarters of the 16th Army Corps. From June 1915 - captain (captain). Then he served in the headquarters of the corps-army level. He was awarded the Iron Crosses of both degrees and two more orders.

After the war, he continued to serve in the Reichswehr, in 1921-1923 in the War Ministry (in the inspection of the cavalry), then in the headquarters of the division level. Since 1930 - regiment commander (from February 1933 - colonel), since 1934 - chief of staff of the 1st Army Corps (Königsberg). Since January 1936, Major General. From November 1938 - commander of the 16th army corps (motorized), lieutenant general, from April 1939 - general of cavalry.

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Since 1935, he maintained contact with representatives of So

opposition in the Wehrmacht.

Participated in the Polish campaign of 1939. For the Polish campaign he was awarded the Knight's Cross. Participated in the invasion of France in 1940. After Fran

During the Puz campaign, he was promoted to colonel-general.

From February 1941 - commander of the 4th Panzer Group. In this capacity, he participated in the attack on Moscow. On January 8, 1942, he ignored Hitler's order to hold out to the last and made a tactical retreat, for which he was removed from the post of commander of the 4th Tank Army with the wording "for cowardice and disobedience to orders." Dismissed from the armed forces without the right to wear a military uniform and awards, as well as without the right to

pension.

, On July 20, 1944, Hoepner was arrested as a participant in a conspiracy against Hitler, on August 8, 1944, he was sentenced to death and hanged in the Plötzensee prison in Berlin.

Awards: Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class, Cross of the Royal Order of the House of Hohenzollern, Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (October 27, 1939) (Zalessky K. A. "Who was who in the Third Reich. - M.: AST, 2002. - 944 p.).

Ruoff Richard

“. In connection with the dismissal of E. Hoepner, General of the Infantry Richard Ruoff was appointed commander of the 4th Panzer Army. He was born on August 18, 1883 in Messbach. In April 1903, he entered the land war as a fanen-junker, in August 1904 he was promoted to lieutenant. Participant in the First World War. He was awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd for military distinctions class 1. "After the demobilization of the army, he remained in the Reichswehr.

< Since 1933 - Colonel Regiment Commander, since 1934 - Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Corps, since 1936 - Major General and Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army Group

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(Dresden), since 1938 - Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Group (Vienna).

The rapid ascent up the career ladder is associated with the coming to power of A. Hitler. In the summer of 1933 he was promoted to colonel and appointed commander of the regiment. From October of the same year - Chief of Staff of the 5th Group Command, from October 1934 - Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Corps, from October 1936 - Chief of Staff of the 3rd Command of the Ground Forces Group (Dresden). From April 1939 - commander of the 5th Army Corps and the 5th Military District (Stuttgart), General of the Infantry.

After the outbreak of World War II, he surrendered the district and went to the front at the head of the 5th Army Corps. During the Polish campaign, R. Ruoff's corps was part of Army Group C. Member of the French Campaign.

During the attack on the USSR, he continued to command the 5th Corps as part of the Army Group Center, participated in the battles near Bialystok, Minsk, in the Smolensk battle and the attack on Moscow. June 30, 1941 was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. On January 8, 1942 he was appointed commander of the 4th Panzer Army.

From June 1, 1942 - commander of the 17th Army of Army Group A, operating on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. In August 1942, the 3rd Romanian Army was transferred to his subordination. When, at the beginning of 1943, Soviet troops undertook a major operation in the Caucasus and Kuban with the aim of encircling R. Ruoff's grouping, on January 10 he ordered to leave strongholds in the Caucasus and went to the Kuban. As a result of this, his troops, although they suffered heavy losses, managed to avoid encirclement. After this defeat || July 1943 was replaced by General E. Jeneke and was not appointed until the end of the war.

Awards: Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class (1914) buckles to the Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, Order

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'military merit (Württemberg), Order of Friedrich (Württemberg), badge "For Wound" black (1918), Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (June 30, 1941).

. Died March 30, 1967 (aged 83). Place of death Tübingen.

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. Weichs Maximilian

. South of the 4th Field Army, the 2nd Field Army advanced on Moscow, inflicting the main blow on Bryansk and Orel.

This army was commanded until mid-November 1941 by Colonel General Maximilian Weichs, and then by Colonel General Rudolf Schmitt.

M. Weichs was born on November 12, 1881. From July 1900 in military service, since 1902 - in officer positions. In 1911 he graduated from the military academy in the line of training officers of the general staff. Member of the First World War, which he passed as an officer of the general staff at the headquarters of the infantry division and the army corps.

„ Was left in the ranks of the Reichswehr. From March 1930, commander of the cavalry regiment, colonel. In 1931-1932, "Weichs was in the 2nd Army Group, and since 1933 - commander of a cavalry division, then commander of the military district in Nuremberg, general of cavalry.

\ During the Polish campaign of 1939 - commander of an army corps. The corps took part in the encirclement of Poznan and Lodz, the defeat of the army "Primorye", on the march to Warsaw. After the end of the Polish campaign, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Army.

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„ Participated in hostilities in France for the second

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e ^ In the spring of 1941, t combat operations

its armies (four army corps, four infantry each, C |: e tank, one motorized and one mountainous division each) in Yugoslavia. In November 1941, he took over Zagreb. The whole operation lasted 12 days, during which

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The Germans lost 151 men killed and about 500 wounded. 254 thousand Yugoslavs were taken prisoner.

In the summer of 1941, the army of M. Weichs was transferred to the Soviet-German front and immediately entered into battle: it participated in the liquidation of the Bialystok pocket, into which the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western Front fell, as a result of which about 300 were taken prisoner. thousands of Red Army soldiers and captured more than 2,000 tanks; in the Battle of Gomel, during which 30 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were taken prisoner. Then, acting together with the tank group of G. Guderian, the troops of the 2nd Army participated in the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev and in the Bryansk region.

By that time, the health of the 60-year-old M. Weichs had already been severely undermined. He was often ill, temporarily left the command of the troops, leaving for the rear for treatment. At the beginning of 1942, the 4th Panzer Army of General G. Hoth and the 2nd Hungarian Army of General G. Jani passed under the command of Weichs, along with his 2nd Army. The Weichs army group took part in the battle near Voronezh as part of Field Marshal F. von Bock's Army Group South, which ended in complete failure for the Germans.

Since July 1942, M. Weichs has been in command of Army Group B, which, in addition to the 6th and 2nd armies, included the Hungarian, Romanian, and Italian armies. The Weichs group was defeated in the battle of Stalingrad. Despite this, February 1, 1943, the day of the surrender of F. Paulus. M. Weichs was promoted to field marshal general.

In February 1943, Army Group B, or rather, its remnants, was disbanded, and M. Weichs himself was appointed commander of Army Group F in Yugoslavia and Italy, where, under the onslaught of the Americans, he was forced to retreat to the area of Lake Balaton, where Weichs did an excellent job on the offensive operation against the 2nd Ukrainian Front in January 1945. At the end of March 1945, Army Group F was disbanded, and M. Weichs was transferred to the reserve of the Wehrmacht High Command, and then retired.

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In the summer of 1945, M. Weichs was arrested by the American occupation authorities. He's been pro- for a while; led in prison, but in 1947 he was released from custody

, live for health reasons. He's the only one of the fashi

Russian field marshals escaped trial as

war criminal. After the release led secluded | | 'new life in West Germany in the city of Rosberg-Cologne, "where he died on September 27, 1954.

Biographer S. Mitcham writes:

" "Tall and wiry, with thick metal-rimmed glasses, with the airs and mannerisms of the born aristocrat that he was, Baron Maxi-milian von Weichs looked more like a university history professor than a Nazi field marshal."

` shala... An old cavalryman, he must have been forced
` balance between their deep religious 'beliefs, on the one hand, and their commitment to "Hitler," on the other. Nevertheless, he managed to maintain the respect of the Fuhrer almost to the very end of the war, and after its end he avoided a military tribunal. As a result of the operations carried out, he earned a reputation as the foundation

"an innovative and skillful, although by no means a brilliant professional military man" (S. Mitcham, Field Marshals of Hitler and Their Battles. - S. 304-305).

Schmidt Rudolf

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In mid-November 1941, Colonel-General Rudolf Schmilt took command of the 2nd Field of the VOI Army of Army Group Center. He was born in 1886. Member of the First World War, company commander. After the war, commander of a battalion, then a rifle regiment. Since 1935, he commanded a tank division, which participated in the "Polish campaign" (1939). From February 1940 he commanded a tank corps. During military operations in Tolland, Belgium and France, he established himself as a talented military leader and expert in armored vehicles.

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Since May 1940, the corps of R. Schmidt became part of the tank group of General G. Guderian, since May 1941, as part of the 3rd tank group, he took part in the battles on the Eastern Front. In July 1941, he was awarded the Knight's Cross with oak leaves for battles in the Bialystok region.

In August 1941, R. Schmidt's corps stormed the fortress on the Neva Schlissenburg. At the end of October of the same year, he commanded a strike group that struck the Tikhvin field in the Leningrad direction, then he acted as commander of the 2nd Army. Conducted a number of military operations in the region of Orel and Bryansk.

In the first half of 1943, the troops of R. Schmidt fought fierce battles with the Soviet troops, who were trying to advance towards Ukraine. In July 1943, he handed over command of the 2nd Army to General L. Randulic, and in September of the same year he was dismissed from the Wehrmacht for health reasons.

After his retirement, he lived in East Germany, where in December 1947 he was arrested by Soviet counterintelligence officers. Deported to the Soviet Union, kept in Moscow and Vladimir prisons. In February 1956, as a non-amnestied criminal, he was handed over to the authorities of the GDR and released under an amnesty.

Died in 1957.

Guderian Heinz

Together with the troops of the 2nd field army, covering Moscow from the south, the 2nd tank group operated, commanded by the famous German tank commander, Colonel General Heinz Guderian. He was born in East Prussia in 1888. In military service since 1907. cadet. Member of the First World War, captain.

After the war, G. Guderian became a great champion in the use of tank troops. Since 1933, colonel. Appointed commander of motorized units of the Wehrmacht. Since 1935, commander of the 2nd

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Panzer Division, Major General. From April 1938 - Commander XU! motorized army corps, lieutenant general. ‹ With the outbreak of World War II, G. Guderian became commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General. 'His tank group participated in the Polish campaign and 'in the attack on France. Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 2nd Tank Troupe has been advancing as part of Army Group Center. Its formations inflicted a defeat on the troops of the Western Front and carried out their envelopment from the south, after which the encirclement of the Soviet troops in the Minsk region followed. Then he took part in the attack on Smolensk, surrounded by a large troupe of the Southwestern Front near Kiev. After that, the 2nd Panzer Group launched an offensive against Mobkva from the southwest, encircling and defeating part of the forces of the Bryansk Front in the area of Bryansk and Orel. Troops

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Guderian reached Tula and covered the area from the west and east, but could not complete the encirclement.

: On December 25, 1941, for retreating without an order, A. Hitler removed G. Guderian from command of the 2nd tank troupe. On February 20, 1943, he was called to

And the Fuhrer's headquarters, Located at that time near Vinnitsa, and returned to Troy. Inspector General of the Armored Forces, and in July 1944 also Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. At the end of March 1945 he was again dismissed from his post. He was taken prisoner by the Americans and released in 1948. In 1951 he published Ku's book Memoirs of a Soldier. Awarded the Knight's Cross (1939) and the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross

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“ Died in 1954.

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COMMANDERS OF THE RKKA

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Moscow strategic direction was covered by the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Kalinin, Reserve fronts, as well as the Moscow defense zone. A large number of armies, corps and divisions operated as part of these associations at various times. Just one list of these formations could fill several pages. All of them acted with varying effectiveness, many were completely defeated, others were surrounded, and only a few were able to withstand and participate in the counter-offensive and the general offensive of the Soviet troops in December 1941 - April 1942.

At the head of the Soviet fronts, armies, corps and divisions from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War until the end of the Moscow battle was a large number of military commanders of the Red Army. Their contribution to the Moscow battle was different, and their fates also developed in different ways. I want to dwell only on the most prominent and 3 of them.

Thus, as part of the high command of the Soviet troops that participated in the Moscow battle. were a variety of people. The vast majority of them were promoted to senior military positions in the wake of the October Revolution and the Civil War. Some were educated at the military academy. others limited themselves to various courses. Units had some combat experience gained in armed conflicts in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

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The rapid career growth of almost all of the 7th Soviet military leaders in 1941 began after the repressions of 1937-1938, when many people who had previously held top leadership positions in the Red Army were removed from their posts and brought to trial.

Pavlov Dmitry Grigorievich

' The troops of the Western Front, commanded by General of the Army Dmitry Grigoryevich Pavlov, were the first to take the enemy's blow in the Moscow direction. The troops of this front, which had significant forces, by means of words and means, they could not stop the advance of "the enemy, who within a week successfully overcame two lines of fortified areas, occupied Minsk and reached the Dnieper. General D. G. Pavlov was accused of this

'defeated and shot along with other ranks of his

'headquarters. Later, regarding the arrest and execution of General Pav-

A variety of opinions have appeared in the literature.

.. D. G. Pavlov was born on October 23 (November 4), 1897 in

'the village of Vonyukh, Kologrivsky district, Kostroma province, ONII.
Father Grigory Vasilyevich and mother Ekaterina Styopa

e 'novna - peasants. He graduated from a rural school and a city
School.

,. Dmitry was called up for military service at the beginning

the evil of the First World War in the autumn of 1914. Private, with

'spring next year senior non-commissioned officer. Cancellation

,Chen three awards. In the battle near the Smokhode River in 1916

{was seriously wounded and captured. Returned home in January

in years.

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In the spring of 1919 he joined the ranks of the Red Army. During the Gra-

Zhdansky war served as a platoon commander,

'commander of the cavalry squadron, assistant to

The mandir of the cavalry regiment in the South, South-West

"NOM and Turkestan fronts. In December 1919, window-

"mil Kostroma infantry courses, in 1922 - Omsk

higher cavalry school.

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After the end of the Civil War, he was left in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1928 he graduated from the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, in 1931 - academic courses at the Military Technical Academy. Since 1928, the commander of a cavalry, then a mechanized regiment. For his courage and skillful leadership of his subordinates during military operations in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1934 he was appointed commander of a mechanized brigade.

In 1936-1937, M. G. Pavlov was the commander of a tank brigade, then a tank group in Spain. For the skillful leadership of the troops and personal courage on June 21, 1937 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Upon return

When he returned to his homeland, he was appointed deputy, and from December 1937 head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army with the assignment of the military rank of commander. Led the formation of mechanized formations: mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions, individual tank regiments. He dealt with the issues of training tank commanders, the development of manuals, manuals and instructions for the combat use of armored forces in operations and combat. Member of the Soviet-Finnish war.

In June 1940 he was appointed commander of the Belorussian (Western Special) Military District, Colonel General of the Tank Forces, from January of the following year - General of the Army. He was very cautious about repressions among the command staff. So, speaking at the meeting, he said: "We have so many enemies of the people that I doubt that they were all enemies." Under his leadership, plans were developed to cover the state border by district associations and their actions in the event of an invasion by fascist Germany, troops were trained, and the operational equipment of the theater of military operations was carried out. Cavalier of five orders.

Since June 22, 1941, D. G. Pavlov has been the commander of the troops of the Western Front. Couldn't organize a party

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, nie none of the defensive operations of the armies at- | covering the state border, as well as the first defensive operation of the troops of the Western Front. The defense of all the armies and the front was broken through to a great depth "at a high rate. During the 17 days of the war, out of 625 thousand people, the Western Front lost 420 thousand people. Huge were the losses of aviation, tanks, artillery and other materiel.

. On June 30, 1941, due to miscalculations made in the leadership of the troops, he was removed from command of the troops of the front and soon put on trial. Accused of 'cowardice, deliberate collapse of front management and surrender of troops to the enemy without a fight. Sentenced to deprivation of military rank, title [hero of the Soviet Union 'and to capital punishment — execution by firing squad with confiscation of property. The sentence was carried out on the night of July 23, 1941.

m Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich

After the removal of General D. G. Pavlov from the command of the Western Front, the leadership of his troops was taken over by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union. K. Timoshenko. Prior to the start of the war, he directly 'participated in the development of a plan to cover the western border

'nitsa of the USSR, led the troops of all military districts, 'was responsible for the combat and mobilization training of the Red Army and, therefore, no less than D. G. Pavlov was responsible for the unsuccessful outcome of the first defensive 'operation of the troops of the Western Front. Now he was instructed to correct the mistakes that the old command of the Western Front had made and to implement the plans developed by the General Staff of the Red Army on the eve of the "WAR, taking into account the already existing conditions of the situation. 5S. K. Timoshenko was unable to complete this task, in The consequence of which was another defeat of the armies of the Western Front in the Smolensk region. Nevertheless S. K. Timo

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Shenko escaped the fate of D. G. Pavlov, and he got the opportunity to make new mistakes and even ended the Great Patriotic War as a holder of the highest Russian Order of Victory.

S. K. Timoshengko was born on February 6 (18), 1895 in the village of Furmanka, Bessarabian province. Since December 1914 in military service. He graduated from the regimental and machine-gun school. Member of the fighting on the Southwestern and Western fronts as part of the 4th Cavalry Division, holder of three St. George crosses and several medals.

From March 1918 in the Red Army, commander of a saber platoon, a cavalry squadron, a separate cavalry detachment, the 1st Crimean Revolutionary Regiment, a cavalry brigade. From October 1919 he headed the 6th. then the 4th cavalry divisions of the 1st Cavalry Army.

In December 1921 - March 1922 he was a student of the Higher Courses of the Military Academy of the Red Army. Since 1925, commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps. In subsequent years, the commander of an army group, assistant commander of the troops of the Belarusian military district for cavalry, twice (in 1927 and 1930) a student of courses for senior officers. Since the summer of 1937, the commander of the North Caucasian, then Kharkov, Kiev military districts, since 1935 the corps commander, since 1937 the commander of the 2nd rank, since 1939 - the commander of the 1st rank.

In September-November 1939, he was commander of the troops of the Ukrainian Front, at the head of which a campaign was made in the regions of Western Ukraine.

In January-March 1940, during the Soviet-Finnish war, from January 7, 1940, he commanded the troops of the North-Western Front, which was able to push the enemy deep into Finland. Awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union (May 7, 1940), awarded the title of Hero

Soviet Union.

On May 7, 1940, he was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Chairman of the Main Military Council of the Red Army: He made a significant contribution to the rearmament of the Red Army, to the software

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raising the level of combat readiness and combat readiness of the Red Army, head of a number of exercises, inspection trips to the border military districts. At the same time, he was unable to fully prepare the Red Army for the start of fascist aggression.

° With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - Chairman of the Headquarters of the High Command. From the beginning of the month to July 19 and July 30 - Commander of the Western Front.

, From the end of September 1941 - Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Strategic Direction. Could not stop the advance of the enemy troops to Bryansk, Kharkov and further to Rostov-on-Don. In June 1942 - March 1943, commander of the troops of the South-Western, Stalingrad, North-Western fronts. Under his leadership, the Battle of Smolensk, Don Bass, Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya, Rostov, Kharkovskaya, Yelets, Demyanskaya and a number of other operations were carried out. Since March 1943, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the fronts of the Southern and Baltic directions.

| After the end of the war, the commander of the military districts, chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans. He made a great contribution to the solution of tasks during the transfer of Kolya of the Soviet Armed Forces from the organization of wartime. Chairman of the Commission for the Demobilization of the Army and Navy. Since April 1960 - in the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1961 - Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1940, 1965), holder of sixteen Soviet and foreign orders, including the Order of Victory.

, Wife - Anastasia Mikhailovna (Zhukovskaya), children: "Katerina, Olga and Konstantin. Ekaterina (1923-1988) was married to Vasily Stalin.

^ Died March 31, 1970. His ashes rest in the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow.

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Shaposhnikov Boris Mikhailovich

After the removal of G.K. Zhukov from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on July 30, 1941, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov was again appointed to this position at the suggestion of I.V. Stalin. who was in this post until May 1942, that is, the entire period of the Moscow battle. It was he who led the development of plans for the summer and autumn retreat of the Red Army, on his conscience the Kiev tragedy of the troops of the Southwestern Front, military failures near Smolensk, Bryansk, Vyazma. After G.K. Zhukov, he became F. [alder's] main opponent in organizing the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front and was able to achieve its turning point near Moscow.

B. M. Shaposhnikov was born on September 20 (October 2), 1882 in the city of Zlatoust, he was educated at the Krasnoufimsk industrial, Perm real and Alexander military schools. In 1910 he graduated from the Nikolaev Academy [of the General Staff. In military service since 1901 in the Turkestan military district, since 1912 he was a senior adjutant of the 14th cavalry division in Poland.

During World War I, chief of staff of the Cossack brigade, Cossack division, 10th Army Corps, commander of the 16th Grenadier Regiment, Caucasian Grenadier Division, Colonel. In March 1918, he was dismissed on indefinite leave.

Since May 1918 in the Red Army, Assistant Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Supreme Military Council, Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Field Headquarters, First Assistant Chief of Staff of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of Ukraine, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. |

From February 1921, B. M. Shaposhnikov was the first assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. In 1925-1928, "commander of the troops of the Leningrad and Moscow! from the military districts. Actively participated in the military reform

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me. In 1928-1931 he was Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Since the autumn of 1931, commander of the troops of the Volga Military District, since 1932, head of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, since 1937, commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

From May 1937, B. M. Shaposhnikov was Chief of the General Staff. Involved in the events on Lake Khasan (1938), on the Khalkin-Gol River (1939), in the liberation campaigns of the Red Army in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, in the events of the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940). At the same time, in the ranks of the Red Army, mass repressions were taking place among the commanding staff.

` Since 1940 Marshal of the Soviet Union.

As K. A. Meretskov, who took up the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff in the autumn of 1937, noted, "working with Boris Mikhailovich and under his direct supervision was both a great honor and a serious test of everyone's business qualities. Shaposhnikov was considered among us the "patriarch" of the staff service. - By that time, he had already held leading positions in the General Staff for about twenty years, he was valued according to his merits as the greatest specialist in his field in the USSR, and I really did not want to lose myself in his eyes. Boris Mikhailovich put two points above all else: the maximum fulfillment by the staffs of their mission and the culture of staff work. He, like no one else, knew how to use "all the best that was introduced into the activities of the Russian General Staff under D. A. Milyutin and N. N. Obruchev, and then raised to the level of modern requirements" in Soviet bodies - All-Russian main headquarters (until 1921) and the headquarters of the Red Army (until 1935). It was he who, along with other prominent Soviet General Staff officers, made every effort to fully implement M. V. Frunze's behest on the creation and development of a "powerful and flexible 'states'".

And in August 1940, for health reasons, B. M. Shaposhnikov was relieved of his post as head of the

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General Headquarters of the Red Army and was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the construction of fortified areas on the western border.

During the Great Patriotic War, Chief of Staff of the Western Direction, from July 30, 1941 - Chief of the General Staff, then - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Head of the Military Academy of the General Staff.

Engaged in scientific work. Head of the team of authors of the work "Battle for Moscow". Author of the work "The Brain of the Army" in three books, a number of military scientific works, articles on military history and memoirs. Professor (since 1935), member of a number of groups of authors of fundamental research on the history of military art. Cavalier of eight orders of the USSR.

He died on March 26, 1945, was buried in Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich

After the defeat of the armies of the Western Front in the region

Smolensk, the troops of another legendary Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, who were brought together into the Reserve Front, stood on the enemy's path to Moscow. In fact, it was an act of desperation. The troops of the Reserve Front did not possess the necessary forces, and S. M. Budyonny did not possess military abilities in order to stop the enemy's attack, which was gaining strength.

S. M. Budyonny was born on April 13 (25), 1883 on the farm Kozyurin, Stavropol province. Member of the Russian-Japanese and First World Wars, senior non-commissioned officer, awarded four St. George's crosses and four medals.

In the Red Army since February 1918: commander of a revolutionary cavalry detachment, then assistant commander of a cavalry regiment, cavalry brigade, combined

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cavalry division. From March 1919 he was the head of the 4th Cavalry Division, from June the commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Member of the Voronezh operation, a number of battles in the Caucasus and the Don.

|. From November 1919 to October 1923, commander of the 1st Cavalry Army. "A dashing and daring, but prudent and very caring commander. A top-class cavalryman, a capable organizer, skillfully leads the troops in an operation, correctly determined his place on the battlefield," MV Frunze wrote about him.

o In subsequent years, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army for Cavalry, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic, inspector of the Red Army Cavalry. In 1932 he graduated from the special group of the MV Frunze Military Academy. Since 1935 Marshal of the Soviet Union, since 1937 the commander of the Moscow Military District, a member of the Chief Military Council of the NPO of the USSR. Val actively participated in the preparation of Soviet troops for the upcoming combat and led a number of exercises and maneuvers.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, S. M. Budyonny was a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, commander of a group of troops of the reserve armies covering the Moscow direction. In this position, he did not show any military leadership, or even organizing abilities. Constantly, without knowledge of the situation and affairs, he interfered in the work of the commanders of the Miami and their headquarters, repeatedly gave orders to the commanders of corps and divisions, bypassing the army command line, which created confusion in the control system. At the same time, he evaded in every possible way from accepting self

Juvenile decisions, appealing to the General

aba. JV Stalin repeatedly expressed to him his "retien" on this matter, but at the same time, the marshal's vanity was in every possible way.

Then the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western Zyni, the commander of the Reserve Front, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction,

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commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Front. According to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the leadership of the troops was not carried out professionally enough. Since January 1943, commander of the Red Army cavalry.

Since 1947, S. M. Budyonny was simultaneously Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR for horse breeding. During these years, he did quite a lot to restore horse breeding disturbed by the war, to breed new breeds of horses.

Since May 1953, S. M. Budyonny was an inspector of the cavalry of the Soviet Army, since 1954 at the disposal of the Minister of Defense of the USSR. In the same year, he was honorably retired and was appointed to the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

During the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny did not show his abilities as a military leader in any way and rarely visited the troops of the army in the field. I. V. Stalin, who personally favored Semyon Mikhailovich, by the end of the war, with difficulty, found a reason to award this commander with the Order of Suvorov [th degree. It was the only commander's order on the chest of S. M. Budyonny. But later N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev corrected this "mistake". On the occasion of his 75th birthday, Semyon Mikhailovich became a hero of the Soviet Union, on the occasion of his 80th birthday he received a second 30th star, and in honor of his 85th birthday, a third. In addition, he received several Orders of Lenin and Orders of the Red Banner, becoming one of the most honored commanders of the Soviet army.

Three times Hero of the Soviet Union (1958, 1963, 1968). Cavalier of fifteen orders of the USSR, ten foreign orders. Author of the work "Fundamentals of cavalry tactics" (1938), a number of works of a memoir character. Member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of eight convocations. Since 1938 he has been a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

He died on October 26, 1973 in Moscow. The ashes were buried at the Kremlin wall.

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Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich

On October 10, 1941, General of the Army Georgy Khonstantinovich Zhukov took command of the united troops of the Reserve from the Western Fronts, covering Moscow from the west, who, from the beginning of 1941 until the defeat of the first strategic echelon of the Red Army, was in the position of chief [General Itaba of the Red Army. The plans for covering the state border with the western military districts, developed under the leadership of the General Staff, were not implemented. Moreover, G.K. Zhukov, sent by I.V. Stalin in the first days of the war to assist the troops of the Southwestern Front, without understanding the situation that had developed, drove the formations of four mechanized corps to death, organizing a frontal counterattack in the Dubno region. But even in the presence of obvious failures in the work of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov escaped the fate of General D.G. Pavlov and was appointed commander of the front. Subsequently, with the name of G.K. Zhukov, local historians connected almost all the major victories of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic Yui War. At the same time, there were many researchers and documents that were more critical of this name. GK. Zhukov was born on November 19 (December 1), 1896 in

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the village of Strelkovka, Kaluga province, in the family of a chic shoe. In military service since 1915. Member of the First World War, junior non-commissioned officer, holder of two [Ergievsky crosses. Since the summer of 1918 in the Red Army. Commander of a platoon and cavalry squadron. For military merit he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. | In 1920 he graduated from cavalry courses. Then command Oval with a cavalry squadron. Participated in the suppression of the Mi peasant uprising under the leadership of A. S. Annova in the Tambov province. Since March 1923, G.K. Zhukov - assistant commander of the 0th cavalry regiment, since June of the same year - who

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mandir of the 39th cavalry regiment. In 1925, he graduated from the Leningrad courses for the improvement of the cavalry command staff, and in 1930 - courses for senior officers, after which he was appointed commander of the 2nd brigade of the 7th Samara cavalry division, commanded by K.K. Rokossov sky. In February 1933, Georgy Konstantinovich was appointed assistant inspector of the Red Army cavalry,

a few months later - the commander of the 4th cavalry division, which was in extremely poor condition. Managed to correct the situation, raise the level of combat training, strengthen discipline. Awarded the Order of Lenin.

From July 1937, G.K. Zhukov was the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, and from February of the following year, the 6th Cossack Corps. In July 1938, he was appointed deputy commander of the troops of the Belorussian military district, military rank - commander.

Since the summer of 1939, Georgy Konstantinovich has been commander of the 1st Army Group, stationed in Mongolia. Having forestalled the enemy, the Soviet troops went over to the offensive with smaller forces, surrounded and defeated the enemy. The Japanese lost about 61 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 8 thousand people killed and died from wounds and the same number of wounded. After that, at the request of the Japanese side, on September 16, hostilities were stopped. For the victory on August 29, 1938, G.K. Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Commander of the 2nd rank.

From June 1940 he was commander of the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. Under his leadership, the troops of the district carried out an offensive operation against the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina that belonged to Romania. Since January 1941, Chief of the General Staff, candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commander of the 1st rank. then General of the Army. At this time, the Plan for the mobilization of the Red Army in case of war and the Plan for

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covering the state border. However, these plans were not implemented at the lower levels of government.

- Also, the development of a plan for a preventive strike is associated with the name of G.K. Zhukov. In May 1941 he proposed the idea of this plan to the People's Commissar of Defense and personally to IV Stalin. If the attack is inevitable, then it is necessary to strike first, Georgy Konstantinovich suggests. In view of (extreme secrecy (even typists were not trusted) this was written by hand by General Vasilevsky, some editing was made by Vatutin's hand. Both of these generals were then Zhukov's closest assistants in the General Staff. In this plan, in particular, it was said: "Given that Germany currently keeps her army mobilized, with rears deployed, she has the ability to warn us of deployment and deliver a "surprise strike. To prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative for action to the German command, preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the deployment stage

and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the roles of the troops ... "Stalin did not accept this proposal of Zhukov, agreed with the people's commissar of defense, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko.

On June 22, 1941, Georgy Konstantinovich was sent to coordinate actions in the South-West and the next day he was appointed a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On July 6, he was recalled to Moscow, where he reported on the situation and proposed to withdraw the troops of the Southwestern Front from Kyiv. Stalin ignored this proposal, calling it "nonsense." To this, Zhukov replied: "If you think that I, as the chief of the General Staff, can only grind Mepuha, then I have nothing to do here. I ask you to release me from the duties of the chief of the General Staff and send me to the front, where I, apparently, will bring more Nolza to the Motherland ... "After that, having handed over the leadership of the General Staff to B. M. Shaposhnikov, he was appointed Commander of the Reserve Front.

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Having taken command of the Reserve Front, G.K. Zhukov regrouped his troops within a week, and on August 30, 1941, he led the troops on the offensive, trying to surround the advancing enemy units. Under this threat, the Nazis began a quick retreat from the Yolni region, and on September 5, Soviet formations entered this city. Then, pursuing the enemy, they moved west for another 25 kilometers. The task was completed. In the battles near Yelnya, the myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled.

On September 9, Georgy Konstantinovich was sent as commander of the Leningrad Front to replace K. E. Voroshilov. He organized the defense of the city, which was already in the ring of blockade, relying on toughness and even cruelty towards the commanders and troops subordinate to him. At the same time, he categorically demanded that a member of the Military Council of the Front, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A. A. Zhdanov, not interfere in his work.

On October 6, G.K. Zhukov was recalled to Moscow to organize the defense of the capital and was appointed commander of the Western Front. This time, too, he based his defense on a tough attitude towards subordinate troops, ordering cowards and alarmists to be shot on the spot if they retreated without permission. Regardless of the losses, he led an active defense, constantly, despite his unpreparedness, threw troops into counterattacks. Nevertheless, he carried out successful defensive and then offensive operations, pushing the enemy back 100-150 km. The victory near Moscow was historic, because here, for the first time after all the numerous victorious campaigns of the Nazis,

tsy were defeated. On the battlefield near Moscow, the beginning of a radical turn in the Great Patriotic War was laid.

On August 27, 1942, Stalin summoned Zhukov to Moscow and announced his appointment as Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The very next day, Georgy Konstantinovich was on the Volga. Zhukov's merit was that he was able to convince Stalin not to spend the remaining

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'troops on useless active actions, and go to the 'defense. Together with A. M. Vasilevsky, he became the developer of a plan for the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive. Subsequently, Georgy Konstantinovich took an active part in the development of the operation to deblockade Leningrad, which received the code name "Iskra". "His participation was so significant that the Supreme Commander considered it necessary to issue a directive from the Headquarters with two signatures. Then Zhukov himself went to the Volkhov Front. Soviet Union.

_ In the summer of 1943, the fate of the war was decided in the battle of 'Kursk. On the eve of the battle, Stalin sent Zhukov to the front to coordinate the actions of the Central, Western and Bryansk fronts. When the success of the Soviet troops in the Orel direction was clearly indicated, Stalin called Zhukov and ordered him to take over the coordination of the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. At the offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Western, Bryansk, Voronezh and Steppe fronts. As a result of the counteroffensive of these fronts, the Soviet troops reached a line that made it possible to prepare for a strategic offensive towards the Dnieper. The Battle of Kursk became a qualitatively new stage in Zhukov's military mastery. If in the battle near Moscow he led the combat operations of 10 combined arms armies, having no tank divisions, then in the battles near Kursk Georgy Konstantinovich coordinated the actions of 22 general, 5 tank and 6 air armies. | In the battle for the Dnieper, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. Their troops not only reached the river, but also crossed it, seizing bridgeheads. The "Eastern Wall" did not help the Nazis to create a strategic defense. November 6 tanks of the 38th army, general-pol

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Zhovnik Moskalenko broke into Kyiv. On January 11, Zhukov reported to Stalin a plan for cutting off, encircling and liquidating the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping,

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which the very next day was approved by the Supreme. [orgy Konstantinovich had to coordinate the actions of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts that carried out this operation. Zhukov's plan was realized

fully.

After Vatutin was wounded on February 29, Zhukov was appointed commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. On March 29, his troops crossed the Prut and captured Chernivtsi. In general, during the Proskurovo-Chernivtsi operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated the enemy that opposed it, advanced 360 kilometers and reached the Carpathians. The task set by the Headquarters was fully completed. After the completion of this operation, Zhukov was awarded the Order of Victory for No. 1.

Then, in the period from June 23 to August 29, 1944, the Belarusian strategic operation was carried out, during which G.K. Zhukov coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. During this operation, the fronts subordinate to him carried out the Mogilev and Bobruisk operations, culminating in the encirclement of the enemy in the Bobruisk region, and then they participated in the encirclement and destruction of a large grouping of German troops in the Minsk region. The reward for the Belarusian operation for Zhukov was the second Star [of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

On November 15, 1944, Zhukov replaced K.K. Rokossovsky as commander of the [th Belorussian Front. He decided to break through the enemy's defenses with powerful strikes simultaneously in three directions, introduce two tank armies into the gaps that had formed, liberate Warsaw and, on the twelfth day of the operation, reach a depth of up to 180 kilometers, and then further advance on Poznan. Thus, having built troops on the principle of action of a library shell, Zhukov broke through the most powerful enemy defenses to a depth of 500 kilometers in an unprecedentedly short time. For the Vistula-Oder operation on March 3, 1945, Georgy Konstantinovich was awarded the second Order of Victory.

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On January 27, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved Zhukov's proposal to continue the offensive on Berlin from the bridgeheads on the Oder. The Berlin operation was difficult. The breakthrough of the defense on the Seelow Heights was completed by April 19 at the cost of the early entry into battle of two guards tank armies and a separate guards

† Panzer Corps. Then the bloodshed began

„ battles in Berlin itself, where Zhukov's troops broke into

"April 21. Heavy street fighting ensued. And only in

the second half of May 2 organized resistance

the enemy was broken, the defenders of Berlin began
surrender en masse.

There are many different opinions about the military art of Zhukov in the Berlin operation. Some believe that the marshal paid too much for the fascist capital.

High price with soldier's blood. Others rank this operation among the most successful... Georgy Konstantinovich himself assessed this operation quite critically. This was especially true of its first phase, associated with the "breakthrough of the enemy's defenses on the outskirts of Berlin." "Later, analyzing the situation that developed on April 16 and 17 at the Seelow Heights, he wrote: "There were no mistakes. However, it must be admitted that we made a MISTAKE, which made it difficult to fight when breaking through the tactical defense zone for one or two days. In preparing the operation, we somewhat underestimated the complexity of the terrain in the area of the Seelow Heights, where the enemy had the opportunity to organize difficult to overcome. my defense. Being 10-12 kilometers from our starting lines, having dug deep into the ground, especially behind the reverse slopes of the heights, the enemy was able to save his

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'forces and equipment from the fire of our artillery and bombardi-

'aircraft. True, we had an extremely limited time to prepare for the Berlin operation, but even this cannot serve as an excuse. Blame for a flaw in the question

, sa first of all I must take over. After capitulation-
"tions of the garrison of the fascist capital Berlin Opera

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The action continued for another six days. During this time, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went to the Elbe to join the Allied forces. Their losses during the entire operation in killed and dead from wounds amounted to almost 180 thousand people. This was the price of Zhukovsky's victory.

Assessing the role of G.K. Zhukov in the Berlin operation, General D. Eisenhower wrote: "I admire Zhukov's military talent and his qualities as a person ... When I was [chief commander of the allied forces in Western Europe, then we are all my subordinates, and the generals who commanded the allied military formations - literally with bated breath followed the victories

nym march of Soviet troops under the command of Zhukov in the direction of Berlin. We knew that Zhukov did not like to joke, if he had already set the goal of crushing the main citadel of fascism in the very heart of Germany, then he would certainly do it. There was no doubt about that."

On May 8, an act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed in Berlin. On behalf of the German side, it was signed by Field Marshal Keitel. From the allies - an Englishman, Air Chief Marshal Arthur V. Tedder, from the Soviet Union, as one would expect, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov.

After the defeat of fascist Germany was completed, G.K. Zhukov was appointed Chief Commander for the Administration of Germany from the Soviet Union: he received the third star of the Hero (June 1, 1945); takes the Victory Parade in Moscow on Red Square.

In the spring of 1946, G.K. Zhukov was removed from his post for malfeasance. Close to him, the arrested Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov during the investigation not only confessed to his crimes, but also testified against G. K. Zhukov. In March 1946, Stalin recalled Zhukov from Germany. He is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. At a meeting of the Supreme Military Council

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On May 31, 1946, Stalin read out the testimony of the former Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov. In them, Zhukov was called the head of a conspiracy to prepare in the country
, military coup. In total, 75 people were involved in the case, of which 74 have already been arrested. . On June 9, Georgy Konstantinovich was removed from his post. Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and demoted to commander of his troops of the Odessa Military District. At the same time, he was removed from the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the KISS. Then
, a "trophy" case was launched against him, connected with the export of a
, large amount of property from Germany: for personal use. In total, the commission seized 194 pieces of antique furniture and other valuables. At the end of 1947, after the transfer from Berlin to Kazan of the head of the operational sector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Berlin, Major General A. M. Sidnev, who had previously worked with Zhukov, new facts of abuses by the marshal were established. By the personal order of I. V. Stalin, in early January - 1948, a search was carried out at the apartment of G. K. Zhukov in Moscow and at his Moscow dacha in Rublevo. During the search, 17 gold watches were found, including three with precious stones, 15 gold pendants and knees, including: including 8 with precious stones, a gold keychain with precious stones, 60 valuable paintings, 29 bronze statues and figurines, 15 unique hunting rifles, 713 pieces of silverware, more than 4000 meters

"Personal fabrics, 323 fur skins, lots of carpets and 'tapestry', 7 button accordions and accordions and much more. In February 1948, a decree was signed appointing G.K. By his order, in October 1952, Zhukov was delegated to the Twentieth Party Congress, where he was re-elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

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nym to Moscow. Immediately after the death of the "leader of the peoples", he is appointed his first deputy, and then becomes an active participant in the arrest of L.P. Beria on June 25, 1953.

On September 9, 1954, G.K. Zhukov, by decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and by order of the Minister of Defense, Marshal Bulganin, conducted secret exercises with a real explosion of an atomic bomb at the Totsk training center near Orenburg. This exercise achieved its research goals, but also brought enormous misfortunes to the personnel of the troops participating in them, as well as to the population of nearby areas.

On February 9, 1955, Georgy Konstantinovich was appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR. He actively participated in the creation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14 of the same year (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia). In September, he was part of the delegation that signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the GDR and also determined the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops in the GDR.

At the end of October 1956, an anti-Soviet uprising began in Budapest, which on November 4 was decisively suppressed by the Soviet troops. It almost coincided with the 60th anniversary of G.K. Zhukov, on the occasion of which he was awarded the fourth star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the second half of 1957, G. K. Zhukov supported N. S. Khrushchev in the struggle for power with the group of V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich and actually saved Nikita Sergeevich from being removed from office First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In gratitude for this, Khrushchev first seeks the election of the marshal as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. At the same time, Nikita Sergeevich sees a certain danger in Zhukov. During the trip of Georgy Konstantinovich to Yugoslavia, on October 26, 1957, he was removed from the post of Minister of Defense. removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and members of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the wording "for gross violations of Leninist party principles in the leadership of the armed

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'by the forces of the country', and on March 15 of the following year he was dismissed.

Years of life in retirement Georgy Konstantinovich devoted his work on the book "Memoirs and Reflections". She saw the light only in 1969. | G.K. Zhukov died on June 18, 1974 after a prolonged Cologne illness. His ashes rest in the Kremlin wall. During the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the 100th anniversary of the birth of Comrade K. Zhukov, a monument was erected to him near Red Square.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich

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, During the battle for Moscow, among the prominent Soviet military leaders of the highest rank, for the first time, the name of Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, who first commanded the 19th Army, and then the troops of the Kalinin Front, sounded quite loudly.

. I. S. Konev was born on December 28, 1897 in the village of Lo deykino, Vologda province. He graduated from the church at the Khodskaya school and the Zemstvo school. In the spring of 1916, he was drafted into the army and sent to the artillery training team that trained non-commissioned officers. But instead of the front | Konev ended up in Moscow, where he met the February and October events of 1917.

. In February 1918, in connection with the demobilization of the army, and. S. Konev returned to his homeland, where he was appointed military commissar of the Nikolsky district. He joined the ranks of the RCP (b). He was a delegate to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Then he was sent to the Eastern Front, where there were heavy battles with E. Kolchak. Detachment commander, commissar of an armored train, rifle brigade and division. In 1921 he participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising.

` - After the end of the Civil War, IS Konev was appointed chief of staff of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. In 1926 he graduated

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Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze and was appointed commander and commissar of a rifle regiment in Nizhny Novgorod. Since 1931, the division commander.

In 1934 he graduated from the main faculty of the Military

Academy named after M.V. Frunze, after which he commands a division, then a corps in the Belarusian Military District. Since 1937 - Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Since 1937, Ivan Stepanovich commands the Special Group of Soviet Troops in Mongolia. Since 1939 - commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Since 1940 - commander of the Trans-Baikal, from January 1941 - the North Caucasian military districts. Lieutenant general.

In May 1941, I. S. Konev received an order to form the 19th Army on the basis of the district, at the head of which he met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the Western direction in the area of Rudnya, Orsha, Smolensk. His army took part in the battle of Smolensk.

At that time, a case was opened against I. S. Konev in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in which the facts of his anti-Soviet activities were emphasized. In this document, in particular, stated: "According to available official materials, Konev I. S. is characterized as an active defender and patron of the enemies of the people. For example, being the commander of a special corps in the MPR until 1939, Konev by all means opposed the bringing to party responsibility and the arrest of the former chief of staff of the corps Malyshev, the former commander of the 7th motorized brigade Yermolin, the former chief of staff of the mechanized regiment Potapov, the former commander of the 106th rifle regiment Kvashina, who nevertheless were arrested and exposed as participants in a counterrevolutionary conspiracy. ... Konev conceals in his autobiographies that his father was a kulak, that his uncle F. I. Konev was a constable for a long time, mocked the peasants, was arrested in 1929 by the NKVD and tried to commit suicide during the arrest, suicide." Apparently, Ivan Stepanovich himself knew nothing about this document.

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In 1941, the situation on the fronts developed in such a way that every competent and decisive military leader was in a special account with I.V. Stalin. These circumstances not only saved the general from arrest, but also contributed to the further career of I. S. Konev. Since September 1941, Colonel General I. S. Konev, commanding the Western Front, has been conducting defensive battles in the Moscow direction. In October, the troops of the front were defeated near Vyazma, for which Ivan Stepanovich was demoted to deputy front commander. But on October 19, he was appointed commander of the Ka troops.

Linin Front, at the head of which he successfully completed the Battle of Moscow.

Since August 1942, I. S. Konev again commands the Western Front, since March 1943 - the North-Western Front. In July-September 1943, commanding the Steppe Front,

Ivan Stepanovich takes part in the Battle of Kursk. The troops he led, in cooperation with the Voronezh Front, carried out an offensive operation to defeat the white city-Kharkov enemy grouping, numbering more than 300 thousand people, up to 600 tanks, over 3 thousand guns. During this battle, in August 1943, I. S. Konev was promoted to army general.

In October 1943, the Steppe Front, headed by I. S. Konev, was renamed the 2nd Ukrainian. In the body of his troops, Ivan Stepanovich carried out an offensive in the Left-Bank Ukraine, forcing the Dnieper on a wide front, encircling and defeating the Nazis in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky region. In February 1944 he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Since May 1944, I. S. Konev has been in command of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which inflicted a heavy defeat during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation on the army group "Northern Ukraine" and captured the bridgehead on the Vistula, which became one of the springboards for a strike in the heart of Germany. This was followed by the Vistula-Oder, Lower and Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.

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Thus, out of 1418 days during which the Soviet-German front existed in World War II, Ivan Stepanovich spent 1365 days and nights on it. Of these, for 72 days he was the commander of the army and 1293 commanders of the troops of front-line formations, who solved operational-strategic tasks independently or as part of a group of fronts. He had the opportunity to lead troops in more than 40 operations, the vast majority of which were successful.

July 29, 1944 and | June 1945 I. S. Konev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, March 30, 1945 he was awarded the highest military order "Victory". In addition, his military merits were awarded with three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov [degrees and two Orders of Kutuzov [degrees], as well as an Honorary Weapon with a golden image of the State Emblem of the USSR

After the end of the Great Patriotic War and the Victory Parade, Konev was engaged in the disbandment of the troops of the front, and in the fall of 1945 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Central Group of Forces and high commissioner for Austria. The following year, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Since 1950, I. S. Konev was the Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Since 1951, he has commanded the troops of the Carpathian Military District.

In December 1953, Ivan Stepanovich was appointed

Chairman of the Special Military Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, which on December 18-23 considered the case and sentenced L.P. Beria and his henchmen to death.

Since 1955, I. S. Konev again took the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, and in May of the same year, after the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, he became Commander-in-Chief of its United Armed Forces. Involved in the suppression of the rebellion in Hungary in 1956 goals.

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, Since 1960 - in the Group of General Inspectors. But in 1961, in connection with the unrest in Berlin, he was appointed commander in chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. After the construction of the Berlin Wall, he returned to Moscow and until the end of his life was in the Group of General Inspectors. In 1971, he was awarded the title of Hero of Czechoslovakia and Hero of Mongolia. In addition to those listed above, I. S. Konev was also awarded seven orders of Lenin, orders of the October Revolution, the Red Star, orders and medals of many foreign countries, including Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, became an honorary citizen of the 'cities of five states. He wrote two books of memoirs: "Notes of the Front Commander. 1943-1944" and "Forty

FIFTH". Ivan Stepanovich died after a severe and prolonged illness on May 21, 1973. His ashes rest in the Kremlin wall.) Eremenko Andrei Ivanovich

,... After the crushing defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front near Kiev and at the beginning of the decisive phase of the battle for Moscow, the Bryansk Front was created, commanded by Lieutenant General AI Eremenko.

— A. I. Eremenko was born on October 2 (14), 1892 in the village 'Markovka of Yekaterinoslav province in a family of peasants.

In 1913 he was drafted into the army as a private. Member of the Battle of Galicia, from the autumn of 1915 on the Romanian front in the reconnaissance team of an infantry regiment, corporal. Personal courage and skillful actions are marked by three medals.

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In the Red Army since the spring of 1918. Member of the Civil „WAR. He fought on the Southern Front, then on the Northern Caucasus. Since the autumn of 1918, a member of the RCP (b).

'Valerian Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Army.

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After the end of the Civil War, in 1923 and 1931 he graduated from advanced training courses for commanding staff, in 1935 from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. Commander of a cavalry regiment, cavalry division, cavalry, and since June 1940 - mechanized corps. It proved itself well in solving problems during the campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and also in Lithuania. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since December 1940, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, major general.

During the Great Patriotic War, Andrei Ivanovich from June 30 to July 2 - commander of the troops of the Western Front, then - deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front. He led the combat operations of the troops of this front in the battle of Smolensk.

In August 1941 he was appointed commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front, from September 11 - Colonel General. In late September - early October 1941, A. I. Eremenko unsuccessfully carried out the Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation against the troops of the 2nd army and the 2nd tank group of the enemy, who managed to encircle a significant part of the front forces. On October 7, he was seriously wounded and sent to the hospital for treatment.

Since December 1941, he was commander of the 4th shock army, which defended the line along the eastern shore of lakes Velye and Seliger. As part of the Kalinin Front, he took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmanskaya offensive operation, was wounded again.

In August 1942, he took command of the South-East (Stalingrad) Front, a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad. From January 1943, commander of the troops of the Southern, from April - Kalinin, from October of the 1st Baltic Front, commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, Colonel General. Since April 1944, commander of the troops of the 2nd Baltic. from March 1945 - 4th Ukrainian fronts, general /

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'armies. He successfully led the fighting in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in the Smolensk operation, during the liberation of the Crimea, Latvia, and Czechoslovakia.

In the postwar years, the commander of the Pri-

`Carpathian, West Siberian, North Caucasian

'military districts. Since 1955 Marshal of the Soviet Union. "Since 1958, Inspector General of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR Since 1946

Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, since 1956 a candidate for

'members of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Hero of the Soviet Union (title awarded in 1944),
'Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (since 1970). Chevalier of
fourteen domestic and nine

'foreign orders, including three orders of Suvoro

va 1st degree and the Order of Kutuzov [th degree. Series author

,memoirs, articles in military magazines on issues

'construction of the armed forces and military art.

“He died on November 19, 1970 in Moscow. The ashes rest

in the Kremlin wall.

Zakharov (Zakharov-Yurin) Georgy Fedorovich

. After A. I. Eremenko was wounded, G. F. Zakharov assumed command
of the troops of the Bryansk Front.

G. F. Zakharov was born on April 23 (May 5), 1897 in the village of Shilovo,
Zolotovskiy district, Saratov province, into the family of a rural teacher.
graduated from the Chistopol "school of ensigns. Participated in a number of
battles of the First World War. For military distinction, he was promoted to
second lieutenant `CHIKI. In October 1917 he was elected commander of an
infantry regiment of the North-Western Front.

? Since August 1918 in the Red Army. Company commander, battalion,
regiment on the Eastern Front. After the end of the Civil War, he graduated
from the infantry courses (in 1920), the "Shot" courses (in 1923), the Military
Academy named after

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nor M. V. Frunze (in 1933). He was the head of the military and economic
supply of the division, deputy commander of the rifle division, and a
teacher of tactics at the Military Engineering Academy of the Red Army. After
completing his studies at the Military Academy of the General Staff in the
summer of 1939, he was appointed chief of staff of the Ural Military District,
Colonel.

Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Chief of Staff of the
22nd Army of the Western Front, which repelled the enemy offensive near
Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki and Nevel, Major General.

Since August 1941, G. F. Zakharov was the chief of staff, since October the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front, which covered the Orel-Tula and Lgovsk-Kursk directions. As chief of staff, he participated in the unsuccessful Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation, which ended in the encirclement of large forces of the front troops. After being wounded, A. I. Eremenko took command of the troops of the Bryansk Front. In a difficult situation, he was able to organize the defense of the troops of the Bryansk Front that had emerged from the encirclement in the Tula direction, preventing the offensive on Tula of the formations of the 2nd Panzer Group of G. Guderian.

From December 1941 - Deputy Commander of the Western Front, who participated in the counteroffensive near Moscow. In May 1942, he was appointed chief of staff of the North Caucasian direction, then the North Caucasian Front. Since August, Chief of Staff of the South-Eastern (Stalingrad) Front. Since October 1942, Deputy Commander of the Stalingrad Front, successfully led the armies of the left wing during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, Lieutenant General. From December 1942 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Southern Front. In February 1943, he took command of the 51st Army, which liberated Rostov-on-Don. In July, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Guards Army, which distinguished itself in breaking through the defense

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enemy on the Mius and Molochnaya rivers, on Perekop, during the liberation of Sevastopol, Colonel General.

Since June 1944, commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front,

which participated in the liberation of Belorussia, General of the Army. Subsequently, the commander of the 4th Guards Army, which successfully crossed the Danube, participated in the encirclement and destruction of Budapest. enemy grouping. From April 1945 he was deputy commander of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Led the military operations of the front formations

in the Prague Offensive.

In the postwar years, Georgy Fedorovich commander of the troops of the South Ural and Eastern military districts, head of the "Shot" courses, deputy chief

; Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces.

He made a significant contribution to the development and realities the introduction of new training programs for personnel, taking into account the entry into service of weapons of mass destruction. Author of a number of instructions and manuals, articles in military magazines on issues of operational art and tactics, protection of troops, training of command personnel. , Cavalier of ten orders of the USSR, including two orders

. Suvorov 1st class, Order of Kutuzov 1st class. , (He died on January 26, 1957 in Moscow, where he was buried.

Cherevichenko Yakov Timofeevich

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After the transfer of G. F. Zakharov, the command of the Bryansk

"The front was received by Colonel-General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. s Ya. T. Cherevichenko was born on September 30 (October 12) about '1894 in a peasant family in the village of Novoselovka, now in the Rostov Region. In 1914 he was called up for military service. Participated in battles of the First World War "on the Northern and North-Western fronts as a private, then a senior non-commissioned officer. He was awarded St. George's. "Crosses of three degrees.

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Since November 1917 in Krasnaya [Vardia, since the spring of next year in the Red Army. He graduated from cavalry courses, the Higher Cavalry School, Military-Political Courses, and the MV Frunze Military Academy. During the Civil War, the commander of a platoon, squadron, assistant commander and commander of a cavalry regiment on the southern and southwestern fronts. "Courageous, resolute in actions, caring and demanding commander" - this is how Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny characterized Yakov Timofeevich in 1920.

Since 1927, Ya. T. Cherevichenko was an assistant commander, a year later - commander of the 31st Cavalry Division. From March 1938 he was commander of the 3rd cavalry corps, from June [1940] he was commander of an army cavalry group in the Kiev military district. A month later, he was appointed commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, Colonel General. The initiator of a number of measures to prepare subordinate formations and units to repel the invasion of German and Romanian troops, as a result of which most of the border formations reached the designated areas in a timely manner according to the plan for covering the state border.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Ya. T. Cherevichenko led defensive battles on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, being commander of the 9th Army. Since September 1941 - commander of the 21st Army of the Southwestern Front, which covered the Kharkov direction. Since October 1941 -

commander of the troops of the Southern Front, who conducted a defensive operation in the Rostov-on-Don region. Since December 1941 - Commander of the Bryansk Front, which participated in the counteroffensive and the general offensive of the Soviet troops as part of the Battle of Moscow.

Subsequently, he was commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces, deputy commander of the troops of the Crimean, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts. In September-December 1943, Commander Harr

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Kovsky military district. Since January 1944, at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, then - the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front. He took an active part in the preparation and conduct of the Berlin operation.

In the postwar years, Ya. T. Cherevichenko was commander of the 7th Rifle Corps, assistant commander of the Tauride Military District. Since 1950 in stock.

He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Kutuzov, II degree and Suворov, II degree, and the Order of the Red Star. In 1941-1946 he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

He died on July 4, 1976 in Moscow, where he was buried
nen.

Artemiev Pavel Artemevich

For the direct defense of Moscow, the Moscow Defense Zone was created, the commander of which was appointed Lieutenant General P. A. Artemyev.

P. A. Artemiev was born on December 17 (29), 1897 in the village of Lisichkino, Starorussky district, Novgorod province.

In the Red Army since July 1918. In 1925 he graduated from the Higher Border School of the OGPU, in 1938 - from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, in 1949 - courses at the Higher Military Academy named after K.E. Voroshilov.

Member of the [civil war: miner, political instructor of the company. In subsequent years, he served in the organs of the OGPU. Since 1938 - the commander of a separate division of the NKVD. From February 1941 - Head of the Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD, Lieutenant General.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed

Commander of the Moscow Military District. Since July 18 - Commander of the Front of the Mozhaisk line of defense. At the same time, from December 1941 to October 1943, he was commander of the Moscow Defense Zone.

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From August 1941 until the end of the war - Commander of the Moscow Military District. Without showing special abilities as a military leader, he was a good organizer and performer.

After the war, he remained (with a break in 1947-1949) commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General. In 1946-1954 he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in 1952-1956 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After the death of I. V. Stalin, he was transferred to the Ural Military District as a deputy commander.

He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, and three Orders of the Red Banner. two orders of the Red Star.

Died in 1979.

Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

In the Battle of Moscow, armies played a huge role, which, acting as part of the fronts, solved problems in the most important operational areas. Many of them, being placed in extremely difficult conditions, were forced to act almost independently. As a result, the role of army commanders in the battle of Moscow was extremely high.

The 16th Army of the Western Front, commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky, acted in the direction of one of the main enemy attacks.

K. K. Rokossovsky was born on December 9 (21), 1896, in the city of Velikiye Luki, Pskov province, in the family of a railway worker, his father was a Pole, his mother was Russian. After graduating from a four-year city school in Warsaw, Konstantin began his working life. He worked for a confectioner, then at a hosiery factory. Member of the First World War. In August 1914, Konstantin was drafted into the army, a private, then a non-commissioned officer of the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment, and was awarded two St. George's Crosses.

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In the Red Guard since December 1917. From september

In 1918, as part of the 3rd, then the 4th Ural division, he took part in battles with the troops of Kolchak. Since May 1919, commander of the 2nd Cavalry Battalion of the Cavalry Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

After the end of the Civil War, K.K. Rokossovsky served in Transbaikalia in the 5th separate cavalry brigade. Then the instructor of the 1st cavalry division of the MNRA. Returning to Transbaikalia, in October 1928 he was appointed commander of the 5th separate Kuban cavalry brigade, with which he participated in the battles on the CER. In 1930-1931, K.K. Rokossovsky commanded the 7th Samara Cavalry Division in the Belorussian Military District. One of the commanders of the cavalry regiments in this division was G.K. Zhukov. In 1932, Konstantin Konstantinovich returned to Transbaikalia as commander of the 15th Cavalry Division. In 1936, he was appointed commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps stationed in Pskov.

In August 1937, Rokossovsky was arrested. During the investigation, he managed to prove his innocence. In March 1940, Rokossovsky's "case" was terminated, he was fully restored in his rights and offered to take command of the same 5th cavalry corps. Since December 1940, Major General. Soon he was appointed commander of the 9th mechanized corps.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 9th Mechanized Corps participated in the unsuccessful counterattack of the Southwestern Front in the Brody area. |

From 1 July 1941 - commander of an army group, from July 22 - commander of the 16th Army on the Western Front. He participated in the battle of Smolensk, the defense of Vyazma, defensive battles on the Mozhaisk line of defense in the Volokolamsk direction. There, he countered the powerful tank attack of the enemy with a deep and flexible anti-tank defense, activity

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and maneuver. In the course of the counteroffensive, in order to develop success, he created two mobile groups in the army, reasonably combined a frontal attack with a bypass and coverage of the enemy's flanks. During the fighting in the Sukhinichi area, Rokossovsky was seriously wounded.

On July 14, 1942, K.K. Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front, and two and a half months later he took command of the Don Front, which played a major role in the Battle of Stalingrad. Together with the armies of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, the troops under his command participated in breaking through the enemy defenses and encircling the 330,000th group of Nazi troops.

near Stalingrad. Then Konstantin Konstantinovich was entrusted with completing the liquidation of the encircled TROOPS.

In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central Front, commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky, in the course of a fierce seven-day defensive battle, managed to repel the offensive of the enemy strike force, and then go on the counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, drive the enemy out of the Oryol salient.

In the battle for the Dnieper, the Central Front, having carried out the Chernigov-Pripyat operation from August 26 to September 30, 1943, defeated the 2nd German army and successively crossed the Desna, Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, creating conditions for an offensive in Pravoberezhnaya Ukraine and in Belarus.

In the autumn and winter of 1943-1944, the troops led by Rokossovsky carried out a number of operations that diverted enemy forces from the Right-Bank Ukraine, where the main events of the winter-spring campaign of 1944 took place, and created the conditions for conducting subsequent operations in Belarus.

In the grandiose Belarusian strategic operation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front became the decisive force in the defeat of the enemy Army Group Center. They are about

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conducted three major operations (Bobruisk, Minsk and Lublin-Brest), went to the Vistula and Warsaw. The operational bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula were captured. During this operation, K.K. Rokossovsky became a Marshal and Hero of the Soviet Union.

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, Konstantin Konstantinovich commanded the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. His troops participated in the East Prussian, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations, completing, together with other Soviet fronts, the defeat of the armies of fascist Germany.

Great was the contribution to the victory of Marshal Rokossovsky. The front-line formations led by him in the period from November 19, 1942 to May 8, 1945 liberated a territory of more than 240 thousand square kilometers. The troops under his command completely defeated three German armies and defeated the formations of three more armies.

Rokossovsky was one of the first commanders in whose troops defensive positions began to be equipped with continuous trenches and communications. As a World War I soldier, he not only understood but

felt the urgent need to use her experience in terms of the engineering equipment of the area. That is why in the 16th Army, which he commanded in the Battle of Moscow, separate rifle trenches at the forefront were connected by trenches and communications. A year and a half later, on the Central Front, each tactical and operational echelon began to have its own position or defensive line, fully equipped in terms of fortification. In the troops of Rokossovsky in April-June 1943, up to 5 thousand kilometers of trenches and communications were dug. Their density was more than 16 kilometers per kilometer of the defense front. The total depth of defense prepared in terms of engineering was 190 kilometers.

Rokossovsky paid special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense. He was the first to build

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it on the basis of anti-tank areas, combined into anti-tank sections. In the Battle of Kursk, anti-tank strongholds, combined into anti-tank areas, covered the entire zone of the expected enemy offensive with a continuous "carpet". As a result, the fascist tanks completely lost the ability to maneuver, encountering everywhere dense anti-tank fire, anti-tank artillery reserves and mobile obstacle detachments.

The military talent of Konstantin Konstantinovich manifested itself most clearly in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations on the fronts he led. Starting with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, troops under the command of Rokossovsky took part in seven major strategic offensive operations (Stalingrad, Oryol, Chernigov-Poltava, Belorussian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, Berlin), within which 11 front-line offensive operations were carried out. In addition, he conducted five independent front-line operations (combat operations in the Sevs direction, Gomel-Rechitskaya, Kalinkovichi-Mozyr, Rogachev-Zhlobinskaya, Serotskaya offensive operations).

Troops under the command of Rokossovsky operated mainly on the decisive sectors of the Soviet German front. At the same time, in essence, all operations were prepared and carried out in a complex operational-strategic situation.

Rokossovsky often had to prepare an offensive within a limited time frame. Lack of time did not allow revealing the forces and grouping of the opposing enemy with sufficient completeness and reliability, and commanders and staffs did not always have time to organize interaction. In a number of cases, tasks that

were determined to the front by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, were greatly overestimated. Despite all this, the troops under the command

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K.K. Rokossovsky in the vast majority of operations achieved the goal.

Konstantin Konstantinovich always knew how to choose the method of defeating the enemy that suited the situation. Preference was given to cutting the enemy grouping by striking in several directions, one of which was the main one. At the same time, he successfully carried out a number of operations to encircle and subsequently destroy the enemy.

K.K. Rokossovsky paid special attention to the destruction of enemy defenses by fire. For the first time, maximum densities of guns and mortars were created in the troops of its fronts, artillery support was carried out with a single and double fire shaft, aviation was used mainly to support the offensive and escort infantry and tanks in the depths of enemy defenses with massive strikes of bomber and attack aircraft. Marshal did not spare shells and bombs, but spared the life of a soldier...

Rokossovsky, one of the few Soviet commanders of that period, refused to use tank formations and formations as a battering ram to break through the enemy's main line of defense, using them as echelons for developing the success of combined arms armies and the front.

In the course of offensive operations, Konstantin Konstantinovich demonstrated various methods of influencing the troops in order to unconditionally fulfill the tasks assigned to him. The most rapid and effective was the defeat of the enemy by air strikes. For example, on July 16, 1943, during the Kromsko-Oryol operation, the troops of the 13th Army, advancing in the direction of the main blow of the front, met stubborn resistance from the Nazi troops in the area of the settlements of Kunach and Kudeyarovo. By order of the front commander, aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered three massive strikes against enemy strongholds,

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having flown over 1300 sorties. The next day, facilitating the advance of the 3rd Panzer Corps of the 2nd Panzer Army, the front's aviation inflicted massive strikes on the Nazis in the areas of Arkhangelskoye, Ozerki, Vesely Berezhok, Ochki, Sokolniki. In the following days, Konstantin Konstantinovich also repeatedly

directed the 16th Air Army to actively support the advancing troops. In accordance with the instructions of the Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force of July 24, 1943, the experience of massive strikes of the 16th Air Army was also widely used in other air armies.

K. K. Rokossovsky was distinguished by a special style of working with subordinates. Konstantin Konstantinovich, with his usual tact, skillfully directed the work of the members of the Front's Military Council. He has always worked in a team and with a team. With this method, everyone felt like an active and direct participant in the decision-making, joined in what can be conditionally called the deep meaning of the plan, was imbued with a comprehensive understanding of its validity, feasibility, and, consequently, a sense of personal responsibility for its implementation. This helped the marshal to make optimal decisions even in the most difficult combat situation and to achieve their implementation.

'Taking into account the vast experience and outstanding services of K. K. Rokossovsky, I. V. Stalin trusted him and G. K. Zhukov to hold the historic Victory Parade, which took place in Moscow on Red Square on June 24, 1945.

After the end of the war, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky from 1945 to 1949 was the commander-in-chief of the Northern Group of Forces. In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet side, he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the INR, he was awarded the military rank of Marshal of Poland, he was elected a member

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Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP and a deputy of the Seimas. Upon his return to the USSR In 1956, K. K. Rokossovsky was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, and from October of the following year, when the international situation worsened, he was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962, he was Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. From April 1962, he became Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945), holder of the Order of Victory, seven Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, twelve foreign orders. He was also awarded the Honorary Golden Weapon with the image of the State Emblem of the USSR,

He died on August 3, 1968, was buried in Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich

During the battle near Moscow, the 1st shock army was commanded by Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov. He was born on January 15, 1894 in the village of Usolka, Cherdynsky district, Perm region. He served in the Russian army from 1915. In 1916 he graduated from the school of ensigns, second lieutenant. Head of the scout team.

In the Red Army since August 1918. In 1926 he graduated from the Shooting and tactical courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Red Army "Shot" them. Comintern, in 1929 - advanced training courses for command personnel, in 1936 - the Special Faculty of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

During the [Civil War] company commander, battalion and infantry regiment. Participated in battles against the troops of Admiral Kolchak and General Wrangel on the Eastern and Southern fronts. Since 1924, the commander of the infantry

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regiment, division and corps of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces. In 1938, V. I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 3rd Army of the Western Special Military District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 3rd Army of the Western Front under the command of V.I. Kuznetsov fought hard battles with superior enemy forces in frontier defensive battles. From August 1941 he was commander of the 21st Army of the Bryansk (since | September of the Southwestern) Front, whose troops fought defensive battles in the area of the cities of Konotop, Chernigov and Kyiv. In October-November 1941, V.I. Kuznetsov was commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District. From November 2, simultaneously commander of the 58th Army of the Supreme Command Headquarters reserve.

From November 23, 1941, V. I. Kuznetsov was the commander of the 1st shock army, which was concentrated in the area of Dmitrov, Ignatovo, Zagorsk. Its units, advanced to the Yakhroma region, defeated the advance detachment of the enemy's 7th Panzer Division, which had crossed to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga Canal. In early December, the army under the command of V.I. Kuznetsov as part of the Western Front, in cooperation with the 20th Army, launched a series of counterattacks from the Dmitrov, Lobnya line to Solnechnogorsk, which made it possible to stop the advance of the Nazi troops to Moscow from the north and northwest. With the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive near Moscow, the army under the command of V. I. Kuznetsov took part in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Rzhev-Vyazemsk offensive operations.

In mid-January 1942, the 20th Army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, regrouped in the area southeast of Staraya Russa. On February 2, the army was transferred to the North-Western Front and participated in the Demyanskaya offensive operation. Since June 1942, V. I. Kuznetsov has been commander of the 63rd Army of the Stalingrad (since September 1942 - Don) Front, whose troops distinguished themselves in fierce defensive battles in the distant

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and near approaches to Stalingrad. From November 1942 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front, from December 1942 he was commander of the 1st Guards Army of the same front (from October 1943 - the 3rd Ukrainian), whose formations liberated the Don Bass. From December 1943 he was deputy commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front. On March 16, 1945, the commander of the 3rd shock army, which in mid-March was withdrawn to the reserve of the 1st Belorussian Front, regrouped to the river. Oder to the area north of Zeden, where it received the defense line of the 47th Army. In early April, after the transfer of the defense zone to the 61st Army, it was regrouped in the Berlin direction.

In the Berlin Offensive Operation, the 3rd Shock Army advanced as part of the front's main strike force. During five days of intense fighting, its troops broke the enemy's resistance and on April 21, they were among the first to break into the northwestern outskirts of Berlin. On April 28, they stormed the center of resistance in the Maobit prison area and freed about 7,000 prisoners. On April 29, soldiers of the 79th Rifle Corps of the Army crossed the Spree River and, repulsing the enemy's furious counterattacks, began to capture the Reichstag and hoisted a banner over it. For his personal courage and courage in the operations of the Great Patriotic War, V. I. Kuznetsov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, V. I. Kuznetsov, commander of the 3rd strike army. Since 1948, chairman of the Central Council of the DOSARM (since August 1951 - the USSR). Since 1953, commander of the Volga Military District. From June 1957 he conducted scientific work at the General Staff. Retired since September 1960. He died on June 20, 1964 in Moscow.

He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov [degrees, medals, as well as foreign orders.

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Purkaev Maxim Alekseevich

During the Battle of Moscow, the 3rd Shock Army was commanded by Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev.

M. A. Purkaev was born on August 14 (26), 1894 in the village of Nalitovo in Mordovia in the family of a military doctor. Graduated from the classical gymnasium. In 1915 he was called up for military service. After completing his studies at the ensign school, he was sent as a platoon commander to the 164th reserve rifle regiment in the city of Sarapul. In March 1917 he was elected to the regimental committee.

Since May 1918 in the Red Army. The commander of a rifle company, then a battalion on the Eastern Front. Participated in the battles for Simbirsk, Samara, Buguruslan, Orsk. From August 1919 he was assistant commander, a month later - commander of the regiment of the 24th Samara Iron Division on the Southern and Western fronts. Certified as a "competent, proactive, resolute in actions, strong-willed boss, enjoying business authority among his subordinates

nennyh".

In 1923 he graduated from the Higher Tactical Shooting Courses "Shot", in 1936 - from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. Commander and commissar of the regiment, assistant chief and chief of staff of the division, head of department and deputy chief of staff of the military district. Since 1938, the commander of an infantry division. A year later, he was appointed chief of staff of the Belarusian military district, major general. In 1939, the military attaché in Germany. From July 1940 he was chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District. According to I. Kh. Baghramyan (then head of the operations department of the headquarters), "he knows his business very well, very organized, punctual, very self-possessed, hardworking and sympathetic military leader." Since January 1941, lieutenant general.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, M.A. Purkaev was the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front (June-July 1941). At the end of July, he was sent to the group of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, leading

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formation and training of redundant connections

. on the territory of the Volga Military District. From November - 1941 - commander of the 60th Army, which is equipped

shaft defensive line on the left bank of the Volga.

At the end of December 1941, the 60th Army was transformed into the 3rd Shock Army, which fought as part of

Northwestern and Kalinin fronts.

From August 1942 - commander of the troops of Kali-

, ninsk front. Under his leadership, the troops successfully

solved tasks in the Toropetsko-Kholmetskaya and Velikolukskaya operations, for which he was awarded the rank of colonel general.

, Since April 1943, the commander of the Dalnevo troops

sewage, from August 2, 1945 - the 2nd Far Eastern Front. Since October 26, 1944 General of the Army. Did a lot of work on the preparation and conduct of the operation for

,to defeat the Japanese TROOPS in Manchuria, as well as to master

Goddess of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In the postwar years, Maxim Alekseevich, commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Military District (September

`` October 1945 - January 1947), chief of staff - lane

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far

: East. Since July 1952, the head of the Office of Higher

, military educational institutions of the Military Ministry of the USSR

=. .

_ Under his leadership, the reform of military academies and schools was carried out, taking into account the reduction in the number of the Soviet Armed Forces and their rearmament.

Cavalier of eight orders of the USSR, including Suvorov of the 1st degree and Kutuzov of the 1-th degree. Significant

,; the number of articles in military journals on issues of military art.

Died | January 1953 in Moscow.

Golikov Philip Ivanovich

With the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive under

Moscow on the right wing of the Western Front in the area

Tula was advancing by the 10th Army of Lieutenant General F. I. Polikova.

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F. I. Golikov was born on July 16 (29), 1900 in the village of Borisovo, Tobolsk province, in the family of a rural feldsher. Educated at the gymnasium in the city of Kamys

love.

In the Red Army since 1918. Since the same year, a member of the RCP (b). In 1919 he graduated from military agitation courses in Petrograd, in 1929 advanced training courses for command personnel. In 1931, a military school; in 1933, the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze (in absentia). Member of the Civil War as part of the volunteer communist rifle regiment "Red Eagles", 10th rifle regiment. Since August 1919, he was an instructor-organizer in the Literary Department of the 51st Infantry Division.

Subsequently, until 1931, in party political work, then commander of the 95th rifle regiment, 61st rifle division, 8th separate mechanized brigade, 45th mechanized corps. Since 1938, a member of the Military Council of the Belarusian Military District, the following year - the commander of the Vinnitsa Group of Forces, the commander of the 6th Army, at the head of which he solved tasks in Western Ukraine. Since July 1940, Deputy Chief of the General Staff - Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General. He made a certain contribution to organizing the receipt and analysis of information about the preparation [of Germany for a war against the USSR, but could not achieve the implementation of this information in practice. He obviously followed the lead of the Soviet leadership that [Germany would not attack the USSR in the near future

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, F. I. Golikov was the head of the Soviet military delegation in England and the USA on military supplies. Since October 1941, he was commander of the 10th Army of the Western Front, which participated in the December counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. The first offensive operation of the 10th Army lasted eight days. During this time she advancing on the move in a strip from 115 to 35 kilometers, advanced 60 kilometers to the west and

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, liberated a number of settlements, including the city of Mikhailov. Favorable conditions were created for the further actions of the Soviet troops on the Kaluga

board. The average rate of advance of the formations of the 10th Army was 7.5 kilometers per day and was 1.5-2 times

- higher than in other armies of the Western Front during the period of

: beginning of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow.

— Since February 1942, F. I. Golikov - commander

. 4th Shock Army, from April - commander of the Bryansk, from July - the Voronezh Front. In August-September, commander of the 1st Guards Army, from October 1942 commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front. Member of the Battle of Stalingrad. Successfully led troops in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation to encircle and destroy a large enemy grouping.

Since April 1943, Colonel-General, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Personnel, since May - Head of the Main Directorate of Personnel, since October 1944, simultaneously authorized by the Council of People's Commissars for the repatriation of citizens of the USSR. He tried to organize the export to the USSR of all persons displaced during the war. The overwhelming majority of those who returned were accused of collaborating with the enemy and sent to concentration camps.

In the postwar years - commander of a separate mechanized army, head of the Military Academy

° missions of the armored forces, in 1958-1962 the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Under his leadership, a number of measures were taken to improve the political and moral

, of the state of the troops. Since 1961 Marshal of the Soviet

, Union.

' Cavalier of fourteen domestic and eleven foreign orders, including four Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, 1st degree. Awarded with Honorary Gold

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weapons depicting the State Emblem of the USSR Author of a number of memoirs. He died on July 29, 1980 and was buried in Moscow.

Efremov Mikhail Grigorievich

During the battle near Moscow, the 33rd Army of the Western Front was commanded by Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov.

M. G. Efremov was born on March 7, 1897 in the city of Tara, Kaluga Region. In the Russian army since 1915, ensign. In the Red Army since February 1918. He graduated from the training team (1915), the Telavi School of Ensigns (1916), the Higher Military Academic Courses (1922), the advanced training courses for the highest commanding staff of the Red Army (1928), the special faculty of one-man commanders of the Military-Political Academy (1930), the Military Academy named after . M. V. Frunze (1933). Member of the First World War.

During the Civil War, he fought on the Southern and Caucasian fronts - commander of a rifle company, battalion, regiment, brigade, head of a rifle division, head combat section of the 11th Army railway. commander and commissar of the Special Separate Corps, detachment of armored trains.

In the interwar period, commander of an infantry division and corps, military adviser in China in 1927. From May 1937, commander of the Volga military districts, from November 1937 - Transbaikal, from July 1938 - Orlovsky, from June 1940 - North Caucasian, from August 1940 - Transcaucasian military districts. Since January 1941 - 1st Deputy Inspector General of the Infantry of the Red Army.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, in his former position, from July 1941 he was commander of the 21st Army, which fought defensive and offensive battles with the Nazi troops in the Mogilev direction as part of the Western Front. Army troops under

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commanded by M. G. Efremov, in stubborn defensive battles, repelled the offensive of superior enemy forces near Rogachev and Zhlobin, as well as in the battle of Smolensk. At the end of July, the formations of the army as part of the Central Front chained up significant forces of the German fascist troops and delayed their advance before the Dnieper.

On August 7, M. G. Efremov was appointed commander of the troops of the Central Front at a difficult moment when the German-Fapgist troops launched an offensive against Gomel. Only as a result of 10 days of fierce fighting, the Nazis managed to capture the city, while suffering heavy losses. Almost until the end of August 1941, the troops of the front under the command of M. G. Efremov held back

bring down the superior forces of the enemy, preventing them from striking the flank and rear of the Southwestern Front. In September - Deputy Commander of the Bryansk Front, since October - Commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. During these battles, in the most difficult year of the war, M. G. Efremov showed personal courage, courage, and the ability to manage combined arms formations and formations in difficult operational conditions. The troops of the army took part in the Mozhaish-Maloyaroslavets defensive operation. By October 24, 1941, they stopped the enemy on the Nara River. In early December, in cooperation with the 5th Army of the front, the army troops in intense battles defeated a grouping of German fascist troops that had broken through north and south of Na-ro-Fominsk in the direction of Aprelevka, and restored the defenses of the time. Nara.

In December 1941 - April 1942, the army under the command of General M. G. Efremov participated in the counteroffensive near Moscow and the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction, during which they liberated the city of Naro-Fominsk, Borovsk and Vereya. By the beginning of February, the army entered the area southeast of Vyazma and, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Cavalry

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Ryan corps tried to seize the city on the move. With strong counterattacks, the enemy cut off part of the army's forces from the main forces of the Western Front. Operating behind enemy lines, the troops of the 33rd Army, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Cavalry, 4th Airborne Corps and partisan detachments, held a vast area, holding down significant forces of the Nazi troops. In April, during a breakthrough of army troops from the encirclement near the village of Zhary, Vyazemsky district, Smolensk region, M. G. Efremov was seriously wounded. On April 19, 1942, he committed suicide to avoid capture. For courage and heroism shown during the Great Patriotic War in the fight against the Nazi invaders, in 1996 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Red Banner of the Azerbaijan SSR, and the medal "XX Years of the Red Army".

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich

During the battle near Moscow, the 5th Army, which was defending in the direction of Mozhaish, Kubinka, was commanded by Major General D. D. Lelyushenko. He was born on October 20 (November 2), 1901 on the Novokuznetsk farm in the Don region in a large peasant family.

Since the spring of 1918, in the partisan detachment of B. M. Dumenko, then in the 1st Cavalry Army. Junior Commander. Participated in battles against the troops of Mamontov, Shkuro, Wrangel, as well as in the Soviet-Polish war. For military distinctions he was awarded three certificates of honor of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army.

In 1921 he graduated from the courses of red commanders, in 1925 from the Leningrad Military-Political School, in 1927 from the Cavalry School for Commanding Staff, and in 1933 from the MV Frunze Military Academy.

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Commander of a rifle platoon, rifle company, rifle battalion of a rifle regiment, cavalry brigade. In the Soviet-Finnish war, the commander of a tank brigade. April 7, 1940 "for skillful actions and personal courage" was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1940 he was appointed commander of the [th Proletarian Moscow Division, major general.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 21st mechanized corps, deputy head of the Main Armored Directorate.

From the autumn of 1941 he was commander of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, which fought in the Oryol-Tula direction. Then - the commander of the 5th Army, which was defending in the Mozhaisk direction. In October he was seriously wounded and left for treatment. Since November 1941 - commander of the 30th Army, which held the defense on the near approaches to the capital, and then participated in the counteroffensive in the Dmitrov-Klin direction.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, he commanded the 1st, 3rd Guards Combined Arms Armies, 4th Tank (4th Guards) Army. Member of the Battle of Kursk, Voroshilovgrad, Zaporozhye, Nikopol operations, forcing the Dniester, battles in the Carpathians, Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague offensive operations. On April 6, 1945 he was again awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. From November 1942 Lieutenant General. According to Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, "one of the prominent military leaders, who well understands the nature of the armed struggle, skillfully used, taking into account the situation, both maneuver and military cunning, as well as other methods of dealing with a strong opponent TIVNIKOOM."

In the postwar years, Dmitry Danilovich graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Commander of the mechanized army, armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in [Germany, Colonel General. Commander since 1956

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troops of the Trans-Baikal and Ural military districts. Since 1959 General of the Army. In 1960-1964, Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Cavalier of sixteen orders of the USSR, including six Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov, 1st Class, and two Orders of Kutuzov, 1st Class, and the Order of Bogdan Khmelnytsky, 1st Class. Hero of Czechoslovakia (since 1970). Author of a number of military historical works and memoirs.

Died July 20, 1987. He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

Govorov Leonid Alexandrovich

During the battle near Moscow, after the wounding of General D. D. Lelyushenko, Major General L. A. Govorov took command of the 5th Army of the Western Front.

L. A. Govorov was born on February 10 (22), 1897 in the village of Butyrki, Vyatka province, into the family of Alexander Grigoryevich Govorov, a clerk of a real school. Educated in a real school in Yelabuga. In 1916 he entered the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, in the same year he was called up for military service, the following year he graduated from the Konstantinovsky Artillery School, second lieutenant. In March 1918 demobilization

called.

He returned to his homeland. In October 1918, when the city of Yelabuga was captured by the Whites, he was mobilized into the Kolchak army. In October of the following year, with a part of the battery soldiers, he fled to Tomsk and went over to the side of the Red Army. In the Red Army since the beginning of 1920. Member of the battles with the White Guards on the Southern and Eastern fronts, commander of the artillery battalion of the 51st Infantry Division, then chief of artillery of this division.

After the end of the Civil War, L. A. Govorov occupied the positions of chief of artillery fortified

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district, and then - the chief of artillery of rifle corps. In 1933 he graduated from the MV Frunze Military Academy in absentia.

In 1936, brigade commander L.A. Govorov became a student of the first intake of the Academy of the General Staff, but

six months before graduation, in 1938, he was appointed as a teacher of tactics at the Artillery Academy named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky. In 1940, during the Soviet-Finnish war, L. A. Govorov was appointed to the post of chief of staff of artillery of the 7th Army of the North-Western Front. Since May 1941, Major-General L. A. Govorov has headed the Academy named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

In July 1941, L. A. Govorov was sent to the Soviet-German front. First, he commands the artillery of the Western Direction, and then the Reserve Front. Since October 1941, he has been deputy commander of the Mozhaisk line of defense. In October 1941, at a time when the situation near Moscow was critical for the Soviet troops, the commander of the 5th Army, General D. D. Le Lyushenko, was seriously wounded. L. A. Govorov was appointed the new commander. The fighters of his army take the fight on the famous Borodino field, where they managed to detain the enemy for five days. A large role in this battle was played by skillfully organized anti-tank areas and strongholds located on the most probable directions of action of enemy tank groupings.

Then the troops of the 5th Army distinguished themselves during the counteroffensive near Moscow in the Istra and Zvenigorod directions, liberated Mozhaisk and reached the approaches to the city the actions of the troops of the army he led in the counteroffensive, and then in the general winter offensive of the Soviet Army, were highly marked by the Motherland. Twice during this period Leonid Aleksan

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Drovich was awarded the Order of Lenin. By a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of November 19, 1941, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general of artillery.

In April 1942, L. A. Govorov was appointed commander of a group of troops of the Leningrad Front, and in June - commander of the troops of this front, already the fifth in a row since the beginning of the war. Of the 900-day heroic defense of Leningrad, over 670 days he directly led the troops defending the city. During the defense of Leningrad, he joined the ranks of the CPSU (b).

L. A. Govorov was the first in the Great Patriotic War in the defense of Leningrad to use a system of continuous trenches on the scale of a front-line association. It connected individual defensive positions, lines and areas into a single whole. This gave stability to the defense, ensured covert maneuver of forces and assets along the front and from the depths, and made it possible to quickly concentrate troops on threatened axes.

L. A. Govorov, being a professional artilleryman, was a master of fire destruction of the enemy, organizing the combat use of large masses of artillery to solve a wide variety of tasks. It is no coincidence that during the war the reputation of the artillery was fixed behind the Leningrad front. There were good reasons for this. It was the artillery, having disrupted the assault on the city, that forced the enemy to switch to positional defense. Then she successfully resisted long-range enemy batteries, which kept the city at gunpoint. Artillery operations were of paramount importance even when the Soviet troops, who went on the offensive, had to break into reinforced concrete fortifications, deeply echeloned defensive belts with which the enemy surrounded Leningrad.

Soon the offensive tactics of the Leningrad gunners brought tangible results. Already in the second half of 1942, the enemy fired only 7679 shells into the city, while in the first three months - more than 20 thousand. The damage caused to Leningrad was reduced

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not only by reducing the intensity of shelling, but also because the enemy had to spend most of the shells on counter-battery combat. As a result, many thousands of human lives, huge material and cultural values, including outstanding monuments of history and architecture, were saved.

On January 12, 1943, a historic battle began, which became one of the brightest pages of the battle for Leningrad in the biography of General L. A. Govorov. The fighting began with a simultaneous throw across the Neva on the ice of four divisions after a hurricane of fire from all the artillery concentrated by TGovorov. For seven days, with unrelenting stubbornness, Soviet troops advanced both from the Neva and from behind Ladoga. The severity of the fighting can be judged by the rate of advance—1-2 kilometers a day, although the fighting did not stop for a minute even at night. Finally, the day came on January 18, 1943. On this day, the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts met. The military and political resonance of this victory of the Soviet troops was enormous. After that, the troops of the Leningrad Front began to prepare an operation to completely unblock Leningrad. In the midst of the preparations for the operation, good news came: L. A. Govorov was awarded the rank of army general by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

In January 1944, troops under the command of L. A. Gorov successfully carried out the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky offensive operation. In 17 days they advanced 70-100 kilometers from Leningrad, liberated Pushkin, Krasnogvardeysk, and other cities and reached the line

the Luga River, in its lower reaches, and in some areas they forced it. A serious defeat was inflicted on the 18th Army of Army Group North. In June of the same year, the Leningrad Front carried out the Vyborg operation to defeat the enemy grouping on the Karelian Isthmus. Based on the results of these operations, by Decree of June 18, 1944, L. A. Govorov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

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In the fall of 1944, the troops under the command of Govorov participated in the Baltic operation, in addition, in close cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, they carried out the Moonsund landing operation.

Remaining commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front until the end of the Great Patriotic War, L. A. Govorov, from October 1, 1944, simultaneously coordinated the actions of his own, as well as the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts. At the end of the war, the military talent and personal courage of Leonid Aleksandrovich were awarded the "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Victory.

The post-war activity of L. A. Govorov was just as fruitful and versatile. From July 1945 to April 1946 he was the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, the chief inspector of the Dry Way Troops, then, from April 1946 to July 1948, the chief inspector of the Armed Forces of the USSR

The next eight years of service of Leonid Aleksandrovich are connected with the Air Defense Forces. He happened to direct the air defense of the state during the critical periods of its post-war reorganizations. In 1948, Govorov was appointed commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country, and since May 1950, at the same time, he was the Deputy Minister of War of the USSR. In May 1954, Govorov became the commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country - Deputy Minister of Defense. Leonid Aleksandrovich worked in this position until the end of his life.

The motherland highly appreciated the merits of Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov. In addition to the Star of the Hero and the Order of Victory, Leonid Aleksandrovich was awarded five Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov [degrees], the Order of Kutuzov [degrees], the Order of the Red Star, and many medals.

L. A. Govorov died on March 19, 1955 after a severe long illness. The urn with his ashes is buried in the Kremlin wall.

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Lukin Mikhail Filippovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin commanded the 19th and 20th armies.

M.F. Lukin was born on November 6, 1892 in the village of Poluhtino, Zubtsovsky District, Tver Region. He was drafted into the Russian army in 1913. During the First World War in 1915 he graduated from the 5th Moscow School of Ensigns. Fought on the Western Front, company commander. He was awarded the orders of St. Vladimir 4th degree, St. Anna 4th degree, St. Stanislav 3rd degree.

In the Red Army in 1918. In 1918 he graduated from the courses of scouts at the Field Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army. During the Civil War, battalion commander, assistant chief of a rifle division, commander of a rifle regiment, commander of a rifle brigade, chief of staff of the 1st Cavalry Division. After another wound, he became the commander of a rifle regiment and brigade. Awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

In the interwar years, M. F. Lukin in 1925 and 1931 completed advanced training courses for senior officers at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. He held the positions of head of infantry courses (Lubny), assistant commander of a rifle division. Since 1923 - chief of staff of a rifle division, since 1924 - head of the combat department of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district. Since 1927, he was the head of the 1st department of the Directorate for the command and command staff of the Red Army. Since 1929 - commander of a rifle division, since 1935 - commandant of Moscow. From December 1937 - Deputy Chief, then - Chief of Staff, from December 1939 - Deputy Commander of the Siberian Military District. From June 1940 - Commander of the 16th Army of the Siberian Military District, Lieutenant General.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the 16th Army was transferred to the Western Front in mid-July 1941. Participated in the battle of Smolensk. In

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In the second half of July, army formations fought heavy defensive battles on the outskirts of Smolensk, then they were surrounded. On August 2, the remnants of the troops of the 16th Army managed to break through the encirclement and unite with the main forces of the front:

During the Battle of Smolensk on August 20, M.F. Lukin was appointed commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front, which fought stubborn defensive battles in the south

her Yartsevo. For skillful actions in the battle of Smolensk, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

From September 10, 1941, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front, whose troops, together with formations of the 20th, 24th and 32nd armies, were surrounded in early September in the area west of Vyazma. I.F. Lukin was instructed to organize a general withdrawal of troops from the encirclement. But while solving this problem, on October 14, he was seriously wounded and captured.

At first he was treated in German hospitals, and since 1943 he was in prisoner of war camps. While in captivity, he was repeatedly interrogated. The Nazis did not hope to involve the general in their plans to create a collaborative Rationist government. In particular, on December 12, 1942, M.F. Lukin said: "Answering the question why the Red Army and the Russian people, despite their hatred of the Soviet system, continue to resist and are not going to drive out the hated government, I must be very frank about to you. Bolshevism is an international and Jewish phenomenon alien to the Russian people... Land is promised to the peasants, and participation in industrial production is promised to the workers. The peasants and workers were deceived. If the peasants today have nothing, and in the best case (as in Siberia) receive 4 kilograms of grain in one working day, if the worker receives an average of 300-500 rubles a month (and cannot buy anything with this money), if poverty and terror reign everywhere, it is not difficult to understand that people would gratefully accept their liberation from Bolshevik oppression ... Despite all this, I do not believe in the possibility of any organized

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no spontaneous uprising in Russia. Too much blood has been shed by the people. All those who have risen against the Red authorities for two decades have been destroyed, burned or died out ... "But then M.F. Lukin expressed firm confidence in the high patriotic feelings of the Soviet people. "Red rulers are not friends, but an enemy is an enemy. Therefore, blood is shed on both sides," the general summed up. Later, the transcripts of these rather frank conversations ended up in the hands of the Soviet command.

M. F. Lukin was released from captivity by American troops in April 1945 and taken to Parii, and then handed over to the Soviet authorities. From May to December 1945, he was tested by the NKVD in Moscow. G.K. Zhukov gave the following assessment: "General Lukin is one of the outstanding commanders of the past war, his military prowess is comparable to the prowess of the heroes of the war of 1812 - Generals Raevsky and Bagration." He was returned to military service and placed at the disposal of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army. Reserved since November 1946.

Awarded with Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Red Banner of Labor of the Ukrainian SSR, Orders of the Red Star.

He died on May 25, 1970 in Moscow. In October 1993, M. F. Lukin was awarded the title [Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).

Boldin Ivan Vasilievich

During the Battle of Moscow, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin commanded the 50th Army. He was born on August 15, 1892 in the village of Vysokaya in Mordovia. Ivan has been in military service since 1914. Member of the First World War, platoon commander, senior non-commissioned officer.

In the Red Army since 1919. During the Civil War, the commander of a company, battalion, regiment, brigade.

In 1922, I. V. Boldin graduated from the Higher Tactical Rifle School of the Command Staff of the Red Army named after the Comintern,

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in 1926 and 1930 - KUVNAS at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, in 1936 - this academy. In the interwar years, he went from commander of a special purpose unit to commander of a rifle division. From December 1936 he was an inspector of the combat training department of the Red Army, from 1937 he was commander and commissar of a rifle division. In 1938 he was appointed commander of the Kalinin Military District. From September 1939 he was commander of a cavalry-mechanized group that took part in the campaign of the Red Army in Western Belorussia. From October 1939 - Commander of the Odessa Military District. Since July 1940 - Deputy and 1st Deputy Commander of the Western Special Military District.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, I. V. Boldin was the commander of the operational group. Being cut off from the main forces of the front, he withdrew his troops from the encirclement. In October-November 1941 - commander of the 19th Army. Participated in the Vyazemsky defensive operation. The formations of his army fought defensive battles in the conditions of encirclement. Was taken out of the area. From November 1941 to February 1945 - Commander of the 50th Army. As part of the troops of the Western Front, at first he defended Tula, then, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the army launched a counteroffensive.

Since April 1945 - Deputy Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

After the Great Patriotic War I.V. Boldin commander of the army (1946-1951), troops of the Siberian military district (1951-1953), first deputy commander of the Kyiv military district (1953-1958). Since 1958, military consultant to the Group of Inspectors General. Colonel General.

He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner. Orders of Suvorov 1st class, Kutuzov 1st class, two orders of the Red Star.

He died on March 28, 1965 in Kyiv.

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Ershakov Philipp Afanasyevich

During the Battle of Moscow, Lieutenant-General F.A. Ershakov commanded the 20th Army.

F. A. Ershakov was born on January 9 (21), 1893 in the Taganka village of the Pyatnitskaya volost, Vyazemsky district, Smolensk province.

In the Russian army since 1915, ensign. In the Red Army since April 1918. During the Civil War, platoon commander, company commander, battalion commander, rifle regiment commander. Awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

In 1924 he graduated from the Shooting and Tactical Courses named after the Comintern "Shot", in 1930 - the courses of one-man commanders at the Military-Political Academy of the Red Army named after Tolmachev, in 1935 - the Special Faculty of the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M. V. Frunze. From January 1938, on the wave of repressions, he was deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov military district, from June of the same year - commander of the troops of the Ural military district, lieutenant general.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 22nd Army was formed on the basis of the Ural Military District, F.A. Ershakov took over its command. The army was transferred to the Pskov region, fought in the Vitebsk region. Then she fought near Smolensk.

In September-October - commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front. The army fought in the Yartsevo region, in the Vyazemsky defensive operation. In the course of the latter, as a result of the enemy's breakthrough of the Western Front north of Yartsevo and southwest of Yelnya, as well as the entry of his strike groups into the Vyazma region, the army troops were surrounded. Part of the troops was able to break through the encirclement and join with their own. F. A. Ershakov was taken prisoner. He was held in a POW camp near Berlin, where he died of a broken heart in July.

1942.

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Rakutin Konstantin Ivanovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Major General K.I. Rakutin commanded the 24th Army.

He was born on May 21, 1902 in the village of Novinki, Vachsky district, Nizhny Novgorod province. In the Red Army since 1919. Member of the Civil War, company commander of the border division. In 1920 he graduated from the Tambov courses for red commanders, in 1931 from the Higher Border School, in 1937 from the evening faculty of the MV Frunze Military Academy.

In the interwar years, K. I. Rakutin was the commandant of the Okhotsk separate border commandant's office, from 1932 he taught at border schools, then he was the head of the border detachment of the Belarusian border district. Since 1937 - chief of staff of the Leningrad border district. As an assistant commander of the 15th army for the protection of the rear, he participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. In June 1940 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Baltic Border District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was commander of the 31st army of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Civil Code. From July - Commander of the 24th Army of the Reserve Army Front (Reserve Front). Participated in the battle of Smolensk, Elninsk offensive. During the last September 6, army troops liberated the city of Yelnya. Four divisions of the 24th Army (100th, 127th, 153rd and 16th) were the first in the Red Army to receive the honorary title of Guards.

In early October 1941, the enemy succeeded in encircling part of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts, including the 24th Army. K. I. Rakutin died on October 7, 1941, near the village of Semlevo, Vyazemsky district, Smolensk region, during the withdrawal of troops from the encirclement. He was buried in the Snegiri military memorial complex in the Istra district of the Moscow region.

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He was awarded the Order of Lenin (posthumously), the Order of the Red Star, and the Honorary Weapon. Posthumously in May 1990 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Reiter Max Andreevich

During the Battle of Moscow, Lieutenant General M.A. Reiter commanded the 20th Army.

M. A. Reiter was born on April 24, 1886 in Latvia. Graduated from the Libau real school. In the Russian army since 1906. In 1910 he graduated from the Irkutsk military school. During the First World War, he commanded a company, a battalion, was an officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Caucasian Army. At the end of 1917, he fell ill with typhus while in a hospital in the city of Hammerstein (East Prussia), was taken prisoner by the Germans. Released in early 1919, colonel.

In the Red Army since 1919. During the Civil War, he fought with the White Guards and interventionists on the Northern Front, holding positions: adjutant of the regiment, assistant commander and commander of the regiment. He took part in the battles against the Poles (1920), in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising (1921). Since 1921, he commanded a rifle brigade, then he was assistant commander of the 11th arrows of the KOV DIVISION.

He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses for Commanding Officers (1923), advanced training courses for senior commanding staff (1928), the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1935).

In 1924-1929 he was commander of the 2nd Amur and 36th rifle divisions. Member of the Soviet-Chinese armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) (1929). Since December 1929, in defense work in the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. Since 1932, commander of the 73rd Infantry Division of the Siberian Military District, since November 1935, in responsible work in the General Staff. In 1936-1939, M. A. Reiter

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head of the department of the combat training department of the Red Army, since January 1940 assistant, and since July deputy commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Military District.

In the Great Patriotic War, from August 1941, M.A. Reiter was the head of logistics - deputy commander of the troops of the Central and Bryansk fronts. This post showed the high organizational skills of M. A. Reiter, who quickly formed the headquarters of the rear of the front and ensured continuous material and technical support for the troops. In December, he was seriously wounded during the Yelets offensive operation.

After leaving the hospital, M.A. Reiter was appointed commander of the North Caucasian Military District, from February 1942 - assistant commander

troops of the Western Front in formations. In March, M.A. Reiter was appointed commander of the 20th Army of the Western Front, which defended on its right wing and in early August 1942 carried out the Pogorelo-Grodishchensk offensive operation. Army troops broke through behind enemy lines to a depth of more than 40 km. The German historian Kurt von Tippelskirch commented in his book on these events: "The breakthrough was prevented only by the fact that three tank and several infantry divisions, which were already preparing to be transferred to the southern front, were detained. The Russians, having pinned down such a large number of German troops, brought great benefits to their main front.

Since September 1942, M. A. Reiter commanded the troops of the Bryansk Front, which participated in the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya offensive operation. In the course of its conduct, the troops of the front defeated the main forces of the 2nd German Army and the 3rd Army Corps of the 2nd Hungarian Army. Pursuing the enemy retreating on the Kursk line, the troops of the front reached the line Novosil, Maloarkhangelsk. In these operations, the high military skill of M. A. Reiter was manifested,

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his ability to firmly control the troops of the front in difficult conditions of the operational-strategic situation, to carry out counterattacks on the advancing enemy groupings, in combination with a stubborn defense of the lines. On March 12, 1943, the Bryansk Front was abolished, and M.A. Reiter was appointed commander of the Reserve Front. Since June 1943, the commander of the Steppe Military District, which functioned according to the states of the front's field administration and was a pre-prepared formation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Since July 1943, M.A. Reiter was deputy commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front, and since September, commander of the troops of the South Ural Military District.

After the war, M. A. Reiter in his former position. Since January 1946, the head of the Higher tactical shooting courses for the improvement of the command staff "Shot" named after. B. M. Shaposhnikova.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov [degrees, medals.

Sobennikov Petr Petrovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Major General P.P. Sobennikov commanded the 43rd Army. He was born on July 13, 1894 in St. Petersburg. In the Russian army since 1914, ensign. Member of the First World War. In 1916 he graduated from the Nikolaev Cavalry School, cornet,

awarded the George Cross of the 4th degree.

In the Red Army since 1918. Member of the Civil War. He commanded a platoon, a squadron in the cavalry, was the chief of staff of the cavalry division.

After the war, he graduated from the Military Academic Courses for the highest command personnel of the Red Army (1923), advanced training courses for the highest commanding staff of the Red Army (1927). In the interwar period - commander of a cavalry brigade, assistant inspector of the Red Army, inspector of the cavalry of the military district. Since 1937, the commander of the cavalry

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division, since 1939, senior teacher of tactics of the Military Academy of the Red Army named after. M. V. Frunze. From January to March 1940, P. P. Sobennikov participated in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, being at the disposal of the front commander. Since March 1940, he was deputy inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army, since March 1941, commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, army troops under the command of P.P. Sobennikov as part of the Northwestern Front fought heavy defensive battles in the Siauliai direction with a superior enemy, inflicting a number of counterattacks on him. In the area southwest of Siauliai, formations of the 8th Army inflicted significant damage on the enemy tank grouping, destroying up to 300 tanks. Then, holding back the onslaught of the enemy, the troops of the army frustrated the plans of the Hitlerite command to press the Soviet troops to the Gulf of Riga and DESTROY THEM.

From July 3, 1941, he commanded the troops of the Northwestern Western Front, which, retreating to the east, fought against the troops of Army Group North and part of the forces of Army Group Center of the enemy. The armies of the front, holding back the advance of enemy troops on Staraya Russa and Kholm, delivered a series of counterattacks against them near the cities of Soltsy and Staraya Russa.

Since August 1941, P.P. Sobennikov commanded the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front, which participated in the Battle of Smolensk, covering the approaches to Moscow. In early October, the enemy, which had a significant superiority in manpower and means, managed to break through the defenses of the 43rd Army. Its formations were forced to withdraw with heavy fighting to the Mozhaisk line of defense, and then to the river. Nara northwest of Serpukhov. On October 16, 1941, P.P. Sobennikov was removed from his post for the unsuccessful outcome of the battles, deprived of the military rank of Major General and sentenced on probation.

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Since February 1942, P. P. Sobennikov, in the group of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, was engaged in the formation and combat coordination of reserve armies in the areas of the cities of Saratov, Vologda, Ivanovo. Since September, being at the disposal of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front, he participated in the development of the plan for the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation. From November 1942 until the end of the war, Colonel P.P. Sobennikov was deputy commander of the 3rd Army. He distinguished himself in January-March 1943, commanding the operational group of troops of the Bryansk Front, which, acting in isolation from the main forces, captured the Kastornoye region (Kursk region), cut the Orel-Kursk highway and reached the approaches to the city of Kromy. After these events, P.P. Sobennikov's conviction was expunged and he was reinstated in the rank of Major General. Later, as part of the army, P. P. Sobennikov took part in the Orel, Bryansk, Gomel-Rechitsa, Rogachev-Zhlobin, Bobruisk, Minsk, Belostok, Mlav-Elbing and Berlin offensive operations. CPU. P. Sobennikov was often in the corps and divisions of the first echelon of the army, performing the main tasks, and in the event of the incapacitation of their commanders, he often took command of the formations.

After the war, P. P. Sobennikov commanded the army, was deputy commander of the military district, behind the deputy head of the Higher tactical infantry officer advanced training courses for scientific work. Since 1955, he was the head of the Higher Strelts of the Shot tactical advanced training courses for the officers of the Soviet Army, since 1959 he was seconded to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR for research work.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Kutuzov [degree, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky [degree, Suvorov II degree, Patriotic War [degree, medals, as well as foreign orders

us.

He died on August 14, 1960 in Moscow.

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Belov Pavel Alexandrovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Major General P. A. Belov commanded the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

P. A. Belov was born on February 16, 1897 in the city of Shuya, Ivanovo Region. In military service since 1916, in 1917 he graduated from the Kyiv school of ensigns. Participation

fought in World War I as a private hussar
regiment.

In the Red Army since 1918. During the [civil war] he was an instructor in the district department of Vseobuch, commanded a cavalry platoon, a squadron, and was an assistant regiment commander.

After the war - commander of a cavalry regiment (1922-1926).
He graduated from cavalry advanced training courses for senior officers (1927). Appointed commander of a separate cavalry squadron, since 1930 - assistant to the head of the department of the Moscow military district. In 1933 he graduated from the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Since 1931 - for special assignments under S. M. Budyonny, since 1932 - assistant inspector of the Red Army cavalry. Since 1934 - assistant commander, then commander of a cavalry division. From July 1937 - Chief of Staff of the Cavalry Corps. From October 1940 he was commander of a mountain rifle division. Participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the Western Criminal Code Raina. From March 1941 - commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps as part of the Odessa Military District (Southern Front).

At the head of this corps, he met the Great Patriotic War on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. Subsequently, the corps was transferred to the Western Front in the Moscow direction. He fought in the Kashira region against the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group of General G. Guderian. At the end of January 1942, the corps, consisting of five divisions, broke through the enemy defenses along

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Warsaw highway, made a raid behind enemy lines. For five months, the formations of the corps conducted active combat operations on the territory of the Smolensk region, together with units of the airborne assault (Vyazemskaya airborne operation).

In June 1942, P. A. Belov was appointed commander of the 61st Army. After crossing the Dnieper, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1945 he reached the Elbe at the head of the 1st Army.

After the war - Commander of the Don Military District (1945-1946), North Caucasian Military District (1946-1948). In 1949 he graduated from the VAK at the Higher Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov. Commander of the troops of the South Ural military district (1949-1955). Since 1955 - Chairman of the CEC DOSAAF. Retired since 1960.

Colonel General. Hero of the Soviet Union. Awarded with five Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, three Orders of Suvorov | degree, order

Kutuzov 1st degree.

He died on December 3, 1962 in Moscow.

Dovator Lev Mikhailovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Major General L.M. Dovator commanded the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. He was born on February 20, 1903 in the village of Khottino, Vitebsk province in Belarus.

In the Red Army since 1924. In 1925 he graduated from the Military Chemical Courses in Moscow, in 1929 - the Leningrad Cavalry School, in 1939 - the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. After graduating from the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of a cavalry regiment, in November 1939 - chief of staff of a cavalry brigade, in March 1941 - chief of staff of a cavalry division.

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From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - at the disposal of the commander of the Western Front. In August 1941 he was appointed commander of a cavalry group, which in November was renamed the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. For skillful command and control of troops during the Smolensk defensive battle, he was awarded the rank of major general. In December, during the counteroffensive, the corps was introduced into a breakthrough near the city of Zvenigorod. Killed in action on the Western Front on December 19, 1941, near the village of Pelash Kino, Ruza District, Moscow Region. Posthumously a few days later he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

He was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and the Red Star.

Pliev Issa Alexandrovich

During the battle near Moscow, Major General I.A. Pliyev commanded the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. He was born on November 12 (25), 1903 in the village of Old Bako-Yurt (Ossetia). Educated in Vladi Caucasian real school. For a short time he worked as an employee in one of the departments of the city government. In 1922 he was drafted into the Red Army. Private of the Special Purpose Detachment of the Separate Caucasian Army. Participated in a number of combat actions. Twice wounded.

In 1926, I. A. Pliev graduated from the Leningrad Cavalry School, in 1933 - the Military Academy

named after M. V. Frunze, in June 1941 - the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1927, he was a course commander of the Krasnodar cavalry school, then chief of staff of a separate detachment, cavalry regiment, head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th cavalry division. In 1936-1938 he was a military adviser in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army. His work to assist in the creation of the Mongolian armed forces

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awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In the autumn of 1939 he was appointed commander of the cavalry regiment of the 6th cavalry division of the Belarussian (Western) Special Military District. He did a great deal of work to increase the level of combat readiness of units, to resupply them, to equip the alert areas with engineering equipment, and to coordinate efforts with the border guards in repelling aggression.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, I. A. Pliev - commander of the 50th (3rd guards) cavalry division, which in August-December 1941 carried out raids on the rear of the enemy in the Smolensk region and in the Moscow region. From December 1941, after the death of General L.M. Dovtor, he was commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.

From April 1942, I. A. Pliev was the commander of the 5th, then the 3rd and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. In November 1944, commander of the 1st Cavalry Mechanized Group on the Western, Southern, Southwestern, Steppe, 3rd Ukrainian, 1st Belorussian, 2nd Ukrainian fronts. Member of the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, Melitopol, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Belorussian, Budapest, Prague operations. On April 16, 1945 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant general. In the Soviet-Japanese war, the commander of the Soviet-Mongolian cavalry-mechanized group, advancing in the first echelon of the Trans-Baikal Front in the Dolonnor direction. For the skillful leadership of the troops in this operation, Issa Aleksandrovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time, and later - Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. Colonel General.

Since 1946, having graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, he commanded the army, the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. From February 1962 he was General of the Army. At the same time he was sent to Cuba as the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces. On

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importance for this responsible post was caused by the

change in the situation in the region. Preparing another aggression against Cuba, the political leadership of the United States recognized the Cuban government in exile, mobilized more than one hundred and fifty reservists, sent more than 180 ships to its shores, and established constant combat watch in the air. At the request of the leadership of Cuba, the Soviet government sharply increased the grouping of its troops. Hidden from the United States, 24 launchers and 42 R-12 missiles, a regiment of MIG-21 fighters, six Il-28 carrier aircraft were delivered to the island, the number of ground groupings increased to forty thousand.

Under the leadership of I. A. Pliev, a set of measures was carried out to bring the troops to a high degree of combat readiness. Only thanks to an agreement between the top political leadership of the USSR and the USA, the so-called Caribbean crisis was resolved peacefully. K. On November 20, the US government lifted the sea and air blockade of Cuba, undertaking not to attack its neighbor.

Since 1968, Issa Alexandrovich has been an inspector-advisor of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, holder of fourteen orders, including two orders of Suvorov, 1st degree, Kutuzov, 1st degree. He is the author of a number of memoirs, as well as articles in military magazines on issues of military development and military art.

Died February 6, 1979. He was buried in the city of Ordzhonikidze (Dzardzhikau).

Gromadin Mikhail Stepanovich

During the Battle of Moscow, Lieutenant General M. S. Gromadin commanded the Moscow air defense zone. He was born on November 8, 1899 in the village of Kraishveo, Yelansky district, Volgograd region.

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In 1918 he was drafted into the Red Army. Member of the Civil War. In 1920 he graduated from the Saratov infantry command courses, after which he was appointed company commander on the Western Front. He participated in the liquidation of the Tambov peasant uprising in 1921 and in the fight against the Basmachi in Central Asia.

In 1927 he graduated from the Kyiv United Infantry School, in 1933 - the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. He served in the positions of commander of a machine gun company, chief of staff of a machine gun regiment, from April 1935 - assistant chief, then head of the air defense department of the Moscow Military District. Since 1940 - commander of the air defense corps, assistant to

commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District for Air Defense, commander of the Moscow Air Defense Zone.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, M. S. Gromadin led the repulsion of enemy air strikes on Moscow. From November 1941 - Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country. At his request, units of fighter aviation were transferred to the Air Defense Forces, which completed the formation of the country's Air Defense Forces.

From June 1943 - Commander of the Western Air Defense Front, from April 1944 - Commander of the Northern Air Defense Front, from January 1945 - Commander of the Central Air Defense Front.

After the war, M. S. Gromadin was the commander of the troops of the central air defense district, from April 1946 - the air defense forces of the country. Since May 1950 - Inspector General of the Air Defense Inspectorate of the Soviet Army. Retired since 1954.

Colonel General (1943). He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st Class, two Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, and the Order of the Red Star.

He died on June 3, 1962 in Moscow.

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Katukov Mikhail Efimovich

During the battle for Moscow, Colonel M. E. Katukov commanded a tank brigade, which at that time was the highest formation of the tank troops of the Red Army MII.

M. E. Katukov was born on September 4 (17), 1900 in the village of Bolishoe Uvarovo, Moscow province, into a peasant family. Member of the October armed uprising in Petrograd. Since 1918 in the Red Army, private, then junior commander. Fought on the Southern Front.

In 1922, M. E. Katukov graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses, in 1927 - the courses "Shot", in 1935 - advanced courses at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

In the interwar years, he served as commander of a rifle platoon, commander of a rifle company, head of a regimental school, commander of a training battalion, chief of staff of a tank brigade, commander of a tank brigade.

During the defense of Moscow - commander of the 4th tank

brigade, which fought in the Volokolamsk direction as part of the 16th Army of the Western Front. On November 11, 1941, M. E. Katukov's brigade was the first in the tank troops to receive the title of Guards and was renamed the 1st Guards Tank Brigade.

In May 1942, M. E. Katukov was appointed commander of the 1st Tank Corps, then commander of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, from December 1941 Major General of the Tank Forces, from May 1942 Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces. In January 1943 he was appointed commander of the 1st Tank (1st Guards Tank) Army. From April 1944 Colonel-General of Tank Forces. Member of the Battle of Kursk, operations to liberate Ukraine, Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin offensive operations. September 23, 1944 and April 6, 1945

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awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. According to Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, "one of the best tank commanders of the Soviet Army, who perfectly understands the place and role of tank formations in solving the problems of achieving the goals of both front-line and strategic offensive operations ... Initiative, decisive in actions, demanding but also a caring commander."

In the postwar years, Mikhail Efimovich graduated from the Higher Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (in 1951). Commander of armored and mechanized troops [Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany. Since 1955, inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. Under his leadership, the reorganization of the tank troops was carried out, the foundations for their combat use in the conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction were developed. He led a number of inspection trips to the troops in order to verify the implementation of the requirements for the training of tankers in the new conditions of warfare. In 1959 he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces. Since 1963, military inspector-adviser in the Group of Inspectors General of the Ministry of Defense.

Cavalier of fourteen orders of the USSR, including two orders of Suvorov 1st degree and Kutuzov 1st degree. Author of memoirs, more than a dozen articles in military journals on the use of tank troops, improving their organization. He died on June 8, 1976 in Moscow, where he was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

Kachalov Vladimir Yakovlevich

At the beginning of the battle for Moscow, the troops under the command of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov played a fairly prominent role. He was born on July 27, 1890 in the Vologda Oblast.

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In 1911 he was drafted into the imperial army. In 1914 he graduated from the school of ensigns. Member of the First World War, company commander, captain.

In the Red Army since 1918. During the Civil War he fought on the Southern, Eastern and Southwestern fronts. He held the following positions: commander of a group of troops, chief of staff of a brigade, a separate cavalry brigade, a consolidated cavalry and 1st cavalry corps, chief of the 2nd cavalry division and field headquarters of the 2nd Cavalry Army.

After the war, he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army (1923), Strelkovo-tactical advanced training courses for the command staff of the Red Army "Shot" named after Comintern (1928), a special faculty of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1935). He served in the positions of commander of the 1st separate cavalry brigade, which participated in the defeat of the Bas machismo, then commander of the 11th cavalry division. From October 1924, cavalry inspector of the Western Military District, from November 1925, commander of the 10th Cavalry Division, from January 1931, commander and commissar of the 6th Oryol Rifle Division, from May 1936, 22nd Rifle Division.

From June 1937 he was commander of the 9th Rifle Corps, from January 1938 he was deputy commander, from April he was commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Military District, and from June 1940 he was commander of the troops of the Arkhangelsk Military District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, V. Ya. Kachalov was the commander of the 28th Army of the Western Front, which participated in the Battle of Smolensk (July-September 1941). In early August 1941, the army troops fought in the encirclement. During a breakthrough from the encirclement, V. Ya. Kachalov died on August 4, 1941.

By order of the Supreme High Command No. 270 of August 16, 1941, he was accused of treason and surrender to the Nazi command. Determination of the Supreme Court of the USSR

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dated December 23, 1953, it was established that V. Ya. Kachalov died heroically near the village of Starinka, Smolensk Region, from enemy artillery fire. On this basis, the order

VGK No. 270 was cancelled.

Awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Patriotic War
[degree (posthumously)].

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